Learning volition: A longitudinal study of developing intentional awareness in Tourette syndrome

Libet's legacy: A primer to the neuroscience of volition

The neuroscience of volition is an emerging subfield of the brain sciences, with hundreds of papers on the role of consciousness in action formation published each year. This makes the state-of-the-art in the discipline poorly accessible to newcomers and difficult to follow even for experts in the field. Here we provide a comprehensive summary of research in this field since its inception that will be useful to both groups. We also discuss important ideas that have received little coverage in the literature so far. We systematically reviewed a set of 2220 publications, with detailed consideration of almost 500 of the most relevant papers. We provide a thorough introduction to the seminal work of Benjamin Libet from the 1960s to 1980s. We also discuss common criticisms of Libet's method, including temporal introspection, the interpretation of the assumed physiological correlates of volition, and various conceptual issues. We conclude with recent advances and potential future directions in the field, highlighting modern methodological approaches to volition, as well as important recent findings.

Letting Tourette's be: The importance of understanding lived experience in research and the clinic

The most common clinical research question regarding Tourette syndrome focuses on tic reduction, which follows from classical 'lack of inhibition' models. Rooted in views about brain deficits, this model suggests that with higher severity and frequency, tics are necessarily disruptive and should therefore be inhibited. However, emerging calls from people with lived experience of Tourette syndrome suggest that this is too narrow a definition. This narrative literature review analyses issues with brain deficit views and qualitative research on tic context and feelings of compulsion. The results suggest the need for a more positive and encompassing theoretical and ethical position on Tourette's. The article puts forward an enactive analytical approach of 'letting be', that is, approaching a phenomenon without forcing preconceived reference structures onto it. We suggest using the identity-first term 'Tourettic'. Prioritizing the perspective of the 'Tourettic patient', it urges attentiveness to the everyday issues diagnosed people encounter and how these are embedded in further life. This approach highlights the strong relationship between the Tourettic persons' felt impairment, their adoption of an outsider's perspective, and feeling under constant scrutiny. It suggests that this felt impairment of tics can be reduced by creating a physical and social environment in which the person is 'let be' but not 'let go of'. WHAT THIS PAPER ADDS: Its theoretical position allows a more holistic view of Tourette's, integrating tics with oft-overlooked complex compulsions. The 'letting be' position also allows us to view why the presentation of Tourette's is likely to vary with gender and age of onset. 'Letting be' is a promising approach to improve a clinical understanding of Tourettic well-being over and above tic severity and frequency. It integrates quantitative research on Tourette syndrome in the neurosciences with qualitative neurodiversity literature in the medical humanities. It integrates ethical frameworks as developed in enactive philosophy with the conceptualization and treatment of tics and compulsions.

What is the intention to move and when does it occur?

In 1983 Benjamin Libet and colleagues published a paper apparently challenging the view that the conscious intention to move precedes the brain's preparation for movement. The experiment initiated debates about the nature of intention, the neurophysiology of movement, and philosophical and legal understanding of free will and moral responsibility. Here we review the concept of "conscious intention" and attempts to measure its timing. Scalp electroencephalographic activity prior to movement, the Bereitschaftspotential, clearly begins prior to the reported onset of conscious intent. However, the interpretation of this finding remains controversial. Numerous studies show that the Libet method for determining intent, W time, is not accurate and may be misleading. We conclude that intention has many different aspects, and although we now understand much more about how the brain makes movements, identifying the time of conscious intention is still elusive.

Physiological and introspective antecedents of tics and movements in adults with tic disorders

OBJECTIVE

To investigate the subjective phenomenon and the neural underpinnings of tics compared with voluntary movements in patients with tic disorders.

METHODS

We recorded electroencephalographic and electromyographic data while subjects completed a Libet clock paradigm. Patients and healthy volunteers reported the times of W (willing to move) and M (movement occurrence) while performing voluntary movements. This was repeated only for the patients for the tics.

RESULTS

In the patients, W and M times preceding voluntary movements and tics did not significantly differ from voluntary movements of healthy volunteers. The Bereitschaftspotentials in the patients were similar to healthy volunteers. Tics were only assessable for 7 patients due to artifacts. Two subjects did not show Bereitschaftspotentials, and they reported the lowest levels of tic voluntariness. 5 subjects did not show beta band event-related desynchronization before tics.

CONCLUSIONS

For patients, the sense of volition for tics is similar to that of their voluntary movements which is similar to normal. Patients showed dissociations between the Bereitschaftspotential and beta desynchronization for tics, with 5/7 showing normal Bereitschaftspotentials and 2/7 showing desynchronization. The absence of desynchronization may suggest attempts to suppress tics.

SIGNIFICANCE

This physiology shows a difference for most tics compared with normal movements.

Motor awareness: a model based on neurological syndromes

Motor awareness is a complex, multifaceted construct involving the awareness of both (i) one's motor state while executing a movement or remaining still and (ii) one's motor abilities. The analysis of neurological syndromes associated with motor disorders suggests the existence of various different components which are, however, integrated into a model of motor awareness. These components are: (i) motor intention, namely, a conscious desire to perform an action; (ii) motor monitoring and error recognition, that is, the capacity to check the execution of the action and identify motor errors; and (iii) a general awareness of one's own motor abilities and deficits, that is, the capacity to recognize the general state of one's motor abilities about the performance of specific actions and the potential consequences of motor impairment. Neuroanatomical correlates involving the parietal and insular cortices, the medial and lateral frontal regions, and subcortical structures (basal ganglia and limbic system) support this multi-component model. Specific damage (or disconnections) to these structures results in a number of different disorders in motor awareness, such as anosognosia for hemiplegia and apraxia, and a number of symptoms which are specific to motor intention disorders (e.g., the Anarchic Hand Syndrome and Tourette's Syndrome) or motor monitoring (e.g., Parkinson's and Huntington's diseases). All of these clinical conditions are discussed in the light of a motor awareness model.

Tourette syndrome research highlights from 2020

We present here research from 2020 relevant to Tourette syndrome (TS). The authors briefly summarize a few reports they consider most important or interesting.

Distinct Brain-Oscillatory Neuroanatomical Architecture of Perception-Action Integration in Adolescents With Tourette Syndrome

Background

Gilles de la Tourette Syndrome (GTS) is a neurodevelopmental disorder with a peak of symptom severity around late childhood and early adolescence. Previous findings in adult GTS suggest that changes in perception-action integration, as conceptualized in the theory of event coding framework, are central for the understanding of GTS. However, the neural mechanisms underlying these processes in adolescence are elusive.

Methods

A total of 59 children/adolescents aged 9 to 18 years (n = 32 with GTS, n = 27 typically developing youths) were examined using a perception-action integration task (event file task) derived from the theory of event coding. Event-related electroencephalogram recordings (theta and beta band activity) were analyzed using electroencephalogram–beamforming methods.

Results

Behavioral data showed robust event file binding effects in both groups without group differences. Neurophysiological data showed that theta and beta band activity were involved in event file integration in both groups. However, the functional neuroanatomical organization was markedly different for theta band activity between the groups. The typically developing group mainly relied on superior frontal regions, whereas the GTS group engaged parietal and inferior frontal regions. A more consistent functional neuroanatomical activation pattern was observed for the beta band, engaging inferior parietal and temporal regions in both groups.

Conclusions

Perception-action integration processes lag behind in persisting GTS but not in the GTS population as a whole, underscoring differences in developmental trajectories and the importance of longitudinal investigations for the understanding of GTS. The findings corroborate known differences in the functional/structural brain organization in GTS and suggest an important role of theta band activity in these patients.

What Is the Readiness Potential?

The readiness potential (RP), a slow buildup of electrical potential recorded at the scalp using electroencephalography, has been associated with neural activity involved in movement preparation. It became famous thanks to Benjamin Libet (Brain 1983;106:623-642), who used the time difference between the RP and self-reported time of conscious intention to move to argue that we lack free will. The RP's informativeness about self-generated action and derivatively about free will has prompted continued research on this neural phenomenon. Here, we argue that recent advances in our understanding of the RP, including computational modeling of the phenomenon, call for a reassessment of its relevance for understanding volition and the philosophical problem of free will.

The Phenomenon of Exquisite Motor Control in Tic Disorders and its Pathophysiological Implications

The unifying characteristic of movement disorders is the phenotypic presentation of abnormal motor outputs, either as isolated phenomena or in association with further clinical, often neuropsychiatric, features. However, the possibility of a movement disorder also characterized by supranormal or enhanced volitional motor control has not received attention. Based on clinical observations and cases collected over a number of years, we here describe the intriguing clinical phenomenon that people with tic disorders are often able to control specific muscle contractions as part of their tic behaviors to a degree that most humans typically cannot. Examples are given in accompanying video documentation. We explore medical literature on this topic and draw analogies with early research of fine motor control physiology in healthy humans. By systematically analyzing the probable sources of this unusual capacity, and focusing on neuroscientific accounts of voluntary motor control, sensory feedback, and the role of motor learning in tic disorders, we provide a novel pathophysiological account explaining both the presence of exquisite control over motor output and that of overall tic behaviors. We finally comment on key questions for future research on the topic and provide concluding remarks on the complex movement disorder of tic behaviors. © 2021 The Authors. Movement Disorders published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of International Parkinson and Movement Disorder Society.