Visuomotor timing compensates for changes in perceptual latency

The implicit sense of agency is not a perceptual effect but is a judgment effect

The sense of agency (SoA) is characterized as the sense of being the causal agent of one's own actions, and it is measured in two forms: explicit and implicit. In the explicit SoA experiments, the participants explicitly report whether they have a sense of control over their actions or whether they or somebody else is the causal agent of seen actions; the implicit SoA experiments study how do participants' agentive or voluntary actions modify perceptual processes (like time, vision, tactility, and audition) without directly asking the participants to explicitly think about their causal agency or sense of control. However, recent implicit SoA literature reported contradictory findings of the relationship between implicit SoA reports and agency states. Thus, I argue that the purported implicit SoA reports are not agency-driven perceptual effects per se but are judgment effects, by showing that (a) the typical operationalizations in implicit SoA domain lead to perceptual uncertainty on the part of the participants, (b) under uncertainty, participants' implicit SoA reports are due to heuristic judgments which are independent of agency states, and (c) under perceptual certainty, the typical implicit SoA reports might not have occurred at all. Thus, I conclude that the instances of implicit SoA are judgments (or response biases)-under uncertainty-rather than perceptual effects.

Voluntary and involuntary contributions to perceptually guided saccadic choices resolved with millisecond precision

In the antisaccade task, which is considered a sensitive assay of cognitive function, a salient visual cue appears and the participant must look away from it. This requires sensory, motor-planning, and cognitive neural mechanisms, but what are their unique contributions to performance, and when exactly are they engaged? Here, by manipulating task urgency, we generate a psychophysical curve that tracks the evolution of the saccadic choice process with millisecond precision, and resolve the distinct contributions of reflexive (exogenous) and voluntary (endogenous) perceptual mechanisms to antisaccade performance over time. Both progress extremely rapidly, the former driving the eyes toward the cue early on (∼100 ms after cue onset) and the latter directing them away from the cue ∼40 ms later. The behavioral and modeling results provide a detailed, dynamical characterization of attentional and oculomotor capture that is not only qualitatively consistent across participants, but also indicative of their individual perceptual capacities.

Rhythmic modulation of visual contrast discrimination triggered by action

Recent evidence suggests that ongoing brain oscillations may be instrumental in binding and integrating multisensory signals. In this experiment, we investigated the temporal dynamics of visual-motor integration processes. We show that action modulates sensitivity to visual contrast discrimination in a rhythmic fashion at frequencies of about 5 Hz (in the theta range), for up to 1 s after execution of action. To understand the origin of the oscillations, we measured oscillations in contrast sensitivity at different levels of luminance, which is known to affect the endogenous brain rhythms, boosting the power of alpha-frequencies. We found that the frequency of oscillation in sensitivity increased at low luminance, probably reflecting the shift in mean endogenous brain rhythm towards higher frequencies. Importantly, both at high and at low luminance, contrast discrimination showed a rhythmic motor-induced suppression effect, with the suppression occurring earlier at low luminance. We suggest that oscillations play a key role in sensory-motor integration, and that the motor-induced suppression may reflect the first manifestation of a rhythmic oscillation.

Differences in perceptual latency estimated from judgments of temporal order, simultaneity and duration are inconsistent

Differences in perceptual latency (ΔL) for two stimuli, such as an auditory and a visual stimulus, can be estimated from temporal order judgments (TOJ) and simultaneity judgments (SJ), but previous research has found evidence that ΔL estimated from these tasks do not coincide. Here, using an auditory and a visual stimulus we confirmed this and further show that ΔL as estimated from duration judgments also does not coincide with ΔL estimated from TOJ or SJ. These inconsistencies suggest that each judgment is subject to different processes that bias ΔL in different ways: TOJ might be affected by sensory interactions, a bias associated with the method of single stimuli and an order difficulty bias; SJ by sensory interactions and an asymmetrical criterion bias; duration judgments by an order duration bias.

Dichotomy in perceptual learning of interval timing: calibration of mean accuracy and precision differ in specificity and time course

Our brain is inexorably confronted with a dynamic environment in which it has to fine-tune spatiotemporal representations of incoming sensory stimuli and commit to a decision accordingly. Among those representations needing constant calibration is interval timing, which plays a pivotal role in various cognitive and motor tasks. To investigate how perceived time interval is adjusted by experience, we conducted a human psychophysical experiment using an implicit interval-timing task in which observers responded to an invisible bar drifting at a constant speed. We tracked daily changes in distributions of response times for a range of physical time intervals over multiple days of training with two major types of timing performance, mean accuracy and precision. We found a decoupled dynamics of mean accuracy and precision in terms of their time course and specificity of perceptual learning. Mean accuracy showed feedback-driven instantaneous calibration evidenced by a partial transfer around the time interval trained with feedback, while timing precision exhibited a long-term slow improvement with no evident specificity. We found that a Bayesian observer model, in which a subjective time interval is determined jointly by a prior and likelihood function for timing, captures the dissociative temporal dynamics of the two types of timing measures simultaneously. Finally, the model suggested that the width of the prior, not the likelihoods, gradually shrinks over sessions, substantiating the important role of prior knowledge in perceptual learning of interval timing.

The influence of visual motion on interceptive actions and perception

Visual information is an essential guide when interacting with moving objects, yet it can also be deceiving. For instance, motion can induce illusory position shifts, such that a moving ball can seem to have bounced past its true point of contact with the ground. Some evidence suggests illusory motion-induced position shifts bias pointing tasks to a greater extent than they do perceptual judgments. This, however, appears at odds with other findings and with our success when intercepting moving objects. Here we examined the accuracy of interceptive movements and of perceptual judgments in relation to simulated bounces. Participants were asked to intercept a moving disc at its bounce location by positioning a virtual paddle, and then to report where the disc had landed. Results showed that interceptive actions were accurate whereas perceptual judgments were inaccurate, biased in the direction of motion. Successful interceptions necessitated accurate information concerning both the location and timing of the bounce, so motor planning evidently had privileged access to an accurate forward model of bounce timing and location. This would explain why people can be accurate when intercepting a moving object, but lack insight into the accurate information that had guided their actions when asked to make a perceptual judgment.

Effect of speed overestimation on flash-lag effect at low luminance

When a brief flash is presented at the same location as a moving object, the flash is perceived to lag behind the moving object to an extent that increases with the speed of the object. Previous studies showed that moving objects appear faster at low luminance as a result of their longer motion trace. Here we examine whether this faster perceived motion also affects the amount of the flash lag at low luminance. We first verified that speed was overestimated at low luminance with our stimulus. We then asked subjects to align a briefly flashed dot with the moving target. Results showed that the flash-lag effect increased with physical speed at both high and low luminance, but there was no additional increase due to the perceived increase of speed at low luminance. We suggest that although motion blur contributes to perceived speed, it does not contribute to the speed information that influences its perceived position.

How well can people judge when something happened?

One way to estimate the temporal precision of vision is with judgments of synchrony or temporal order of visual events. We show that irrelevant motion disrupts the high temporal precision that can be found in such tasks when the two events occur close together, suggesting that the high precision is based on detecting illusory motion rather than on detecting time differences. We also show that temporal precision is not necessarily better when one can accurately anticipate the moments of the events. Finally, we illustrate that a limited resolution of determining the duration of an event imposes a fundamental problem in determining when the event happened. Our experimental estimates of how well people can explicitly judge when something happened are far too poor to account for human performance in various tasks that require temporal precision, such as interception, judging motion or aligning moving targets spatially.