Infants' neural responses to helping and hindering scenarios

Neural signatures to prosocial and antisocial interactions in young infants

Preverbal infants appear to be more attracted by prosocial characters and events, as typically assessed using preferential looking times and manual choice. However, infants' neural correlates of observed prosocial and antisocial interactions are still scarce. Here, we familiarized 5-month-old (N = 24) infants with a prosocial and antisocial scene (i.e., a character either helping or hindering) and infants' Event-Related Potentials (ERP) were recorded in response to the presentation of short video clips of the prosocial and antisocial interaction. On a neural level, results revealed that infants could discriminate between helping and hindering events at an early stage of processing, as shown by a larger N290 response to the former compared to the latter. Further, while the Nc - typically indexing attentional processes - was larger for antisocial over prosocial events, the LPP, indexing cognitive evaluation of the stimuli, was larger for prosocial over antisocial actions. Finally, infants' higher scores on the effortful control temperamental subscale were related to infants' increased N290 neural sensitivity to antisocial scenes. Together, these findings provide new evidence of the time course of infants' ERP responses during the observation of helping and hindering interactions, which involves both attentional and socially relevant processes.

Generalizing across moral sub-domains: infants bidirectionally link fairness and unfairness to helping and hindering

Across two experiments, we investigated whether infants use prior behavior to form expectations about future behavior within the moral domain, focusing on the sub-domains of fairness and help/harm. In Experiment 1, 14- to 27-month-old infants were familiarized to an agent who either helped or hindered another agent to obtain her goal. At test, infants saw the helper or hinderer perform either a fair or unfair distribution of resources to two recipients. Infants familiarized to helping looked longer to the unfair distribution than the fair distribution at test, whereas infants familiarized to hindering looked equally at both test events, suggesting that hindering led infants to suspend baseline expectations of fairness. In Experiment 2, infants saw these events in reverse. Following familiarization to fair behavior, infants looked equally to helping and hindering; in contrast, following familiarization to unfair behavior, infants looked significantly longer to helping than hindering on test, suggesting that prior unfair behavior led infants to expect the agent to hinder another agent's goals. These results suggest that infants utilize prior information from one moral sub-domain to form expectations of how an individual will behave in another sub-domain, and that this tendency seems to manifest more strongly when infants initially see hindering and unfair distributions than when they see helping and fair distributions. Together, these findings provide evidence for consilience within the moral domain, starting by at least the second year of life.

Socially evaluative contexts facilitate mentalizing

Our ability to understand others' minds stands at the foundation of human learning, communication, cooperation, and social life more broadly. Although humans' ability to mentalize has been well-studied throughout the cognitive sciences, little attention has been paid to whether and how mentalizing differs across contexts. Classic developmental studies have examined mentalizing within minimally social contexts, in which a single agent seeks a neutral inanimate object. Such object-directed acts may be common, but they are typically consequential only to the object-seeking agent themselves. Here, we review a host of indirect evidence suggesting that contexts providing the opportunity to evaluate prospective social partners may facilitate mentalizing across development. Our article calls on cognitive scientists to study mentalizing in contexts where it counts.