Sensorimotor intentionality: The origins of intentionality in prospective agent action

How bipedalism shapes humans' actions with hand tools

The task for an embodied cognitive understanding of humans' actions with tools is to elucidate how the human body, as a whole, supports the perception of affordances and dexterous action with objects in relation to other objects. Here, we focus on the relationship between humans' actions with handheld tools and bipedal posture. Posture plays a pivotal role in shaping animals' perception and action dynamics. While humans stand and locomote bipedally, other primates predominantly employ quadrupedal postures and locomotion, relying on both hands and feet to support the body. Drawing upon evidence from evolutionary biology, developmental psychology and performance studies, we elucidate the influence of bipedalism on our actions with objects and on our proficiency in using tools. We use the metaphor of cascades to capture the dynamic, nonlinear transformations in morphology and behaviour associated with posture and the use of tools across evolutionary and developmental timescales. Recent work illustrates the promise of multifractal cascade analysis to reveal nonlinear, cross-scale interactions across the entire body in real-time, supporting the perception of affordances for actions with tools. Cascade analysis enriches our comprehension of real-time performance and facilitates exploration of the relationships among whole-body coordination, individual development, and evolutionary processes.This article is part of the theme issue 'Minds in movement: embodied cognition in the age of artificial intelligence'.

Mental causation: an evolutionary perspective

The relationship between consciousness and individual agency is examined from a bottom-up evolutionary perspective, an approach somewhat different from other ways of dealing with the issue, but one relevant to the question of animal consciousness. Two ways are identified that would decouple the two, allowing consciousness of a limited kind to exist without agency: (1) reflex pathways that incorporate conscious sensations as an intrinsic component (InCs), and (2) reflexes that are consciously conditioned and dependent on synaptic plasticity but not memory (CCRs). Whether InCs and CCRs exist as more than hypothetical constructs is not clear, and InCs are in any case limited to theories where consciousness depends directly on EM field-based effects. Consciousness with agency, as we experience it, then belongs in a third category that allows for deliberate choice of alternative actions (DCs), where the key difference between this and CCR-level pathways is that DCs require access to explicit memory systems whereas CCRs do not. CCRs are nevertheless useful from a heuristic standpoint as a conceptual model for how conscious inputs could act to refine routine behaviors while allowing evolution to optimize phenomenal experience (i.e., qualia) in the absence of individual agency, a somewhat counterintuitive result. However, so long as CCRs are not a required precondition for the evolution of memory-dependent DC-level processes, the later could have evolved first. If so, the adaptive benefit of consciousness when it first evolved may be linked as much to the role it plays in encoding memories as to any other function. The possibility that CCRs are more than a theoretical construct, and have played a role in the evolution of consciousness, argues against theories of consciousness focussed exclusively on higher-order functions as the appropriate way to deal with consciousness as it first evolved, as it develops in the early postnatal period of life, or with the conscious experiences of animals other than ourselves. An evolutionary perspective also resolves the problem of free will, that it is best treated as a property of a species rather than the individuals belonging to that species whereas, in contrast, agency is an attribute of individuals.

Multisensory decisions from self to world

Classic Bayesian models of perceptual inference describe how an ideal observer would integrate 'unisensory' measurements (multisensory integration) and attribute sensory signals to their origin(s) (causal inference). However, in the brain, sensory signals are always received in the context of a multisensory bodily state-namely, in combination with other senses. Moreover, sensory signals from both interoceptive sensing of one's own body and exteroceptive sensing of the world are highly interdependent and never occur in isolation. Thus, the observer must fundamentally determine whether each sensory observation is from an external (versus internal, self-generated) source to even be considered for integration. Critically, solving this primary causal inference problem requires knowledge of multisensory and sensorimotor dependencies. Thus, multisensory processing is needed to separate sensory signals. These multisensory processes enable us to simultaneously form a sense of self and form distinct perceptual decisions about the external world. In this opinion paper, we review and discuss the similarities and distinctions between multisensory decisions underlying the sense of self and those directed at acquiring information about the world. We call attention to the fact that heterogeneous multisensory processes take place all along the neural hierarchy (even in forming 'unisensory' observations) and argue that more integration of these aspects, in theory and experiment, is required to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of multisensory brain function. This article is part of the theme issue 'Decision and control processes in multisensory perception'.

Consciousness and its hard problems: separating the ontological from the evolutionary

Few of the many theories devised to account for consciousness are explicit about the role they ascribe to evolution, and a significant fraction, by their silence on the subject, treat evolutionary processes as being, in effect, irrelevant. This is a problem for biological realists trying to assess the applicability of competing theories of consciousness to taxa other than our own, and across evolutionary time. Here, as an aid to investigating such questions, a consciousness "machine" is employed as conceptual device for thinking about the different ways ontology and evolution contribute to the emergence of a consciousness composed of distinguishable contents. A key issue is the nature of the evolutionary innovations required for any kind of consciousness to exist, specifically whether this is due to the underappreciated properties of electromagnetic (EM) field effects, as in neurophysical theories, or, for theories where there is no such requirement, including computational and some higher-order theories (here, as a class, algorithmic theories), neural connectivity and the pattern of information flow that connectivity encodes are considered a sufficient explanation for consciousness. In addition, for consciousness to evolve in a non-random way, there must be a link between emerging consciousness and behavior. For the neurophysical case, an EM field-based scenario shows that distinct contents can be produced in the absence of an ability to consciously control action, i.e., without agency. This begs the question of how agency is acquired, which from this analysis would appear to be less of an evolutionary question than a developmental one. Recasting the problem in developmental terms highlights the importance of real-time feedback mechanisms for transferring agency from evolution to the individual, the implication being, for a significant subset of theories, that agency requires a learning process repeated once in each generation. For that subset of theories the question of how an evolved consciousness can exist will then have two components, of accounting for conscious experience as a phenomenon on the one hand, and agency on the other. This reduces one large problem to two, simplifying the task of investigation and providing what may prove an easier route toward their solution.

Learning limb-specific contingencies in early infancy

Most research with the mobile paradigm has the underlying assumption that young infants can selectively move the limb causing the contingent feedback from the mobile while avoiding irrelevant motor responses. Contrary to this long-held belief, others have argued that such differentiation ability is not fully developed early in life. In the current study, we revisited the traditional mobile paradigm with a contemporary research approach (using high-precision motion capture techniques, a yoked-control design, and a large sample size) to investigate whether response differentiation ability emerges before 5 months of age. The data collected from 76 infants (aged between 115 and 159 days) revealed that infants can learn sensorimotor contingencies by increasing the movement of the connected leg relative to their baseline level. However, they did not differentially increase the movement of the leg causing an effect in the environment compared with that of other limbs. Our results illustrate that response differentiation ability emerges later than previously suggested.

Narrative as co-regulation: A review of embodied narrative in infant development

We review evidence of non-verbal, embodied narratives in human infancy to better understand their form and function as generators of common experience, regulation, and learning. We examine their development prior to the onset of language, with a view to improve understanding of narrative as regular motifs or schemas of early experience in both solitary and social engagement. Embodied narratives are composed of regular patterns of interest, arousal, affect, and intention that yield a characteristic four-part structure of (i) introduction, (ii) development, (iii) climax, and (iv) resolution. Made with others these form co-created shared acts of meaning, and are parsed in time with discreet beginnings and endings that allow a regular pattern to frame and give predictive understanding for prospective regulation (especially important within social contexts) that safely returns to baseline again. This characteristic pattern, co-created between infant and adult from the beginning of life, allows the infant to contribute to, and learn, the patterns of its culture. We conclude with a view on commonalities and differences of co-created narrative in non-human primates, and discuss implications of disruption to narrative co-creation for developmental psychopathology.

Rhythmic Relating: Bidirectional Support for Social Timing in Autism Therapies

We propose Rhythmic Relating for autism: a system of supports for friends, therapists, parents, and educators; a system which aims to augment bidirectional communication and complement existing therapeutic approaches. We begin by summarizing the developmental significance of social timing and the social-motor-synchrony challenges observed in early autism. Meta-analyses conclude the early primacy of such challenges, yet cite the lack of focused therapies. We identify core relational parameters in support of social-motor-synchrony and systematize these using the communicative musicality constructs: pulse; quality; and narrative. Rhythmic Relating aims to augment the clarity, contiguity, and pulse-beat of spontaneous behavior by recruiting rhythmic supports (cues, accents, turbulence) and relatable vitality; facilitating the predictive flow and just-ahead-in-time planning needed for good-enough social timing. From here, we describe possibilities for playful therapeutic interaction, small-step co-regulation, and layered sensorimotor integration. Lastly, we include several clinical case examples demonstrating the use of Rhythmic Relating within four different therapeutic approaches (Dance Movement Therapy, Improvisational Music Therapy, Play Therapy, and Musical Interaction Therapy). These clinical case examples are introduced here and several more are included in the Supplementary Material (Examples of Rhythmic Relating in Practice). A suite of pilot intervention studies is proposed to assess the efficacy of combining Rhythmic Relating with different therapeutic approaches in playful work with individuals with autism. Further experimental hypotheses are outlined, designed to clarify the significance of certain key features of the Rhythmic Relating approach.

Developmental differences in the prospective organisation of goal-directed movement between children with autism and typically developing children: A smart tablet serious game study

Movement is prospective. It structures self-generated engagement with objects and social partners and is fundamental to children's learning and development. In autistic children, previous reports of differences in movement kinematics compared to neurotypical peers suggest that its prospective organisation might be disrupted. Here, we employed a smart tablet serious game paradigm to assess differences in the feedforward and feedback mechanisms of prospective action organisation, between autistic and neurotypical preschool children. We analysed 3926 goal-directed finger movements made during smart-tablet ecological gameplay, from 28 children with Childhood Autism (ICD-10; ASD) and 43 neurotypical children (TD), aged 3-6 years old. Using linear and generalised linear mixed-effect models, we found the ASD group executed movements with longer movement time (MT) and time to peak velocity (TTPV), lower peak velocity (PV), with PV less likely to occur in the first movement unit (MU) and with a greater number of movement units after peak velocity (MU-APV). Interestingly, compared to the TD group, the ASD group showed smaller increases in PV, TTPV and MT with an increase in age (ASD × age interaction), together with a smaller reduction in MU-APV and an increase in MU-APV at shorter target distances (ASD × Dist interaction). Our results are the first to highlight different developmental trends in anticipatory feedforward and compensatory feedback mechanisms of control, contributing to differences in movement kinematics observed between autistic and neurotypical children. These findings point to differences in integration of prospective perceptuomotor information, with implications for embodied cognition and learning from self-generated action in autism.

Consciousness generates agent action

Consciousness directs the actions of the agent for its own purposive gains. It re-organises a stimulus-response linear causality to deliver generative, creative agent action that evaluates the subsequent experience prospectively. This inversion of causality affords special properties of control that are not accounted for in integrated information theory (IIT), which is predicated on a linear, deterministic cause-effect model. IIT remains an incomplete, abstract, and disembodied theory without explanation of the psychobiology of consciousness that serves the vital agency the organism.

A Pre-registered sticky mittens study: active training does not increase reaching and grasping in a swedish context

Several studies have previously investigated the effects of sticky mittens training on reaching and grasping development. However, recent critique casted doubts on the robustness of the motor effect of this training. The current study presents a pre-registered report that aimed to generalize these effects to Swedish infants. Three-month-old infants N = 96, 51 females, mostly White middle class in Uppsala, received daily, parent-led sticky mittens or observational training for 2 weeks or no training in 2019. Reaching and grasping abilities were assessed before and after training, using motion tracking and a 4-step reaching task. Sticky mittens training did not facilitate successful reaching. These results indicate that beneficial motor effects of sticky mittens training did not generalize to this sample.

Back to square one: the bodily roots of conscious experiences in early life

Most theoretical and empirical discussions about the nature of consciousness are typically couched in a way that endorses a tacit adult-centric and vision-based perspective. This paper defends the idea that consciousness science may be put on a fruitful track for its next phase by examining the nature of subjective experiences through a bottom-up developmental lens. We draw attention to the intrinsic link between consciousness, experiences and experiencing subjects, which are first and foremost embodied and situated organisms essentially concerned with self-preservation within a precarious environment. Our paper suggests that in order to understand what consciousness 'is', one should first tackle the fundamental question: how do embodied experiences 'arise' from square one? We then highlight one key yet overlooked aspect of human consciousness studies, namely that the earliest and closest environment of an embodied experiencing subject is the body of another human experiencing subject. We present evidence speaking in favour of fairly sophisticated forms of early sensorimotor integration of bodily signals and self-generated actions already being established in utero. We conclude that these primitive and fundamentally relational and co-embodied roots of our early experiences may have a crucial impact on the way human beings consciously experience the self, body and the world across their lifespan.

Comparison of Japanese and Scottish Mother-Infant Intersubjectivity: Resonance of Timing, Anticipation, and Empathy During Feeding

Feeding involves communication between mothers and infants and requires precise synchrony in a special triadic relationship with the food. It is deeply related to their intersubjectivity. This study compared the development of mother-infant intersubjectivity through interactional synchrony in feeding between 11 Japanese and 10 Scottish mother-infant dyads, observed at 6 and 9 months by video. Japanese mothers were more deliberate in feeding at an earlier age, whereas Scottish mothers were significantly more coercive than Japanese mothers at an earlier age. Japanese mothers brought the spoon to infants with a pause to adjust the timing of insertion to match their infants' readiness, whereas this pause was not observed in Scottish mothers. Isomorphic mouth opening between mothers and infants was observed. This empathic maternal display is an important element of intersubjectivity in infant feeding that differed between Scottish and Japanese mothers. Scottish mothers' mouth opening always followed their infants' mouth opening, but about half of Japanese mothers preceded their infants. Further, the mouths of Scottish infants and mothers opened almost at the same time as spoon insertion. In contrast, Japanese mothers' mouth opening did not co-occur with the insertion but was close to spoon arrival, a subtle but important difference that allows for greater infant autonomy. The time structure of Scottish mother-infant interactions was simpler and more predictable at 9 months than in Japan, where the structure was more variable, likely due to a stronger regulation by Scottish mothers. In conclusion, Scottish mother-infant intersubjectivity is characterized as more maternally reactive and mother-centered, whereas Japanese mother-infant intersubjectivity is characterized as more maternally empathetic and infant-centered. Cultural differences in intersubjectivity during feeding between Japan and Scotland are further discussed in relation to triadic relationships and parenting styles.

Pre-verbal Children's Participation in a New Key. How Intersubjectivity Can Contribute to Understanding and Implementation of Child Rights in Early Childhood

Children's participation and involvement has increasingly been on the agenda for the last few decades. The right for children to participate was established in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). However, even though the UNCRC gives the right to participate to all children, national policy and practice seems to draw a line on verbal language and exclude pre-verbal infants from participation. The spur of this paper is to challenge the exclusion of infants, to describe how pre-linguistic children communicate their intentions, and to show how an understanding of children's participation grounded in intersubjectivity, can inform and reframe the participation of all children as being fundamentally about close relationships with sensitive and containing adults who look within themselves for the voice of the child. The infant's proto-conversational narrative communicates interests and feelings through sympathetic rhythms of what infant researchers have named "communicative musicality," and it can surface in the mother's narrative about the child and their relationship. Intersubjectivity oppose the monadic view of man as separate and left only to imitate others and claims that humans from the very start are intertwined in a fundamental thirdness of co-created reality. Infants are powerful communicators who actively engage in intersubjective relationships with their caretakers only days after birth, and newborns actively influence and even control the mental process of those who communicate with them. Early childhood participation then, would be to find within ourselves the voice of the child. A research project building on the theories and ideas described in the first part of the article, is presented.

Whatever Next and Close to My Self-The Transparent Senses and the "Second Skin": Implications for the Case of Depersonalization

In his paper “Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science,” Andy Clark seminally proposed that the brain's job is to predict whatever information is coming “next” on the basis of prior inputs and experiences. Perception fundamentally subserves survival and self-preservation in biological agents, such as humans. Survival however crucially depends on rapid and accurate information processing of what is happening in the here and now. Hence, the term “next” in Clark's seminal formulation must include not only the temporal dimension (i.e., what is perceived now) but also the spatial dimension (i.e., what is perceived here or next-to-my-body). In this paper, we propose to focus on perceptual experiences that happen “next,” i.e., close-to-my-body. This is because perceptual processing of proximal sensory inputs has a key impact on the organism's survival. Specifically, we focus on tactile experiences mediated by the skin and what we will call the “extended skin” or “second skin,” that is, immediate objects/materials that envelop closely to our skin, namely, clothes. We propose that the skin and tactile experiences are not a mere border separating the self and world. Rather, they simultaneously and inherently distinguish and connect the bodily self to its environment. Hence, these proximal and pervasive tactile experiences can be viewed as a “transparent bridge” intrinsically relating and facilitating exchanges between the self and the physical and social world. We conclude with potential implications of this observation for the case of Depersonalization Disorder, a condition that makes people feel estranged and detached from their self, body, and the world.

The first prior: From co-embodiment to co-homeostasis in early life

The idea that our perceptions in the here and now are influenced by prior events and experiences has recently received substantial support and attention from the proponents of the Predictive Processing (PP) and Active Inference framework in philosophy and computational neuroscience. In this paper we look at how perceptual experiences get off the ground from the outset, in utero. One basic yet overlooked aspect of current PP approaches is that human organisms first develop within another human body. Crucially, while not all humans will have the experience of being pregnant or carrying a baby, the experience of being carried and growing within another person's body is universal. Specifically, we focus on the development of minimal selfhood in utero as a process co-embodiment and co-homeostasis, and highlight their close relationship. We conclude with some implications on several critical questions fuelling current debates on the nature of conscious experiences, minimal self and social cognition.

A Dynamic Systems Framework for Gender/Sex Development: From Sensory Input in Infancy to Subjective Certainty in Toddlerhood

From birth to 15 months infants and caregivers form a fundamentally intersubjective, dyadic unit within which the infant's ability to recognize gender/sex in the world develops. Between about 18 and 36 months the infant accumulates an increasingly clear and subjective sense of self as female or male. We know little about how the precursors to gender/sex identity form during the intersubjective period, nor how they transform into an independent sense of self by 3 years of age. In this Theory and Hypothesis article I offer a general framework for thinking about this problem. I propose that through repetition and patterning, the dyadic interactions in which infants and caregivers engage imbue the infant with an embodied, i.e., sensori-motor understanding of gender/sex. During this developmental period (which I label Phase 1) gender/sex is primarily an intersubjective project. From 15 to 18 months (which I label Phase 2) there are few reports of newly appearing gender/sex behavioral differences, and I hypothesize that this absence reflects a period of developmental instability during which there is a transition from gender/sex as primarily inter-subjective to gender/sex as primarily subjective. Beginning at 18 months (i.e., the start of Phase 3), a toddler's subjective sense of self as having a gender/sex emerges, and it solidifies by 3 years of age. I propose a dynamic systems perspective to track how infants first assimilate gender/sex information during the intersubjective period (birth to 15 months); then explore what changes might occur during a hypothesized phase transition (15 to 18 months), and finally, review the emergence and initial stabilization of individual subjectivity-the period from 18 to 36 months. The critical questions explored focus on how to model and translate data from very different experimental disciplines, especially neuroscience, physiology, developmental psychology and cognitive development. I close by proposing the formation of a research consortium on gender/sex development during the first 3 years after birth.

Towards Motor-Based Early Detection of Autism Red Flags: Enabling Technology and Exploratory Study Protocol

Observing how children manipulate objects while they are playing can help detect possible autism spectrum disorders (ASD) at an early stage. For this purpose, specialists seek the so-called “red-flags” of motor signature of ASD for more precise diagnostic tests. However, a significant drawback to achieve this is that the observation of object manipulation by the child very often is not naturalistic, as it involves the physical presence of the specialist and is typically performed in hospitals. In this framework, we present a novel Internet of Things support in the form factory of a smart toy that can be used by specialists to perform indirect and non-invasive observations of the children in naturalistic conditions. While they play with the toy, children can be observed in their own environment and without the physical presence of the specialist. We also present the technical validation of the technology and the study protocol for the refinement of the diagnostic practice based on this technology.

Acting with shared intentions: A systematic review on joint action coordination in Autism Spectrum Disorder

BACKGROUND

Joint actions, described as a form of social interaction in which individuals coordinate their actions in space and time to bring about a change in the environment, rely on sensory-motor processes that play a role in the development of social skills. Two brain networks, associated with "mirroring" and "mentalizing", are engaged during these actions: the mirror neuron and the theory of mind systems. People with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) showed impairment in interpersonal coordination during joint actions. Studying joint action coordination in ASD will contribute to clarify the interplay between sensory-motor and social processes throughout development and the interactions between the brain and the behavior.

METHOD

This review focused on empirical studies that reported behavioral and kinematic findings related to joint action coordination in people with ASD.

RESULTS

Literature on mechanisms involved in the joint action coordination impairment in ASD is still limited. Data are controversial. Different key-components of joint action coordination may be impaired, such as cooperative behavior, temporal coordination, and motor planning.

CONCLUSIONS

Interpersonal coordination during joint actions relies on early sensory-motor processes that have a key role in guiding social development. Early intervention targeting the sensory-motor processes involved in the development of joint action coordination could positively support social skills.

Pregnant Agencies: Movement and Participation in Maternal-Fetal Interactions

Pregnancy presents some interesting challenges for the philosophy of embodied cognition. Mother and fetus are generally considered to be passive during pregnancy, both individually and in their relation. In this paper, we use the enactive operational concepts of autonomy, agency, individuation, and participation to examine the relation between mother and fetus in utero. Based on biological, physiological, and phenomenological research, we explore the emergence of agentive capacities in embryo and fetus, as well as how maternal agency changes as pregnancy advances. We show that qualitatively different kinds of agency have their beginnings already in utero, and to what extent fetal and maternal movement modulate affectivity and individuation in pregnancy. We thus propose that mother and fetus are both agents who participate in pregnancy. Pregnancy then emerges as a relational developmental organization that anchors and holds its developing participants. We end the paper with reflections on ethical implications of this proposal, and suggestions for future research.

Making Meaning Together: Embodied Narratives in a Case of Severe Autism

Shared understanding is generated between individuals before speech through a language of body movement and non-verbal vocalisation, expression of feeling and interest made in gestures of movement and voice. Human understanding is co-created in these embodied projects, displayed in serially organised expressions with shared timing of reciprocal actions between partners. These develop in narrative events that build over cycles of reciprocal expressive action in a four-part structure shared by all the time-based arts: "introduction," "development," "climax," and "conclusion." Pre-linguistic narrative establishes the foundation of later, linguistic intelligence. Yet, participating in social interactions that give rise to narrative development is a central problem of autism spectrum disorder. In this paper, we examine the rapid growth of narrative meaning-making between a non-verbal young woman with severe autism and her new therapist. Episodes of embodied, shared understanding were enabled through a basic therapeutic mode of reciprocal, creative mirroring of expressive gesture. These developed through reciprocal cycles and as the relationship progressed, complete co-created narratives were formed resulting in shared joy and the mutual interest and trust of companionship. These small, embodied stories enabled moments of co-regulated arousal that the young woman had previous difficulty with. These data provide evidence for an intact capacity for non-verbal narrative meaning-making in autism.

An innate brainstem self-other system involving orienting, affective responding, and polyvalent relational seeking: Some clinical implications for a "Deep Brain Reorienting" trauma psychotherapy approach

Underlying any complex relational intersubjectivity there is an inherent urge to connect, to have proximity, to engage in an experience of interpersonal contact. The hypothesis set out here is that this most basic urge to connect is dependent on circuits based in three main components: the midbrain superior colliculi (SC), the midbrain periaqueductal gray (PAG), and the mesolimbic and mesocortical dopamine systems originating in the midbrain ventral tegmental area. Firstly, there is orienting towards or away from interpersonal contact, dependent on approach and/or defensive/withdrawal areas of the SC. Secondly, there is an affective response to the contact, mediated by the PAG. Thirdly, there is an associated, affectively-loaded, seeking drive based in the mesolimbic and mesocortical dopamine systems. The neurochemical milieu of these dopaminergic systems is responsive to environmental factors, creating the possibility of multiple states of functioning with different affective valences, a polyvalent range of subjectively positive and negative experiences. The recognition of subtle tension changes in skeletal muscles when orienting to an affectively significant experience or event has clinical implications for processing of traumatic memories, including those of a relational/interpersonal nature. Sequences established at the brainstem level can underlie patterns of attachment responding that repeat over many years in different contexts. The interaction of the innate system for connection with that for alarm, through circuits based in the locus coeruleus, and that for defence, based in circuits through the PAG, can lay down deep patterns of emotional and energetic responses to relational stimuli. There may be simultaneous sequences for attachment approach and defensive aggression underlying relational styles that are so deep as to be seen as personality characteristics, for example, of borderline type. A clinical approach derived from these hypotheses, Deep Brain Reorienting, is briefly outlined as it provides a way to address the somatic residues of adverse interpersonal interactions underlying relational patterns and also the residual shock and horror of traumatic experiences. We suggest that the innate alarm system involving the SC and the locus coeruleus can generate a pre-affective shock while an affective shock can arise from excessive stimulation of the PAG. Clinically significant residues can be accessed through careful, mindful, attention to orienting-tension-affect-seeking sequences when the therapist and the client collaborate on eliciting and describing them.

Being misunderstood in autism: The role of motor disruption in expressive communication, implications for satisfying social relations

Jaswal & Akhtar's outstanding target article identifies the necessary social nature of the human mind, even in autism. We agree with the authors and present significant contributory origins of this autistic isolation in disruption of purposeful movement made social from infancy. Timing differences in expression can be misunderstood in embodied engagement, and social intention misread. Sensitive relations can repair this.

Uncanny Mirroring: A Developmental Perspective on the Neurocognitive Origins of Self-Disorders in Schizophrenia

Varieties of anomalous subjective experiences, i.e. "basic self-disorders" (SDs), have been empirically demonstrated as core clinical features of schizophrenia spectrum disorders, predating full-blown psychotic symptoms. However, the clinical stage in which SDs emerge and their putative neurocognitive origins remain unsolved issues. Focusing on a prototypical anomalous mirror experience (i.e., a stable, trait-like subjective feeling of nonexisting while looking at oneself in the mirror) reported by an 11-year-old boy at familial high risk for schizophrenia and diagnosed as attenuated psychosis syndrome, we outline some possible developmental pathways leading to SDs. Such pathways are hypothesized in accordance with the documented early impairments in perceptual integration across distinct modalities in children at risk for schizophrenia spectrum disorders and to the specific features of mirror experience as provided by phenomenological and developmental psychology perspectives. We conclude that SDs could presumably have an early developmental origin, although children become progressively more aware of them. Although further hypothesis testing in clinical samples and longitudinal empirical investigation of at-risk children is badly needed, we propose that age-appropriate, phenomenologically oriented assessment of SDs could be useful for the early identification of psychotic risk.

Prospective organization of neonatal arm movements: A motor foundation of embodied agency, disrupted in premature birth

Prospective motor control moves the body into the future, from where one is to where one wants to be. It is a hallmark of intentionality. But its origin in development is uncertain. In this study, we tested whether or not the arm movements of newborn infants were prospectively controlled. We measured the spatiotemporal organization of 480 full-term neonatal arm movements and 384 arm movements of prematurely born infants at-risk for neurodevelopmental disorder. We found 75% of healthy term-birth neonatal movements and 68% of prematurely born infant movements conformed to the τG -coupling model of prospective sensorimotor control. Prospective coupling values were significantly reduced in the latter (p = .010, r = .087). In both cases prospectively controlled movements were tightly organized by fixed-duration units with a base duration of 218 ms and additional temporal units of 145 ms. Yet distances remained constant. Thus, we demonstrate for the first time a precise prospective spatiotemporal organization of neonatal arm movements and demonstrate that at-risk infants exhibit reduced sensorimotor control. Prospective motor control is a hallmark of primary sensorimotor intentionality and gives a strong embodied foundation to conscious motor agency.

Motor Intention/Intentionality and Associationism - A conceptual review

Motor intention/intentionality (MI) has been investigated from many different angles. Some researchers focus on the purely physical and mechanical aspects of the human motor system, while others emphasize the subjectivity involved in intentionality. While bridging this seemingly dualistic gap between the two concepts ought to be the researcher's' main task, different schools of thought have instead specialized in stressing one (objective) or the other (subjective) part of this construct. Thus, we find everything from neuroscientific to phenomenologically inspired approaches to MI. The purpose of this article is to review the literature regarding these different approaches to the MI construct. In reviewing the literature, we introduce a broadened conception of associationism. In organizing our data in relation to the laws of association, a lack of methodology clearly manifests itself. Hence, 123 articles out of 143 meet the criteria of our definition of associationism. It seems that this old doctrine sneaks in to a big part of the research rather implicitly through a lack of methodology. To shed light on how this happens in the 123 articles, we develop a continuum to show to which extend associationism operates on a transcendent or substantial level in each article. We find only very few articles that seem to try to gap the bridge between motor and intention/intentionality, and thus we suggest that future MI research reintroduce methodological debates concerning the conceptual character of this construct.

Shaping of Reach-to-Grasp Kinematics by Intentions: A Meta-Analysis

When we reach to grasp something, we need to take into account both the properties of the object we are grasping and the intention we have in mind. Previous research has found these constraints to be visible in the reach-to-grasp kinematics, but there is no consensus on which kinematic parameters are the most sensitive. To examine this, a systematic literature search and meta-analyses were performed. The search identified studies assessing how changes in either an object property or a prior intention affect reach-to-grasp kinematics in healthy participants. Hereafter, meta-analyses were conducted using a restricted maximum likelihood random effect model. The meta-analyses showed that changes in both object properties and prior intentions affected reach-to-grasp kinematics. Based on these results, the authors argue for a tripartition of the reach-to-grasp movement in which the accelerating part of the reach is primarily associated with transporting the hand to the object (i.e., extrinsic object properties), the decelerating part of the reach is used as a preparation for object manipulation (i.e., prepare the grasp or the subsequent action), and the grasp is associated with manipulating the object's intrinsic properties, especially object size.

Toward the Autism Motor Signature: Gesture patterns during smart tablet gameplay identify children with autism

Autism is a developmental disorder evident from infancy. Yet, its clinical identification requires expert diagnostic training. New evidence indicates disruption to motor timing and integration may underpin the disorder, providing a potential new computational marker for its early identification. In this study, we employed smart tablet computers with touch-sensitive screens and embedded inertial movement sensors to record the movement kinematics and gesture forces made by 37 children 3-6 years old with autism and 45 age- and gender-matched children developing typically. Machine learning analysis of the children's motor patterns identified autism with up to 93% accuracy. Analysis revealed these patterns consisted of greater forces at contact and with a different distribution of forces within a gesture, and gesture kinematics were faster and larger, with more distal use of space. These data support the notion disruption to movement is core feature of autism, and demonstrate autism can be computationally assessed by fun, smart device gameplay.

The ontogenesis of narrative: from moving to meaning

Narrative, the creation of imaginative projects and experiences displayed in expressions of movement and voice, is how human cooperative understanding grows. Human understanding places the character and qualities of objects and events of interest within stories that portray intentions, feelings, and ambitions, and how one cares about them. Understanding the development of narrative is therefore essential for understanding the development of human intelligence, but its early origins are obscure. We identify the origins of narrative in the innate sensorimotor intelligence of a hypermobile human body and trace the ontogenesis of narrative form from its earliest expression in movement. Intelligent planning, with self-awareness, is evident in the gestures and motor expressions of the mid-gestation fetus. After birth, single intentions become serially organized into projects with increasingly ambitious distal goals and social meaning. The infant imitates others’ actions in shared tasks, learns conventional cultural practices, and adapts his own inventions, then names topics of interest. Through every stage, in simple intentions of fetal movement, in social imitations of the neonate, in early proto-conversations and collaborative play of infants and talk of children and adults, the narrative form of creative agency with it four-part structure of ‘introduction,’ ‘development,’ ‘climax,’ and ‘resolution’ is present. We conclude that shared rituals of culture and practical techniques develop from a fundamental psycho-motor structure with its basic, vital impulses for action and generative process of thought-in-action that express an integrated, imaginative, and sociable Self. This basic structure is evident before birth and invariant in form throughout life. Serial organization of single, non-verbal actions into complex projects of expressive and explorative sense-making become conventional meanings and explanations with propositional narrative power. Understanding the root of narrative in embodied meaning-making in this way is important for practical work in therapy and education, and for advancing philosophy and neuroscience.

Embodied intersubjective engagement in mother-infant tactile communication: a cross-cultural study of Japanese and Scottish mother-infant behaviors during infant pick-up

This study examines the early development of cultural differences in a simple, embodied, and intersubjective engagement between mothers putting down, picking up, and carrying their infants between Japan and Scotland. Eleven Japanese and ten Scottish mothers with their 6- and then 9-month-old infants participated. Video and motion analyses were employed to measure motor patterns of the mothers’ approach to their infants, as well as their infants’ collaborative responses during put-down, pick-up, and carry phases. Japanese and Scottish mothers approached their infants with different styles and their infants responded differently to the short duration of separation during the trial. A greeting-like behavior of the arms and hands was prevalent in the Scottish mothers’ approach, but not in the Japanese mothers’ approach. Japanese mothers typically kneeled before making the final reach to pick-up their children, giving a closer, apparently gentler final approach of the torso than Scottish mothers, who bent at the waist with larger movements of the torso. Measures of the gap closure between the mothers’ hands to their infants’ heads revealed variably longer duration and distance gap closures with greater velocity by the Scottish mothers than by the Japanese mothers. Further, the sequence of Japanese mothers’ body actions on approach, contact, pick-up, and hold was more coordinated at 6 months than at 9 months. Scottish mothers were generally more variable on approach. Measures of infant participation and expressivity indicate more active participation in the negotiation during the separation and pick-up phases by Scottish infants. Thus, this paper demonstrates a culturally different onset of development of joint attention in pick-up. These differences reflect cultures of everyday interaction.

Jointly structuring triadic spaces of meaning and action: book sharing from 3 months on

This study explores the emergence of triadic interactions through the example of book sharing. As part of a naturalistic study, 10 infants were visited in their homes from 3–12 months. We report that (1) book sharing as a form of infant-caregiver-object interaction occurred from as early as 3 months. Using qualitative video analysis at a micro-level adapting methodologies from conversation and interaction analysis, we demonstrate that caregivers and infants practiced book sharing in a highly co-ordinated way, with caregivers carving out interaction units and shaping actions into action arcs and infants actively participating and co-ordinating their attention between mother and object from the beginning. We also (2) sketch a developmental trajectory of book sharing over the first year and show that the quality and dynamics of book sharing interactions underwent considerable change as the ecological situation was transformed in parallel with the infants' development of attention and motor skills. Social book sharing interactions reached an early peak at 6 months with the infants becoming more active in the coordination of attention between caregiver and book. From 7 to 9 months, the infants shifted their interest largely to solitary object exploration, in parallel with newly emerging postural and object manipulation skills, disrupting the social coordination and the cultural frame of book sharing. In the period from 9 to 12 months, social book interactions resurfaced, as infants began to effectively integrate manual object actions within the socially shared activity. In conclusion, to fully understand the development and qualities of triadic cultural activities such as book sharing, we need to look especially at the hitherto overlooked early period from 4 to 6 months, and investigate how shared spaces of meaning and action are structured together in and through interaction, creating the substrate for continuing cooperation and cultural learning.

We can work it out: an enactive look at cooperation

The past years have seen an increasing debate on cooperation and its unique human character. Philosophers and psychologists have proposed that cooperative activities are characterized by shared goals to which participants are committed through the ability to understand each other's intentions. Despite its popularity, some serious issues arise with this approach to cooperation. First, one may challenge the assumption that high-level mental processes are necessary for engaging in acting cooperatively. If they are, then how do agents that do not possess such ability (preverbal children, or children with autism who are often claimed to be mind-blind) engage in cooperative exchanges, as the evidence suggests? Secondly, to define cooperation as the result of two de-contextualized minds reading each other's intentions may fail to fully acknowledge the complexity of situated, interactional dynamics and the interplay of variables such as the participants' relational and personal history and experience. In this paper we challenge such accounts of cooperation, calling for an embodied approach that sees cooperation not only as an individual attitude toward the other, but also as a property of interaction processes. Taking an enactive perspective, we argue that cooperation is an intrinsic part of any interaction, and that there can be cooperative interaction before complex communicative abilities are achieved. The issue then is not whether one is able or not to read the other's intentions, but what it takes to participate in joint action. From this basic account, it should be possible to build up more complex forms of cooperation as needed. Addressing the study of cooperation in these terms may enhance our understanding of human social development, and foster our knowledge of different ways of engaging with others, as in the case of autism.