Response to, "On the origins of the linear no-threshold (LNT) dogma by means of untruths, artful dodges and blind faith."

It Is Time to Move Beyond the Linear No-Threshold Theory for Low-Dose Radiation Protection

The US Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) is the primary federal agency responsible for promulgating regulations and policies to protect people and the environment from ionizing radiation. Currently, the USEPA uses the linear no-threshold (LNT) model to estimate cancer risks and determine cleanup levels in radiologically contaminated environments. The LNT model implies that there is no safe dose of ionizing radiation; however, adverse effects from low dose, low-dose rate (LDDR) exposures are not detectable. This article (1) provides the scientific basis for discontinuing use of the LNT model in LDDR radiation environments, (2) shows that there is no scientific consensus for using the LNT model, (3) identifies USEPA reliance on outdated scientific information, and (4) identifies regulatory reliance on incomplete evaluations of recent data contradicting the LNT. It is the time to reconsider the use of the LNT model in LDDR radiation environments. Incorporating the latest science into the regulatory process for risk assessment will (1) ensure science remains the foundation for decision making, (2) reduce unnecessary burdens of costly cleanups, (3) educate the public on the real effects of LDDR radiation exposures, and (4) harmonize government policies with the rest of the radiation scientific community.

Lessons to be learned from a contentious challenge to mainstream radiobiological science (the linear no-threshold theory of genetic mutations)

There are both statistically valid and invalid reasons why scientists with differing default hypotheses can disagree in high-profile situations. Examples can be found in recent correspondence in this journal, which may offer lessons for resolving challenges to mainstream science, particularly when adherents of a minority view attempt to elevate the status of outlier studies and/or claim that self-interest explains the acceptance of the dominant theory. Edward J. Calabrese and I have been debating the historical origins of the linear no-threshold theory (LNT) of carcinogenesis and its use in the regulation of ionizing radiation. Professor Calabrese, a supporter of hormesis, has charged a committee of scientists with misconduct in their preparation of a 1956 report on the genetic effects of atomic radiation. Specifically he argues that the report mischaracterized the LNT research record and suppressed calculations of some committee members. After reviewing the available scientific literature, I found that the contemporaneous evidence overwhelmingly favored a (genetics) LNT and that no calculations were suppressed. Calabrese's claims about the scientific record do not hold up primarily because of lack of attention to statistical analysis. Ironically, outlier studies were more likely to favor supra-linearity, not sub-linearity. Finally, the claim of investigator bias, which underlies Calabrese's accusations about key studies, is based on misreading of text. Attention to ethics charges, early on, may help seed a counter narrative explaining the community's adoption of a default hypothesis and may help focus attention on valid evidence and any real weaknesses in the dominant paradigm.

Risk Communication Strategies: Lessons Learned from Previous Disasters with a Focus on the Fukushima Radiation Accident

PURPOSE OF THE REVIEW

It has been difficult to both mitigate the health consequences and effectively provide health risk information to the public affected by the Fukushima radiological disaster. Often, there are contrasting public health ethics within these activities which complicate risk communication. Although no risk communication strategy is perfect in such disasters, the ethical principles of risk communication provide good practical guidance.

FINDINGS

These discussions will be made in the context of similar lessons learned after radiation exposures in Goiania, Brazil, in 1987; the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident, Ukraine, in 1986; and the attack at the World Trade Center, New York, USA, in 2001. Neither of the two strategies is perfect nor fatally flawed. Yet, this discussion and lessons from prior events should assist decision makers with navigating difficult risk communication strategies in similar environmental health disasters.

Response to, "On the origins of the linear no-threshold (LNT) dogma by means of untruths, artful dodges and blind faith."

It is not true that successive groups of researchers from academia and research institutions-scientists who served on panels of the US National Academy of Sciences (NAS)-were duped into supporting a linear no-threshold model (LNT) by the opinions expressed in the genetic panel section of the 1956 "BEAR I" report. Successor reports had their own views of the LNT model, relying on mouse and human data, not fruit fly data. Nor was the 1956 report biased and corrupted, as has been charged in an article by Edward J. Calabrese in this journal. With or without BEAR I, the LNT model would likely have been accepted in the US for radiation protection purposes in the 1950's.

LNTgate: How scientific misconduct by the U.S. NAS led to governments adopting LNT for cancer risk assessment

This paper provides a detailed rebuttal to the letter of Beyea (2016) which offered a series of alternative interpretations to those offered in my article in Environmental Research (Calabrese, 2015a) concerning the role of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Biological Effects of Atomic Radiation (BEAR) I Committee Genetics Panel in the adoption of the linear dose response model for cancer risk assessment. Significant newly uncovered evidence is presented which supports and extends the findings of Calabrese (2015a), reaffirming the conclusion that the Genetics Panel should be evaluated for scientific misconduct for deliberate misrepresentation of the research record in order to enhance an ideological agenda. This critique documents numerous factual errors along with extensive and deliberate filtering of information in the Beyea letter (2016) that leads to consistently incorrect conclusions and an invalid general perspective.