Collaborative and competitive motivations uniquely impact infants' racial categorization

Infants' biased individuation of in-group members

Adults tend to construe members of their group as "unique individuals" more than members of other groups. This study investigated whether infants exhibit this tendency, even in regard to unfamiliar arbitrary groups. Ninety-six White 1-year-olds were assigned to an Ingroup, Outgroup, or No-Group condition, based on whether or not they shared two preferences (food and shirt color) with women appearing on video sequences. In the critical trial, infants saw two women (Ingroup, Outgroup, or No-Group) - one at a time - appearing from behind a curtain. The curtain opened to reveal only one woman. Infants in the Ingroup condition looked longer at this display than infants in the other two conditions. This suggests that infants in the Ingroup condition had a stronger expectation than those in the other two conditions that there would be two women behind the curtain. In other words, infants individuated in-group members more than out-group members.

Oxytocin attenuates racial categorization in 14-month-old infants

Intergroup bias - the preferential attitudes one holds towards one's social group - is a ubiquitous socio-cognitive phenomenon. In fact, studies show that already in the first months of life, infants manifest a preference for members of their own social group. This points to the possibility of inborn mechanisms involved in social group cognition. Here we assess the effect of a biological activation of infants' affiliative motivation on their social categorization capacity. In a first visit to the lab, mothers self-administered either Oxytocin (OT) or placebo (PL) via a nasal spray and then engaged in a face-to-face interaction with their 14-month-old infants, a procedure previously shown to increase OT levels in infants. Infants then performed a racial categorization task presented on an eye-tracker. Mothers and infants returned a week later and repeated the procedure while self-administering the complementary substance (i.e., PL or OT, respectively). In total, 24 infants completed the two visits. We found that whereas infants in the PL condition on the first visit exhibited racial categorization, infants in the OT condition in their first visit did not. Moreover, these patterns remained a week later despite the change in substance. Thus, OT inhibited racial categorization when infants first encountered the to-be-categorized faces. These findings highlight the role of affiliative motivation in social categorization, and suggest that the neurobiology of affiliation may provide insights on mechanisms that may be involved in the downstream prejudicial consequences of intergroup bias.

Construal level mindsets modulate gender categorizations in preschool children

Social categorization is a crucial information processing strategy that adults deliberately adjust depending on goals and situational requirements. This study investigated whether flexibility in categorization is similarly present among preschool children. More specifically, we tested whether spontaneous gender categorizations are more pronounced for children with a situationally induced abstract compared to concrete construal level mindset. Sixty-one children first participated in a construal mindset induction task before completing a visual variant of the "who said what" memory task. Systematic memory confusions indicated that all children engaged in gender-based social categorization but that this tendency was accentuated in the abstract compared to concrete mindset condition. These results suggest an ability of children to modulate social categorizations. Implications for the development of intergroup biases are discussed.

Small groups lead, big groups control: Perceptions of numerical group size, power, and status across development

Participants (N = 384 three- to ten-year-olds; 51% girls, 49% boys; 73% White, 18% multiracial/other, 5% Asian, and 3% Black; N = 610 adults) saw depictions of 20 individuals split into two social groups (1:19; 2:18; 5:15; or 8:12 per group) and selected which group was "in charge" (Experiment 1), "the leader" (Experiment 2), or likely to "get the stuff" (resources) in a conflict (Experiment 3). Whereas participants across ages predicted the larger group would "get the stuff," a tendency to view smaller groups as "in charge" and "the leader" strengthened with age and when the smaller group was rarer. These findings suggest the perceived relation between numerical group size and hierarchy is flexible and inform theory regarding the developmental trajectories of reasoning about power and status.

Intuitive sociology

How do humans intuitively understand the structure of their society? How should psychologists study people's commonsense understanding of societal structure? The present chapter seeks to address both of these questions by describing the domain of "intuitive sociology." Drawing primarily from empirical research focused on how young children represent and reason about social groups, we propose that intuitive sociology consists of three core phenomena: social types (the identification of relevant groups and their attributes); social value (the worth of different groups); and social norms (shared expectations for how groups ought to be). After articulating each component of intuitive sociology, we end the chapter by considering both the emergence of intuitive sociology in infancy as well as transitions from intuitive to reflective representations of sociology later in life.

A Motivational Perspective on the Development of Social Essentialism

The tendency to view groups as constituting essentially different categories emerges early in development. To date, most attempts at understanding the origins of this tendency have focused on cognitive processes. Drawing from social-psychological and evolutionary theory, I propose that motivations—in particular, a need to belong—may be foundational for the development of social essentialism. I review evidence indicating that this perspective not only is developmentally plausible but also may explain children’s tendency to consider intentional behaviors performed by in-group members as normative.

Why do children essentialize social groups?

The tendency to essentialize social groups is universal, and arises early in development. This tendency is associated with negative intergroup attitudes and behaviors, and has thus encouraged the search for remedies for the emergence of essentialism. In this vein, great attention has been devoted to uncovering the cognitive foundations of essentialism. In this chapter, I suggest that attention should also be turned toward the motivational foundations of essentialism. I propose that considerations of power and group identity, but especially a "need to belong," may encourage children's essentialization of social groups. Namely, from a young age, children are keen to feel members of a group, and that their membership is secure and exclusive. Essentialism is the conceptual gadget that satisfies these feelings. And to the extent that groups are defined by what they do, this motivated essentialism also impels children to be adamant about the maintenance of unique group behaviors.

The Development of Social Categorization

Social categorization is a universal mechanism for making sense of a vast social world with roots in perceptual, conceptual, and social systems. These systems emerge strikingly early in life and undergo important developmental changes across childhood. The development of social categorization entails identifying which ways of classifying people are culturally meaningful, how these categories might be used to predict, explain, and evaluate the behavior of other people, and how one's own identity relates to these systems of categorization and representation. Social categorization can help children simplify and understand their social environment but has detrimental consequences in the forms of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination. Thus, understanding how social categorization develops is a central problem for the cognitive, social, and developmental sciences. This review details the multiple developmental processes that underlie this core psychological capacity.