The non-take up of long-term care benefit in France: A pecuniary motive?

Failure to take-up public healthcare entitlements: Evidence from the Medical Card system in Ireland

While population health and welfare can be improved through the provision of non-cash benefits, such as free healthcare, many welfare improving schemes have low rates of take up amongst those eligible for such a benefit. One interesting example of this is the Medical Card scheme in Ireland. Medical Cards are a non-cash benefit that provide free primary, community, and hospital care, as well as heavily subsidised prescriptions drugs, for those below specific income means-test threshold. However, despite the significant benefits afforded by a Medical Card, many people forego entitlement. While this has been of concern to policymakers, the prevalence of, and reason for, non-take up, have to date not been examined in-depth. Using detailed household demographic, healthcare, income and expenditure data, this paper estimates the Medical Card take-up rate, examines the reasons for non-take, and estimates the additional healthcare cost burden to individuals due to non-take-up. The paper estimates that 31% of eligible individuals do not take up a Medical Card. Private health insurance coverage, receipt of social welfare, employment status and health status are all strongly correlated with take up. Results suggest that of a lack of information about eligibility status and social stigma are key factors driving non take up. The paper estimates that families who forego their entitled Medical Card typically spend an additional €202 annually on healthcare. Furthermore, as a consequence of higher purchase rates of, perhaps unnecessary, private health insurance, families not taking up their entitlement spend an additional €489 per annum on PHI premia. Welfare losses are likely to be even higher if forgoing medical care due to cost results in future negative health outcomes.

Health measures and long-term care use in the European frail population

This paper explores the association between health measures and long-term care (LTC) use in the 70+ old population. We examine how different measures of health-subjective versus objective-predict LTC use, provided either formally or informally. We consider an absolute measure of subjective health, the grade given by the individual to his/her health status, and additionally construct a relative measure capturing the difference between this grade and the average grade given to health by individuals sharing the same characteristics. Conceptually, this difference comes from the perception of the individual, corresponding to both the private health information and the reporting behavior affecting self-rated health. We use the baseline data from the SPRINTT study, an ongoing randomized control trial on 1519 subjects facing physical frailty and sarcopenia (PF&S) in 11 European countries. Our sample population is older than 70 (mean: 79 years) and comprises a majority (71%) of women. Results show that self-rated health indicators correlate to formal care even when objective health measures are included, while it is not the case for informal care. Formal care consumption thus appears to be more sensitive to the individual's perception of health than informal care.

Does independent needs assessment limit use of publicly financed long-term care?

In health care the assessment of patients' needs is typically entrusted to health care providers. By contrast, in publicly financed long-term care (LTC) needs assessment is often delegated to an independent assessor. One rationale offered for independent needs assessment in LTC is to limit the scope for moral hazard and supplier-induced demand, which may be particularly strong in case of public LTC insurance. We study whether independent needs assessment restricts use of publicly financed LTC at the intensive margin (i.e. after people are being assessed to be eligible for receiving care). Therefore, we link nationwide Dutch administrative datasets about individual LTC use and eligibility decisions by the independent assessment agency in 2012. We find for virtually all types of care, all population subgroups, and all regions that LTC use by patients was substantially less than the maximum amount of care allowed by the independent assessor. This suggests that in the Netherlands independent needs assessment in LTC does not impose a binding constraint on use once a person is considered eligible for care. Still, independent needs assessment may have reduced LTC use at the extensive margin. A significant proportion of the applications for care (16 %) was rejected. In addition, the independent assessment may deter some people from applying.

Pay less, consume more? The price elasticity of home care for the disabled elderly in France

Little is known about the price sensitivity of demand for home care of the disabled elderly. We partially fill this knowledge gap by using administrative data on the beneficiaries of the main French home care subsidy program in a department and exploiting interindividual variation in provider prices. We address the potential endogeneity of prices by taking advantage of the unequal spatial coverage of providers and instrumenting price by the number of municipalities served by a provider. We estimate a price elasticity of around -0.4 that is significantly different from both 0 and -1. This less than proportionate response of consumption to price has implications for the efficiency and redistributive impact of variation in the level of copayments in home care subsidy schemes.