Pay for performance for specialised care in England: Strengths and weaknesses

Is Economic Evaluation and Care Commissioning Focused on Achieving the Same Outcomes? Resource-Allocation Considerations and Challenges Using England as a Case Study

Commissioning describes the process of contracting appropriate care services to address pre-identified needs through pre-agreed payment structures. Outcomes-based commissioning (i.e., paying services for pre-agreed outcomes) shares a common goal with economic evaluation: achieving value for money for relevant outcomes (e.g., health) achieved from a finite budget. We describe considerations and challenges as to the practical role of relevant outcomes for evaluation and commissioning, seeking to bridge a gap between economic evaluation evidence and care commissioning. We describe conceptual (e.g., what are 'relevant' outcomes) alongside practical considerations (e.g., quantifying and using relevant endpoint or surrogate outcomes) and pertinent issues when linking outcomes to commissioning-based payment mechanisms, using England as a case study. Economic evaluation often focuses on a single endpoint health-focused maximand, e.g., quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs), whereas commissioning often focuses on activity-based surrogate outcomes (e.g., health monitoring), as easier-to-measure key performance indicators that are more acceptable (e.g., by clinicians) and amenable to being linked with payment structures. However, payments linked to endpoint and/or surrogate outcomes can lead to market inefficiencies; for example, when surrogates do not have the intended causal effect on endpoint outcomes or when service activity focuses on only people who can achieve prespecified payment-linked outcomes. Accounting for and explaining direct links from commissioners' payment structures to surrogate and then endpoint economic outcomes is a vital step to bridging a gap between economic evaluation approaches and commissioning. Decision-analytic models could aid this but they must be designed to account for relevant surrogate and endpoint outcomes, the payments assigned to such outcomes, and their interaction with the system commissioners purport to influence.

Pay-for-Performance incentives for specialised services in England: a mixed methods evaluation

BACKGROUND

A Pay-for-Performance (P4P) programme, known as Prescribed Specialised Services Commissioning for Quality and Innovation (PSS CQUIN), was introduced for specialised services in the English NHS in 2013/2014. These services treat patients with rare and complex conditions. We evaluate the implementation of PSS CQUIN contracts between 2016/2017 and 2018/2019.

METHODS

We used a mixed methods evaluative approach. In the quantitative analysis, we used a difference-in-differences design to evaluate the effectiveness of ten PSS CQUIN schemes across a range of targeted outcomes. Potential selection bias was addressed using propensity score matching. We also estimated impacts on costs by scheme and financial year. In the qualitative analysis, we conducted semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions to gain insights into the complexities of contract design and programme implementation. Qualitative data analysis was based on the constant comparative method, inductively generating themes.

RESULTS

The ten PSS CQUIN schemes had limited impact on the targeted outcomes. A statistically significant improvement was found for only one scheme: in the clinical area of trauma, the incentive scheme increased the probability of being discharged from Adult Critical Care within four hours of being clinically ready by 7%. The limited impact may be due to the size of the incentive payments, the complexity of the schemes' design, and issues around ownership, contracting and flexibility.

CONCLUSION

The PSS CQUIN schemes had little or no impact on quality improvements in specialised services. Future P4P programmes in healthcare could benefit from lessons learnt from this study on incentive design and programme implementation.

Measuring the State Dependence Effect in Hospital Payment Adjustment

Since FY 2013, as a part of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) program, the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing (HVBP) program has adjusted Medicare's payments to hospitals based on the total performance score of the hospital. First, the program reduces a portion of the hospital's Medicare payments in a specific fiscal year, and then, by the end of the same fiscal year, the amount of the payment reductions will be awarded to the hospitals based on the total performance score; thus, the hospitals that do not receive the reward will lose the portion of money reduced by Medicare. In this research, we apply the theory of state dependence and use the dynamic random effect probit model to estimate this effect. The results show that the hospital payment adjustment dynamics have a very significant state dependence effect (0.341); this means that hospitals that received a reward in the previous year are 34.1% more likely to receive a reward this year than the ones that received a penalty in the previous year. Meanwhile, we also find that the state dependence effect varies significantly across hospitals with different ownership (proprietary/government owned/voluntary nonprofit), and the results show that voluntary nonprofit hospitals exhibit the largest effect of state dependence (0.370), while government-owned hospitals exhibit the lowest effect of state dependence (0.293), and proprietary hospitals are in the middle. Among the factors that influence the likelihood that a hospital receives a reward, we find that teaching hospitals with a large number of beds (>400) are less likely be rewarded; in terms of ownership, we find that voluntary nonprofit hospitals are more likely be rewarded; in terms of demographic factors, hospitals where the average household income are higher within the region are more likely be rewarded.

Beyond Microsystem Fixes: Targeting National Drivers of Low-Value Care Comment on "Key Factors that Promote Low-Value Care: Views of Experts From the United States, Canada, and the Netherlands"

Low-value care drivers and interventions are often focused on a microsystem (eg, clinic or inpatient ward) or within a health system. Identification of national drivers such as payment structure and medical culture of overuse can help identify regional approaches to reducing low-value care. However, these approaches in isolation are insufficient and require additional strategies. These can include policy and payment changes and adopting shared decision-making (SDM). SDM has the potential to move medical culture away from the 'more is better' paternalistic and physician-centric culture to one that actively engages patients as full partners in managing their care.

Establishing the content validity of a new emergency department patient-reported experience measure (ED PREM): a Delphi study

Background

Patient-reported experience measures aim to capture the patient’s perspective of what happened during a care encounter and how it happened. However, due to a lack of guidance to support patient-reported experience measure development and reporting, the content validity of many instruments is unclear and ambiguous. Thus, the aim of this study was to establish the content validity of a newly developed Emergency Department Patient-Reported Experience Measure (ED PREM).

Methods

ED PREM items were developed based on the findings of a systematic mixed studies review, and qualitative interviews with Emergency Department patients that occurred during September and October, 2020. Individuals who participated in the qualitative interviews were approached again during August 2021 to participate in the ED PREM content validation study. The preliminary ED PREM comprised 37 items. A two-round modified, online Delphi study was undertaken where patient participants were asked to rate the clarity, relevance, and importance of ED PREM items on a 4-point content validity index scale. Each round lasted for two-weeks, with 1 week in between for analysis. Consensus was a priori defined as item-level content validity index scores of ≥0.80. A scale-level content validity index score was also calculated.

Results

Fifteen patients participated in both rounds of the online Delphi study. At the completion of the study, two items were dropped and 13 were revised, resulting in a 35-item ED PREM. The scale-level content validity index score for the final 35-item instrument was 0.95.

Conclusions

The newly developed ED PREM demonstrates good content validity and aligns strongly with the concept of Emergency Department patient experience as described in the literature. The ED PREM will next be administered in a larger study to establish its’ construct validity and reliability. There is an imperative for clear guidance on PREM content validation methodologies. Thus, this study may inform the efforts of other researchers undertaking PREM content validation.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1186/s12873-022-00617-5.

Pay for performance system in Turkey and the world; a global overview

Objective: This study aimed to compare the pay for performance system applied nationally in Turkey and in other countries around the world and to reveal the effects of the system applied in our country on the general surgery.

Material and Methods: Current literature and countries’ programs on the implementation of the pay for performance system were recorded. The results of the Turkish Surgical Association’s performance and Healthcare Implementation Communique (HIC) commission studies were evaluated in light of the literature.

Results: Many countries have implemented performance systems on a limited scale to improve quality, speed up the diagnosis, treatment, and control of certain diseases, and they have generally applied it as a financial promotion by receiving the support of health insurance companies and nongovernmental organizations. It turns out that surgeons in our country feel that they are being wronged because of the injustice in the current system because the property of their works is not appreciated and they cannot get the reward for the work they do. This is also the reason for the reluctance of medical school graduates to choose general surgery.

Conclusion: Authorities should pay attention to the opinions of associations and experts in the related field when creating lists of interventional procedures related to surgery. Equal pay should be given to equal work nationally, and surgeons should be encouraged by incentives to perform detailed, qualified surgeries. There is a possibility that the staff positions opened for general surgery, as well as, all surgical branches will remain empty in the near future.

Antibiotic prophylaxis as a quality of care indicator: does it help in the fight against surgical site infections following fragility hip fractures?

INTRODUCTION

Fragility hip fractures are associated with increased morbidity, mortality, and costs. To improve patient care, quality indicator programs were introduced. Yet, the efficacy of these programs and specific quality indicators are questioned. We aimed to determine whether defining prophylactic pre-surgical antibiotic treatment as a quality indicator affected hip fracture outcomes.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

A retrospective study comparing consecutive patients, 65 years and older, who were operated for fragility hip fractures between 01/01/2011 and 30/06/2016, before and after the prophylactic pre-surgical antibiotic treatment quality indicator, which was introduced in 01/2014. Primary outcomes were 1-year surgical site infections (SSI). Secondary outcomes were meeting the quality index and mortality rates, either within a hospital or during the first post-operative year.

RESULTS

904 patients, ages 82.5 ± 7.2 years were operated for fragility hip fractures. 403 patients presented before the antibiotic prophylaxis quality indicator, and 501 following its administration. Patients demographics were comparable. In the pre-quality indicator period, documentation of prophylactic antibiotic treatment was lacking. Only 19.6% had a record for antibiotic administration in their surgical records and for merely 10.4% the type of antibiotic was stated. However, in the post-quality indicator period, 97.0% of patients had a registered prophylactic antibiotic regimen in the hour preceding the surgical incision (p  < 0.001). Post-operative SSI rates were equivalent, and as were in-hospital infections, mortality and recurrent hospitalizations CONCLUSIONS: The introduction of the pre-operative antibiotic treatment quality indicator increased the documentation of antibiotic administration yet failed to influence the incidence of post-operative orthopaedic and medical infections in fragility hip fracture patients.

Examining organisational responses to performance-based financial incentive systems: a case study using NHS staff influenza vaccination rates from 2012/2013 to 2019/2020

Objective

Financial incentives are often applied to motivate desirable performance across organisations in healthcare systems. In the 2016/2017 financial year, the National Health Service (NHS) in England set a national performance-based incentive to increase uptake of the influenza vaccination among frontline staff. Since then, the threshold levels needed for hospital trusts to achieve the incentive (ie, the targets) have ranged from 70% to 80%. The present study examines the impact of this financial incentive across eight vaccination seasons.

Design

A retrospective observational study examining routinely recorded rates of influenza vaccination among staff in all acute NHS hospital trusts across eight vaccination seasons (2012/2013–2019/2020). The number of trusts included varied per year, from 127 to 137, due to organisational changes. McCrary’s density test is conducted to determine if the number of hospital trusts narrowly achieving the target by the end of each season is higher than would be expected in the absence of any responsiveness to the target. We refer to this bunching above the target threshold as a ‘threshold effect’.

Results

In the years before a national incentive was set, 9%–31% of NHS Trusts reported achieving the target, compared with 43%–74% in the 4 years after. Threshold effects did not emerge before the national incentive for payment was set; however, since then, threshold effects have appeared every year. Some trusts report narrowly achieving the target each year, both as the target rises and falls. Threshold effects were not apparent at targets for partial payments.

Conclusions

We provide compelling evidence that performance-based financial incentives produced threshold effects. Policymakers who set such incentives are encouraged to track threshold effects since they contain information on how organisations are responding to an incentive, what enquiries they may wish to make, how the incentive may be improved and what unintended effects it may be having.