Can We Teach Reflective Reasoning in General-Practice Training Through Example-Based Learning and Learning by Doing?

Teaching medical students to apply deliberate reflection

PURPOSE

Deliberate reflection on initial diagnosis has been found to repair diagnostic errors. We investigated the effectiveness of teaching students to use deliberate reflection on future cases and whether their usage would depend on their perception of case difficulty.

METHOD

One-hundred-nineteen medical students solved cases either with deliberate-reflection or without instructions to reflect. One week later, all participants solved six cases, each with two equally likely diagnoses, but some symptoms in the case were associated with only one of the diagnoses (discriminating features). Participants provided one diagnosis and subsequently wrote down everything they remembered from it. After the first three cases, they were told that the next three would be difficult cases. Reflection was measured by the proportion of discriminating features recalled (overall; related to their provided diagnosis; related to alternative diagnosis).

RESULTS

The deliberate-reflection condition recalled more features for the alternative diagnosis than the control condition (p = .013) regardless of described difficulty. They also recalled more features related to their provided diagnosis on the first three cases (p = .004), but on the last three cases (described as difficult), there was no difference.

CONCLUSION

Learning deliberate reflection helped students engage in more reflective reasoning when solving future cases.

Cognitive perspectives on maintaining physicians' medical expertise: II. Acquiring, maintaining, and updating cognitive skills

Over the course of training, physicians develop significant knowledge and expertise. We review dual-process theory, the dominant theory in explaining medical decision making: physicians use both heuristics from accumulated experience (System 1) and logical deduction (System 2). We then discuss how the accumulation of System 1 clinical experience can have both positive effects (e.g., quick and accurate pattern recognition) and negative ones (e.g., gaps and biases in knowledge from physicians' idiosyncratic clinical experience). These idiosyncrasies, biases, and knowledge gaps indicate a need for individuals to engage in appropriate training and study to keep these cognitive skills current lest they decline over time. Indeed, we review converging evidence that physicians further out from training tend to perform worse on tests of medical knowledge and provide poorer patient care. This may reflect a variety of factors, such as specialization of a physician's practice, but is likely to stem at least in part from cognitive factors. Acquired knowledge or skills gained may not always be readily accessible to physicians for a number of reasons, including an absence of study, cognitive changes with age, and the presence of other similar knowledge or skills that compete in what is brought to mind. Lastly, we discuss the cognitive challenges of keeping up with standards of care that continuously evolve over time.

Learning deliberate reflection in medical diagnosis: does learning-by-teaching help?

Deliberate reflection has been found to foster diagnostic accuracy on complex cases or under circumstances that tend to induce cognitive bias. However, it is unclear whether the procedure can also be learned and thereby autonomously applied when diagnosing future cases without instructions to reflect. We investigated whether general practice residents would learn the deliberate reflection procedure through 'learning-by-teaching' and apply it to diagnose new cases. The study was a two-phase experiment. In the learning phase, 56 general-practice residents were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. They either (1) studied examples of deliberate reflection and then explained the procedure to a fictitious peer on video; or (2) solved cases without reflection (control). In the test phase, one to three weeks later, all participants diagnosed new cases while thinking aloud. The analysis of the test phase showed no significant differences between the conditions on any of the outcome measures (diagnostic accuracy, p = .263; time to diagnose, p = .598; mental effort ratings, p = .544; confidence ratings, p = .710; proportion of contradiction units (i.e. measure of deliberate reflection), p = .544). In contrast to findings on learning-by-teaching from other domains, teaching deliberate reflection to a fictitious peer, did not increase reflective reasoning when diagnosing future cases. Potential explanations that future research might address are that either residents in the experimental condition did not apply the learned deliberate reflection procedure in the test phase, or residents in the control condition also engaged in reflection.

Deliberate reflection and clinical reasoning: Founding ideas and empirical findings

CONTEXT

The idea that reflection improves reasoning and learning, since long present in other fields, emerged in the 90s in the medical education literature. Since then, the number of publications on reflection as a means to improve diagnostic learning and clinical problem-solving has increased steeply. Recently, concerns with diagnostic errors have raised further interest in reflection. Several approaches based on reflection have been proposed to reduce clinicians' errors during diagnostic reasoning. What reflection entails varies substantially, and most approaches still require empirical examination.

PURPOSE

The present essay aims to help clarify the role of deliberate reflection in diagnostic reasoning. Deliberate reflection is an approach whose effects on diagnostic reasoning and learning have been empirically studied over the past 15 years. The philosophical roots of the approach will be briefly examined, and the theory and practice of deliberate reflection, particularly its effectiveness, will be reviewed. Lessons learned and unresolved issues will be discussed.

DISCUSSION

The deliberate reflection approach originated from a conceptualization of the nature of reflection practice in medicine informed by Dewey's and Schön's work. The approach guides physicians through systematically reviewing the grounds of their initial diagnosis and considering alternatives. Experimental evidence has supported the effectiveness of deliberate reflection in increasing physicians' diagnostic performance, particularly in nonstraightforward diagnostic tasks. Deliberate reflection has also proved helpful to improve students' diagnostic learning and to facilitate learning of new information. The mechanisms behind the effects of deliberate reflection remain unclear. Tentative explanations focus on the activation/reorganisation of prior knowledge induced by deliberate reflection. Its usefulness depends therefore on the difficulty of the problem relative to the clinician's knowledge. Further research should examine variations in instructions on how to reflect upon a case, the value of further guidance while learning from deliberate reflection, and its benefits in real practice.

Improving medical residents' self-assessment of their diagnostic accuracy: does feedback help?

When physicians do not estimate their diagnostic accuracy correctly, i.e. show inaccurate diagnostic calibration, diagnostic errors or overtesting can occur. A previous study showed that physicians' diagnostic calibration for easy cases improved, after they received feedback on their previous diagnoses. We investigated whether diagnostic calibration would also improve from this feedback when cases were more difficult. Sixty-nine general-practice residents were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In the feedback condition, they diagnosed a case, rated their confidence in their diagnosis, their invested mental effort, and case complexity, and then were shown the correct diagnosis (feedback). This was repeated for 12 cases. Participants in the control condition did the same without receiving feedback. We analysed calibration in terms of (1) absolute accuracy (absolute difference between diagnostic accuracy and confidence), and (2) bias (confidence minus diagnostic calibration). There was no difference between the conditions in the measurements of calibration (absolute accuracy, p = .204; bias, p = .176). Post-hoc analyses showed that on correctly diagnosed cases (on which participants are either accurate or underconfident), calibration in the feedback condition was less accurate than in the control condition, p = .013. This study shows that feedback on diagnostic performance did not improve physicians' calibration for more difficult cases. One explanation could be that participants were confronted with their mistakes and thereafter lowered their confidence ratings even if cases were diagnosed correctly. This shows how difficult it is to improve diagnostic calibration, which is important to prevent diagnostic errors or maltreatment.