Differences in cognitive abilities among primates are concentrated on G: Phenotypic and phylogenetic comparisons with two meta-analytical databases

The economics of brain size evolution in vertebrates

Across the animal kingdom, we see remarkable variation in brain size. This variation has even increased over evolutionary time. Traditionally, studies aiming to explain brain size evolution have looked at the fitness benefits of increased brain size in relation to its increased cognitive performance in the social and/or ecological domain. However, brains are among the most energetically expensive tissues in the body and also require an uninterrupted energy supply. If not compensated, these energetic demands inevitably lead to a reduction in energy allocation to other vital functions. In this review, we summarize how an increasing number of studies show that to fully comprehend brain size evolution and the large variation in brain size across lineages, it is important to look at the economics of brains, including the different pathways through which the high energetic costs of brains can be offset. We further show how numerous studies converge on the conclusion that cognitive abilities can only drive brain size evolution in vertebrate lineages where they result in an improved energy balance through favourable ecological preconditions. Cognitive benefits that do not directly improve the organism's energy balance can only be selectively favoured when they produce such large improvements in reproduction or survival that they outweigh the negative energetic effects of the large brain.

Understanding Human Cognitive Uniqueness

Humanity has regarded itself as intellectually superior to other species for millennia, yet human cognitive uniqueness remains poorly understood. Here, we evaluate candidate traits plausibly underlying our distinctive cognition (including mental time travel, tool use, problem solving, social cognition, and communication) as well as domain generality, and we consider how human cognitive uniqueness may have evolved. We conclude that there are no traits present in humans and absent in other animals that in isolation explain our species' superior cognitive performance; rather, there are many cognitive domains in which humans possess unusually potent capabilities compared to those found in other species. Humans are flexible cognitive all-rounders, whose proficiency arises through interactions and reinforcement between cognitive domains at multiple scales.

Linking ecology and cognition: does ecological specialisation predict cognitive test performance?

Variation in cognitive abilities is thought to be linked to variation in brain size, which varies across species with either social factors (Social Intelligence Hypothesis) or ecological challenges (Ecological Intelligence Hypothesis). However, the nature of the ecological processes invoked by the Ecological Intelligence Hypothesis, like adaptations to certain habitat characteristics or dietary requirements, remains relatively poorly known. Here, we review comparative studies that experimentally investigated interspecific variation in cognitive performance in relation to a species’ degree of ecological specialisation. Overall, the relevant literature was biased towards studies of mammals and birds as well as studies focusing on ecological challenges related to diet. We separated ecological challenges into those related to searching for food, accessing a food item and memorising food locations. We found interspecific variation in cognitive performance that can be explained by adaptations to different foraging styles. Species-specific adaptations to certain ecological conditions, like food patch distribution, characteristics of food items or seasonality also broadly predicted variation in cognitive abilities. A species’ innovative problem-solving and spatial processing ability, for example, could be explained by its use of specific foraging techniques or search strategies, respectively. Further, habitat generalists were more likely to outperform habitat specialists. Hence, we found evidence that ecological adaptations and cognitive performance are linked and that the classification concept of ecological specialisation can explain variation in cognitive performance only with regard to habitat, but not dietary specialisation.

The Myth of the Stupid Believer: The Negative Religiousness-IQ Nexus is Not on General Intelligence (g) and is Likely a Product of the Relations Between IQ and Autism Spectrum Traits

Numerous studies have found a negative relationship between religiousness and IQ. It is in the region of - 0.2, according to meta-analyses. The reasons for this relationship are, however, unknown. It has been suggested that higher intelligence leads to greater attraction to science, or that it helps to override evolved cognitive dispositions such as for religiousness. Either way, such explanations assume that the religion-IQ nexus is on general intelligence (g), rather than some subset of specialized cognitive abilities. In other words, they assume it is a Jensen effect. Two large datasets comparing groups with different levels of religiousness show that their IQ differences are not on g and must, therefore, be attributed to specialized abilities. An analysis of the specialized abilities on which the religious and non-religious groups differ reveals no clear pattern. We cautiously suggest that this may be explicable in terms of autism spectrum disorder traits among people with high IQ scores, because such traits are negatively associated with religiousness.

Establishing an infrastructure for collaboration in primate cognition research

Inferring the evolutionary history of cognitive abilities requires large and diverse samples. However, such samples are often beyond the reach of individual researchers or institutions, and studies are often limited to small numbers of species. Consequently, methodological and site-specific-differences across studies can limit comparisons between species. Here we introduce the ManyPrimates project, which addresses these challenges by providing a large-scale collaborative framework for comparative studies in primate cognition. To demonstrate the viability of the project we conducted a case study of short-term memory. In this initial study, we were able to include 176 individuals from 12 primate species housed at 11 sites across Africa, Asia, North America and Europe. All subjects were tested in a delayed-response task using consistent methodology across sites. Individuals could access food rewards by remembering the position of the hidden reward after a 0, 15, or 30-second delay. Overall, individuals performed better with shorter delays, as predicted by previous studies. Phylogenetic analysis revealed a strong phylogenetic signal for short-term memory. Although, with only 12 species, the validity of this analysis is limited, our initial results demonstrate the feasibility of a large, collaborative open-science project. We present the ManyPrimates project as an exciting opportunity to address open questions in primate cognition and behaviour with large, diverse datasets.

The Fallacy of Equating the Hereditarian Hypothesis with Racism

There is a large amount of evidence that groups differ in average cognitive ability. The hereditarian hypothesis states that these differences are partly or substantially explained by genetics. Despite being a positive claim about the world, this hypothesis is frequently equated with racism, and scholars who defend it are frequently denounced as racists. Yet equating the hereditarian hypothesis with racism is a logical fallacy. The present article identifies ten common arguments for why the hereditarian hypothesis is racist and demonstrates that each one is fallacious. The article concludes that society will be better served if the hereditarian hypothesis is treated the same way as any other scientific claim—critically, but dispassionately.

General intelligence does not help us understand cognitive evolution

Burkart et al. conflate the domain-specificity of cognitive processes with the statistical pattern of variance in behavioural measures that partly reflect those processes. General intelligence is a statistical abstraction, not a cognitive trait, and we argue that the former does not warrant inferences about the nature or evolution of the latter.

Future directions for studying the evolution of general intelligence

The goal of our target article was to lay out current evidence relevant to the question of whether general intelligence can be found in nonhuman animals in order to better understand its evolution in humans. The topic is a controversial one, as evident from the broad range of partly incompatible comments it has elicited. The main goal of our response is to translate these issues into testable empirical predictions, which together can provide the basis for a broad research agenda.

Holocene Selection for Variants Associated With General Cognitive Ability: Comparing Ancient and Modern Genomes

Human populations living during the Holocene underwent considerable microevolutionary change. It has been theorized that the transition of Holocene populations into agrarianism and urbanization brought about culture-gene co-evolution that favored via directional selection genetic variants associated with higher general cognitive ability (GCA). To examine whether GCA might have risen during the Holocene, we compare a sample of 99 ancient Eurasian genomes (ranging from 4.56 to 1.21 kyr BP) with a sample of 503 modern European genomes (Fst= 0.013), using three different cognitive polygenic scores (130 SNP, 9 SNP and 11 SNP). Significant differences favoring the modern genomes were found for all three polygenic scores (odds ratios = 0.92,p= 001; .81,p= 037; and .81,p= .02 respectively). These polygenic scores also outperformed the majority of scores assembled from random SNPs generated via a Monte Carlo model (between 76.4% and 84.6%). Furthermore, an indication of increasing positive allele count over 3.25 kyr was found using a subsample of 66 ancient genomes (r= 0.22,pone-tailed= .04). These observations are consistent with the expectation that GCA rose during the Holocene.

Selection to outsmart the germs: The evolution of disease recognition and social cognition

The emergence of providing care to diseased conspecifics must have been a turning point during the evolution of hominin sociality. On a population level, care may have minimized the costs of socially transmitted diseases at a time of increasing social complexity, although individual care-givers probably incurred increased transmission risks. We propose that care-giving likely originated within kin networks, where the costs may have been balanced by fitness increases obtained through caring for ill kin. We test a novel hypothesis of hominin cognitive evolution in which disease may have selected for the cognitive ability to recognize when a conspecific is infected. Because diseases may produce symptoms that are likely detectable via the perceptual-cognitive pathways integral to social cognition, we suggest that disease recognition and social cognition may have evolved together. Using agent-based modeling, we test 1) under what conditions disease can select for increasing disease recognition and care-giving among kin, 2) whether providing care produces greater selection for cognition than an avoidance strategy, and 3) whether care-giving alters the progression of the disease through the population. The greatest selection was produced by diseases with lower risks to the care-giver and prevalences low enough not to disrupt the kin networks. When care-giving and avoidance strategies were compared, only care-giving reduced the severity of the disease outbreaks and subsequent population crashes. The greatest selection for increased cognitive abilities occurred early in the model runs when the outbreaks and population crashes were most severe. Therefore, over the course of human evolution, repeated introductions of novel diseases into naïve populations could have produced sustained selection for increased disease recognition and care-giving behavior, leading to the evolution of increased cognition, social complexity, and, eventually, medical care in humans. Finally, we lay out predictions derived from our disease recognition hypothesis that we encourage paleoanthropologists, bioarchaeologists, primatologists, and paleogeneticists to test.

The evolution of intelligence in mammalian carnivores

Although intelligence should theoretically evolve to help animals solve specific types of problems posed by the environment, it is unclear which environmental challenges favour enhanced cognition, or how general intelligence evolves along with domain-specific cognitive abilities. The social intelligence hypothesis posits that big brains and great intelligence have evolved to cope with the labile behaviour of group mates. We have exploited the remarkable convergence in social complexity between cercopithecine primates and spotted hyaenas to test predictions of the social intelligence hypothesis in regard to both cognition and brain size. Behavioural data indicate that there has been considerable convergence between primates and hyaenas with respect to their social cognitive abilities. Moreover, compared with other hyaena species, spotted hyaenas have larger brains and expanded frontal cortex, as predicted by the social intelligence hypothesis. However, broader comparative study suggests that domain-general intelligence in carnivores probably did not evolve in response to selection pressures imposed specifically in the social domain. The cognitive buffer hypothesis, which suggests that general intelligence evolves to help animals cope with novel or changing environments, appears to offer a more robust explanation for general intelligence in carnivores than any hypothesis invoking selection pressures imposed strictly by sociality or foraging demands.

The evolution of general intelligence

The presence of general intelligence poses a major evolutionary puzzle, which has led to increased interest in its presence in nonhuman animals. The aim of this review is to critically evaluate this question and to explore the implications for current theories about the evolution of cognition. We first review domain-general and domain-specific accounts of human cognition in order to situate attempts to identify general intelligence in nonhuman animals. Recent studies are consistent with the presence of general intelligence in mammals (rodents and primates). However, the interpretation of a psychometric g factor as general intelligence needs to be validated, in particular in primates, and we propose a range of such tests. We then evaluate the implications of general intelligence in nonhuman animals for current theories about its evolution and find support for the cultural intelligence approach, which stresses the critical importance of social inputs during the ontogenetic construction of survival-relevant skills. The presence of general intelligence in nonhumans implies that modular abilities can arise in two ways, primarily through automatic development with fixed content and secondarily through learning and automatization with more variable content. The currently best-supported model, for humans and nonhuman vertebrates alike, thus construes the mind as a mix of skills based on primary and secondary modules. The relative importance of these two components is expected to vary widely among species, and we formulate tests to quantify their strength.

The coevolution of innovation and technical intelligence in primates

In birds and primates, the frequency of behavioural innovation has been shown to covary with absolute and relative brain size, leading to the suggestion that large brains allow animals to innovate, and/or that selection for innovativeness, together with social learning, may have driven brain enlargement. We examined the relationship between primate brain size and both technical (i.e. tool using) and non-technical innovation, deploying a combination of phylogenetically informed regression and exploratory causal graph analyses. Regression analyses revealed that absolute and relative brain size correlated positively with technical innovation, and exhibited consistently weaker, but still positive, relationships with non-technical innovation. These findings mirror similar results in birds. Our exploratory causal graph analyses suggested that technical innovation shares strong direct relationships with brain size, body size, social learning rate and social group size, whereas non-technical innovation did not exhibit a direct relationship with brain size. Nonetheless, non-technical innovation was linked to brain size indirectly via diet and life-history variables. Our findings support 'technical intelligence' hypotheses in linking technical innovation to encephalization in the restricted set of primate lineages where technical innovation has been reported. Our findings also provide support for a broad co-evolving complex of brain, behaviour, life-history, social and dietary variables, providing secondary support for social and ecological intelligence hypotheses. The ability to gain access to difficult-to-extract, but potentially nutrient-rich, resources through tool use may have conferred on some primates adaptive advantages, leading to selection for brain circuitry that underlies technical proficiency.

The more g-loaded, the more heritable, evolvable, and phenotypically variable: Homology with humans in chimpanzee cognitive abilities

Expanding on a recent study that identified a heritable general intelligence factor (g) among individual chimpanzees from a battery of cognitive tasks, we hypothesized that the cognitive abilities that are more g-loaded would be more heritable and would present more additive genetic variance, in addition to showing more phenotypic variability. This pattern was confirmed, and is comparable to that found in humans, indicating fundamental homology. Finally, tool use presented the highest heritability, the largest amount of additive genetic variance and of phenotypic variance, consistent with previous findings indicating that it is associated with high interspecies variance and evolutionary rates in comparative primate studies.