Emotion expressions shape human social norms and reputations

Emotion expression and cooperation under collective risks

The difficulties associated with solving Humanity's major global challenges have increasingly led world leaders and everyday citizens to publicly adopt strong emotional responses, with either mixed or unknown impacts on others' actions. Here, we present two experiments showing that non-verbal emotional expressions in group interactions play a critical role in determining how individuals behave when contributing to public goods entailing future and uncertain returns. Participants' investments were not only shaped by emotional expressions but also enhanced by anger when compared with joy. Our results suggest that global coordination may benefit from interaction in which emotion expressions can be paramount.

The evolution and social cost of herding mentality promote cooperation

Herding behavior has a social cost for individuals not following the herd, influencing human decision-making. This work proposes including a social cost derived from herding mentality into the payoffs of pairwise game interactions. We introduce a co-evolutionary asymmetric model with four individual strategies (cooperation vs. defection and herding vs. non-herding) to understand the co-emergence of herding behavior and cooperation. Computational experiments show how including herding costs promotes cooperation by increasing the parameter space under which cooperation persists. Results demonstrate a synergistic relationship between the emergence of cooperation and herding mentality: the highest cooperation is achieved when the herding mentality also achieves its highest level. Finally, we study different herding social costs and its relationship to cooperation and herding evolution. This study points to new social mechanisms, related to conformity-driven imitation behavior, that help to understand how and why cooperation prevails in human groups.

Small bots, big impact: solving the conundrum of cooperation in optional Prisoner's Dilemma game through simple strategies

Cooperation plays a crucial role in both nature and human society, and the conundrum of cooperation attracts the attention from interdisciplinary research. In this study, we investigated the evolution of cooperation in optional Prisoner's Dilemma games by introducing simple bots. We focused on one-shot and anonymous games, where the bots could be programmed to always cooperate, always defect, never participate or choose each action with equal probability. Our results show that cooperative bots facilitate the emergence of cooperation among ordinary players in both well-mixed populations and a regular lattice under weak imitation scenarios. Introducing loner bots has no impact on the emergence of cooperation in well-mixed populations, but it facilitates the dominance of cooperation in regular lattices under strong imitation scenarios. However, too many loner bots on a regular lattice inhibit the spread of cooperation and can eventually result in a breakdown of cooperation. Our findings emphasize the significance of bot design in promoting cooperation and offer useful insights for encouraging cooperation in real-world scenarios.

Delegation to artificial agents fosters prosocial behaviors in the collective risk dilemma

Home assistant chat-bots, self-driving cars, drones or automated negotiation systems are some of the several examples of autonomous (artificial) agents that have pervaded our society. These agents enable the automation of multiple tasks, saving time and (human) effort. However, their presence in social settings raises the need for a better understanding of their effect on social interactions and how they may be used to enhance cooperation towards the public good, instead of hindering it. To this end, we present an experimental study of human delegation to autonomous agents and hybrid human-agent interactions centered on a non-linear public goods dilemma with uncertain returns in which participants face a collective risk. Our aim is to understand experimentally whether the presence of autonomous agents has a positive or negative impact on social behaviour, equality and cooperation in such a dilemma. Our results show that cooperation and group success increases when participants delegate their actions to an artificial agent that plays on their behalf. Yet, this positive effect is less pronounced when humans interact in hybrid human-agent groups, where we mostly observe that humans in successful hybrid groups make higher contributions earlier in the game. Also, we show that participants wrongly believe that artificial agents will contribute less to the collective effort. In general, our results suggest that delegation to autonomous agents has the potential to work as commitment devices, which prevent both the temptation to deviate to an alternate (less collectively good) course of action, as well as limiting responses based on betrayal aversion.

Teacher's Emotional Display Affects Students' Perceptions of Teacher's Competence, Feelings, and Productivity in Online Small-Group Discussions

Teacher's emotions have been shown to be highly important in the quality and effectiveness of teaching and learning. There is a recognized need to examine the essential role of teacher's emotions in students' academic achievement. However, the influence of teacher's displays of emotions on students' outcomes in small-group interaction activities, especially in the online environment, has received little attention in prior research. The aim of the present study was to explore the relationship between teacher's different emotional displays and students' perceptions of the teacher's competence, as well as students' collaborative feelings and productivity in online small-group discussions. Using a three-level between-subjects design, 74 participants were randomly divided into four-member groups comprising a teacher and three other participants. All the groups were asked to discuss an open-ended realistic problem using online software, during which the teacher's display of emotions varied (positive vs. negative vs. neutral). The participants' self-reported questionnaire data (perception of the teacher's competence, students' feeling of pleasure, collaborative satisfaction, and willingness to continue collaborating) and productivity (number of effective ideas expressed within a given time) were measured to compare the participants who were exposed to different emotional displays. As expected, the results showed that the participants who received the teacher's positive emotional display reported that they experienced higher levels of pleasure during the task. However, in contrast to our expectations, those under the negative emotional display condition showed a significantly higher level of productivity in the group task. In addition, compared to emotional display, the participants' perceptions of the teacher's competence were rated significantly higher under the neutral condition, and they reported higher levels of collaborative satisfaction and greater willingness to continue collaborating with their group. The findings have the potential benefit of informing educational practice on whether teachers should display their emotions in a small-group discussion or how they should display emotions following adjustment for the relative aim of the teaching activities.

The complexity of human cooperation under indirect reciprocity

Indirect reciprocity (IR) is a key mechanism to understand cooperation among unrelated individuals. It involves reputations and complex information processing, arising from social interactions. By helping someone, individuals may improve their reputation, which may be shared in a population and change the predisposition of others to reciprocate in the future. The reputation of individuals depends, in turn, on social norms that define a good or bad action, offering a computational and mathematical appealing way of studying the evolution of moral systems. Over the years, theoretical and empirical research has unveiled many features of cooperation under IR, exploring norms with varying degrees of complexity and information requirements. Recent results suggest that costly reputation spread, interaction observability and empathy are determinants of cooperation under IR. Importantly, such characteristics probably impact the level of complexity and information requirements for IR to sustain cooperation. In this review, we present and discuss those recent results. We provide a synthesis of theoretical models and discuss previous conclusions through the lens of evolutionary game theory and cognitive complexity. We highlight open questions and suggest future research in this domain. This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.