The role of reciprocity in human-robot social influence

The Importance of Being Consistent: Attribution of Mental States in Strategic Human-Robot Interactions

This article investigates the attribution of mental state (AMS) to an anthropomorphic robot by humans in a strategic interaction. We conducted an experiment in which human subjects are paired with either a human or an anthropomorphic robot to play an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game, and we tested whether AMS is dependent on the robot "consistency," that is, the correspondence between the robot's verbal reaction and its behavior after a nonoptimal social outcome of the game is obtained. We find that human partners are attributed a higher mental state level than robotic partners, regardless of the partner's consistency between words and actions. Conversely, the level of AMS assigned to the robot is significantly higher when the robot is consistent in its words and actions. This finding is robust to the inclusion of psychological factors such as risk attitude and trust, and it holds regardless of subjects' initial beliefs about the adaptability of the robot. Finally, we find that when the robot apologizes for its behavior and defects in the following stage, the epistemic component of the AMS significantly increases.

Social Influence Under Uncertainty in Interaction with Peers, Robots and Computers

Taking advice from others requires confidence in their competence. This is important for interaction with peers, but also for collaboration with social robots and artificial agents. Nonetheless, we do not always have access to information about others’ competence or performance. In these uncertain environments, do our prior beliefs about the nature and the competence of our interacting partners modulate our willingness to rely on their judgments? In a joint perceptual decision making task, participants made perceptual judgments and observed the simulated estimates of either a human participant, a social humanoid robot or a computer. Then they could modify their estimates based on this feedback. Results show participants’ belief about the nature of their partner biased their compliance with its judgments: participants were more influenced by the social robot than human and computer partners. This difference emerged strongly at the very beginning of the task and decreased with repeated exposure to empirical feedback on the partner’s responses, disclosing the role of prior beliefs in social influence under uncertainty. Furthermore, the results of our functional task suggest an important difference between human–human and human–robot interaction in the absence of overt socially relevant signal from the partner: the former is modulated by social normative mechanisms, whereas the latter is guided by purely informational mechanisms linked to the perceived competence of the partner.