Beyond vernacular: Measurement solutions to the lexical fallacy in disgust research

Disgust as a basic, sexual, and moral emotion

Disgust is a basic emotion that increases the organism's survival success by preventing the transfer of pathogens. In this regard, it directs cognitive processes and motivates avoidance behaviors that prevent pathogens from entering the body. Moreover, disgust has many specific characteristics that distinguish it from other basic emotions. Firstly, unlike other basic emotions, it contaminates neutral objects around it and causes difficult-to-change learning. Another specific characteristic of disgust is that it depends on ideational processes. Objects, situations, and behaviors that do not contain pathogens can also cause disgust. In this regard, disgust appears not only as a basic emotion but also as different adaptations in different fields. In this context, two distinct adaptations of disgust stand out: sexual and moral disgust. These two adaptations of disgust benefit from disgust-related behaviors and motivations in different ways. Sexual disgust works as a gene protection mechanism, while moral disgust helps maintain social rules. The specific characteristics of disgust and its effects on cognitive processes such as attention and memory interact. In conclusion, the multifaceted structure of disgust shows that it needs to be studied more in the subfields of psychology. (Strohminger, Philos Compass 9:478-493, 2014) defines disgust as a psychological nebula that needs to be discovered. However, it is observed that disgust has not been adequately addressed. This review aims to comprehensively explore unique characteristics and diverse aspects of disgust, shedding light on its significance from various perspectives. This study underscores the broader understanding of disgust and its pivotal role in psychological research.

Specificity Versus Generality: A Meta-Analytic Review Of The Association Between Trait Disgust Sensitivity And Moral Judgment

Disgust seems to play an important role in moral judgment. However, it is unclear whether the role of disgust in moral judgment is limited to certain kinds of moral domains (versus many) and/or certain types of disgust (versus many). To clarify these questions, we conducted a multilevel meta-analysis ( k = 512; N = 72,443) on relations between trait disgust sensitivity and moral judgment (disgust-immorality association). Main analyses revealed a significant overall mean disgust-immorality association ( r = .23). Additionally, moderator analyses revealed significant specificity in disgust type and moral domain (grounded in Moral Foundations Theory): effects were stronger for (a) sexual disgust compared to pathogen disgust, (b) sanctity moral judgments compared to other domains of moral judgments, and (c) sexual-sanctity associations compared to other disgust type-moral domain pairings.