ALIED: Humans as adaptive lie detectors

Veracity Judgments Based on Complications: A Training Experiment

Research has shown that complications are more common in truth tellers' accounts than in lie tellers' accounts, but there is currently no experiment that has examined the accuracy of observers' veracity judgments when looking at complications. A total of 87 participants were asked to judge 10 transcripts (five truthful and five false) derived from a set of 59 transcripts generated in a previous experiment by Deeb et al. Approximately half of the participants were trained to detect complications (Trained), and the other half did not receive training (Untrained). Trained participants were more likely to look for complications, but they did not detect them accurately, and thus their veracity judgments did not improve beyond Untrained participants' judgments. We discuss that the training may have been too brief or not sensitive enough to enhance decision-making.

Introducing the high-context communication style interview protocol to detect deception in pairs

In four experiments, we examined whether pairs of truth tellers could be distinguished from pairs of lie tellers by taking advantage of the fact that only pairs of truth tellers can refer to shared events by using brief expressions (high-context communication style). In Experiments 1 and 2, pairs of friends and pairs of strangers pretending to be friends answered (i) questions they likely had expected to be asked (e.g., 'How did you first meet'?) and (ii) unexpected questions (e.g., 'First, describe a shared event in a few words. Then elaborate on it'). Pairs were interviewed individually (Experiment 1, N = 134 individuals) or collectively (Experiment 2, N = 130 individuals). Transcripts were coded for the verbal cues details, complications, plausibility, predictability, and overlap (Experiment 1 only) or repetitions (Experiment 2 only). In two lie detection experiments observers read the individual transcripts in Experiment 3 (N = 146) or the collective transcripts in Experiment 4 (N = 138). The verbal cues were more diagnostic of veracity and observers were better at distinguishing between truths and lies in the unexpected than in the expected questions condition, but only when the pair members were interviewed individually.

Truthful yet misleading: Elementary second-order deception in school-age children and its sociocognitive correlates

In highly competitive contexts, deceptive intentions might be transparent, so conveying only false information to the opponent can become a predictable strategy. In such situations, alternating between truths and lies (second-order lying behavior) represents a less foreseeable option. The current study investigated the development of 8- to 10-year-old children's elementary second-order deception in relation to their attribution of ignorance (first- and second-order ignorance) and executive functions (inhibitory control, shifting ability, and verbal working memory). An adapted version of the hide-and-seek paradigm was used to assess children's second-order lie-telling, in which children were asked to hide a coin in either of their hands. Unlike the standard paradigm, the opponent did not consistently look for the coin in the location indicated by the children, so children needed to switch between telling simple lies and truths (elementary second-order lies about the coin location) to successfully deceive the recipient. The results showed that older children were less likely to tell elementary second-order lies. However, across the sample, when children decided to lie, this ability was positively related to their second-order ignorance attribution and their verbal working memory. Moreover, we obtained preliminary evidence for the presence of a habituation effect in second-order lying, with children being more accurate and having less variability in their truthful-to-deceive responses (this being the more frequently elicited response) than when telling lies to deceive. Our findings could have implications for understanding the mechanisms underlying children's ability to alternate between truths and lies to deceive.

In their own words: deception detection by victims and near victims of fraud

Aim

Research on deception detection has usually been executed in experimental settings in the laboratory. In contrast, the present research investigates deception detection by actual victims and near victims of fraud, as reported in their own words.

Materials and methods

Our study is based on a nationally representative survey of 11 types of (mostly) online fraud victimization (N = 2,864). We used qualitative information from actual victims and near victims on why they didn't fall for the fraud, or how, in hindsight, it could have been prevented.

Results

The main detection strategies mentioned by near victims (N = 958) were 1) fraud knowledge (69%): these near victims clearly recognized fraud. Other strategies related to fraud knowledge were: noticing mistakes (27.9%), rules and principles about safe conduct (11.7%), and personal knowledge (7.1%). A second type of strategy was distrust (26.1%). A third strategy was 'wise through experience' (1.6%). Finally, a limited number of respondents (7.8%) searched for additional information: they contacted other people (5.5%), sought information online (4%), contacted the fraudster (2.9%), contacted their bank or credit card company (2.2%), or contacted the police (0.2%). Using knowledge as a strategy decreases the probability of victimization by a factor of 0.43. In contrast, all other strategies increased the likelihood of victimization by a factor of 1.6 or more. Strategies generally were uncorrelated, several strategies differed by type of fraud. About 40% of the actual victims (N = 243) believed that their victimization might have been prevented by: 1) seeking information (25.2%), 2) paying more attention (18.9%), 3) a third party doing something (16.2%), 4) following safety rules or principles, like using a safer way of paying or trading (14.4%), or by 5) 'simply not going along with it' (10.8%). Most of these strategies were associated with a higher, not lower, likelihood of victimization.

Conclusion

Clearly, knowledge of fraud is the best strategy to avoid fraud victimization. Therefore, a more proactive approach is needed to inform the public about fraud and attackers' modus operandi, so that potential victims already have knowledge of fraud upon encountering it. Just providing information online will not suffice to protect online users.

How Perceptions of Caller Honesty Vary During Vishing Attacks That Include Highly Sensitive or Seemingly Innocuous Requests

OBJECTIVE

To understand how aspects of vishing calls (phishing phone calls) influence perceived visher honesty.

BACKGROUND

Little is understood about how targeted individuals behave during vishing attacks. According to truth-default theory, people assume others are being honest until something triggers their suspicion. We investigated whether that was true during vishing attacks.

METHODS

Twenty-four participants read written descriptions of eight real-world vishing calls. Half included highly sensitive requests; the remainder included seemingly innocuous requests. Participants rated visher honesty at multiple points during conversations.

RESULTS

Participants initially perceived vishers to be honest. Honesty ratings decreased before requests occurred. Honesty ratings decreased further in response to highly sensitive requests, but not seemingly innocuous requests. Honesty ratings recovered somewhat, but only after highly sensitive requests.

CONCLUSIONS

The present results revealed five important insights: (1) people begin vishing conversations in the truth-default state, (2) certain aspects of vishing conversations serve as triggers, (3) other aspects of vishing conversations do not serve as triggers, (4) in certain situations, people's perceptions of visher honesty improve, and, more generally, (5) truth-default theory may be a useful tool for understanding how targeted individuals behave during vishing attacks.

APPLICATION

Those developing systems that help users deal with suspected vishing attacks or penetration testing plans should consider (1) targeted individuals' truth-bias, (2) the influence of visher demeanor on the likelihood of deception detection, (3) the influence of fabricated situations surrounding vishing requests on the likelihood of deception detection, and (4) targeted individuals' lack of concern about seemingly innocuous requests.

Unraveling the Misconception About Deception and Nervous Behavior

In this article, we attempt to unravel the misconception about deception and nervous behavior. First we will cite research demonstrating that observers believe lie tellers display more nervous behaviors than truth tellers; that observers pay attention to nervous behaviors when they attempt to detect deception; and that lie tellers actually feel more nervous than truth tellers. This is all in alignment with a lie detection approach based on spotting nervous behaviors. We then will argue that the next, vital, step is missing: Research has found that lie tellers generally do not display more than truth tellers the nervous behaviors laypersons and professionals appear to focus on. If observers pay attention to nervous behaviors but lie tellers do not come across as being nervous, lie detection performance is expected to be poor. Research has supported this claim. We finally discuss ideas for research into lie detection based on non-verbal behaviors.

Approach, Avoidance, and the Perception of Credibility

Based on a functional approach to credibility judgments, the authors hypothesize that receivers’ judgments of senders’ credibility involve an evaluative dimension (i.e., good–bad) and are associated with approach and avoidance tendencies. In three experiments (total N = 645), participants (receivers) judged the credibility of suspects (senders) denying involvement in a mock theft. While watching or reading the message, receivers performed an approach-related (arm flexion) or an avoidance-related (arm extension) motor action. Although receivers’ affective evaluations of senders (good–bad) correlated strongly with credibility judgments in all three experiments, the results of the arm position manipulation were mixed. In Experiment 1, receivers in an arm flexion (vs. arm extension) state judged the sender as more credible, but only when informed beforehand about the upcoming credibility judgment. In Experiment 2 and 3, however, there was no evidence of an arm position effect on credibility judgments. A cross-experimental meta-analysis revealed that the effect of the manipulation was statistically indistinguishable from zero, Hedges’ g = 0.07, 95% CI [−0.09, 0.22], and provided strong support for the null hypothesis. Multiple interpretations of the results are discussed.

Police accuracy in truth/lie detection when judging baseline interviews

Research has shown that a comparable truth baseline (CTB) approach elicits more cues to deception and results in higher accuracy rates than a small talk baseline. Past research focused on laypeople's accuracy rates. We examined whether the CTB also has a positive effect on law enforcement personnel accuracy. In this study, 95 police officers judged 10 interviews, whereby half of the senders told the truth, and the other half lied about a mock undercover mission. Half of the interviews included only questioning about the event under investigation, whereas the other half also included questioning aimed at creating a CTB. Total and truth accuracy did not differ, but observers who watched interviews with a CTB obtained higher lie detection accuracy rates than those who watched interviews without the baseline questioning. Signal detection analyses showed that this effect could be attributed to a decreased response bias in the CTB condition.

Aligning Spinoza with Descartes: An informed Cartesian account of the truth bias

There is a bias towards believing information is true rather than false. The Spinozan account claims there is an early, automatic bias towards believing. Only afterwards can people engage in an effortful re-evaluation and disbelieve the information. Supporting this account, there is a greater bias towards believing information is true when under cognitive load. However, developing on the Adaptive Lie Detector (ALIED) theory, the informed Cartesian can equally explain this data. The account claims the bias under load is not evidence of automatic belief; rather, people are undecided, but if forced to guess they can rely on context information to make an informed judgement. The account predicts, and we found, that if people can explicitly indicate their uncertainty, there should be no bias towards believing because they are no longer required to guess. Thus, we conclude that belief formation can be better explained by an informed Cartesian account - an attempt to make an informed judgment under uncertainty.

Deception and Cognitive Load: Expanding Our Horizon with a Working Memory Model

Recently, studies on deception and its detection have increased dramatically. Many of these studies rely on the “cognitive load approach” as the sole explanatory principle to understand deception. These studies have been exclusively on lies about negative actions (usually lies of suspects of [mock] crimes). Instead, we need to re-focus more generally on the cognitive processes involved in generating both lies and truths, not just on manipulations of cognitive load. Using Baddeley’s (2000, 2007, 2012) working memory model, which integrates verbal and visual processes in working memory with retrieval from long-term memory and control of action, not only verbal content cues but also nonverbal, paraverbal, and linguistic cues can be investigated within a single framework. The proposed model considers long-term semantic, episodic and autobiographical memory and their connections with working memory and action. It also incorporates ironic processes of mental control (Wegner, 1994, 2009), the role of scripts and schemata and retrieval cues and retrieval processes. Specific predictions of the model are outlined and support from selective studies is presented. The model is applicable to different types of reports, particularly about lies and truths about complex events, and to different modes of production (oral, hand-written, typed). Predictions regarding several moderator variables and methods to investigate them are proposed.