The PI IRAP : An alternative scoring algorithm for the IRAP using a probabilistic semiparametric effect size measure

Beyond vernacular: Measurement solutions to the lexical fallacy in disgust research

Disgust may play an important role in several mental disorders, in part because disgust seems impervious to corrective information, a feature noted long before it was studied by clinical psychologists. A deeper understanding of disgust could improve not only the treatment of mental disorders, but also other societal problems involving this peculiar emotion. In this paper, we review the measurement of disgust and identify issues that hold back progress in understanding how to treat this emotion. First, self-report measures of disgust, although optimized in terms of reliability, are compromised in terms of validity due to the "lexical fallacy," that is, the assumption that vernacular usage of emotion terms reveals natural kinds. Improved self-report measures that parse disgust from neighboring states of discomfort and disapproval can address this limitation, but these approaches are absent in clinical psychology. Second, "objective" measures of disgust, although free of vernacular limitations, require greater psychometric scrutiny. In a critical review, we find that most instrument-based measures fail to demonstrate adequate reliability, rendering them unsuitable for the individual differences research crucial to clinical psychology. In light of this assessment, we provide several recommendations for improving the reliability and validity of disgust measurement, including renewed attention to theory.

Cultural pressure and biased responding in free will attitudes

Whether you believe free will exists has profound effects on your behaviour, across different levels of processing, from simple motor action to social cognition. It is therefore important to understand which specific lay theories are held in the general public and why. Past research largely focused on investigating free will beliefs (FWB, 'Do you think free will exists?'), but largely ignored a second key aspect: free will attitudes (FWA, 'Do you like/value will?'). Attitudes are often independently predictive of behaviour, relative to beliefs, yet we currently know very little about FWAs in the general public. One key issue is whether such attitudes are subject to biased, socially desirable responding. The vast majority of the general public strongly believes in the existence of free will, which might create cultural pressure to value free will positively as well. In this registered report, we used a very large (N = 1100), open available dataset measuring implicit and explicit attitudes towards free will and determinism to address this issue. Our results indicate that both explicit and implicit attitudes towards free will are more positive than attitudes towards determinism. We also show that people experience cultural pressure to value free will, and to devalue determinism. Yet, we found no strong evidence that this cultural pressure affected either implicit or explicit attitudes in this dataset.