Effects of Pay-for-Performance for Primary Care Physicians on Preventable Diabetes-Related Hospitalization Costs Among Adults in New Brunswick, Canada: A Quasiexperimental Evaluation

Association of a Heart Failure Management Incentive in Primary Care With Clinical Outcomes: A Retrospective Cohort Study

BACKGROUND

We aim to examine the association between primary care physicians' billing of Q050A, a pay-for-performance heart failure (HF) management incentive fee code, and the composite outcome of mortality, hospitalization, and emergency department visits.

METHODS AND RESULTS

This population-based cohort study linked administrative health databases in Ontario, Canada, for patients with HF aged >66 years between January 1, 2008, and March 31, 2020. Cases were patients with HF who had a Q050A fee code billed. Cases and controls were matched 1:1 on age, sex, patient status on being rostered to a primary care physician, cardiologist, or internist visit in the 6 months before study enrollment, Johns Hopkins Adjusted Clinical Group resource use bands, days between HF diagnosis and study enrollment (±2 years), and the logit of the propensity score. A Cox proportional hazards model assessed the association of Q050A with the outcome. A total of 59 664 cases had a Q050A billed, whereas 244 883 patients did not. Before matching, patients who had a Q050A billed were more likely to be men (52% versus 49%), were rostered to a primary care physician (100% versus 96%), had a higher Charlson Comorbidity Index, and had higher health care costs. The mean follow-up was 481 days for cases and 530 days for controls. The composite outcome (hazard ratio, 1.11 [95% CI, 1.09-1.12]) was significantly higher for cases than controls.

CONCLUSIONS

The Q050A incentive improved financial compensation for primary care physicians managing patients with HF but was not associated with improvements in the outcome. Research on promoting evidence-based HF management is warranted.

Impact of prevention in primary care on costs in primary and secondary care for people with serious mental illness

A largely unexplored part of the financial incentive for physicians to participate in preventive care is the degree to which they are the residual claimant from any resulting cost savings. We examine the impact of two preventive activities for people with serious mental illness (care plans and annual reviews of physical health) by English primary care practices on costs in these practices and in secondary care. Using panel two-part models to analyze patient-level data linked across primary and secondary care, we find that these preventive activities in the previous year are associated with cost reductions in the current quarter both in primary and secondary care. We estimate that there are large beneficial externalities for which the primary care physician is not the residual claimant: the cost savings in secondary care are 4.7 times larger than the cost savings in primary care. These activities are incentivized in the English National Health Service but the total financial incentives for primary care physicians to participate were considerably smaller than the total cost savings produced. This suggests that changes to the design of incentives to increase the marginal reward for conducting these preventive activities among patients with serious mental illness could have further increased welfare.

A nationwide cohort investigation on pay-for-performance and major adverse limb events in patients with diabetes

A retrospective cohort study was conducted using claims data from Taiwan's National Health Insurance program to assess the effect of diabetic pay-for-performance (P4P) program on major adverse limb events (MALE) and major adverse cardiovascular events (MACE) in patients with type 2 diabetes mellitus (T2DM). This study included patients with T2DM who had completed or not completed a 1-year P4P program from 2002 to 2013. Propensity-score matching was used to balance the baseline characteristics between groups. The Cox proportional-hazard model and Fine and Gray subdistribution hazard model were used to examine the association between P4P and the risks of MALE, MACE, systemic thromboembolism (ST), heart failure (HF) hospitalization, and all-cause mortality. Patients who underwent the P4P program had a significantly decreased incidence of MALE (2.0% vs. 2.6%, subdistribution hazard ratio [SHR] 0.73, 95% CI 0.71-0.76). Regarding the individual components, the P4P group demonstrated lower risks for foot ulcer (1.1% vs 1.3%, SHR 0.80, 95% CI 0.77-0.84), gangrene (0.57% vs 0.93%, SHR 0.59, 95% CI 0.56-0.63), percutaneous transluminal angioplasty (0.61% vs 0.79%, SHR 0.72, 95% CI 0.68-0.77), and amputation (0.46% vs 0.75%, SHR 0.58, 95% CI 0.55-0.62). In addition, the risks of MACE, ST, HF hospitalization, and all-cause mortality were remarkably lower in the P4P group. The P4P program might significantly reduce critical events of MALE, MACE, ST, HF, and mortality in the diabetic population.

Primary Care Physicians in the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS): a Qualitative Investigation of Participants' Experiences, Self-Reported Practice Changes, and Suggestions for Program Administrators

BACKGROUND

While both administrators of pay-for-performance programs and practicing physicians strive to improve healthcare quality, they sometimes disagree on the best approach. The Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 mandated the creation of the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS), a program that incentivizes more than 700,000 physician participants to report on four domains of care, including healthcare quality. While MIPS performance scores were recently released, little is known about how primary care physicians (PCPs) and their practices are being affected by the program and what actions they are taking in response to MIPS.

OBJECTIVES

To (1) describe PCP perspectives and self-reported practice changes related to quality measurement under MIPS and (2) disseminate PCP suggestions for improving the program.

DESIGN

Qualitative study employing semi-structured interviews.

PARTICIPANTS

Twenty PCPs trained in internal medicine or family medicine who were expected to report under MIPS for calendar year 2017 were interviewed between October 2017 and June 2018. Eight PCPs self-reported to be knowledgeable about MIPS. Seven PCPs worked in small practices.

KEY RESULTS

Most PCPs identified advantages of quality measurement under MIPS, including the creation of practice-level systems for quality improvement. However, they also cited disadvantages, including administrative burdens and fears that practices serving vulnerable patients could be penalized. Many participants reported using technology or altering staffing to help with data collection and performance improvement. A few participants were considering selling small practices or joining larger ones to avoid administrative tasks. Suggestions for improving MIPS included simplifying the program to reduce administrative burdens, protecting practices serving vulnerable populations, and improving communication between program administrators and PCPs.

CONCLUSIONS

MIPS is succeeding in nudging PCPs to develop quality measurement and improvement systems, but PCPs are concerned that administrative burdens are leading to the diversion of clinical resources away from patient-centered care and negatively impacting patient and clinician satisfaction. Program administrators should improve communication with participants and consider simplifying the program to make it less burdensome. Future work should be done to investigate how technical assistance programs can target PCPs that serve vulnerable patient populations and are having difficulty adapting to MIPS.

Gendered effects of pay for performance among family physicians for chronic disease care: an economic evaluation in a context of universal health coverage

BACKGROUND

Despite increasing popularity among health organizations of pay for performance (P4P) for the provision of comprehensive care for chronic non-communicable diseases, evidence of its effectiveness in improving health system outcomes is weak. An important void in the evidence base is whether there are gendered differences in P4P uptake and in related outcomes amenable to healthcare improvement. This study assesses the gender-specific effects of P4P among family physicians on diabetes healthcare costs in a context of universal health coverage.

METHODS

We use population-based linked longitudinal administrative datasets on chronic disease cases, physician billings, hospital discharge abstracts, and physician and resident registries in the province of New Brunswick, Canada. We estimate the effects of introduction of a P4P scheme on excess public healthcare costs among cohorts of adult diabetes patients using propensity score-adjusted difference-in-differences regressions stratified by physician's gender.

RESULTS

We observed greater male physician uptake of incentive payments, seemingly exacerbating gender gaps in professional remuneration. Regression results indicated P4P did not lead to improved outcomes in terms of preventing hospitalization costs among patients, only measurable increases in compensation for both the male and female physician workforce.

CONCLUSIONS

While P4P was not attributed in this study to reduced hospital burden and enhanced sustainability of healthcare financing, incentive payments were found to be related to earning gaps by physician's gender. Decision-makers should consider that benefits of P4P be monitored not only for patient metrics but also for provider metrics in terms of gender equality especially given feminization of primary care medical workforces.