Equal egocentric bias in school-aged children with and without autism spectrum disorders

Normative values and diagnostic optimisation of three social cognition measures for autism and schizophrenia diagnosis in a healthy adolescent and adult sample

Awareness of the importance of assessing social cognition skills under conditions showing atypical social behaviours has increased over the years. However, the evaluation of the psychometric properties of the measures and the availability of normative values for the clinical context are still limited. This study aims to revise, provide normative values, and evaluate the clinical validity of the Italian version of three social cognition measures: Advanced Theory of Mind (A-ToM) task, the Emotion Attribution Task (EAT), and the Social Situation Task (SST). Measures were administered to 580 adolescents and adult healthy controls (age range 14-50). We performed differential item functioning and Rasch analysis to revise each task, so normative data of the revised measures were calculated. Moreover, the revised measures were administered to 38 individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and 35 individuals with schizophrenia spectrum disorders (SSD): ASD and SSD were matched by age, gender, and IQ with a control sample to evaluate clinical validity. ROC analysis showed that the SST is the best measure differentiating between healthy and clinical groups, compared to the A-ToM (AUCASD = 0.70; AUCSSD = 0.65) and EAT (AUCASD = 0.67; AUCSSD = 0.50), which showed poorer performance. For SSD diagnosis, two SST subscales (Violation and Gravity score) indicated the best accuracy (AUCs of 0.88 and 0.84, respectively); for the ASD diagnosis, we propose a combined score between the SST subscale and A-ToM (AUC = 0.86). The results suggest that the proposed measures can be used to support the diagnostic process and clinical practice.

Egocentric norm in health-based decision making of patients on the autistic spectrum

BACKGROUND

Individuals diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) without intellectual disability (ID) may have advanced mental reasoning; however, symptomology may vary within the population. Possible symptomology includes communication problems, difficulty relating to people, things, and events, and sensory sensitivity. Current concepts in determining health behavior are not applicable to the ASD without ID population.

AIM

The aim of this analysis is to define the concept of egocentric norm in the context of health-based decisions of adults diagnosed with ASD without ID and to support improved nursing practice with this population.

DESIGN

The Walker and Avant approach was used. Model, borderline, and contrary cases are offered.

DATA SOURCE

Literature search yielded 47 peer reviewed papers that were included in the analysis.

REVIEW METHODS

Uses of the concept were reviewed, following the Walker and Avant approach.

RESULTS

Egocentric norm is defined as an individual's ability to perceive, adapt, and respond to information and potential consequences of personal health behavior based on self-evaluation and the immediate environment with limited regard to peer and family influence.

CONCLUSIONS

The new concept of egocentric norm may account for the unique dynamics presented by adults with ASD without ID, which may impact health behaviors and actions.

Cognitive and Affective Aspects of Theory of Mind in Greek-Speaking Children with Autism Spectrum Disorders

Substantial research indicates that individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) have difficulties with Theory of Mind (ToM) abilities, but rarely have studies used a comprehensive battery to measure both the cognitive and affective aspects of ToM. The present study tested this ability in 24 Greek-speaking children with ASD (ages 7-14), and their performance was compared to 24 age-, gender- and language-matched typically developing controls. Results showed that ASD children's performance was selectively impaired in both ToM aspects, supporting the distinction between ToM components. This is the first study of ToM abilities among Greek-speaking children with ASD, and the findings confirm that children with ASD are experiencing difficulties with socio-emotional understanding across languages and cultures.

Measuring Individual Differences in Cognitive, Affective, and Spontaneous Theory of Mind Among School-Aged Children with Autism Spectrum Disorder

The present study examined individual differences in theory of mind (ToM) among a group of 60 children (7-11 years-old) with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and average intelligence. Using open-ended and structured tasks to measure affective ToM, cognitive ToM, and spontaneous social attribution, we explored the nature of ToM and assessed whether ToM predicts the phenotypic heterogeneity in ASD through structural equation modeling. Affective ToM uniquely predicted social symptom severity, whereas no ToM types predicted parent reported social functioning. Our findings suggest that differentiating among theoretical components is crucial for future ToM research in ASD, and ToM challenges related to reasoning about others' emotions may be particularly useful in distinguishing children with worse social symptoms of ASD.

The unreliability of egocentric bias across self-other and memory-belief distinctions in the Sandbox Task

Humans are often considered egocentric creatures, particularly (and ironically) when we are supposed to take another person's perspective over our own (i.e. when we use our theory of mind). We investigated the underlying causes of this phenomenon. We gave young adult participants a false belief task (Sandbox Task) in which objects were first hidden at one location by a protagonist and then moved to a second location within the same space but in the protagonist's absence. Participants were asked to indicate either where the protagonist remembered the item to be (reasoning about another's memory), believed it to be (reasoning about another's false belief), or where the protagonist would look for it (action prediction of another based on false belief). The distance away from Location A (the original one) towards Location B (the new location) was our measure of egocentric bias. We found no evidence that egocentric bias varied according to reasoning type, and no evidence that participants actually were more biased when reasoning about another person than when simply recalling the first location from memory. We conclude that the Sandbox Task paradigm may not be sensitive enough to draw out consistent effects related to mental state reasoning in young adults.

Egocentric bias across mental and non-mental representations in the Sandbox Task

In the Sandbox Task, participants indicate where a protagonist who has a false belief about the location of an object will look for that object in a trough filled with a substrate that conceals the hidden object's location. Previous findings that participants tend to indicate a location closer to where they themselves know the object to be located have been interpreted as evidence of egocentric bias when attributing mental states to others. We tested the assumption that such biases occur as a result of reasoning about mental states specifically. We found that participants showed more egocentric bias when reasoning from a protagonist's false belief than from their own memory, but found equivalent levels of bias when they were asked to indicate where a false film would depict the object as when they were asked about a protagonist's false belief. Our findings suggest that that egocentric biases found in adult false belief tasks are more likely due to a general difficulty with reasoning about false representations than a specialised difficulty with reasoning about false mental states.

Social perspective taking is associated with self-reported prosocial behavior and regional cortical thickness across adolescence

Basic perspective taking and mentalizing abilities develop in childhood, but recent studies indicate that the use of social perspective taking to guide decisions and actions has a prolonged development that continues throughout adolescence. Here, we aimed to replicate this research and investigate the hypotheses that individual differences in social perspective taking in adolescence are associated with real-life prosocial and antisocial behavior and differences in brain structure. We used an experimental approach and a large cross-sectional sample (n = 293) of participants aged 7–26 years old to assess age-related improvement in social perspective taking usage during performance of a version of the director task. In subsamples, we then tested how individual differences in social perspective taking were related to self-reported prosocial behavior and peer relationship problems on the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (n = 184) and to MRI measures of regional cortical thickness and surface area (n = 226). The pattern of results in the director task replicated previous findings by demonstrating continued improvement in use of social perspective taking across adolescence. The study also showed that better social perspective taking usage is associated with more self-reported prosocial behavior, as well as to thinner cerebral cortex in regions in the left hemisphere encompassing parts of the caudal middle frontal and precentral gyri and lateral parietal regions. These associations were observed independently of age and might partly reflect individual developmental variability. The relevance of cortical development was additionally supported by indirect effects of age on social perspective taking usage via cortical thickness.

Testing the validity of a continuous false belief task in 3- to 7-year-old children

In two studies, we examined young children's performance on the paper-and-pencil version of the Sandbox task, a continuous measure of false belief, and its relations with other false belief and inhibition tasks. In Study 1, 96 children aged 3 to 7years completed three false belief tasks (Sandbox, Unexpected Contents, and Appearance/Reality) and two inhibition tasks (Head-Shoulders-Knees-Toes and Grass/Snow). Results revealed that false belief bias-a measure of egocentrism-on the Sandbox task correlated with age but not with the Unexpected Contents or Appearance/Reality task or with measures of inhibition after controlling for age. In Study 2, 90 3- to 7-year-olds completed five false belief tasks (Sandbox, Unexpected Contents, Appearance/Reality, Change of Location, and a second-order false belief task), two inhibition tasks (Simon Says and Grass/Snow), and a receptive vocabulary task (Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test). Results showed that false belief bias on the Sandbox task correlated negatively with age and with the Change of Location task but not with the other false belief or inhibition tasks after controlling for age and receptive vocabulary. The Sandbox task shows promise as an age-sensitive measure of false belief performance during early childhood and shows convergent and discriminant validity.