Not just a sum of its parts: How tasks of the theory of mind scale relate to executive function across time

Culturally constituted universals: Evidential basis of belief matters

Differences in the sequence with which children pass the tasks in Wellman and Liu's (2004) theory of mind (ToM) battery is increasingly bringing into question the universal and cultural specifics of children's developing understanding of others' minds. Children from China, Iran, and Turkey pass the knowledge access (KA) task of the battery earlier than they pass the diverse beliefs (DB) task (e.g., Selcuk et al., 2018). This pattern is the reverse of what has been documented with children from Australia and the US (e.g., Peterson et al., 2005). This paper presents three studies with Turkish samples that explore the possible reasons for developmental sequence and performance differences in the ToM battery. Study 1 investigated Turkish-speaking adults' judgments of appropriateness for different epistemic verbs as used in the DB and false belief (FB) tasks. Study 2 investigated whether adults' performance (i.e., accuracy, reaction time) on FB tasks were affected by culturally preferred uses of these verbs. Collectively these studies showed that adults found different epistemic language ("guess," "think," and the Turkish-specific "falsely think") to be appropriate for different belief-based tasks. However, there was no difference in adults' performance based on epistemic language. In Study 3, Turkish-speaking preschoolers' performance in belief-related tasks based on variations in epistemic language and epistemic features (i.e., presence of evidence) was investigated. Among five modifications, Turkish children benefited only from a modification that involved the manipulation of the epistemological basis for ambiguous beliefs (i.e., visual evidence for belief). RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS: Turkish adults find different epistemic language ("guess," "think," and the Turkish-specific "falsely-think") to be appropriate for different belief-based tasks (diverse and false belief tasks). Turkish adults' performance on false belief (FB) tasks is not affected by epistemic language. Turkish children perform better in diverse beliefs (DB) task if an epistemological basis for ambiguous beliefs (i.e., visual evidence for either belief) is provided.

Theory of Mind as a Correlate of Bystanders' Reasoning About Intergroup Bullying of Syrian Refugee Youth

The current study examined how ingroup and outgroup Theory of Mind (ToM) predicts children’s and adolescents’ reasoning for their acceptability judgments of intergroup bullying of Syrian refugee peers and group support of intergroup bullying. Participants included 587 Turkish middle (n = 372, M_age = 12.19, SD = 1.01; 208 girls) and high school (n = 215, M_age = 14.81, SD = 0.97; 142 girls) students. Participants read a bias-based bullying story with a Syrian refugee peer targeted by an ingroup Turkish peer. Then, participants rated the acceptability of bullying and group support of bullying and were presented with a reasoning question (Why?) after each acceptability question (bullying and group support of bullying). Reasoning codes included Fairness, Refugee Status/War, Prejudice and Discrimination, Harm, Prescriptive Norms, Group Functioning, and Relationship with the Bully. Participants’ ingroup and outgroup ToM abilities (measured using the Strange Stories) were evaluated as predictors of reasoning. Results documented that middle school students were more likely to attribute mental states to their ingroup members compared to outgroup members while high school students’ ToM performance did not differ across contexts. Further, the more unacceptable participants judged bullying to be, the more they reasoned about the bullying by referencing fairness, refugee status, discrimination, and harm. Results also documented that ingroup and outgroup ToM were positively related to attribution to fairness and participants’ usage of multiple reasoning judgments while only outgroup ToM was a significant predictor of reasoning around refugee status/war, discrimination, and prejudice. The findings provide implications for intervention programs that tackle intergroup bullying by examining bystanders’ social cognitive skills in a specific context.

Competitive children, cooperative mothers? Effect of various social factors on the retrospective and prospective use of theory of mind

Our capacity to attribute mental states to others, or theory of mind (ToM), affects the way in which we manage social interactions. Likewise, the social scenario in which we find ourselves probably influences our use of ToM. In this study, 6-year-old children and adult women participated in pairs in a task where participants needed to infer their partner's behavior considering the partner's visual perception (Experiment 1), knowledge (Experiment 2), and false belief (Experiment 3) regarding the placement of rewards under cups. The results were analyzed according to the temporal direction of the inference (past or future behavior of the partner), the social context (competition or cooperation), and-in the case of women-the type of social relationship with their partner (another adult or their own child). Children solved only the visual perception task, and adults solved the three tasks but performed better in the visual perception task than in the false belief task, suggesting that not only developmental issues but also differences in the intrinsic difficulty of the tasks underlie children's results. The temporal direction of the inference, in contrast, did not influence their results. Whereas children performed better in the competition context, adults performed better in the cooperation context in one experiment. Moreover, women avoided competing against their own child, and even cooperated with her or him when this was against their own interest, suggesting that cooperation between mothers and children might have been a key driving force in the evolution of ToM in our species.

Cognitive processes predicting advanced theory of mind in the broader autism phenotype

Little is known about executive functions (EFs) associated with advanced theory of mind (ToM) abilities. We aimed to determine if advanced ToM abilities were reduced in individuals with subclinical traits of autism spectrum disorder (ASD), known as the "Broader Autism Phenotype" (BAP), and identify the EFs that predicted unimpaired performance on an advanced ToM task, the faux pas test. We assessed 29 participants (13 males) with the BAP who were relatives of children with ASD. Thirteen participants showed reduced ability to understand a faux pas. A discriminant function analysis correctly classified 79% of cases as impaired or unimpaired, with high sensitivity (80%) and specificity (77%), which was best predicted by language-mediated EFs, including verbal generativity, working memory, cognitive inhibition, and flexibility. Autism Res 2020, 13: 921-934. © 2019 International Society for Autism Research, Wiley Periodicals, Inc. LAY SUMMARY: Little is known about the complex cognitive processes that enable accurate interpretation of another person's thoughts and emotions, known as "theory of mind." In relatives of individuals with autism, who had mild traits of autism themselves, approximately half had difficulty interpreting situations involving a social faux pas. Cognitive inhibition and flexibility, working memory, and verbal generativity were related to, and appeared to be protective for, unimpaired understanding of a faux pas.

Impairment in Theory of Mind in Parkinson's Disease Is Explained by Deficits in Inhibition

Objective

Several studies have reported that people with Parkinson's disease (PD) perform poorly on tests of 'Theory of Mind' (ToM), suggesting impairment in the ability to understand and infer other people's thoughts and feelings. However, few studies have sought to separate the processes involved in social reasoning from those involved in managing the inhibitory demands on these tests. In this study, we investigated the contribution of inhibition to ToM performance in PD.

Methods

18 PD patients and 22 age-matched healthy controls performed a ToM test that separates the ability to infer someone else's perspective from the ability to inhibit one's own. Participants also completed a battery of standard measures of social and executive functioning, including measures of inhibition.

Results

The PD patients performed worse on the ToM test only when the inhibitory demands were high. When the level of inhibition required was reduced, there were no significant group differences. Furthermore, executive impairments in PD patients were limited to measures of inhibition, with disadvantages associated with poorer ToM performance in this group.

Conclusions

This study provides convincing evidence that the apparent impairment observed on ToM tests in PD is explained by deficits in inhibition.

The contributions of executive functions to mathematical learning difficulties and mathematical talent during adolescence

Are mathematical learning difficulties caused by impairment of the abilities that underlie mathematical talent? Or are mathematical difficulties and talent qualitatively different? The main goal of this study was to determine whether mathematical learning difficulties are explained by the same executive functions as mathematical talent. We screened a pool of 2,682 first-year high school students and selected 48 for evaluation, dividing them into three groups: those with mathematical learning difficulties (n = 16), those with typical performance (n = 16), and those with mathematical talent (n = 16). Adolescents from the learning difficulties and talented groups had age, reading skills, and verbal and non-verbal intelligence that were similar to those of the typical performance group. Participants were administered a suite of tasks to evaluate verbal and visual short-term memory and executive functions of inhibition, shifting, and updating. Different executive functions showed different contributions at the two ends of the math ability continuum: lower levels of performance in updating visual information were related to mathematical learning difficulties, while greater shifting abilities were related to mathematical talent. Effect sizes for the differences in performance between groups were large (Hedges' g > 0.8). These results suggest that different executive functions are associated with mathematical learning difficulties and mathematical talent. We discuss how these differences in executive functions could be related to the different types of mathematical abilities that distinguish the three groups.