How do infants and adults process communicative events in real time?

Do face-to-face interactions support 6-month-olds' understanding of the communicative function of speech?

Infants by 6 months recognize that speech communicates information between third parties. We investigated whether 6-month-olds always expect speech to communicate or whether they also consider social features of communication, like how interlocutors engage with one another. A small sample of infants watched an actor (the Speaker) choose one of two objects to play with (the target). When the Speaker could no longer reach her target object, she turned to a new actor (the Listener) and said a nonsense word. During speech, the actors were either face-to-face, the Speaker was facing away from the Listener, or the reverse. When the actors had been face-to-face, infants looked longer when the Listener selected the non-target object compared to the target. Infants looked equally regardless of what the Listener chose when either actor had been disengaged. Area-of-interest gaze coding suggests that infants were similarly interested in the interaction across conditions, but their pattern of attention to Speaker and Listener differed when the Listener was disengaged during speech. Although these experiments should be replicated with a larger sample, the findings provide initial evidence that 6-month-olds do not expect speech alone to communicate, but also attend to the social context in which speech is produced.

Infants differentiate between successful and failed communication in a false-belief context

Communication is based on social interaction, that is, interlocutors sharing attention to the intentions that they communicate about. In this study, we asked whether infants are aware of the fact that for information to be transferred, both interlocutors need to be present and share attention. Using a violation-of-expectation paradigm created to test infants' understanding of others' false beliefs, we asked whether 18-month-olds (n = 84) understood that correcting an agent's false belief via communication requires that the agent discerns the verbal statement. Participants saw how an agent put a toy into a box and left. An assistant then moved the toy into a cup. The intervention phase varied between three conditions: The agent and the assistant communicated about the actual location of the toy (full-communication), the agent was absent during the assistant's statement (incomplete-communication) or no communication took place (no-communication). At test, the agent reached into either the box or the cup. When no communication took place, infants expected the agent to search the toy at the original location. Full communication resulted in infants' expectations that the recipient's actions were altered, that is, the infants expected her to search the toy at the actual location. In contrast, incomplete communication did not yield clear expectations. Eighteen-month-olds thus seem to understand that for information to be transferred, it is a precondition that the recipient of the communicative act must be present and share attention during the communicator's statement. Only then communication can change a recipient's mental state.

Are linguistic and social-pragmatic abilities separable in neurotypical infants and infants later diagnosed with ASD?

Adult humans process communicative interactions by recognizing that information is being communicated through speech (linguistic ability) and simultaneously evaluating how to respond appropriately (social-pragmatic ability). These abilities may originate in infancy. Infants understand how speech communicates in social interactions, helping them learn language and how to interact with others. Infants later diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder (ASD), who show deficits in social-pragmatic abilities, differ in how they attend to the linguistic and social-pragmatic information in their environment. Despite their interdependence, experimental measures of language and social-pragmatic attention are often studied in isolation in infancy. Thus, the extent to which language and social-pragmatic abilities are related constructs remains unknown. Understanding how related or separable language and social-pragmatic abilities are in infancy may reveal whether these abilities are supported by distinguishable developmental mechanisms. This study uses a single communicative scene to examine whether real-time linguistic and social-pragmatic attention are separable in neurotypical infants and infants later diagnosed with ASD, and whether attending to linguistic and social-pragmatic information separately predicts later language and social-pragmatic abilities 1 year later. For neurotypical 12-month-olds and 12-month-olds later diagnosed with ASD, linguistic attention was not correlated with concurrent social-pragmatic attention. Furthermore, infants' real-time attention to the linguistic and social-pragmatic aspects of the scene at 12 months predicted and distinguished language and social-pragmatic abilities at 24 months. Language and social-pragmatic attention during communication are thus separable in infancy and may follow distinguishable developmental trajectories. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).