Developmental evidence for a link between the inherence bias in explanation and psychological essentialism

Biological Essentialism Correlates With (But Doesn't Cause?) Intergroup Bias

People with biological essentialist beliefs about social groups also tend to endorse biased beliefs about individuals in those groups, including intensified emphasis on the group, stereotypes, and prejudices. These correlations could be due to biological essentialism causing bias, and some experimental studies support this causal direction. Given this prior work, we expected to find that biological essentialism would lead to increased bias compared with a control condition and set out to extend this prior work in a new direction (regarding "value-based" essentialism). But although the manipulation affected essentialist beliefs and essentialist beliefs were correlated with group emphasis (Study 1), stereotyping (Studies 2, 3a, 3b, and 3c), prejudice (Studies 3a), there was no evidence that biological essentialism caused these outcomes (NTotal = 1,903). Given these findings, our initial research question became moot. We thus focus on reexamining the relationship between essentialism and bias.

How barriers become invisible: Children are less sensitive to constraints that are stable over time

When making inferences about the mental lives of others (e.g., others' preferences), it is critical to consider the extent to which the choices we observe are constrained. Prior research on the development of this tendency indicates a contradictory pattern: Children show remarkable sensitivity to constraints in traditional experimental paradigms, yet often fail to consider real-world constraints and privilege inherent causes instead. We propose that one explanation for this discrepancy may be that real-world constraints are often stable over time and lose their salience. The present research tested whether children (N = 133, 5- to 12-year-old mostly US children; 55% female, 45% male) become less sensitive to an actor's constraints after first observing two constrained actors (Stable condition) versus after first observing two actors in contexts with greater choice (Not Stable condition). We crossed the stability of the constraint with the type of constraint: either the constraint was deterministic such that there was only one option available (No Other Option constraint) or, in line with many real-world constraints, the constraint was probabilistic such that there was another option, but it was difficult to access (Hard to Access constraint). Results indicated that children in the Stable condition became less sensitive to the probabilistic Hard to Access constraint across trials. Notably, we also found that children's sensitivity to constraints was enhanced in the Not Stable condition regardless of whether the constraint was probabilistic or deterministic. We discuss implications for children's sensitivity to real-world constraints. RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS: This research addresses the apparent contradiction that children are sensitive to constraints in experimental paradigms but are often insensitive to constraints in the real world. One explanation for this discrepancy is that constraints in the real world tend to be stable over time and may lose their salience. When probabilistic constraints (i.e., when a second option is available but hard to access) are stable, children become de-sensitized to constraints across trials. First observing contexts with greater choice increases children's sensitivity to both probabilistic and deterministic constraints.

The inherence bias in preschoolers' explanations for achievement differences: replication and extension

Two studies examined how preschoolers (N = 610; French) explain differences in achievement. Replicating and extending previous research, the results revealed that children invoke more inherent factors (e.g., intelligence) than extrinsic factors (e.g., access to educational resources) when explaining why some children do better in school than others. This inherence bias in explanation can contribute to inequalities in education (e.g., the early-emerging disparities based on social class) by portraying them as fair and legitimate even when they are not.

Verbally Highlighting Extrinsic Causes of Novel Social Disparities Helps Children View Low-Status Groups as Structurally Disadvantaged Rather Than Personally Inferior

As part of their “essentialist” intuitions, young children tend to form personal attributions for observed intergroup differences – attributing them to groups’ intrinsic natures or inborn characteristics. Much research has linked this essentialist view of social groups with prejudiced attitudes. However, less research has explored children’s capacity to form structural attributions for observed intergroup differences – attributing them to groups’ extrinsic circumstances or access to opportunities – or how structural attributions relate to social attitudes. Structural attributions could enable children to view low-status groups as extrinsically disadvantaged rather than intrinsically inferior. We were interested in whether verbally highlighting the extrinsic causes of novel social status disparities could support young children in forming structural attributions for them, thereby mitigating the formation of prejudice toward novel low-status groups. To investigate, we introduced participants (n=106 5- and 6-year olds) to novel social status disparities that could be attributed to either intrinsic or extrinsic causes, and we framed the disparities in either intrinsic, neutral, or extrinsic terms. We then assessed children’s attributions for the disparities (through two measures: explanations and interventions) and their social attitudes toward the groups (through two measures: friendship preferences and prize allocations). Results indicated that participants tended to provide mostly personal attributions overall but that extrinsic framing led them to provide significantly more structural attributions. Extrinsic framing did not significantly impact social attitudes overall, but exploratory analyses revealed that it impacted participants’ friendship preferences in particular. Together, results suggest that verbally highlighting extrinsic causes can disrupt children’s intuitive tendency toward personal attributions, with promising implications for their views of low-status groups.

Does essentialism lead to racial prejudice? It is not so Black and White

Over half a century ago, psychologists hypothesized that social essentialism, an intuitive theory comprising the beliefs that social categories reflect naturally occurring distinctions and that category members share an underlying and fundamental essence, lays the foundation for prejudice. In the intervening decades, research has shown that although essentialism sometimes leads to prejudicial beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors, it does not always, sometimes even leading to decreased prejudice toward stigmatized groups. The relation between essentialism and prejudice is clearly complex, but this review proposes four questions that will help clarify how and when essentialism leads to prejudice: (1) What precisely is essentialism and how might a more nuanced understanding of its components and structure shed light on the mechanisms by which essentialist beliefs contribute to prejudice?; (2) Do essentialist beliefs orient group-based prejudice toward out-groups or toward stigmatized groups, and what are the consequences of essentialist beliefs among those with minoritized identities?; (3) Do essentialist beliefs engender group-based prejudice directly, or must essentialist beliefs interact with additional information or belief systems to lead to negative consequences?; and (4) Do essentialist beliefs lay a foundation for group-based prejudice to develop, or is essentialism strategically invoked to justify existing prejudice? By posing these questions, describing what is currently known about each, and proposing future lines of inquiry that focus on the importance of including participants from a diverse set of backgrounds and across developmental periods, this review aims to stimulate research studies best designed to fill the gaps in our knowledge. By understanding how and when essentialism contributes to prejudice, we will be better equipped to use this early-emerging, but malleable, aspect of cognition to decrease prejudice and create a more equitable society.

What is social essentialism and how does it develop?

Social essentialism consists of the commonly held belief that certain ways of categorizing people (e.g., gender and race) reflect meaningful, fundamental distinctions found in nature-that some kind of category "essence" (e.g., something in their blood or their DNA) explains why groups of people (such as boys and girls) are different from one another. Yet as common as they are, essentialist beliefs can give rise to adverse consequences, including stereotyping and social prejudice. In this chapter, we examine the development of social essentialism. To begin, we briefly address the evidence that these beliefs are the result of developmental processes that unfold beginning in early childhood (and not something innate that children are born with). Then, we consider the nature of those processes; specifically, how basic processes underlying conceptual development give rise to different components of essentialist beliefs. We then address how different essentialist beliefs might be integrated into a coherent essentialist view of a category, and finally into a coherent essentialist view of a domain.

Public Understanding of Behavioral Genetics: Integrating Heuristic Thinking, Motivated Reasoning and Planned Social Change Theories for Better Communication Strategies

The field of behavioral genetics is experiencing a revolution following the development of genome-wide association studies and the availability of large datasets from international consortia. This rapid change could increase the existing gaps between basic research, translation, and public understanding of science. In the present work, we aim to synthesize key explanations of how public understanding of socio-scientific issues develop. We propose that integrating dual-process, motivated reasoning, and change management theories will increase the extent to which we understand, and can change, how people respond to findings from behavior genetics.