Conceptual continuity in the development of intent-based moral judgment

Being nice by choice: The effect of counterfactual reasoning on children's social evaluations

The ability to engage in counterfactual thinking (reason about what else could have happened) is critical to learning, agency, and social evaluation. However, not much is known about how individual differences in counterfactual reasoning may play a role in children's social evaluations. In the current study, we investigate how prompting children to engage in counterfactual thinking about positive moral actions impacts children's social evaluations. Eighty-seven 4-8-year-olds were introduced to a character who engaged in a positive moral action (shared a sticker with a friend) and asked about what else the character could have done with the sticker (counterfactual simulation). Children were asked to generate either a high number of counterfactuals (five alternative actions) or a low number of counterfactuals (one alternative action). Children were then asked a series of social evaluation questions contrasting that character with one who did not have a choice and had no alternatives (was told to give away the sticker to his friend). Results show that children who generated selfish counterfactuals were more likely to positively evaluate the character with choice than children who did not generate selfish counterfactuals, suggesting that generating counterfactuals most distant from the chosen action (prosociality) leads children to view prosocial actions more positively. We also found age-related changes: as children got older, regardless of the type of counterfactuals generated, they were more likely to evaluate the character with choice more positively. These results highlight the importance of counterfactual reasoning in the development of moral evaluations. RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS: Older children were more likely to endorse agents who choose to share over those who do not have a choice. Children who were prompted to generate more counterfactuals were more likely to allocate resources to characters with choice. Children who generated selfish counterfactuals more positively evaluated agents with choice. Comparable to theories suggesting children punish willful transgressors more than accidental transgressors, we propose children also consider free will when making positive moral evaluations.

Intent-Based Moral Judgment in Old Age

OBJECTIVES

Recent studies support the idea of an intent-to-outcome shift in moral judgments with age. We further assessed whether a reduced reliance on intentions is associated with aging in a preregistered study with 73 younger (20-41 years) and 79 older (70-84 years) adults, group-matched on education level.

METHOD

Participants were presented with a set of moral cases to evaluate, created by varying orthogonally the valence (neutral, negative) of the information regarding the agent's intentions and the action's outcomes.

RESULTS

The two age groups did not differ in the extent they relied on intentions in moral judgment.

DISCUSSION

These results suggest that an intent-to-outcome shift might not be found in all aging populations, challenging prevailing theories suggesting that aging is necessarily associated with a reduced reliance on intentions.

Children's moral reasoning about self- versus other-benefiting public health measures

The COVID-19 pandemic has introduced novel public health measures such as masking and social distancing. In adults, framing these behaviors as benefiting others versus the self has been shown to affect people's perceptions of public health measures and willingness to comply. Here we asked whether self- versus other-oriented frames of novel public health measures influence children's endorsement and moral reasoning. Children aged 5 to 10 years viewed hypothetical dilemmas of aliens in which we manipulated the frame (other-oriented or self-oriented) of the prevention behavior and the severity (high or low) of the potential harm. Across two studies (Study 1: N = 48; Study 2: N = 61), results showed that across ages framing the behaviors as other-oriented, but not self-oriented, yielded more positive ratings of individuals who followed the public health measures and more negative ratings of those who did not. Across both frames, children generally endorsed these public health measures when the severity was high. Children used more moralizing concepts in other-oriented frames and were more critical of intentional transgressions over accidental transgressions, demonstrating further evidence that other-oriented frames induce moral reasoning. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these framing effects for sociomoral reasoning and action.

Five-year-old children value reasons in apologies for belief-based accidents

Accidents can be intent-based (unintended action-unintended outcome) or belief-based (intended action-unintended outcome). As compared to intent-based accidents, giving reasons is more crucial for belief-based accidents because the transgressor appears to have intentionally transgressed. In Study 1, UK-based preschoolers who were native English speakers (N = 96, 53 girls, collected 2020-2021) witnessed two intent-based or belief-based accidents; one transgressor apologized, the other apologized with a reason. Five-year-olds, but not 4-year-olds, favored the reason-giving transgressor following a belief-based accident but not an intent-based accident (where an apology sufficed). In Study 2, 5-year-olds (N = 48, 25 girls, collected 2021) distinguished between "good" and "bad" reasons for the harm caused. Thus, 5-year-old children recognize when reasons should accompany apologies and account for the quality of these reasons.

Toddlers' social evaluations of agents who act on false beliefs

Mature social evaluations privilege agents' intentions over the outcomes of their actions, but young children often privilege outcomes over intentions in verbal tasks probing their social evaluations. In three experiments (N = 118), we probed the development of intention-based social evaluation and mental state reasoning using nonverbal methods with 15-month-old toddlers. Toddlers viewed scenarios depicting a protagonist who sought to obtain one of two toys, each inside a different box, as two other agents observed. Then, the boxes' contents were switched in the absence of the protagonist and either in the presence or the absence of the other agents. When the protagonist returned, one agent opened the box containing the protagonist's desired toy (a positive outcome), and the other opened the other box (a neutral outcome). When both agents had observed the toys move to their current locations, the toddlers preferred the agent who opened the box containing the desired toy. In contrast, when the agents had not seen the toys move and therefore should have expected the desired toy's location to be unchanged, the toddlers preferred the agent who opened the box that no longer contained the desired toy. Thus, the toddlers preferred the agent who intended to make the protagonist's desired toy accessible, even when its action, guided by a false belief concerning that toy's location, did not produce a positive outcome. Well before children connect beliefs to social behavior in verbal tasks, toddlers engage in intention-based evaluations of social agents with false beliefs.

Infants' intention-based evaluations of distributive actions

Recent research revealed that infants attend to agents' intentions when they evaluate helping actions. The current study investigated whether infants also consider agents' intentions when they evaluate distributive actions. In Experiment 1, 9-month-old infants were first shown two failed attempts to perform a distribution. In the "failed equal distribution," the distributor first tried to reach one of the recipients to deliver an apple, failed, and then attempted to reach the other possible recipient to deliver a different apple and also failed. In the "failed unequal distribution," a different distributor always tried unsuccessfully to reach the same beneficiary. Then, in the test phase, infants were presented with the two distributors side by side, and infants' spontaneous preferential looking and reaching actions were recorded. We found a reliable preference for the equal distributor in both the visual and manual responses. Experiments 2 and 3 helped to rule out alternative explanations based on perceptual cues and affiliative biases. Overall, these findings suggest that infants' ability to evaluate distributive actions relies not only on the outcomes but also on the distributors' intentions.

EXPRESS: Judging accidental harm: reasoning style modulates the weight of intention and harm severity

When judging a perpetrator who harmed someone accidentally, humans rely on distinct information pertaining to the perpetrator and victim. The present study investigates how reasoning style modulates the contribution of the victim's harm and the perpetrator's intention to third-party judgment of accidental harm. In two pre-registered online experiments, we simultaneously manipulated harm severity and the perpetrator's intention. Participants completed reasoning measures as well as a moral judgment task consisting of short narratives which depicted the interaction between a perpetrator and a victim. In experiment 1, we manipulated the perpetrator's intent to harm (accidental vs. intentional harm) and the victim's harm (mild vs. severe harm). In experiment 2, we aimed to manipulate intent in accidental harm scenarios exclusively, using positive or neutral intents and manipulating harm severity (mild vs. severe harm). As expected, intent and harm severity moderated participants' moral judgment of acceptability, punishment and blame. Most importantly, in both experiments, the perpetrator's intent not only interacted with outcome severity but also polarized moral judgments in participants with a more deliberative reasoning style. While moral judgments of more intuitive reasoners were less sensitive to intent, more deliberative reasoners were more forgiving of accidental harm, especially following mild harm. These findings extend previous studies by showing that reasoning style interacts with intent and harm severity to shape moral judgment of accidents.

They should have known better: The roles of negligence and outcome in moral judgements of accidental actions

Two experiments were conducted to investigate the relative influence of agents' negligence and their actions' unintended outcomes on moral judgements. In Study 1, 343 participants were asked in an online questionnaire about a driver whose level of negligence, and the severity of the outcome, were varied systematically. Each judged how much punishment and blame the driver deserved, and rated her negligence, causal responsibility, and intentionality. In Study 2, 341 participants completed the same questionnaire, and also judged the driver's wrongness and the outcome's severity. In both studies, judgements were strongly influenced by negligence; blame was also affected by causal responsibility, and wrongness by intention, but the relatively slight outcome effect on blame and wrongness was largely mediated by negligence. In contrast, both negligence and outcome had substantial effects on punishment judgements; most participants assigned high levels of punishment when, and only when, the outcome was negative and the agent was negligent. These findings shed light on the intriguing phenomenon of moral luck, and indicate that it applies more to punishment judgements than to blame and wrongness. They also indicate that when no negligence information is provided in the description of accidents (as in many previous studies), participants often attribute negligence to agents and judge them accordingly. It seems that the effect of outcome on moral judgements has often been overestimated by researchers, and that of negligence underestimated.

But they weren't being careful! Role of theory of mind in moral judgments about victim and transgressor negligence

Previous research showed that children are influenced not only by intentions and outcomes but also by transgressor negligence in their moral judgments. The current study investigated the role of transgressor and victim negligence on children's moral judgments. Children's false-belief theory of mind understanding (FBU ToM) was examined as a possible factor that might shape moral judgments in contexts involving negligence. Children (N = 117, M_age = 5.41 years, range = 3-8) were presented with two stories involving property damage and physical harm where negligence was manipulated and with a series of questions assessing moral judgments regarding act acceptability of the transgressor and victim, punishment, and assessments of alternative actions. FBU ToM was measured with a false-content task. Children with higher FBU ToM were more likely to consider both transgressor and victim negligence in their moral judgments across different transgressions. The findings have implications for how social cognitive abilities interact with transgressor and victim negligence in moral decisions.

The Effect of Cognitive Load on Intent-Based Moral Judgment

When making a moral judgment, people largely care about two factors: Who did it (causal responsibility), and did they intend to (intention)? Since Piaget's seminal studies, we have known that as children mature, they gradually place greater emphasis on intention, and less on mere bad outcomes, when making moral judgments. Today, we know that this developmental shift has several signature properties. Recently, it has been shown that when adults make moral judgments under cognitive load, they exhibit a pattern similar to young children; that is, their judgments become notably more outcome based. Here, we show that all of the same signature properties that accompany the outcome-to-intent shift in childhood characterize the "intent-to-outcome" shift obtained under cognitive load in adults. These findings hold important implications for current theories of moral judgment.

When a Circle Becomes the Letter O: Young Children's Conceptualization of Learning and Its Relation With Theory of Mind Development

In two independent yet complementary studies, the current research explored the developmental changes of young children’s conceptualization of learning, focusing the role of knowledge change and learning intention, and its association with their developing theory of mind (ToM) ability. In study 1, 75 children between 48 and 86 months of age (M = 65.45, SD = 11.45, 36 girls) judged whether a character with or without a genuine knowledge change had learned. The results showed that younger children randomly attributed learning between genuine knowledge change and accidental coincidence that did not involve knowledge change. Children’s learning judgments in familiar contexts improved with age and correlated with their ToM understanding. However, the correlation was no longer significant once age was held constant. Another sample of 72 children aged between 40 and 90 months (M = 66.87, SD = 11.83, 31 girls) participated in study 2, where children were asked to judge whether the story protagonists intended to learn and whether they eventually learned. The results suggested that children over-attributed learning intention to discovery and implicit learning. Stories with conflict between the learning intention and outcome appeared to be most challenging for children. Children’s intention judgment was correlated with their ToM understanding, and ToM marginally predicted intention judgment when the effect of age was accounted for. The implication of the findings for school readiness was discussed. Training studies and longitudinal designs in the future are warranted to better understand the relation between ToM development and children’s learning understanding.

Judging accidental harm: Due care and foreseeability of side effects

Both in philosophy and in cognitive psychology, models of moral judgment posit that individuals take into account both agents’ intentions and actions’ outcomes. The present research focused on a third crucial piece of information, agents’ negligence. In Study 1, participants judged the moral wrongness and punishability of agents’ actions that resulted in negative side effects. In the scenarios, we orthogonally manipulated whether the agent acted with or without due care and whether she had or did not have information to foresee the negative side effects of her actions. Participants judged careless agents more condemnable than careful agents, especially when negative side effects could have been easily foreseen. In Study 2, we manipulated due care in acting in cases where the agent’s primary intention was to bring about a certain outcome without knowing that such outcome would actually be harmful. Here information about the foreseeability of negative outcomes was not provided, and participants judged actions performed with care more wrong and punishable than actions performed without care. This suggests that sometimes acting carefully and nevertheless causing harm may constitute evidence of the presence of negative intentions in the agents or evidence of the fact that agents indeed could have foreseen the negative effects of their actions. Together, these findings indicate that carefulness in acting and foreseeability are highly intertwined in moral judgment, and highlight the need to improve existing processing models of moral judgment to account for people’s evaluation of agents and actions whenever negligence can be attributed.

Conscience and theory of mind in children aged 4 to 7 years

Associations between three dimensions of early conscience-moral reasoning, the capacity to experience guilt, and the moral self-and theory of mind (ToM) were examined in children aged 4-7 years (N = 80). Participants were administered a task assessing their understanding of the intentions and actions of a transgressor in situations entailing intentional and accidental wrongdoing, a moral self scale, and a battery of first-order and second-order false belief tasks. Children's capacity to experience guilt was measured via parent report. Expressive vocabulary was also measured. Repeated-measures analysis of covariance with ToM, age, and their interaction as covariates revealed that children who had higher ToM scores attributed more positive intentions to the accidental transgressor than to the intentional transgressor and judged the intentional transgressor's action as more wrongful than children who scored lower on these tasks. Ηierarchical regression analyses also indicated that a more advanced ToM performance predicted higher levels of guilt and the moral self after accounting for age and expressive vocabulary.

Infants Consider the Distributor's Intentions in Resource Allocation

Recent experimental studies suggest that preverbal infants are able to evaluate agents on the basis of their distributive actions. Here we asked whether such evaluations are based on infants' understanding of the distributors' intentions, or only the outcome of their actions. Ten-month-old infants observed animated movies of unequal resource allocations by distributors who attempted but failed to distribute resources equally or unequally between two individuals. We found that infants attended longer to the test event showing a third agent approaching a distributor who was unable to make an unequal distribution, compared to the test event where the third agent approached a distributor who was unable to make an equal distribution of resources. Our results suggest that infants' ability to encode distributive actions goes beyond an analysis of the outcome of these actions, by including the intentions of the distributors whose actions lead to these outcomes.