Why do children punish? Fair outcomes matter more than intent in children's second- and third-party punishment

Preschoolers' in-group bias promotes altruistic sharing and reduces second-party punishment: The role of theory of mind

This study examines how in-group bias affects altruistic sharing and second-party punishment in preschoolers and the role of theory of mind (ToM) in in-group bias. Preschoolers aged 4 to 7 years (N = 309; 160 girls) were asked to share resources with an in-group member and an out-group member (Dictator Game) and to reject or accept an unequal allocation proposed by an in-group member and an out-group member (Ultimatum Game). The results showed that preschoolers shared more resources with, and tolerated more unfair behaviors from, in-group members. ToM influenced the in-group bias in both altruistic sharing and second-party punishment. Notably, children's degree of in-group favoritism in altruistic sharing was positively related to the second-party punishment children imposed on out-group members. However, this pattern was found only among children who had acquired first-order ToM. This study reveals the developmental patterns of preschoolers' in-group bias in altruistic sharing and second-party punishment and the effects of ToM on in-group bias.

The science of justice: The neuropsychology of social punishment

The social punishment (SP) of norm violations has received much attention across multiple disciplines. However, current models of SP fail to consider the role of motivational processes, and none can explain the observed behavioral and neuropsychological differences between the two recognized forms of SP: second-party punishment (2PP) and third-party punishment (3PP). After reviewing the literature giving rise to the current models of SP, we propose a unified model of SP which integrates general psychological descriptions of decision-making as a confluence of affect, cognition, and motivation, with evidence that SP is driven by two main factors: the amount of harm (assessed primarily in the salience network) and the norm violator's intention (assessed primarily in the default-mode and central-executive networks). We posit that motivational differences between 2PP and 3PP, articulated in mesocorticolimbic pathways, impact final SP by differentially impacting the assessments of harm and intention done in these domain-general large-scale networks. This new model will lead to a better understanding of SP, which might even improve forensic, procedural, and substantive legal practices.

Preverbal infants' reactions to third-party punishments and rewards delivered toward fair and unfair agents

Rewarding individuals who distribute resources fairly and punishing those who distribute resources unfairly may be very important actions for fostering cooperation. This study investigated whether 9-month-olds have some expectations concerning punishments and rewards that follow distributive actions. Infants were shown simple animations and were tested using the violation-of-expectation paradigm. In Experiment 1, we found that infants looked longer when they saw a bystander delivering a corporal punishment to a 'fair distributor,' who distributed some windfall resources equally to the possible recipients, rather than to an 'unfair distributor,' who distributed the resources unequally. This pattern of looking times was reversed when, in Experiment 2, punishments were replaced with rewards. These findings suggest an early emergence of expectations about punishing and rewarding actions in third-party contexts, and they help to evaluate competing claims about the origins of a sense of fairness.

Reward type influences adults’ rejections of inequality in a task designed for children

In the context of economic games, adults sacrifice money to avoid unequal outcomes, showing so-called inequity aversion. Child-friendly adaptations of these games have shown that children, too, show inequity aversion. Moreover, inequity aversion shows a clear developmental trajectory, with young children rejecting only disadvantageously unequal distributions and older children rejecting both disadvantageously and advantageously unequal distributions. However, based on existing work, it is difficult to compare adult and child responses to inequity because (1) adapting economic games to make them child-friendly may importantly alter the dynamics of the fairness interaction and (2) adult work typically uses abstract rewards such as money while work with children typically uses more concrete rewards like candy, stickers or toys. Here we adapted the Inequity Game—a paradigm designed to study children’s responses to inequality in isolation from other concerns—to test inequity aversion in adults (N = 104 pairs). We manipulated whether participants made decisions about concrete rewards (candy) or abstract rewards (tokens that could be traded in for money). We found that, like children, adults rejected unequal payoffs in this task. Additionally, we found that reward type mattered: adults rejected disadvantageous—but not advantageous—monetary distributions, yet rejected both disadvantageous and advantageous candy distributions. These findings allow us to draw clearer comparisons across child and adult responses to unfairness and help paint a fuller picture of inequity aversion in humans.

Varieties of normative understanding and their relation to sharing behavior in preschool children

Children increasingly appreciate normative obligations and share resources across the preschool years. But the internal structure and behavioral relevance of normative expressions in the context of sharing-that is, the relation with children's own sharing behavior-remains disputed. Here, 4- to 6-year-old children (N = 90; 37 female) observed protagonists sharing or not sharing resources. As measures of normative expressions, children's evaluation, punishment acceptability, non-costly punishment, and costly punishment of the protagonists as well as their moral self-concept were assessed. To measure actual prosocial behavior, children had the possibility to share resources. A factor analysis revealed that the variety of normative expressions constitutes two distinct factors: normative representation (evaluation and hypothetical punishment) and norm enforcement (actual non-costly and costly punishment). Children's moral self-concept was the only normative expression that related to sharing behavior. Person-centered analyses suggest some consistency in individual differences across normative and prosocial development, with normative expressions and sharing behavior being aligned for some children on a low level and for some children on a high level. This study advances our understanding of early normative development and highlights the internal structure of normative stances during the preschool years.

To punish or exclude? Children’s responses to unfair and fair advantages created in competitive contexts

To determine whether children will exclude or punish a peer who creates an unfair advantage in an intergroup team context, four-to ten-year-old participants (N = 120, M_age = 6.87) were assigned a team membership and evaluated unintentional and intentional unfair advantages created by a character. Children were more likely to endorse punishment and exclusion responses when reasoning about an opponent than a teammate. This difference between groups was not observed when in-group and out-group members reasoned about punishing a character who intentionally created an unfair advantage. Older children were less likely to endorse exclusion than younger participants. Further, older children and in-group members utilized punishment more frequently than exclusion. Taken together this demonstrates that the group identity and the age of the child influences the ways in which children endorse responses to transgressions. These findings increase our understanding regarding children's conceptions of fairness responses to transgressions in intergroup contexts.

Ire and punishment: Incidental anger and costly punishment in children, adolescents, and adults

Why do children, adolescents, and adults engage in costly punishment to sanction fairness violations? Two studies investigated the differential impact of incidental anger on the costly punishment of 8-year-olds, 13-year-olds, and adults. Focusing on experimentally manipulated incidental anger allows for a causal investigation as to whether and how anger affects costly punishment in these age groups in addition to other motives such as inequity aversion. Study 1 (N = 210) assessed the effect of incidental anger (vs. a neutral emotion) on second-party punishment, where punishers were direct victims of fairness violations. Study 2 (N = 208) examined third-party punishment, where the punisher was an observer unaffected by the violation. Across ages, incidental anger increased the second-party punishment of unequal offers but not equal offers. Thus, anger seems to play a causal role in the punishment of unfairness when fairness violations are self-relevant. As predicted, adults' third-party punishment of unequal offers was higher in the incidental anger condition than in the neutral emotion condition. Children's third-party punishment of unfairness was not affected by the emotion condition, but incidental anger increased adolescents' third-party punishment across offers. Overall, our data suggest that the association between anger and costly punishment is based on the self-relevance of the violation. In third-party situations, where unfairness does not affect the self, social-cognitive processes that develop well into adulthood, such as emotional appraisals, might be necessary for third parties to engage in costly punishment.

Children's group identity is related to their assessment of fair and unfair advantages

Unfair advantages can be created either intentionally (e.g., cheating) or unintentionally (e.g., unintended benefit). Little is known regarding how children evaluate different types of advantages in situations where group identity and group membership are made salient. To investigate how children's group identity influences their evaluations and attribution of intentions in intergroup contexts, children were presented with three hypothetical advantages (unintentionally unfair, intentionally unfair, and fair) in a competitive context created by either an in-group member or an out-group member. Children (N = 120) were 4-6 years of age (n = 59; M_age = 5.29 years) and 7-10 years of age (n = 61; M_age = 8.34 years), including 64 girls and 56 boys. Participants were 67% European American, 18% African American, 11% Asian American, and 4% Hispanic. All participants were assigned to one of two teams in a contest in order to create an in-group/out-group manipulation prior to their evaluation of the actions. Out-group members viewed unintentional unfair and fair advantages as less acceptable than in-group members, but in-group and out-group members were equally negative in their assessment of an intentional transgression. When reasoning about unintentional and intentional unfair advantages, older children referenced the intentions of the advantage creator to justify their decisions more than younger children, whereas younger children reasoned about the impact of the behavior on their team more than older children. These novel findings shed light on developmental and social factors influencing children's understanding of fairness and intentionality in everyday contexts.

Children favor punishment over restoration

Why do people punish selfish behavior? Are they motivated to punish perpetrators of selfishness (retribution) or to compensate the victims of selfishness (restoration)? Developmental data can provide important insight into these questions by revealing whether punishment of selfishness is more retributive or restorative when it first emerges. Across two studies, we examined costly third-party intervention in 6- to 9-year-olds. In Study 1, children learned about a selfish actor who refused to share with a recipient. Children then chose to (1) punish the selfish actor by rejecting their payoff (retribution); (2) compensate the victim of selfishness by equalizing payoffs between the perpetrator and victim (restoration); or (3) do nothing. We found that children were more likely to punish than compensate in response to selfishness, suggesting that intervention in this context is more retributive than restorative. In Study 2, we tested third-party intervention in the face of generosity which, like selfishness, can lead to unequal outcomes. As in Study 1, children in this context could reject unequal payoffs, thereby depriving the recipient of the advantageous payoff but having no effect on the actor. Children could also use compensation in this context, equalizing the payoffs between actor and recipient. We found that children did not punish inequality that stemmed from generosity, suggesting that the retributive punishment in Study 1 was specifically targeting selfishness rather than inequality more generally. These results contribute to the debate on the function of third-party punishment in humans, suggesting that retributive motives toward selfish transgressors are privileged during ontogeny.