Two-year-olds use past memories to accomplish novel goals

Three- and four-year-old children represent mutually exclusive possible identities

How do children think about and plan for possible outcomes of events that could happen in the future? Previous work that has investigated children's ability to think about mutually exclusive possibilities has largely focused on children's reasoning about one type of possibility-the possible locations of an object. Here, we investigated children's reasoning about another type of possibility-mutually exclusive possible identities. In two experiments (N = 201 U.S. 3- and 4-year-olds), children were told that two animal characters (e.g., a bunny and a monkey) were going to take turns sliding down a playground slide. Children were told that the animals wanted to eat their favorite foods (e.g., carrots and bananas, respectively) as soon as they got to the bottom of the slide. In an Unambiguous Identity condition, we told children the identity of the animal that would slide down. In an Ambiguous Identity condition, we told children that which animal would slide down first was unknown. To examine children's representations of possible identities, we asked children to "get snack ready." We found that children in the Unambiguous Identity condition selected only one of the snacks (i.e., the favorite snack of the animal they were told would slide down), whereas children in the Ambiguous Identity condition selected both snacks, suggesting that they were accounting for both possible identities. These results extend the literature on the development of modal reasoning to include reasoning about possible identities and suggest that this ability may be available to children as young as 3 years.

Measuring spontaneous episodic future thinking in children: Challenges and opportunities

The "Spoon task" is a common measure of episodic future thinking (i.e., ability to imagine hypothetical future events) in children. However, by providing items and prompting children to choose one, this task might not require deliberate and goal-driven episodic future thinking. In contrast, "spontaneous" Spoon tasks may better reflect Tulving's original conception as they minimize environmental cues and verbal prompts. We identify challenges in designing such tasks, including removing the scaffolded intention to act and giving children permission and sufficient motivation to act. Drawing on the comparative literature, we propose methods to overcome these obstacles when designing spontaneous Spoon tasks. Furthermore, sampling from the work of Clayton and colleagues, we advocate for a multipronged approach including two or more of the following methods in order to capture spontaneous behavior: naturalistic observation, virtually administered tasks within the child's home, laboratory experiments, and questionnaires. Our review highlights the importance of spontaneous episodic future thinking and establishes a foundation for future methodologies to study this complex cognitive process.

Three-year-olds' ability to plan for mutually exclusive future possibilities is limited primarily by their representations of possible plans, not possible events

The ability to prepare for mutually exclusive possible events in the future is essential for everyday decision making. Previous studies have suggested that this ability develops between the ages of 3 and 5 years, and in young children is primarily limited by the ability to represent the set of possible outcomes of an event as "possible". We tested an alternative hypothesis that this ability may be limited by the ability to represent the set of possible actions that could be taken to prepare for those possible outcomes. We adapted the inverted y-shaped tube task of Redshaw and Suddendorf (2016), in which children are asked to catch a marble that is dropped into the top of the tube and can emerge from either the left or right branch of the tube. While 4-year-olds typically place their hands under both openings to catch the marble, preparing for both possible outcomes (optimal action), 3-year-olds often cover only one opening, preparing for only one possible outcome (suboptimal action). In three Experiments, we asked whether first showing children the set of possible actions that could be taken on the tube would enable them to recognize the optimal action that should be used to catch the marble (Experiments 1 and 3, total n = 99 US 3- and 4-year-olds) and enable them to use the optimal action themselves (Experiment 2, n = 96 US 3- and 4-year-olds). We found that 3- and 4-year-olds performed similarly when they were given the opportunity to observe the set of possible actions beforehand. These findings suggest that 3-year-olds' competence at representing mutually exclusive possibilities may be masked by their developing ability to represent and deploy plans to act on these possibilities.

"Plan chunking" expands 3-year-olds' ability to complete multiple-step plans

The ability to use knowledge to guide the completion of goals is a critical cognitive skill, but 3-year-olds struggle to complete goals that require multiple steps. This study asked whether 3-year-olds could benefit from "plan chunking" to complete multistep goals. Thirty-two U.S. children (range = 35.75-46.59 months; 18 girls; 9 white, 3 mixed race, 20 unknown; tested between July 2020 and April 2021) were asked to complete "treasure maps," retrieving four colored map pieces by pressing specific buttons on a "rainbow box." Children completed more of the four-step sequence correctly when the steps were presented in a way that encouraged chunking the steps into pairs. These findings suggest a potential mechanism supporting memory-guided planning abilities in early childhood.

Can 18-Month-Olds Revise Attributed Beliefs?

Successful social interactions rely on flexibly tracking and revising others' beliefs. These can be revised prospectively, new events leading to new beliefs, or retrospectively, when realizing that an attribution may have been incorrect. However, whether infants are capable of such belief revisions is an open question. We tested whether 18-month-olds can revise an attributed FB into a TB when they learn that a person may have witnessed an event that they initially thought she could not see. Infants first observed Experimenter 1 (E1) hiding two objects into two boxes. Then E1 left the room, and the locations of the objects were swapped. Infants then accompanied Experimenter 2 (E2) to the adjacent room. In the FB-revised-to-TB condition, infants observed E1 peeking into the experimental room through a one-way mirror, whereas in the FB-stays-FB condition, they observed E1 reading a book. After returning to the experimental room E1 requested an object by pointing to one of the boxes. In the FB-stays-FB condition, most infants chose the non-referred box, congruently with the agent's FB. However, in the FB-revised-to-TB condition, most infants chose the other, referred box. Thus, 18-month-olds revised an already attributed FB after receiving evidence that this attribution might have been wrong.

Tracking what went where across toddlerhood: Feature-location bound object representations in 2- to 3-year-olds' working memory

Two experiments examined the development of the ability to encode, maintain, and update integrated representations of occluded objects' locations and featural identities in working memory across toddlerhood. Sixty-eight 28- to 40-month-old US toddlers (13 Asian or Pacific Islander, 6 Black, 48 White, 1 multiracial; 40 girls; tested between February 2015 and July 2017) tracked the locations of different color beads that were hidden simultaneously (Experiment 1) or sequentially (Experiment 2). Toddlers' ability to reliably store feature-location bound object representations in working memory varied as a function of age, memory load, and task demands. These results bridge a developmental gap between infancy and early childhood and provide new insights into sources of limitation and developmental change in children's early object representational capacities.

3-4-year-old children’s memory flexibility allows adaptation to an altered context

Imitation provides a reliable method to investigate the developing memory functions in childhood. The present study explored whether 3-4-year-old children are able to revise their previous experiences after a 1 week delay in order to adapt to an altered context. We used a combined short-term (Session 1) and delayed (Session 2) imitation paradigm based on a previous study with 2-year-olds. The constraints (target object close/far) and relatedly the relevance of using a tool in a goal attainment task (irrelevant/relevant, respectively) changed between the sessions. We found that children in Session 1 used the tool only when it was needed (relevant/object far context). After the 1 week delay when the tool was previously irrelevant and then became relevant, children remembered the irrelevant act and applied it in the altered context. When the tool lost its relevance after 1 week, children used the tool less than before, but did not fully omit it, despite its reduced efficiency. The present data with 3-year-olds was compared to a pattern of results with 2-year-olds (from a similar previous study), that allowed to discuss possible developmental transitions in memory and imitation. We propose that the flexible restoration of a formerly irrelevant act and the maintenance of a formerly successful solution indicate flexibility of preschooler’s memory when guiding imitation. This flexibility, however, interacts with children’s tendency to remain faithful to strategies that were previously ostensively demonstrated to them.