Effect of Certificate of Need Law on Emergency Department Length of Stay

The Effects of Certificate-of-Need Laws on the Quality of Hospital Medical Services

Certificate-of-need (CON) laws restrict entry into health services by requiring healthcare providers to seek approval from state healthcare regulators before making any major capital expenditures. An important question is whether CON laws influence the quality of medical services in CON law states. For instance, if CON laws actually lower the quality of medical services, they fail to achieve their intended effect. This paper tests the hypothesis that hospitals in states with CON laws provide lower-quality services than hospitals in states without CON laws. Our overall results suggest that CON regulations lead to lower-quality care for some quality measures and have little or no effect on other quality standards. The results remain consistent across several robustness tests.

Does certificate of need law enhance competition in inpatient care market? An empirical analysis

This article investigates the impact of Certificate of Need (CON) laws on competition in the inpatient care market. One of the major criticisms of these laws is that it may hinder competition in the health care market, which can lead to higher prices. However, from a theoretical standpoint, CON laws could also promote competition by limiting excessive expansion from incumbents. Our main conclusion is that CON laws by and large enhanced competition in the inpatient market during the period of our study. This indicates that the effects of CON laws to hinder predatory behavior could dominate its effects of preventing new entrants into the inpatient care market. We do not find statistically significant evidence to reject the exogeneity assumption of either CON laws or their stringency in our study. We also find factors such as proportion of population aged 18-44, proportion of Asian American population, obesity rate, political environment, etc., in a state significantly impact competition. Our findings could shed some light to public policy makers when deciding the appropriate health programs or legislative framework to promote health care market competition and thereby facilitate quality health care.

Regional variation in Medicare payments for medical imaging: radiologists versus nonradiologists

OBJECTIVE

The purpose of this article was to study regional variation in Medicare Physician Fee Schedule (MPFS) payments for medical imaging to radiologists compared with nonradiologists.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

Using a 5% random sample of all Medicare enrollees, which covered approximately 2.5 million Part B beneficiaries in 2011, total professional-only, technical-only, and global MPFS spending was calculated on a state-by-state and United States Census Bureau regional basis for all Medicare Berenson-Eggers Type of Service-defined medical imaging services. Payments to radiologists versus nonradiologists were identified and variation was analyzed.

RESULTS

Nationally, mean MPFS medical imaging spending per Medicare beneficiary was $207.17 ($95.71 [46.2%] to radiologists vs $111.46 [53.8%] to nonradiologists). Of professional-only (typically interpretation) payments, 20.6% went to nonradiologists. Of technical-only (typically owned equipment) payments, 84.9% went to nonradiologists. Of global (both professional and technical) payments, 70.1% went to nonradiologists. The percentage of MPFS medical imaging spending on nonradiologists ranged from 32% (Minnesota) to 69.5% (South Carolina). The percentage of MPFS payments for medical imaging to nonradiologists exceeded those to radiologists in 58.8% of states. The relative percentage of MPFS payments to nonradiologists was highest in the South (58.5%) and lowest in the Northeast (48.0%).

CONCLUSION

Nationally, 53.8% of MPFS payments for medical imaging services are made to nonradiologists, who claim a majority of MPFS payments in most states dominated by noninterpretive payments. This majority spending on nonradiologists may have implications in bundled and capitated payment models for radiology services. Medical imaging payment policy initiatives must consider the roles of all provider groups and associated regional variation.