Atmospheric transport modelling of time resolved 133Xe emissions from the isotope production facility ANSTO, Australia

Nuclear explosion monitoring network design considerations

Design of an efficient monitoring network requires information on the type and size of releases to be detected, the accuracy and reliability of the measuring equipment, and the desired network performance. This work provides a scientific basis for optimizing or minimizing networks of 133Xe samplers to achieve a desired performance level for different levels of release. The approach of this work varies the density of sampling locations to find optimal location subsets, and to explore the properties of variations of those subsets - how crucial is a specific subset; are substitutions problematic? The choice of possible station locations is arbitrary but constrained to some extent by the location of islands, land masses, difficult topography (mountains, etc.) and the places where infrastructure exists to run and support a sampler. Performance is evaluated using hypothetical releases and atmospheric transport models that cover an entire year. Three network performance metrics are calculated: the probability of detecting the releases, the expected number of stations to detect the releases, and the expected number of samples that detect the releases. The quantitative measures support picking optimal or near-optimal network of a specific station density. If a detection probability of 90% (high) was desired for a design basis release of 1014 Bq (1% of 133Xe production from a 1 kt explosion), then a very high density would be required using today's sampling and measurement technology. If the design basis release were raised to 1015 Bq, then the station density could be lowered by a factor of 3. To achieve a location goal of three station detections on average, posited here for the first time, would also require very high station density for a release of 1014 Bq.

Addressing the quantification of meteorological uncertainties in the atmospheric transport simulations of the 133Xe industrial background

The French National Data Center (NDC) uses an automated simulation of the 133Xe worldwide atmospheric background as one of the means to categorize the radionuclide measurements of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) International Monitoring System (IMS). These simulations take into account 133Xe releases from the known or assumed major industrial emitters in the world and global-scale meteorological data. However, a quantification of the simulation uncertainties in this operational set up is yet to be addressed. This work discusses the benefits of meteorological ensemble data as available from National Centers for Environmental Prediction (NCEP) for that purpose. For this study, the daily dispersion of releases from the Institute for Radio Elements (IRE), a medical isotope production facility located in Fleurus (Belgium), was calculated over one year with emissions measured in-site and ensemble meteorological data. The ensemble contains 31 members, which resulted in as many predictions of activity concentration for any given time and place. The resulting distribution statistics (mean, median and spread), and the control run, were confronted to the deterministic run and to measurements at one IMS-like station near Paris (France) and one IMS station in Freiburg (Germany). Overall, the ensemble results have decreased the simulation performance, as expected given the use of meteorological analyses only. However, contrasting patterns were found with a detailed analysis of daily activity concentration over two one-month-and-a-half periods. Noticeably, outlier results were found to carry the best forecast in some significant detections, proving their relevance for the measurement categorization, despite their isolated character. Importantly, the ensemble has allowed the quantification of meteorological uncertainties, which was beneficial in all cases. It either has improved the confidence of IMS data categorization or has pointed to low confidence predictions. A criterion to identify the latter is suggested, based on information provided by the ensemble distributions. In addition, maps of probability of detections and of relative spread are suggested to show additional benefits of ensemble meteorology.

Global emission inventory of 131mXe, 133Xe, 133mXe, and 135Xe from all kinds of nuclear facilities for the reference year 2014

Global radioactivity monitoring for the verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) includes the four xenon isotopes ^131mXe, ¹³³Xe, ^133mXe and ¹³⁵Xe. These four isotopes are serving as important indicators of nuclear explosions. The state-of-the-art radioxenon emission inventory uses generic release estimates for each known nuclear facility. However, the release amount can vary by several orders of magnitude from year to year. The year 2014 was selected for a single year radioxenon emission inventory with minimized uncertainty. Whenever 2014 emissions reported by the facility operator are available these are incorporated into the 2014 emission inventory. This paper summarizes this new emission inventory. The emissions are compared with previous studies. The global radioxenon emission inventory for 2014 can be used for studies to estimate the contribution of this anthropogenic source to the observed ambient concentrations at IMS noble gas sensors to support CTBT monitoring activities, including calibration and performance assessment of the verification system as described in the Treaty as well as developing and validating methods for enhanced detection capabilities of signals that may indicate a nuclear test. One specific application is the 1st Nuclear Explosion Signal Screening Open Inter-Comparison Exercise announced end of 2021.

Impact of industrial nuclear emissions on nuclear explosion monitoring

In 1995, the development of a global radioactive xenon monitoring network was discussed in the Conference on Disarmament as part of a nuclear explosion verification regime. Discussions considered different network densities and different possible source magnitudes. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was subsequently written to initially include 40 locations for noble gas (radioxenon) samplers, and to consider using a total of 80 locations for noble gas samplers in its International Monitoring System (IMS) after the treaty enters into force. Since 2000, a global network of noble gas monitoring locations has been built as part of the IMS. This network, currently with 31 locations, is of sufficient sensitivity to discover that the Earth's atmosphere contains a complex anthropogenic radioactive xenon background. In this work, the impact of calculated xenon backgrounds on IMS radionuclide stations is determined by atmospheric transport modeling over a period of two years using global average values. The network coverage for potential nuclear explosions is based on a proposed method for finding anomalies among frequent background signals. Even with the addition of background radioxenon sources and using a conservative anomaly-based approach, this work shows that various network configurations have higher xenon coverage than the estimates developed when the IMS network was designed in 1995. While these global xenon coverage figures are better than expected when the network was designed in 1995, the regional impact of background radioxenon sources is large, especially for smaller source magnitudes from potential nuclear explosions, and in some cases the xenon background vastly reduces the coverage value of individual sampling locations. The results show the detection capability and presents an optimal installation order of noble gas sampling locations, e.g. from 40 to 80, after the treaty enters into force.

Use of STAX data in global-scale simulation of 133Xe atmospheric background

A global-scale simulation of the ¹³³Xe atmospheric background is automated at the French National Data Center (NDC) for the purpose of categorizing the radionuclide measurements of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) International Monitoring System (IMS). These simulations take into account ¹³³Xe releases from all known major industrial emitters in the world, compiled from the literature and described as constant values. Emission data measured directly at the stack of the Institute for Radio Elements (IRE), a medical isotope production facility located in Fleurus (Belgium), were implemented in the simulations with a time resolution of 15 minutes. This work discusses the contribution of real (measured) emissions to the prediction of the ¹³³Xe atmospheric background at IMS noble gas stations and at a location near Paris, for which IMS-like ¹³³Xe measurements were available. For the purpose of this study, simulations initiated with the IRE measured emissions were run in parallel to those with the a priori emissions used to date. The benefits of including actual emissions in the simulations were found as a function of the distance between the station and the source of the release. At the closest stations, i.e., near Paris (France) and at Schauinsland, Freiburg (Germany), respectively 250 and 400 km from Fleurus, the simulated activity concentrations differed by a factor greater than 2 more than one third of the time, and by a factor of more than 5 about 10% of the time. No significant or detectable differences were found beyond 1500-2000 km. Furthermore, at the Paris station, the timing of the measured peaks was better reproduced with the actual emission data. However, not all peak amplitudes were correctly reproduced even though the real emissions were used, highlighting the remaining uncertainties, primarily in the meteorological data and transport modeling.

Uncertainty quantification of atmospheric transport and dispersion modelling using ensembles for CTBT verification applications

Airborne concentrations of specific radioactive xenon isotopes (referred to as "radioxenon") are monitored globally as part of the verification regime of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, as these could be the signatures of a nuclear explosion. However, civilian nuclear facilities emit a regulated amount of radioxenon that can interfere with the very sensitive monitoring network. One approach to deal with this civilian background of radioxenon for Treaty verification purposes, is to explicitly simulate the expected radioxenon concentration from civilian sources at monitoring stations using atmospheric transport modelling. However, atmospheric transport modelling is prone to uncertainty, and the absence of an uncertainty quantification can limit its use for detection screening. In this paper, several ensembles are assessed that could provide an atmospheric transport modelling uncertainty quantification. These ensembles are validated with radioxenon observations, and recommendations are given for atmospheric transport modelling uncertainty quantification. Finally, the added value of an ensemble for detection screening is illustrated.

Classification of radioxenon spectra with deep learning algorithm

In this study, we propose for the first time a model of classification for Beta-Gamma coincidence radioxenon spectra using a deep learning approach through the convolution neural network (CNN) technique. We utilize the entire spectrum of actual data from a noble gas system in Charlottesville (USX75 station) between 2012 and 2019. This study shows that the deep learning categorization can be done as an important pre-screening method without directly involving critical limits and abnormal thresholds. Our results demonstrate that the proposed approach of combining nuclear engineering and deep learning is a promising tool for assisting experts in accelerating and optimizing the review process of clean background and CTBT-relevant samples with high classification average accuracies of 92% and 98%, respectively.

Source term estimation in the presence of nuisance signals

Many source-term estimation algorithms for atmospheric releases assume the measured concentration data are influenced only by the releases of interest. However, there are situations where identifying a short-term release from an unknown location in the presence of long-term releases from a different location is of interest. One such example is determining if part or all of a typical magnitude concentration of a radioactive isotope in a sampler came from a nuclear explosion, such as the explosion announced by DPRK in 2013, while medical isotope facilities and nuclear power plants were also operating in the region. An estimation algorithm has been developed for the case where a short-duration release is confounded by a long-term nuisance signal associated with an additional release location. The technique is demonstrated using synthetic release data for a hypothetical medical isotope production facility and a hypothetical puff release from a different location. The algorithm successfully determines the location (within 30 km) and time-varying release rate (within a factor of 2) for the medical isotope production facility and the location (within 60 km), time (within 6 h), and release magnitude (within a factor of 4) of the puff release.

Time resolution requirements for civilian radioxenon emission data for the CTBT verification regime

The capability of the noble gas component of the International Monitoring System as a verification tool for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is deteriorated by a background of radioxenon emitted by civilian sources. One of the possible approaches to deal with this issue, is to simulate the daily radioxenon concentrations from these civilian sources at noble gas stations by using atmospheric transport models. In order to accurately quantify the contribution from these civilian sources, knowledge on the releases is required. However, such data are often not available and furthermore it is not clear what temporal resolution such data should have. In this paper, we assess which temporal resolution is required to best model the ¹³³Xe contribution from civilian sources at noble gas stations in an operational context. We consider different sampling times of the noble gas stations and discriminate between nearby and distant sources. We find that for atmospheric transport and dispersion problems on a scale of 1000 km or more, emission data with subdaily temporal resolution is generally not necessary. However, when the source-receptor distance decreases, time-resolved emission data become more important. The required temporal resolution of emission data thus depends on the transport scale of the problem. In the context of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, where forty noble gas stations will monitor the whole globe, daily emission data are generally sufficient, but for certain meteorological conditions, better temporally resolved emission data are required.

Setting the baseline for estimated background observations at IMS systems of four radioxenon isotopes in 2014

Worldwide monitoring of radionuclides is an essential part of the verification system of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) as it can provide a direct evidence of the nuclear nature of an explosion. In the case of underground nuclear testing, the radioactive noble gases, specifically radioxenon, have the highest probability to escape to the atmosphere. The detection capability of the CTBT noble gas network, which is being built, is weakened due to the presence of a worldwide civilian radioxenon background. Improving the understanding and knowledge of civilian radioxenon sources and their impact on the noble gas systems background is crucial to strengthen their verification capabilities. Two major civilian radioxenon sources have been identified in past research, namely: Medical Isotope Production Facilities (MIPFs) and Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs). In this study, a 2014 baseline radioxenon emission inventory is proposed for all four CTBT relevant radioxenon isotopes (Xe-131m, Xe-133m, Xe-133 and Xe-135) on the basis of a literature review for both the Medical Isotopes Productions Facilities and Nuclear Power Plants. This 2014 baseline radioxenon emission inventory relies on peer-reviewed information on the facility location and corresponding radioxenon emission. The baseline radioxenon emission inventory is used along with Atmospheric Transport Modelling (ATM) to estimate the radioxenon activity concentrations at the noble gas systems. The results reveal the complexity and the geographical dependence of the civilian radioxenon background. The estimations are compared to the observations for CTBT noble gas systems that were operational in 2014. It is demonstrated that the estimated Xe-133 activity concentrations are, for most systems, in the same order of magnitude than observed detections. Non-detections of Xe-131m, Xe-133m, Xe-133 and Xe-135 are, for most samples, well reproduced by the estimation. To our best knowledge, this study is the first attempt to propose, a baseline emission inventory for all four CTBT relevant radioxenon isotopes and compare the estimated Xe-131m, Xe-133m, Xe-133 and Xe-135 activity concentrations with all observations at CTBT noble gas systems during the full 2014 calendar year.

Assessment of the announced North Korean nuclear test using long-range atmospheric transport and dispersion modelling

On 6 January 2016, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea announced to have conducted its fourth nuclear test. Analysis of the corresponding seismic waves from the Punggye-ri nuclear test site showed indeed that an underground man-made explosion took place, although the nuclear origin of the explosion needs confirmation. Seven weeks after the announced nuclear test, radioactive xenon was observed in Japan by a noble gas measurement station of the International Monitoring System. In this paper, atmospheric transport modelling is used to show that the measured radioactive xenon is compatible with a delayed release from the Punggye-ri nuclear test site. An uncertainty quantification on the modelling results is given by using the ensemble method. The latter is important for policy makers and helps advance data fusion, where different nuclear Test-Ban-Treaty monitoring techniques are combined.

On the capability to model the background and its uncertainty of CTBT-relevant radioxenon isotopes in Europe by using ensemble dispersion modeling

Knowledge on the global radioxenon background is imperative for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty verification. In this paper, the capability to simulate the radioxenon background from regional sources is assessed at two International Monitoring System stations in Europe. An ensemble dispersion modeling approach is used to quantify uncertainty by making use of a subset of the Ensemble Prediction System of the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts. Although the uncertainty quantification shows promising results, the ensemble shows a lack of spread that could be attributed to emission uncertainty from nuclear power plants, which is not taken into account. More knowledge on the emissions of nuclear power plants can help improve our understanding of the radioxenon background.

Present and future potential of krypton-85 for the detection of clandestine reprocessing plants for treaty verification

Burnup calculations are applied to determine the amount of krypton-85 that is produced during the irradiation of nuclear fuel. Since krypton-85 is most likely released into the atmosphere during reprocessing to separate plutonium, atmospheric transport modeling is used to calculate the worldwide distribution of krypton-85 concentrations stemming from emissions from declared reprocessing plants. The results are the basis for scenarios in which emissions from clandestine reprocessing facilities have to be detected against various background levels. It is concluded that today's background imposes heavily on the ability to detect small and medium plutonium separation rates; only high separation rates of 1 SQ per week and higher have a chance to be detected with feasible outlay. A fixed network of monitoring stations seems too costly; instead the high number of samples that are required rather calls for mobile sampling procedures, where air samples are collected at random locations over the world and are analyzed in regional laboratories for their krypton-85 concentration. Further, it is argued that krypton-85 emissions from declared reprocessing activities have to be significantly lowered to enable a worldwide verification of the absence of even smaller clandestine reprocessing. For each scenario the number of samples that have to be taken for probable detection is calculated.

International challenge to predict the impact of radioxenon releases from medical isotope production on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty sampling station

The International Monitoring System (IMS) is part of the verification regime for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty Organization (CTBTO). At entry-into-force, half of the 80 radionuclide stations will be able to measure concentrations of several radioactive xenon isotopes produced in nuclear explosions, and then the full network may be populated with xenon monitoring afterward. An understanding of natural and man-made radionuclide backgrounds can be used in accordance with the provisions of the treaty (such as event screening criteria in Annex 2 to the Protocol of the Treaty) for the effective implementation of the verification regime. Fission-based production of (99)Mo for medical purposes also generates nuisance radioxenon isotopes that are usually vented to the atmosphere. One of the ways to account for the effect emissions from medical isotope production has on radionuclide samples from the IMS is to use stack monitoring data, if they are available, and atmospheric transport modeling. Recently, individuals from seven nations participated in a challenge exercise that used atmospheric transport modeling to predict the time-history of (133)Xe concentration measurements at the IMS radionuclide station in Germany using stack monitoring data from a medical isotope production facility in Belgium. Participants received only stack monitoring data and used the atmospheric transport model and meteorological data of their choice. Some of the models predicted the highest measured concentrations quite well. A model comparison rank and ensemble analysis suggests that combining multiple models may provide more accurate predicted concentrations than any single model. None of the submissions based only on the stack monitoring data predicted the small measured concentrations very well. Modeling of sources by other nuclear facilities with smaller releases than medical isotope production facilities may be important in understanding how to discriminate those releases from releases from a nuclear explosion.

Estimates of radioxenon released from Southern Hemisphere medical isotope production facilities using measured air concentrations and atmospheric transport modeling

The International Monitoring System (IMS) of the Comprehensive-Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty monitors the atmosphere for radioactive xenon leaking from underground nuclear explosions. Emissions from medical isotope production represent a challenging background signal when determining whether measured radioxenon in the atmosphere is associated with a nuclear explosion prohibited by the treaty. The Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) operates a reactor and medical isotope production facility in Lucas Heights, Australia. This study uses two years of release data from the ANSTO medical isotope production facility and (133)Xe data from three IMS sampling locations to estimate the annual releases of (133)Xe from medical isotope production facilities in Argentina, South Africa, and Indonesia. Atmospheric dilution factors derived from a global atmospheric transport model were used in an optimization scheme to estimate annual release values by facility. The annual releases of about 6.8 × 10(14) Bq from the ANSTO medical isotope production facility are in good agreement with the sampled concentrations at these three IMS sampling locations. Annual release estimates for the facility in South Africa vary from 2.2 × 10(16) to 2.4 × 10(16) Bq, estimates for the facility in Indonesia vary from 9.2 × 10(13) to 3.7 × 10(14) Bq and estimates for the facility in Argentina range from 4.5 × 10(12) to 9.5 × 10(12) Bq.