Processing goals moderate the effect of co-occurrence on automatic evaluation

Two social minds in one brain? error-related negativity provides evidence for parallel processing pathways during social evaluation

Several authors assume that evaluative conditioning (EC) relies on high-level propositional thinking. In contrast, the dual-process perspective proposes two processing pathways, one associative and the other propositional, contributing to EC. Dual-process theorists argue that attitudinal ambiguity resulting from these two pathways' conflicting evaluations demonstrate the involvement of both automatic and controlled processes in EC. Previously, we suggested that amplitude variations of error-related negativity and error-positivity, two well-researched event-related potentials of performance monitoring, allow for the detection of attitudinal ambiguity at the neural level. The present study utilises self-reported evaluation, categorisation performance, and neural correlates of performance monitoring to explore associative-propositional ambiguity during social attitude formation. Our results show that compared to associative-propositional harmony, attitudinal ambiguity correlates with more neutral subjective evaluations, longer response times, increased error commission, and diminished error-related negativity amplitudes. While our findings align with dual-process models, we aim to offer a propositional interpretation. We discuss dual-process theories in the context of evolutionary psychology, suggesting that associative processes may only represent a small piece of the EC puzzle.

Neural correlates of performance monitoring vary as a function of competition between automatic and controlled processes: An ERP study

Dual process theories of attitude formation propose that an evolutionary old associative system automatically generates subjective judgments by processing mere spatiotemporal contiguity between paired objects, subjects, or events. These judgments can potentially contradict our well-reasoned evaluations and highjack decisional or behavioral outcomes. Contrary to this perspective, other models stress the exclusive work of a single propositional system that consciously process co-occurrences between environmental cues and produce propositions, i.e., mental statements that capture the specific manner through which stimuli are linked. We constructed an experiment on the premise that it would be possible, if the associative system does produce attitudes in a parallel non-conscious fashion, to condition two mutually exclusive attitudes (one implicit, the other explicit) toward a same stimulus. Through explicit ratings, inhibition performance, and neural correlates of performance monitoring, we assessed whether there was a discrepancy between stimuli that were conditioned with (1) the two systems working in harmony (i.e., producing congruent attitudes), or (2) the two systems working in competition (i.e., producing incongruent attitudes). Compared with congruent stimuli, incongruent stimuli consistently elicited more neutral liking scores, higher response times and error rates, as well as a diminished amplitudes in two well-studied neural correlates of automatic error detection (i.e., error-related negativity) and conscious appraisal of error commission (i.e., error-related positivity). Our findings are discussed in the light of evolutionary psychology, dual-process theories of attitude formation and theoretical frameworks on the functional significance of error-related neural markers.

Attribution Impacts Implicit (And Explicit) Evaluations

Two studies examined whether the attributional framing of negative events affected explicit evaluations, as measured by differences in liking, and implicit evaluations, as measured by the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald et al., 1998). In Study 1, participants read negative information about a novel target ordered to elicit internal or external attributions. Participants in the internal attribution condition evaluated the target more negatively than did those in the external attribution condition on both implicit and explicit measures. Study 2 replicated these results and tested the effects of attribution on recently formed negative evaluations. Participants who evaluated targets before and after receiving additional negative information about them demonstrated implicit and explicit evaluative change consistent with the attributional framing of that information. This research provides clear evidence that attribution influences the formation and change of implicit evaluations; however, these effects were weaker than those on explicit measures of evaluation.

The role of causal structure in implicit evaluation

Causal relationships, unlike mere co-occurrence, allow humans to obtain rewards and avoid punishments by intervening on their environment. Accordingly, explicit (controlled) evaluations of stimuli encountered in the environment are known to be sensitive to causal relationships above and beyond mere co-occurrence. In this project, we conduct stringent tests of whether implicit (automatic) evaluation also reflects causal relationships and begin to probe the representational mechanisms underlying such sensitivity. Participants (N = 4836) observed causal events during which two stimuli were equally contingent with positive or negative outcomes but only one of them was causally responsible for these outcomes. Across 6 studies, varying in design and amount of verbal scaffolding provided, differences in causal status consistently guided not only explicit measures of evaluation (Likert and slider scales; Bayes Factor meta-analysis: Cohen's d = 0.28, BF₁₀ > 10⁴⁶) but also their implicit counterparts (Implicit Association Tests; Bayes Factor meta-analysis: Cohen's d = 0.22, BF₁₀ > 10²⁹). However, unlike their explicit counterparts, implicit evaluations were not sensitive to causal relationships that had to be flexibly derived by combining disparate past experiences. Taken together, these studies suggest that implicit evaluations are sensitive to causal information. Such sensitivity seems to be mediated via precompiled, causally informed value representations rather than online computations over a causal model.

Attitudes as propositional representations

Attitudes are mental representations that help to explain why stimuli evoke positive or negative responses. Until recently, attitudes were often thought of as associations in memory. This idea inspired extensive research on evaluative conditioning (EC) and implicit evaluation. However, attitudes can also be seen as propositional representations, which, unlike associations, specify relational information and have a truth value. We review research on EC and implicit evaluation that tested the basic tenets of the propositional perspective on attitudes. In line with this perspective, studies show that both phenomena are moderated by relational and truth information. We discuss implications for the prediction and influencing of seemingly irrational behavior such as excessive alcohol intake and implicit racial bias.

Examining Automatic Stereotyping From a Propositional Perspective: Is Automatic Stereotyping Sensitive to Relational and Validity Information?

Research on automatic stereotyping is dominated by the idea that automatic stereotyping reflects the activation of (group-trait) associations. In two preregistered experiments (total N = 391), we tested predictions derived from an alternative perspective that suggests that automatic stereotyping is the result of the activation of propositional representations that, unlike associations, can encode relational information and have truth values. Experiment 1 found that automatic stereotyping is sensitive to the validity of information about pairs of traits and groups. Experiment 2 showed that automatic stereotyping is sensitive to the specific relations (e.g., whether a particular group is more or less friendly than a reference person) between pairs of traits and groups. Interestingly, both experiments found a weaker influence of validity/relational information on automatic stereotyping than on non-automatic stereotyping. We discuss the implications of these findings for research on automatic stereotyping.

Sensitivity of implicit evaluations to accurate and erroneous propositional inferences

Explicit (directly measured) evaluations are widely assumed to be sensitive to logical structure. However, whether implicit (indirectly measured) evaluations are uniquely sensitive to co-occurrence information or can also reflect logical structure has been a matter of theoretical debate. To test these competing ideas, participants (N = 3928) completed a learning phase consisting of a series of two-step trials. In step 1, one or more conditional statements (A → B) containing novel targets co-occurring with valenced adjectives (e.g., "if you see a blue square, Ibbonif is sincere") were presented. In step 2, a disambiguating stimulus, e.g., blue square (A) or gray blob (¬A) was revealed. Co-occurrence information, disambiguating stimuli, or both were varied between conditions to enable investigating the unique and joint effects of each. Across studies, the combination of conditional statements and disambiguating stimuli licensed different normatively accurate inferences. In Study 1, participants were prompted to use modus ponens (inferring B from A → B and A). In Studies 2-4, the information did not license accurate inferences, but some participants made inferential errors: affirming the consequent (inferring A from A → B and B; Study 2) or denying the antecedent (inferring ¬B from A → B and ¬A; Studies 3A, 3B, and 4). Bayesian modeling using ordinal constraints on condition means yielded consistent evidence for the sensitivity of both explicit (self-report) and implicit (IAT and AMP) evaluations to the (correctly or erroneously) inferred truth value of propositions. Together, these data suggest that implicit evaluations, similar to their explicit counterparts, can reflect logical structure.

Propositional Accounts of Implicit Evaluation: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead

Associative accounts suggest that implicit (indirectly measured) evaluations are sensitive primarily to co-occurrence information (e.g., pairings of gorges with positive experiences) and are represented associatively (e.g., Gorge–Nice). By contrast, recent propositional accounts have argued that implicit evaluations are also responsive to relational information (e.g., gorges causing vs. preventing ennui) and are represented propositionally (e.g., “I find gorges fascinating”). In a review of 30 empirical papers involving exposure to contradictory co-occurrence information and relational information, we found overwhelming evidence for the latter dominating the updating of implicit evaluations, supporting the propositional perspective. However, unlike explicit evaluations, implicit evaluations seem recalcitrant in the face of relational information that requires retrospective revaluation of already encoded co-occurrence information. These findings may be jointly explained by a “common currency” hypothesis under which implicit evaluations emerge from compressed summary representations, which are sensitive to relational information but are not fully propositional.

Evaluative Conditioning as Memory-Based Judgment

The article proposes a view of evaluative conditioning (EC) as resulting from judgments based on learning instances stored in memory. It is based on the formal episodic memory model MINERVA 2. Additional assumptions specify how the information retrieved from memory is used to inform specific evaluative dependent measures. The present approach goes beyond previous accounts in that it uses a well-specified formal model of episodic memory; it is however more limited in scope as it aims to explain EC phenomena that do not involve reasoning processes. The article illustrates how the memory-based-judgment view accounts for several empirical findings in the EC literature that are often discussed as evidence for dual-process models of attitude learning. It sketches novel predictions, discusses limitations of the present approach, and identifies challenges and opportunities for its future development.

Simple First: A Skeleton for an Evaluative Learning Model

Simple firstis our name for a set of hypotheses that we have found useful in our research on evaluative learning. The hypotheses are: (1) It is easier to encode and retrieve information that two concepts are linked than information about how they are linked; (2) It is easier to store and retrieve information than to make an inference based on that information; (3) When people encounter an object and memory activates valence that is mentally linked to that object, they consider the activation valid evidence that the activated valence characterizes the object. We demonstrate how these hypotheses generate useful assumptions about Evaluative Conditioning, and open paths for further research on evaluative learning and evaluation.

Evaluative Conditioning From the Perspective of the Associative-Propositional Evaluation Model

Evaluative conditioning (EC) is defined as the change in the evaluation of a conditioned stimulus (CS) due to its pairing with a positive or negative unconditioned stimulus (US). According to the associative-propositional evaluation (APE) model, EC effects can be the result of two functionally distinct learning mechanisms: associative and propositional learning. The current article reviews the core assumptions of the APE model regarding (1) the defining features of associative and propositional learning, (2) the mental representations resulting from the two learning mechanisms, (3) the processes involved in the behavioral expression of these representations, and (4) the automatic versus controlled nature of the processes underlying EC effects. In addition to reviewing the core assumptions of the APE model, the article reviews relevant evidence to illustrate the theory’s main hypotheses, its explanatory and predictive power, as well as empirical challenges for the theory.

Evaluative conditioning effects are modulated by the nature of contextual pairings

Across two studies participants completed a learning phase comprised of two types of trials: context pairing trials in which two (valenced or non-valenced) words were identical or opposite to one another and evaluative conditioning (EC) trials in which a CS was paired with a US. Based on the idea that EC occurs because CS-US pairings function as a symbolic cue about the relation between the CS and the US, we hypothesised that the nature of context pairings (identical or opposite) might moderate EC effects. Results indicate that identity-based context pairs led to typical assimilative explicit and implicit effects whereas opposition-based pairs led to attenuated effects. Implications and different accounts of our findings are discussed.

Associative Attitude Learning: A Closer Look at Evidence and How It Relates to Attitude Models

Associative attitude learning is typically viewed as a low-level process that automatically registers mere co-occurrences between stimuli, independent of their validity and relational meaning. This view invites to critically examine how attitude formation conforms to four operating conditions (i.e., unawareness, efficiency, goal independence, and uncontrollability) and two operating principles (i.e., unqualified registration of mere co-occurrences between stimuli and formation of direct stimulus–response links), which is the main purpose of the present contribution. The general discussion examines how contemporary attitude models endorse these conditions and principles. Overall, this contribution calls for (a) a nuanced understanding of the nature and scope of associative attitude learning, (b) a fine-grained understanding of how contemporary attitude models endorse conditions and principles reviewed here and find them relevant to their theorization of attitude formation, (c) a clarification of how direct and indirect evaluative measures relate to these conditions and principles, and (d) enhanced efforts in specifying contemporary attitude formation models.

The Moderating Impact of Distal Regularities on the Effect of Stimulus Pairings

Throughout much of the past century psychologists have focused their attention on a seemingly simple question: How do people come to like or dislike stimuli in the environment? Evaluative Conditioning (EC) - a change in liking due to the pairing of stimuli - has been offered as one avenue through which novel preferences may be formed and existing ones altered. In the current article, we offer a new look at EC from the perspective of Contextual Behavioral Science (CBS) and, more specifically, Relational Frame Theory (RFT). We briefly review the EC literature, introduce Contextual Behavioral Science (CBS), Relational Frame Theory (RFT), and then describe a behavioral phenomenon known as arbitrarily applicable relational responding (AARR). Afterwards, we examine the relationship between EC and AARR. This novel perspective offers ways to organize existing as well as predict new EC effects, contributes to debates on "genuine" EC, human versus nonhuman EC, and further facilitates the development and refinement of cognitive theories of EC.