Third parties promote cooperative norms in repeated interactions

Can Leading by Example Alone Improve Cooperation?

Cooperation is essential for the survival of human society. Understanding the nature of cooperation and its underlying mechanisms is crucial for studying human behavior. This paper investigates the impact of leadership on public cooperation by employing repeated sequential public goods games, as well as by examining whether leading by example (through rewards and punishments) can promote cooperation and organizational success. The leaders were assigned randomly and were given the authority to reward or punish. As a result, (1) the leaders showed a strong tendency toward reciprocity by punishing free riders and rewarding cooperators at their own expense, which enhanced the intrinsic motivation for others to follow their example; and (2) both rewards and punishments were effective in promoting cooperation, but punishment was more effective in sustaining a high level of collaboration. Additionally, leaders preferred using rewards and were more reluctant to use punishments. These findings are crucial for creating organizational structures that foster cooperation.

Strategic thinking and behavior during a pandemic

This paper introduces a novel theoretical model and measure of strategic thinking in social decision making. The model distinguishes four strategic orientations: egocentric (thinking about how one’s actions shape one’s outcomes), impact (thinking about how one’s actions shapes others’ outcomes), dependency (thinking about how others’ actions shape one’s outcomes), and altercentric (thinking about how others’ actions shape their outcomes). Applying this model to explain social behavior in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, an exploratory study finds that the more people think about how their actions shape others’ outcomes, the more likely they are to: (a) comply with social distancing restrictions designed to curb the spread of the virus, and (b) donate money they received in the study to charitable organizations. These findings advance understanding of the multifaceted nature of strategic thinking and highlight the usefulness of the Strategic Thinking Scale for explaining social behavior.

Revisiting the form and function of conflict: Neurobiological, psychological, and cultural mechanisms for attack and defense within and between groups

Conflict can profoundly affect individuals and their groups. Oftentimes, conflict involves a clash between one side seeking change and increased gains through victory and the other side defending the status quo and protecting against loss and defeat. However, theory and empirical research largely neglected these conflicts between attackers and defenders, and the strategic, social, and psychological consequences of attack and defense remain poorly understood. To fill this void, we model (1) the clashing of attack and defense as games of strategy and reveal that (2) attack benefits from mismatching its target's level of defense, whereas defense benefits from matching the attacker's competitiveness. This suggests that (3) attack recruits neuroendocrine pathways underlying behavioral activation and overconfidence, whereas defense invokes neural networks for behavioral inhibition, vigilant scanning, and hostile attributions; and that (4) people invest less in attack than defense, and attack often fails. Finally, we propose that (5) in intergroup conflict, out-group attack needs institutional arrangements that motivate and coordinate collective action, whereas in-group defense benefits from endogenously emerging in-group identification. We discuss how games of attack and defense may have shaped human capacities for prosociality and aggression, and how third parties can regulate such conflicts and reduce their waste.

More for Us or More for Me? Social Dominance as Parochial Egoism

Intergroup interactions allow members of advantaged groups to cooperate with in-group and out-group members alike (universal cooperation), cooperate with in-group members exclusively (parochial cooperation), or withhold cooperation altogether. These behaviors impact the intergroup hierarchy differently; therefore, individuals’ ideological support of intergroup hierarchy may predict their choices among them. Universal cooperation is inherently egalitarian and hence inconsistent with social dominance orientation (SDO). Although parochial cooperation strengthens the in-group relative to the out-group, and hence consistent with SDO, it is unclear to what extent members of advantaged groups higher in SDO are willing to pay the costs associated with participation in parochial cooperation. Studies conducted across three distinct intergroup contexts in the United States and Israel consistently find that SDO coincides with behavioral selfishness, a pattern we label parochial egoism. These findings illuminate a gap between individuals’ ideological worldview and their social behavior and elucidate the motivational meaning of SDO.