How much blame does he truly deserve? Historicist narratives engender uncertainty about blameworthiness, facilitating motivated cognition in moral judgment

Partisan animosity through the lens of blame: Partisan animosity can be reduced by a historicist thinking intervention

Partisan animosity has been on the rise in America. Partisan animosity involves blame, wherein political partisans blame outparty members for their beliefs and actions. Here, we examine whether a historicist thinking intervention-drawn from research on blame mitigation-can reduce partisan animosity. The intervention consisted of three components: (1) a narrative about the idiosyncratic development of one political opponent paired with (2) a message about how unique life experiences shape everyone's political beliefs and (3) a suggestion that outparty members can be changed by future formative experiences. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that the intervention reduced cold feelings-measured via Feeling Thermometer-towards the outparty for both Democrats and Republicans. Experiments 3 and 4 focused on more specific emotional changes. Experiment 3 showed that, for Democrats, the intervention increased compassion. Experiment 4 showed that, for Republicans, the intervention reduced disgust, disapproval, anger, and contempt, but had no impact on compassion. For Democrats, but not for Republicans, reductions in animosity were mediated by reduced perceptions of control of self-formation, the mediator identified in prior work on historicist thinking and blame mitigation.

What do other people think he deserves? Social influence on utilization of mitigating information regarding a violent offender's unfortunate life history

The blameworthiness of an offender is often discussed in groups. Yet, the research literature overwhelmingly examines individuals assessing blameworthiness in isolation. To address this gap in the literature, the present study examines group deliberations about blameworthiness, with a particular focus on how group deliberations impact utilization of mitigating information about an offender's unfortunate life history. Participants from introductory psychology courses at a U.S. university were placed in groups of two or three and each group also included a confederate who followed a script. Groups were randomly assigned to one of four conditions. In one condition (deed only), groups learned only about the offender's heinous crimes. In the three remaining conditions, participants also received a historicist narrative regarding how the offender's unfortunate history deformed his moral character. These conditions differed in terms of the confederate's arguments: Neutral arguments, arguments to ignore the narrative, or arguments to give great weight to the narrative. Results showed that the historicist narrative was particularly effective at reducing outrage and increasing compassion when the confederate argued for its utilization. The reduction in outrage mediated a reduction in spiteful punitiveness toward the offender. Interestingly, the confederate who urged fellow deliberators to ignore the historicist narrative had no impact on outrage or compassion. We also examined mediation of the impact of historicist narratives on outrage and compassion. We found that when the confederate remained neutral the impact of historicist narratives on outrage and compassion was mediated via diminished perceptions of the offender's control of self-formation. This mirrors what is typically found in prior work focused on individual judgments. In contrast, when the confederate argued that great weight should be given to the narrative, reductions in outrage were mediated via diminished perceptions of offender freedom of action. This pattern of mediation is not typically found but has been found in one previous study where participants received social encouragement to mitigate blame. Results are discussed in terms of how social influence might alter the inferences draw from historicist narratives. Suggestions for future research on social influence in the context of blame are presented.

Doesn't everybody jaywalk? On codified rules that are seldom followed and selectively punished

Rules are meant to apply equally to all within their jurisdiction. However, some rules are frequently broken without consequence for most. These rules are only occasionally enforced, often at the discretion of a third-party observer. We propose that these rules-whose violations are frequent, and enforcement is rare-constitute a unique subclass of explicitly codified rules, which we call 'phantom rules' (e.g., proscribing jaywalking). Their apparent punishability is ambiguous and particularly susceptible to third-party motives. Across six experiments, (N = 1440) we validated the existence of phantom rules and found evidence for their motivated enforcement. First, people played a modified Dictator Game with a novel frequently broken and rarely enforced rule (i.e., a phantom rule). People enforced this rule more often when the "dictator" was selfish (vs. fair) even though the rule only proscribed fractional offers (not selfishness). Then we turned to third person judgments of the U.S. legal system. We found these violations are recognizable to participants as both illegal and commonplace (Experiment 2), differentiable from violations of prototypical laws (Experiments 3) and enforced in a motivated way (Experiments 4a and 4b). Phantom rule violations (but not prototypical legal violations) are seen as more justifiably punished when the rule violator has also violated a social norm (vs. rule violation alone)-unless the motivation to punish has been satiated (Experiment 5). Phantom rules are frequently broken, codified rules. Consequently, their apparent punishability is ambiguous, and their enforcement is particularly susceptible to third party motives.

Tweeting Others With Respect: Historicist Thinking Can Reduce Blame and Hostile Retaliation to Nasty Communications From Partisan Opponents

Hostile partisan communication pervades social media. Partisan hostility often takes the form of reciprocal blaming, where one feels blamed by an out-party member (“She said my beliefs are stupid!”) and then reciprocates with blame-fueled verbal hostility. Here, we examine whether historicist narratives, story-like descriptions of how someone developed her beliefs, can reduce such hostile verbal retaliation. In three experiments, strongly liberal or strongly conservative participants were presented with “tweets” that criticized their views. They replied with a “tweet” of their own. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that historicist narratives regarding their criticizer reduced hostile verbal retaliation by both liberals and conservatives. Experiment 3 showed that an abstract historicist reminder—a general message about how life history shapes people—reduced hostile verbal retaliation by liberals. Across experiments, reductions in verbal retaliation were mediated by reduced blame of the criticizer.

Cognitive miserliness in argument literacy? Effects of intuitive and analytic thinking on recognizing fallacies

Fallacies are a particular type of informal argument that are psychologically compelling and often used for rhetorical purposes. Fallacies are unreasonable because the reasons they provide for their claims are irrelevant or insufficient. Ability to recognize the weakness of fallacies is part of what we call argument literacy and imporatant in rational thinking. Here we examine classic fallacies of types found in textbooks. In an experiment, participants evaluated the quality of fallacies and reasonable arguments. We instructed participants to think either intuitively, using their first impressions, or analytically, using rational deliberation. We analyzed responses, response times, and cursor trajectories (captured using mouse tracking). The results indicate that instructions to think analytically made people spend more time on the task but did not make them change their minds more often. When participants made errors, they were drawn towards the correct response, while responding correctly was more straightforward. The results are compatible with “smart intuition” accounts of dual-process theories of reasoning, rather than with corrective default-interventionist accounts. The findings are discussed in relation to whether theories developed to account for formal reasoning can help to explain the processing of everyday arguments.

Unwilling to Un-Blame: Whites Who Dismiss Historical Causes of Societal Disparities Also Dismiss Personal Mitigating Information for Black Offenders

When will racial bias in blame and punishment emerge? Here, we focus on White people's willingness to “un-blame” Black and White offenders upon learning of their unfortunate life histories or biological impairments. We predicted that personal mitigating narratives of Black (but not White) offenders would be ignored by Whites who are societal-level anti-historicists. Societal-level anti-historicists deny that a history of oppression by Whites has shaped current societal-level intergroup disparities. Thus, our prediction centers on how societal-level beliefs relate to bias against individuals. Our predictions were confirmed in three studies. In one of those studies, we also showed how racial bias in willingness to un-blame can be removed: Societal-level anti-historicists became open to mitigation for Black offenders if they were reminded that the offender began as an innocent baby. Results are discussed in terms of how the rich literature on blame and moral psychology could enrich the study of racial bias.

Those who ignore the past are doomed…to be heartless: Lay historicist theory is associated with humane responses to the struggles and transgressions of others

When one learns that current struggles or transgressions of an individual or group are rooted in an unfortunate history, one experiences compassion and reduced blame. Prior research has demonstrated this by having participants receive (or not) a concrete historicist narrative regarding the particular individual or group under consideration. Here, we take a different approach. We explore the possibility that everyday people show meaningful variation in a broad lay theory that we call lay historicism. Lay historicists believe that—as a general fact—people’s psychological characteristics and life outcomes are powerfully molded by their life histories. We present eight studies linking lay historicism to broad tendencies toward compassion and non-blaming. Collectively, Studies 1–5 suggest that lay historicism affects compassion and blame, respectively, via distinct mechanisms: (1) Lay historicism is associated with compassion because it creates a sense that—as a general fact—past suffering lies behind present difficulties, and (2) lay historicism is associated with blame mitigation because historicists reject the idea that—as a general fact—people freely and autonomously create their moral character. Thus, lay historicism increases compassion and decreases blame via distinct mechanisms. The remaining studies diversify our evidence base. Study 6 examines criminal justice philosophies rather than broad moral traits (as in the earlier studies) and shows that lay historicism is associated with preference for humane criminal justice philosophies. Study 7 moves from abstract beliefs to concrete situations and shows that lay historicism predicts reduced blaming of an irresponsible peer who is encountered face-to-face. One additional study—in our Supplemental Materials—shows that lay historicism predicts lower levels of blaming on implicit measures, although only among those who also reject lay controllability theories. Overall, these studies provide consistent support for the possibility that lay historicism is broadly associated with humane responding to the struggles and transgressions of others.

Moral Judgments

Research on morality has increased rapidly over the past 10 years. At the center of this research are moral judgments-evaluative judgments that a perceiver makes in response to a moral norm violation. But there is substantial diversity in what has been called moral judgment. This article offers a framework that distinguishes, theoretically and empirically, four classes of moral judgment: evaluations, norm judgments, moral wrongness judgments, and blame judgments. These judgments differ in their typical objects, the information they process, their speed, and their social functions. The framework presented here organizes the extensive literature and provides fresh perspectives on measurement, the nature of moral intuitions, the status of moral dumbfounding, and the prospects of dual-process models of moral judgment. It also identifies omitted questions and sets the stage for a broader theory of moral judgment, which the coming decades may bring forth.

When history becomes his story: Shifts in narrative perspective weaken the blame-mitigating force of life-history narratives

Life-history narratives describing how a transgressor developed aversive traits can mitigate blame. How is their effectiveness affected by narrative perspective? In particular, how is blame mitigation impacted when the transgressor appears to be knowledgeable of the story of his self-formation? In three experiments, we compare the effectiveness of narratives that reflect an objective perspective to those that reflect the transgressor's perspective. The experiments contrast two hypotheses. The Perspective Taking hypothesis asserts that the transgressor perspective will be especially effective for blame mitigation because it encourages 'stepping into the shoes' of the transgressor. In contrast, the Should Know Better hypothesis asserts that the transgressor perspective will be especially ineffective because it reveals the transgressor to have self-knowledge, which triggers an inference that he deeply comprehends the suffering he causes. Results support the Should Know Better hypothesis. Furthermore, Experiment 3 shows that the transgressor perspective increases blameworthiness regardless of whether the transgressor's prior life experiences parallel what he inflicts on his victims.