Beware a dishonest face?: Updating face-based implicit impressions using diagnostic behavioral information

Learned trustworthiness does not have the same influence on implicit responses measured via fast periodic visual stimulation as face trustworthiness

Past research has demonstrated that it is possible to detect implicit responses to face trustworthiness using fast periodic visual stimulation (FPVS). Because people readily retrieve affective associations with faces, the current study investigated whether learned trustworthiness would yield similar responses to face trustworthiness as measured via FPVS. After learning to associate faces with untrustworthy or trustworthy behaviors, participants completed three separate tasks while electroencephalography (EEG) was recorded. In each of these tasks, participants viewed oddball sequences of faces where a single base face was presented repeatedly at a rate of 6 Hz and oddball faces with different identities were presented every fifth face (6 Hz/5 = 1.2 Hz). Providing evidence of learning, the oddball response at 1.2 Hz and its harmonics was stronger for the learned faces compared to novel faces over bilateral occipitotemporal cortex and beyond. In addition, reproducing previous findings with face trustworthiness, we observed a stronger response at 1.2 Hz and its harmonics for sequences with less trustworthy-looking versus trustworthy-looking oddball faces over bilateral occipitotemporal cortex and other sites. However, contrary to our predictions, we did not observe a significant influence of learned trustworthiness on the oddball response. These data indicate that impressions based on learning are treated differently than impressions based on appearance, and they raise questions about the types of design and stimuli that yield responses that are measurable via FPVS.

Face and context integration in emotion inference is limited and variable across categories and individuals

The ability to make nuanced inferences about other people's emotional states is central to social functioning. While emotion inferences can be sensitive to both facial movements and the situational context that they occur in, relatively little is understood about when these two sources of information are integrated across emotion categories and individuals. In a series of studies, we use one archival and five empirical datasets to demonstrate that people could be integrating, but that emotion inferences are just as well (and sometimes better) captured by knowledge of the situation alone, while isolated facial cues are insufficient. Further, people integrate facial cues more for categories for which they most frequently encounter facial expressions in everyday life (e.g., happiness). People are also moderately stable over time in their reliance on situational cues and integration of cues and those who reliably utilize situation cues more also have better situated emotion knowledge. These findings underscore the importance of studying variability in reliance on and integration of cues.

Facial first impressions are not mandatory: A priming investigation

A common assertion is that, based around prominent character traits, first impressions are spontaneously extracted from faces. Specifically, mere exposure to a person is sufficient to trigger the involuntary extraction of core personality characteristics (e.g., trustworthiness, dominance, competence), an outcome that supports a range of significant judgments (e.g., hiring, investing, electing). But is this in fact the case? Noting ambiguities in the extant literature, here we used a repetition priming procedure to probe the extent to which impressions of dominance are extracted from faces absent the instruction to evaluate the stimuli in this way. Across five experiments in which either the character trait of interest was made increasingly obvious to participants (Expts. 1-3) or attention was explicitly directed toward the faces to generate low-level/high-level judgments (Expts. 4 & 5), no evidence for the spontaneous extraction of first impressions was observed. Instead, priming only emerged when judgments of dominance were an explicit requirement of the task at hand. Thus, at least using a priming methodology, the current findings contest the notion that first impressions are a mandatory product of person perception.

A 3D framework of implicit attitude change

According to early theories, implicit (automatic) social attitudes are difficult if not impossible to change. Although this view has recently been challenged by research relying on experimental, developmental, and cultural approaches, relevant work remains siloed across research communities. As such, the time is ripe to systematize and integrate disparate (and seemingly contradictory) findings and to identify gaps in existing knowledge. To this end, we introduce a 3D framework classifying research on implicit attitude change by levels of analysis (individual vs. collective), sources of change (experimental, ontogenetic, and cultural), and timescales (short term vs. long term). This 3D framework highlights where evidence for implicit attitude change is more versus less well established and pinpoints directions for future research, including at the intersection of fields.

Children show neural sensitivity to facial trustworthiness as measured by fast periodic visual stimulation

Adults exhibit neural responses over the visual occipito-temporal area in response to faces that vary in how trustworthy they appear. However, it is not yet known when a mature pattern of neural sensitivity can be seen in children. Using a fast periodic visual stimulation (FPVS) paradigm, face images were presented to 8-to-9-year-old children (an age group which shows development of trust impressions; N = 31) and adult (N = 33) participants at a rate of 6 Hz (6 face images per second). Within this sequence, an 'oddball' face differing in the level of facial trustworthiness compared to the other faces, was presented at a rate of 1 Hz (once per second). Children were sensitive to variations in facial trustworthiness, showing reliable and significant neural responses at 1 Hz in the absence of instructions to respond to facial trustworthiness. Additionally, the magnitude of children's and adults' neural responses was similar, with strong Bayesian evidence that implicit neural responses to facial trustworthiness did not differ across the groups, and therefore, that visual sensitivity to differences in facial trustworthiness can show mature patterns by this age. Thus, nine or less years of social experience, perceptual and/or cognitive development may be sufficient for adult-like neural sensitivity to facial trustworthiness to emerge. We also validate the use of the FPVS methodology to examine children's implicit face-based trust processing for the first time, which is especially valuable in developmental research because this paradigm requires no explicit instructions or responses from participants.

The Relation Between Updated Implicit Evaluations and the Trust Game

Recent work has shown that people can update their implicit evaluations based on facial trustworthiness. However, do these updated implicit evaluations map onto subsequent decisions? We examined whether implicit evaluations based on faces but updated in light of new behavioral evidence uniquely predict responses in the trust game. Across six studies ( N = 2,059), we measured participants’ initial implicit evaluations of a target based on the target’s face and then their updated implicit evaluations based on newly learned behavioral evidence. We then tested whether these updated implicit evaluations uniquely predicted (i.e., beyond explicit evaluations) responses in a hypothetical trust game. Although participants consistently based their initial evaluations on the face and updated their evaluations after learning new diagnostic information, their updated implicit evaluations did not uniquely predict their responses in the trust game. We discuss theoretical considerations in this article.

Disclosing political partisanship polarizes first impressions of faces

Americans’ increasing levels of ideological polarization contribute to pervasive intergroup tensions based on political partisanship. Cues to partisanship may affect even the most basic aspects of perception. First impressions of faces constitute a widely-studied basic aspect of person perception relating to intergroup tensions. To understand the relation between face impressions and political polarization, two experiments were designed to test whether disclosing political partisanship affected face impressions based on perceivers’ political ideology. Disclosed partisanship more strongly affected people’s face impressions than actual, undisclosed, categories (Experiment 1). In a replication and extension, disclosed shared and opposing partisanship also engendered, respectively, positive and negative changes in face impressions (Experiment 2). Partisan disclosure effects on face impressions were paralleled by the extent of people’s partisan threat perceptions (Experiments 1 and 2). These findings suggest that partisan biases appear in basic aspects of person perception and may emerge concomitant with perceived partisan threat.

The Effect of Facial Self-Resemblance on Emotional Mimicry

Social resemblance, like group membership or similar attitudes, increases the mimicry of the observed emotional facial display. In this study, we investigate whether facial self-resemblance (manipulated by computer morphing) modulates emotional mimicry in a similar manner. Participants watched dynamic expressions of faces that either did or did not resemble their own, while their facial muscle activity was measured using EMG. Additionally, after each presentation, respondents completed social evaluations of the faces they saw. The results show that self-resemblance evokes convergent facial reactions. More specifically, participants mimicked the happiness and, to a lesser extent, the anger of self-resembling faces. In turn, the happiness of non-resembling faces was less likely mimicked than in the case of self-resembling faces, while anger evoked a more divergent, smile-like response. Finally, we found that social evaluations were in general increased by happiness displays, but not influenced by resemblance. Overall, the study demonstrates an interesting and novel phenomenon, particularly that mimicry can be modified by relatively subtle cues of physical resemblance.

Cross-modal impression updating: Dynamic impression updating from face to voice and the other way around

Research has shown that faces and voices shape impression formation. Most studies have examined either the impact of faces and voices in isolation or the relative contribution of each source when presented simultaneously. However, only a few studies have questioned whether and how impressions formed via one source can be updated due to incremental information gathered from the alternative source. Yet, cross-modal impression updating is key to shed light on person perception. Thus, we tested whether positive and negative face- and voice-based impressions could be updated by inconsistent cross-modal information. In Experiment 1 (N = 130), we tested whether face-based impressions could be updated by (in)consistent voices. In Experiment 2 (N = 262), we compared face-to-voice and voice-to-face impression updating. In Experiment 3 (N = 242), we favoured a more direct comparison of the two types of stimuli (i.e., the co-occurrence of both cue types when the new information is revealed). Results showed that voices have the greatest updating impact and that the updating effect of faces was halved when voices co-occurred for a second time. We discussed these results as evidence of the dynamical evolution of cross-modal impressions.

Older and Younger Adults Perform Similarly in an Iterated Trust Game

In social contexts, aging is typically associated with a greater reliance on heuristics, such as categorical information and stereotypes. The present research examines younger and older adults’ use of individuating and age-based categorical information when gauging whether or not to trust unfamiliar targets. In an adaptation of the iterated Trust Game, participants had to predict the cooperative tendencies of their partners to earn economic rewards in first encounters – in a context in which they knew nothing about their partners, and across repeated interactions – in a context in which they could learn the individual cooperative tendency of each partner. In line with previous research, we expected all participants to rely on stereotypes in first encounters, and progressively learn to disregard stereotypes to focus on individuating behavioral cues across repeated interactions. Moreover, we expected older participants to rely more on social categories than younger participants. Our results indicate that overall, both the elderly and the young adopted an individuating approach to predict the cooperative behaviors of their partners across trials. However, older adults more consistently relied on gender (but not age) stereotypes to make cooperation decisions at zero acquaintance. The impact of context, motivation, and relevance of categorical information in impression formation is discussed.

Deconstructing moral character judgments

People often make judgments of others' moral character - an inferred moral essence that presumably predicts moral behavior. We first define moral character and explore why people make character judgments before outlining three key elements that drive character judgments: behavior (good vs. bad, norm violations, and deliberation), mind (intentions, explanations, capacities), and identity (appearance, social groups, and warmth). We also provide taxonomy of moral character that goes beyond simply good vs. evil. Drawing from the theory of dyadic morality, we outline a two-dimensional triangular space of character judgments (valence and strength/agency), with three key corners - heroes, villains, and victims. Varieties of perceived moral character include saints and demons, strivers/sinners and opportunists, the nonmoral, virtuous, and culpable victims, and pure victims.

In Your Face(t)-Personality Traits Interact With Prototypical Personality Faces in Economic Decision Making

In everyday life, assumptions about our peers' as well as our own personality shape social interactions. We investigated whether self-rated personality and inferences drawn from partners' faces influence economic decisions. Participants (N = 285) played the trust game in the role of the trustor as well as the ultimatum game in the role of the proposer and interacted with trustees and receivers represented by prototypical personality faces. Participants also evaluated both their own traits and the personality of the faces. In the trust game, trustees represented by faces rated higher on agreeableness yielded higher transferred amounts. This effect was more pronounced for trustors low on dispositional trust, whereas trustors high on dispositional trust did not relate their decisions to the faces. Trustees represented by faces rated higher on conscientiousness yielded higher transferred amounts only for trustors high on dispositional anxiety. In the ultimatum game, receivers represented by faces rated higher on conscientiousness yielded lower offers only for proposers high on dispositional assertiveness. These results extend previous findings on the inferences drawn from facial features and the influence of personality on decision making. They highlight the importance of considering the personality of both interaction partner, as well as potential interactions of players' traits.

Culturally learned first impressions occur rapidly and automatically and emerge early in development

Previous research indicates that first impressions from faces are the products of automatic and rapid processing and emerge early in development. These features have been taken as evidence that first impressions have a phylogenetic origin. We examine whether first impressions acquired through learning can also possess these features. First, we confirm that adults rate a person as more intelligent when they are wearing glasses (Study 1). Next, we show this inference persists when participants are instructed to ignore the glasses (Study 2) and when viewing time is restricted to 100 ms (Study 3). Finally, we show that 6-year-old, but not 4-year-old, children perceive individuals wearing glasses to be more intelligent, indicating that the effect is seen relatively early in development (Study 4). These data indicate that automaticity, rapid access and early emergence are not evidence that first impressions have an innate origin. Rather, these features are equally compatible with a learning model.