Action-inaction asymmetries in moral scenarios: Replication of the omission bias examining morality and blame with extensions linking to causality, intent, and regret

The asymmetric impact of decision-making confidence on regret and relief

When individuals make uncertain decisions, they often evaluate the correctness of their choices in what is referred to as decision-making confidence. The outcomes of such decision-making can lead to counterfactual thinking wherein alternative possible outcomes are contemplated. This, in turn, can elicit counterfactual emotions including upward and downward counterfactual thinking, which, respectively, refer to regret and relief. Decision-making confidence and counterfactual emotions have key effects on how individuals learn from the past and prepare for the future. However, there has been little understanding of how these experiences are related. For this study, 98 total adults were recruited with the goal of assessing the connections between decision-making confidence and sensations of regret and relief when completing a card-based gambling task. The results of this study suggest that decision-making confidence may reduce the intensity of relief while increasing the degree of regret experienced. These findings thus emphasize the important effect that decision confidence has on emotional processing.

Aggression by omission: Redefining and measuring an understudied construct

Researchers of aggression have classically focused on what has been previously called active aggression-the deliberate infliction of harm through the direct application of deleterious consequences. However, the counterpart to this, what was originally called passive aggression, has gone understudied, and its definition has mutated beyond its original conceptualization. The present two studies (N's 196 and 220, respectively) attempted to examine passive aggression as originally defined-the deliberate withholding of behavior to ensure that a target is harmed-and renaming it aggression by omission (ABO), in contrast to aggression by commission (ABC). These studies found that both fit within a similar nomological network of antagonism, Sadism, and trait aggression. Study 2 additionally found that both were equally affected by provocation and were considered equally harmful. These findings encourage further research into ABO to capture this construct concretely, especially in the context of common paradigms (e.g., the Taylor Aggression Paradigm, Hot Sauce, Point-Subtraction Aggression Paradigm), and trait aggression scales, which typically measure ABC.

Impact of Actor's Initial State of Engagement in a Course of Action on Judgements of Post-decisional Regret and Joy: Revisiting Kahneman and Tversky (1982)

According to the phenomenon commonly known as action effect and vastly replicated across the judgment and decision-making literature, more regret is associated with decisions resulting from action than inaction. Action vs. inaction, however, might either refer to change vs. no change or doing something vs. not doing something. The purpose of this study was to examine the effect of this variation in operationalization of action-inaction on the strength of action effect, for both positive and negative outcomes, across four different domains of employment, finance, education, and health. This was an experimental scenario-based study (N = 215) with four between-subjects conditions varying in outcome valence and the actor's initial state as either engaged or non-engaged in a particular course of action. Action effect was found to be stronger with respect to the initially engaged than the initially non-engaged decision-maker (ηp2 = .04), indicating that action as change results in a stronger action effect than action as doing something. The effect of the initial state was also moderated by domain. In addition, we both replicated and went beyond prior empirical literature regarding the effect of outcome valence and domain on action effect, with our findings being mostly consistent across joy and regret. Findings are discussed in light of the norm theory and its key concept of normality and contribute to the literature on moderators of action effect.

Decision avoidance and post-decision regret: A systematic review and meta-analysis

Decision Avoidance (DA) strategies allow people to forego or abandon effortful deliberation by postponing, bypassing, or delegating a decision. DA is thought to reduce regret, primarily by allowing decision makers to evade personal responsibility for potential negative outcomes. We tested this relation between DA and post-decision regret in a multilevel meta-analysis of 59 effect estimates coming from 13 papers. Five DA strategies were considered: status quo preservation, action omission, inaction inertia, choice delegation and choice deferral. Across all effects and DA strategies, there was a non-significant trend toward DA reducing regret (Hedges' g = -0.23, p = 0.063). When assessing individual strategies, we found that only status quo preservation reduced regret reliably (Hedges' g = -0.45, p = 0.006). The relationship between DA and regret was unclear for the other DA strategies. We tested a number of moderators for the effect. Only 'previous experience' (i.e., the outcome of a previous decision) influenced the relation between DA and regret reliably. That is, if participants choose the DA option when the same choice previously led to a negative outcome, regret is actually enhanced. Overall, there is clear evidence that status quo preservation can reduce regret, but it is currently unclear whether the same holds for other DA strategies.

Omission bias in children's and adults' moral judgments of lies

This study examined whether omission bias occurs in moral judgments of lies. Omission bias is the tendency to judge acts of commission as morally worse than equivalent acts of omission. Children aged 8 and 9 years (third graders) and 11 and 12 years (sixth graders), as well as adults, made moral judgments about lies of commission and omission to conceal transgressions. Descriptions of four scenarios varied in terms of whether the protagonists lied to benefit themselves or others and whether the transgression was deliberate or accidental. The results showed that both age groups of children, as well as adults, judged that lies of commission were morally worse than lies of omission in all four scenarios, indicating that omission bias clearly occurs in moral judgments of lies. However, there were age differences in the magnitude of omission bias. Third and sixth graders generally showed omission bias of the same magnitude for all scenarios, whereas omission bias in adults was stronger for the scenarios that benefited self rather than others and for scenarios in which deliberate transgressions, rather than accidental ones, were concealed. These results reveal differences in moral judgments of lies between middle childhood and adulthood.

Action and Inaction in Moral Judgments and Decisions: Meta-Analysis of Omission Bias Omission-Commission Asymmetries

Omission bias is people's tendency to evaluate harm done through omission as less morally wrong and less blameworthy than commission when there is harm. However, findings are inconsistent. We conducted a preregistered meta-analysis, with 21 samples (13 articles, 49 effects) on omission-commission asymmetries in judgments and decisions. We found an overall effect of g = 0.45, 95% confidence interval (CI) = [0.14, 0.77], with stronger effects for morality and blame than for decisions. Publication bias tests produced mixed results with some indication for publication bias, though effects persisted even after most publication bias adjustments. The small sample of studies included limited our ability to draw definite conclusions regarding moderators, with inconclusive findings when applying different models. After compensating for low power, we found indication for moderation by role responsibility, perspective (self vs. others), outcome type, and study design. We hope this meta-analysis will inspire research on this phenomenon and applications to real-life, especially given the raging pandemic. Materials, data, and code are available on https://osf.io/9fcqm/.

Sensitivity to Moral Principles Predicts Both Deontological and Utilitarian Response Tendencies in Sacrificial Dilemmas

When facing sacrificial dilemmas in which harm maximizes outcomes, people appear sensitive to three moral principles: They are more averse to actively causing harm than passively allowing it ( action principle), causing harm directly than indirectly ( contact principle), and causing harm as a means than as a by-product of helping others ( intention principle). Across five studies and a meta-analysis ( N = 1,218), we examined whether individual differences in people’s sensitivity to these principles were related to participants’ moral preferences on sacrificial dilemmas. Interestingly, sensitivity to each of these principles was related to both elevated harm-rejection (i.e., deontological) as well as elevated outcome-maximization (i.e., utilitarian) response tendencies. Rather than increasing responses consistent with only one philosophical position, people sensitive to moral principles balanced moral concerns about causing harm and maximizing outcomes similar to people high in other measures of moral concern.

Asymmetry and symmetry of acts and omissions in punishment, norms, and judged causality

Harmful acts are punished more often and more harshly than harmful omissions. This asymmetry has variously been ascribed to differences in how individuals perceive the causal responsibility of acts versus omissions and to social norms that tend to proscribe acts more frequently than omissions. This paper examines both of these hypotheses, in conjunction with a new hypothesis: that acts are punished more than omissions because it is usually more efficient to do so. In typical settings, harms occur as a result of relatively few harmful actions, but many individuals may have had the opportunity to prevent or rectify the harm. Penalising actors therefore requires relatively few punishment events compared to punishing omitters. We employ a novel group paradigm in which harm occurs only if both actors and omitters contribute to the harm. Subjects play a repeated economic game in fixed groups involving a social dilemma (total N = 580): on each round self-interest favours harmful actions (taking from another) and harmful omissions (failing to repair the victim’s loss), but the group payoff is maximized if individuals refrain from these behaviors. In one treatment harm occurs as a result of one action and two omissions; in the other, it is the result of two actions and one omission. In the second treatment, the more efficient strategy to maximize group benefit is to punish omissions. We find that subjects continue to prefer to punish acts rather than omissions, with two important caveats. There is still a substantial level of punishment of omissions, and there is also evidence of some responsiveness to the opportunity to enforce a more efficient rule. Further analysis addresses whether the omission effect is associated with asymmetric norm-based attitudes: a substantial proportion of subjects regard it as equally fair to punish harmful acts and omissions, while another portion endorse an asymmetry; and punishment behavior correlates with these attitudes in both groups.