Moral impressions and presumed moral choices: Perceptions of how moral exemplars resolve moral dilemmas

Beyond Trolleyology: The CNI Model of Moral-Dilemma Responses

PUBLIC ABSTRACT

How do people make judgments about actions that violate moral norms yet maximize the greater good (e.g., sacrificing the well-being of a small number of people for the well-being of a larger number of people)? Research on this question has been criticized for relying on highly artificial scenarios and for conflating multiple distinct factors underlying responses in moral dilemmas. The current article reviews research that used a computational modeling approach to disentangle the roles of multiple distinct factors in responses to plausible moral dilemmas based on real-world events. By disentangling sensitivity to consequences, sensitivity to moral norms, and general preference for inaction versus action in responses to realistic dilemmas, the reviewed work provides a more nuanced understanding of how people make judgments about the right course of action in moral dilemmas.

Thinking About Reasons for One's Choices Increases Sensitivity to Moral Norms in Moral-Dilemma Judgments

Whereas norm-conforming (deontological) judgments have been claimed to be rooted in automatic emotional responses, outcome-maximizing (utilitarian) judgments are assumed to require reflective reasoning. Using the CNI model to disentangle factors underlying moral-dilemma judgments, the current research investigated effects of thinking about reasons on sensitivity to consequences, sensitivity to moral norms, and general action preferences. Three experiments (two preregistered) found that thinking about reasons (vs. responding intuitively or thinking about intuitions) reliably increased sensitivity to moral norms independent of processing time. Thinking about reasons had no reproducible effects on sensitivity to consequences and general action preferences. The results suggest that norm-conforming responses in moral dilemmas can arise from reflective thoughts about reasons, challenging the modal view on the role of cognitive reflection in moral-dilemma judgment. The findings highlight the importance of distinguishing between degree (high vs. low elaboration) and content (intuitions vs. reasons) as distinct aspects of cognitive reflection.

Effects of Alexithymia on Moral Decision-Making in Sacrificial Dilemmas: High Alexithymia is Associated with Weaker Sensitivity to Moral Norms

Purpose

Although several studies have investigated the association between alexithymia and moral decision-making in sacrificial dilemmas, the evidence remains mixed. The current work investigated this association and how alexithymia affects moral choice in such dilemmas.

Methods

The current research used a multinomial model (ie, CNI model) to disentangle (a) sensitivity to consequences, (b) sensitivity to moral norms, and (c) general preference for inaction versus action irrespective of consequences and norms in responses to moral dilemmas.

Results

Higher levels of alexithymia were associated with a greater preference for utilitarian judgments in sacrificial dilemmas (Study 1). Furthermore, individuals with high alexithymia showed significantly weaker sensitivity to moral norms than did those with low alexithymia, whereas there were no significant differences in sensitivity to consequences or a general preference for inaction versus action (Study 2).

Conclusion

The findings suggest that alexithymia affects moral choice in sacrificial dilemmas by blunting emotional reactions to causing harm, rather than through increased deliberative cost-benefit reasoning or general preference for inaction.