Alternative payment models and physician treatment decisions: Evidence from lower back pain

Financial incentives and health provider behaviour: Evidence from a capitation policy in Ghana

The capitation payment model has been used as a supply-side cost-containment tool in controlling physician behaviour. However, little is known regarding its effectiveness in controlling costs and discouraging use of low-value care. This study seeks to examine whether financial incentives in capitation influence provider behaviour, and if so, whether such behaviour compromises outcomes for inpatients with hypertension. To this end, we evaluate the effect on outpatient visits and inpatient outcomes of the introduction of capitation into a mixed payment system involving diagnosis-related groups and fee-for-service in the Ashanti region of Ghana. We use difference-in-differences with fixed effects and event study analysis of claims data over 48 months (2016-2019). We found that providers responded to financial incentives in capitation; outpatient visits were approximately 35% lower. However, we found no significant impact of capitation on inpatient outcomes; that is, the in-hospital death rate did not increase, and the length of hospital stay (which may be a rough indicator of the severity of illness) also did not increase. These findings indicate that patient health outcomes did not deteriorate. Evidence suggests that the observed reduction in outpatient visits may be in unnecessary or low-value visits, especially at lower levels of the healthcare system.

Development of a low back pain care pathway in an academic hospital system: results of a consensus process

BACKGROUND

Low back pain (LBP) is the leading cause of disability worldwide and a significant component of healthcare expenditures. Clinical practice guidelines (CPGs) have been highlighted as a key resource to improve the quality of care. This study aimed to develop a clinical pathway for LBP based on CPGs in an academic health system.

METHODS

We conducted a modified Delphi study of clinicians caring for patients with LBP who were asked to rate 21 CPG-informed seed statements through an online survey. The goal was to identify statements that achieved a minimum of 80% consensus among panelists.

RESULTS

Thirty-five healthcare providers participated as panelists. The majority of participants were male (68.6%), had MD or DO (62.9%) degrees, and were clinicians (73.8%) working in neurosurgery (36.1%), orthopedics (25.7%), emergency medicine (14.3%), or physical therapy (11.4%). Initially, consensus was reached on 20 of 21 seed statements. One statement did not reach consensus in the initial round and was revised into two separate statements based on feedback from panelists. One of these statements achieved consensus in the second review round. All statements reaching consensus were incorporated into a care pathway consisting of diagnosis, evaluation, and treatment for LBP.

CONCLUSION

Healthcare providers across various disciplines supported statements interpreting current CPGs related to care for LBP. This study represents a step toward supporting guideline-concordant care for LBP. Additional research is needed to assess how such pathways impact actual clinical care.

Who benefits from quality competition in health care? A theory and a laboratory experiment on the relevance of patient characteristics

We study how competition between physicians affects the provision of medical care. In our theoretical model, physicians are faced with a heterogeneous patient population, in which patients systematically vary with regard to both their responsiveness to the provided quality of care and their state of health. We test the behavioral predictions derived from this model in a controlled laboratory experiment. In line with the model, we observe that competition significantly improves patient benefits as long as patients are able to respond to the quality provided. For those patients, who are not able to choose a physician, competition even decreases the patient benefit compared to a situation without competition. This decrease is in contrast to our theoretical prediction implying no change in benefits for passive patients. Deviations from patient-optimal treatment are highest for passive patients in need of a low quantity of medical services. With repetition, both, the positive effects of competition for active patients as well as the negative effects of competition for passive patients become more pronounced. Our results imply that competition can not only improve but also worsen patient outcome and that patients' responsiveness to quality is decisive.

Failed Back Surgery Syndrome: No Longer a Surgeon's Defeat-A Narrative Review

The introduction of the term Persistent Spinal Pain Syndrome (PSPS-T1/2), replacing the older term Failed Back Surgery Syndrome (FBSS), has significantly influenced our approach to diagnosing and treating post-surgical spinal pain. This comprehensive review discusses this change and its effects on patient care. Various diagnostic methods are employed to elucidate the underlying causes of back pain, and this information is critical in guiding treatment decisions. The management of PSPS-T1/2 involves both causative treatments, which directly address the root cause of pain, and symptomatic treatments, which focus on managing the symptoms of pain and improving overall function. The importance of a multidisciplinary and holistic approach is emphasized in the treatment of PSPS-T1/2. This approach is patient-centered and treatment plans are customized to individual patient needs and circumstances. The review concludes with a reflection on the impact of the new PSPS nomenclature on the perception and management of post-surgical spinal pain.

Cost Sharing and Cost Shifting Mechanisms under a per Diem Payment System in a County of China

Cost sharing and cost shifting mechanisms are of vital importance in a prospective payment system. This paper employed the difference-in-differences method to estimate the impacts of a per diem system with inverted-U-shape rates on medical costs and the length of stay based on data from a health insurance institution. The supply side cost sharing mechanism worked so that the new payment system significantly reduced medical costs by 17.59 percent while the average length of stay varied little. After further analyzing the mechanism, we found that heterogeneous effects emerged mainly due to the special rates design. The reform decreased the cases that incurred relatively high medical costs and lengths of stay. However, cost shifting existed so that physicians could be motivated to provide unnecessary services to the patients who should have been discharged before the average length of stay. Therefore, payment rates in the per diem system require a sophisticated design to constrain its distortion to medical service provision even though medical expenditures were successfully contained.