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Semenova OV, Brazhnikov AA, Butovskaya ML. Evolution of parental roles in phase portraits of bimatrix asymmetric games. Front Ecol Evol 2023. [DOI: 10.3389/fevo.2023.930795] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 04/03/2023] Open
Abstract
In this paper, we address the evolutionary dynamic of parental roles using game theory. The main purpose of the article was to expand a classical list of evolutionary dynamic parental conflicts by adding some important cases which hitherto have not been intensively studied. Our models are apt to deliver some novel insights into the evolution of parental care. We also introduced several hypothetical events that served as illustrations of an arising alteration in cost-benefits for both parents and simulated a subsequent evolutionary endpoint. Our models revealed that evolutionary outcomes for reproductive decisions of both parents could be completely predicted by certain payoff matrices, which serve as proxies for a Darwinian fitness gain. In this sense, the result of a frequency-dependent selection on reproductive traits would inevitably depend on fitness costs and benefits arising for both parents in various circumstances. We demonstrated that population division could be a plausible evolutionary consequence for any human mating game where ‘reproductive defection’ represents the best response to any action by the reproductive opponent. We conclude that future evolutionary studies of human reproductive behavior should be more oriented on estimating a sex-biased asymmetry in potential fitness gains obtained by cooperative and deceptive parents in diverse environments and cultures.
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2
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Sharp thresholds limit the benefit of defector avoidance in cooperation on networks. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2022; 119:e2120120119. [PMID: 35939706 PMCID: PMC9388082 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2120120119] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Consider a cooperation game on a spatial network of habitat patches, where players can relocate between patches if they judge the local conditions to be unfavorable. In time, the relocation events may lead to a homogeneous state where all patches harbor the same relative densities of cooperators and defectors, or they may lead to self-organized patterns, where some patches become safe havens that maintain an elevated cooperator density. Here we analyze the transition between these states mathematically. We show that safe havens form once a certain threshold in connectivity is crossed. This threshold can be analytically linked to the structure of the patch network and specifically to certain network motifs. Surprisingly, a forgiving defector avoidance strategy may be most favorable for cooperators. Our results demonstrate that the analysis of cooperation games in ecological metacommunity models is mathematically tractable and has the potential to link topics such as macroecological patterns, behavioral evolution, and network topology.
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3
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Stenseke J. Persistent homology and the shape of evolutionary games. J Theor Biol 2021; 531:110903. [PMID: 34534569 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2021.110903] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/13/2021] [Revised: 09/08/2021] [Accepted: 09/09/2021] [Indexed: 11/17/2022]
Abstract
For nearly three decades, spatial games have produced a wealth of insights to the study of behavior and its relation to population structure. However, as different rules and factors are added or altered, the dynamics of spatial models often become increasingly complicated to interpret. To tackle this problem, we introduce persistent homology as a rigorous framework that can be used to both define and compute higher-order features of data in a manner which is invariant to parameter choices, robust to noise, and independent of human observation. Our work demonstrates its relevance for spatial games by showing how topological features of simulation data that persist over different spatial scales reflect the stability of strategies in 2D lattice games. To do so, we analyze the persistent homology of scenarios from two games: a Prisoner's Dilemma and a SIRS epidemic model. The experimental results show how the method accurately detects features that correspond to real aspects of the game dynamics. Unlike other tools that study dynamics of spatial systems, persistent homology can tell us something meaningful about population structure while remaining neutral about the underlying structure itself. Regardless of game complexity, since strategies either succeed or fail to conform to shapes of a certain topology there is much potential for the method to provide novel insights for a wide variety of spatially extended systems in biology, social science, and physics.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jakob Stenseke
- Department of Philosophy, Lund University, Helgonavagen 3, Lund 221 00, Sweden.
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4
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Wu B, Zhou L. Individualised aspiration dynamics: Calculation by proofs. PLoS Comput Biol 2018; 14:e1006035. [PMID: 30252850 PMCID: PMC6177198 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1006035] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/18/2017] [Revised: 10/09/2018] [Accepted: 08/24/2018] [Indexed: 11/30/2022] Open
Abstract
Cooperation is key for the evolution of biological systems ranging from bacteria communities to human societies. Evolutionary processes can dramatically alter the cooperation level. Evolutionary processes are typically of two classes: comparison based and self-evaluation based. The fate of cooperation is extremely sensitive to the details of comparison based processes. For self-evaluation processes, however, it is still unclear whether the sensitivity remains. We concentrate on a class of self-evaluation processes based on aspiration, where all the individuals adjust behaviors based on their own aspirations. We prove that the evolutionary outcome with heterogeneous aspirations is the same as that of the homogeneous one for regular networks under weak selection limit. Simulation results further suggest that it is also valid for general networks across various distributions of personalised aspirations. Our result clearly indicates that self-evaluation processes are robust in contrast with comparison based rules. In addition, our result greatly simplifies the calculation of the aspiration dynamics, which is computationally expensive. Cooperation is the cornerstone to understand how biological systems evolve. Previous studies have shown that cooperation is sensitive to the details of evolutionary processes, even if all the individuals update strategies in the same way. Here we propose a class of updating rules driven by self-evaluation, where each individual has its personal aspiration. The evolutionary outcome is the same as if all the individuals adopt the same aspiration for regular networks, provided the selection intensity is weak enough. In addition, we provide a simple numerical method to identify the favored strategy. Our result shows a very robust class of strategy updating rules. And it implies that complexity in updating rules does not necessarily lead to the sensitivity of evolutionary outcomes.
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Affiliation(s)
- Bin Wu
- School of Sciences, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing, China
- * E-mail:
| | - Lei Zhou
- Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing, China
- Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, United States of America
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5
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Szabó G, Varga L, Szabó M. Anisotropic invasion and its consequences in two-strategy evolutionary games on a square lattice. Phys Rev E 2016; 94:052314. [PMID: 27967092 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.94.052314] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/25/2016] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
Abstract
We have studied invasion processes in two-strategy evolutionary games on a square lattice for imitation rule when the players interact with their nearest neighbors. Monte Carlo simulations are performed for systems where the pair interactions are composed of a unit strength coordination game when varying the strengths of the self-dependent and cross-dependent components at a fixed noise level. The visualization of strategy distributions has clearly indicated that circular homogeneous domains evolve into squares with an orientation dependent on the composition. This phenomenon is related to the anisotropy of invasion velocities along the interfaces separating the two homogeneous regions. The quantified invasion velocities indicate the existence of a parameter region in which the invasions are opposite for the horizontal (or vertical) and the tilted interfaces. In this parameter region faceted islands of both strategies shrink and the system evolves from a random initial state into the homogeneous state that first percolated.
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Affiliation(s)
- György Szabó
- Institute of Technical Physics and Materials Science, Centre for Energy Research, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, P.O. Box 49, H-1525 Budapest, Hungary
| | - Levente Varga
- Babeş-Bolyai University, Faculty of Physics, RO-400084 Cluj-Napoca, Romania
| | - Mátyás Szabó
- Reed College, Department of Physics, 97202 Portland, Oregon, USA
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6
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Renslow RS, Lindemann SR, Song HS. A Generalized Spatial Measure for Resilience of Microbial Systems. Front Microbiol 2016; 7:443. [PMID: 27092116 PMCID: PMC4823267 DOI: 10.3389/fmicb.2016.00443] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/31/2015] [Accepted: 03/18/2016] [Indexed: 11/29/2022] Open
Abstract
The emergent property of resilience is the ability of a system to return to an original state after a disturbance. Resilience may be used as an early warning system for significant or irreversible community transition; that is, a community with diminishing or low resilience may be close to catastrophic shift in function or an irreversible collapse. Typically, resilience is quantified using recovery time, which may be difficult or impossible to directly measure in microbial systems. A recent study in the literature showed that under certain conditions, a set of spatial-based metrics termed recovery length, can be correlated to recovery time, and thus may be a reasonable alternative measure of resilience. However, this spatial metric of resilience is limited to use for step-change perturbations. Building upon the concept of recovery length, we propose a more general form of the spatial metric of resilience that can be applied to any shape of perturbation profiles (for example, either sharp or smooth gradients). We termed this new spatial measure “perturbation-adjusted spatial metric of resilience” (PASMORE). We demonstrate the applicability of the proposed metric using a mathematical model of a microbial mat.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ryan S Renslow
- Environmental Molecular Sciences Laboratory, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland WA, USA
| | - Stephen R Lindemann
- Biological Sciences Division, Earth and Biological Sciences Directorate, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland WA, USA
| | - Hyun-Seob Song
- Biological Sciences Division, Earth and Biological Sciences Directorate, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland WA, USA
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7
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Nax HH, Rigos A. Assortativity evolving from social dilemmas. J Theor Biol 2016; 395:194-203. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2016.01.032] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/07/2015] [Revised: 12/13/2015] [Accepted: 01/20/2016] [Indexed: 10/22/2022]
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8
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Pérez I, Janssen MA. The effect of spatial heterogeneity and mobility on the performance of social–ecological systems. Ecol Modell 2015. [DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolmodel.2014.10.014] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
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9
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Laird RA, Schamp BS. Competitive intransitivity, population interaction structure, and strategy coexistence. J Theor Biol 2015; 365:149-58. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.10.010] [Citation(s) in RCA: 19] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/27/2014] [Revised: 09/30/2014] [Accepted: 10/07/2014] [Indexed: 10/24/2022]
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10
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Deng X, Wang Z, Liu Q, Deng Y, Mahadevan S. A belief-based evolutionarily stable strategy. J Theor Biol 2014; 361:81-6. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.07.009] [Citation(s) in RCA: 21] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/05/2014] [Revised: 07/03/2014] [Accepted: 07/07/2014] [Indexed: 10/25/2022]
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11
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Kaiping GA, Jacobs GS, Cox SJ, Sluckin TJ. Nonequivalence of updating rules in evolutionary games under high mutation rates. PHYSICAL REVIEW. E, STATISTICAL, NONLINEAR, AND SOFT MATTER PHYSICS 2014; 90:042726. [PMID: 25375542 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.90.042726] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/10/2014] [Indexed: 06/04/2023]
Abstract
Moran processes are often used to model selection in evolutionary simulations. The updating rule in Moran processes is a birth-death process, i. e., selection according to fitness of an individual to give birth, followed by the death of a random individual. For well-mixed populations with only two strategies this updating rule is known to be equivalent to selecting unfit individuals for death and then selecting randomly for procreation (biased death-birth process). It is, however, known that this equivalence does not hold when considering structured populations. Here we study whether changing the updating rule can also have an effect in well-mixed populations in the presence of more than two strategies and high mutation rates. We find, using three models from different areas of evolutionary simulation, that the choice of updating rule can change model results. We show, e. g., that going from the birth-death process to the death-birth process can change a public goods game with punishment from containing mostly defectors to having a majority of cooperative strategies. From the examples given we derive guidelines indicating when the choice of the updating rule can be expected to have an impact on the results of the model.
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Affiliation(s)
- G A Kaiping
- Computational Engineering and Design, University of Southampton, Southampton, United Kingdom
| | - G S Jacobs
- Applied Mathematics, University of Southampton, Southampton, United Kingdom
| | - S J Cox
- Computational Engineering and Design, University of Southampton, Southampton, United Kingdom
| | - T J Sluckin
- Applied Mathematics, University of Southampton, Southampton, United Kingdom
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12
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Van Dyken JD, Müller MJI, Mack KML, Desai MM. Spatial population expansion promotes the evolution of cooperation in an experimental Prisoner's Dilemma. Curr Biol 2013; 23:919-23. [PMID: 23664975 DOI: 10.1016/j.cub.2013.04.026] [Citation(s) in RCA: 79] [Impact Index Per Article: 7.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/30/2013] [Revised: 03/11/2013] [Accepted: 04/09/2013] [Indexed: 10/26/2022]
Abstract
Cooperation is ubiquitous in nature, but explaining its existence remains a central interdisciplinary challenge. Cooperation is most difficult to explain in the Prisoner's Dilemma game, where cooperators always lose in direct competition with defectors despite increasing mean fitness. Here we demonstrate how spatial population expansion, a widespread natural phenomenon, promotes the evolution of cooperation. We engineer an experimental Prisoner's Dilemma game in the budding yeast Saccharomyces cerevisiae to show that, despite losing to defectors in nonexpanding conditions, cooperators increase in frequency in spatially expanding populations. Fluorescently labeled colonies show genetic demixing of cooperators and defectors, followed by increase in cooperator frequency as cooperator sectors overtake neighboring defector sectors. Together with lattice-based spatial simulations, our results suggest that spatial population expansion drives the evolution of cooperation by (1) increasing positive genetic assortment at population frontiers and (2) selecting for phenotypes maximizing local deme productivity. Spatial expansion thus creates a selective force whereby cooperator-enriched demes overtake neighboring defector-enriched demes in a "survival of the fastest." We conclude that colony growth alone can promote cooperation and prevent defection in microbes. Our results extend to other species with spatially restricted dispersal undergoing range expansion, including pathogens, invasive species, and humans.
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Affiliation(s)
- J David Van Dyken
- Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA.
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13
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Ezoe H, Ikegawa Y. Coexistence of mutualists and non-mutualists in a dual-lattice model. J Theor Biol 2013; 332:1-8. [PMID: 23614874 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2013.04.016] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/12/2012] [Revised: 04/12/2013] [Accepted: 04/13/2013] [Indexed: 11/26/2022]
Abstract
Evolution and maintenance of mutualism have been one of the major questions in evolutionary ecology, because it is often susceptible of invasion of non-mutualistic strategy. Some previous studies using dual-lattice model suggest that spatial structures of habitat can prevent non-mutualism from prevailing over mutualism, while the detail of the dynamics is not fully revealed. Here we explore population dynamics of the two strategies (mutualism and non-mutualism) in two species engaged in Prisoner's Dilemma game on a dual-lattice space, especially focusing on whether mutualists and non-mutualists can coexist in long-term dynamics. The habitat consists of two layers, each of which a population of species inhabits, and interspecific interaction is restricted between two corresponding sites of the layers. Each individual of the both species is either a mutualist or a non-mutualist and only the former pay cost c for benefit of the partner b. The payoff of the game affects the individuals' fecundity, while the mortality is constant. Reproduction is restricted to neighboring vacant sites of the focal individuals. Our computer simulations of the model show that even if b/c ratio remains constant, mutualists become dominant in both species over wider ranges of basic reproduction rate (reproduction rate without interspecific interaction) as b and c increase. If basic reproduction rates are asymmetric between the species or basic reproduction rates were sufficiently large, mutualists and non-mutualists can coexist in one or both species, while their population sizes often fluctuate. Transition of the final state between mutualism and non-mutualism happens rather discontinuously, then total population sizes change drastically at the transition. Moreover, we also find paradoxical cases of unilateral exploitation, i.e. one species consists of mutualists and other species non-mutualists. Additional simulations reveal that accidental extinction of the non-mutualists of one species can result in extinction of mutualist of the other species.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hideo Ezoe
- Department of Biological Science, Graduate School of Science, Osaka Prefecture University, 1-1 Gakuen-cho, Nakaku, Sakai 599-8531, Japan.
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14
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Zukewich J, Kurella V, Doebeli M, Hauert C. Consolidating birth-death and death-birth processes in structured populations. PLoS One 2013; 8:e54639. [PMID: 23382931 PMCID: PMC3557300 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0054639] [Citation(s) in RCA: 62] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/01/2012] [Accepted: 12/13/2012] [Indexed: 11/26/2022] Open
Abstract
Network models extend evolutionary game theory to settings with spatial or social structure and have provided key insights on the mechanisms underlying the evolution of cooperation. However, network models have also proven sensitive to seemingly small details of the model architecture. Here we investigate two popular biologically motivated models of evolution in finite populations: Death-Birth (DB) and Birth-Death (BD) processes. In both cases reproduction is proportional to fitness and death is random; the only difference is the order of the two events at each time step. Although superficially similar, under DB cooperation may be favoured in structured populations, while under BD it never is. This is especially troubling as natural populations do not follow a strict one birth then one death regimen (or vice versa); such constraints are introduced to make models more tractable. Whether structure can promote the evolution of cooperation should not hinge on a simplifying assumption. Here, we propose a mixed rule where in each time step DB is used with probability and BD is used with probability . We derive the conditions for selection favouring cooperation under the mixed rule for all social dilemmas. We find that the only qualitatively different outcome occurs when using just BD (). This case admits a natural interpretation in terms of kin competition counterbalancing the effect of kin selection. Finally we show that, for any mixed BD-DB update and under weak selection, cooperation is never inhibited by population structure for any social dilemma, including the Snowdrift Game.
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Affiliation(s)
- Joshua Zukewich
- Department of Mathematics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada.
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15
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Sirakoulis GC, Karafyllidis IG. Cooperation in a Power-Aware Embedded-System Changing Environment: Public Goods Games With Variable Multiplication Factors. ACTA ACUST UNITED AC 2012. [DOI: 10.1109/tsmca.2011.2172417] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
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16
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Abstract
Metanorms is a mechanism proposed to promote cooperation in social dilemmas. Recent experimental results show that network structures that underlie social interactions influence the emergence of norms that promote cooperation. We generalize Axelrod's analysis of metanorms dynamics to interactions unfolding on networks through simulation and mathematical modeling. Network topology strongly influences the effectiveness of the metanorms mechanism in establishing cooperation. In particular, we find that average degree, clustering coefficient and the average number of triplets per node play key roles in sustaining or collapsing cooperation.
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Affiliation(s)
- José M Galán
- Área de Organización de Empresas, Departamento de Ingeniería Civil, Universidad de Burgos, Burgos, Spain.
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17
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Liu, Hao. An Application of a Dual-Process Approach to Decision Making in Social Dilemmas. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY 2011; 124:203-12. [DOI: 10.5406/amerjpsyc.124.2.0203] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
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18
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Schuster S, Kreft JU, Brenner N, Wessely F, Theissen G, Ruppin E, Schroeter A. Cooperation and cheating in microbial exoenzyme production--theoretical analysis for biotechnological applications. Biotechnol J 2010; 5:751-8. [PMID: 20540107 DOI: 10.1002/biot.200900303] [Citation(s) in RCA: 25] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
Abstract
The engineering of microorganisms to produce a variety of extracellular enzymes (exoenzymes), for example for producing renewable fuels and in biodegradation of xenobiotics, has recently attracted increasing interest. Productivity is often reduced by "cheater" mutants, which are deficient in exoenzyme production and benefit from the product provided by the "cooperating" cells. We present a game-theoretical model to analyze population structure and exoenzyme productivity in terms of biotechnologically relevant parameters. For any given population density, three distinct regimes are predicted: when the metabolic effort for exoenzyme production and secretion is low, all cells cooperate; at intermediate metabolic costs, cooperators and cheaters coexist; while at high costs, all cells use the cheating strategy. These regimes correspond to the harmony game, snowdrift game, and Prisoner's Dilemma, respectively. Thus, our results indicate that microbial strains engineered for exoenzyme production will not, under appropriate conditions, be outcompeted by cheater mutants. We also analyze the dependence of the population structure on cell density. At low costs, the fraction of cooperating cells increases with decreasing cell density and reaches unity at a critical threshold. Our model provides an estimate of the cell density maximizing exoenzyme production.
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Affiliation(s)
- Stefan Schuster
- Department of Bioinformatics, School of Biology and Pharmaceutics, Friedrich Schiller University of Jena, Ernst-Abbe-Platz 2, Jena, Germany
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Fu F, Nowak MA, Hauert C. Invasion and expansion of cooperators in lattice populations: prisoner's dilemma vs. snowdrift games. J Theor Biol 2010; 266:358-66. [PMID: 20619271 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.06.042] [Citation(s) in RCA: 77] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/12/2010] [Revised: 04/23/2010] [Accepted: 06/30/2010] [Indexed: 10/19/2022]
Abstract
The evolution of cooperation is an enduring conundrum in biology and the social sciences. Two social dilemmas, the prisoner's dilemma and the snowdrift game have emerged as the most promising mathematical metaphors to study cooperation. Spatial structure with limited local interactions has long been identified as a potent promoter of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma but in the spatial snowdrift game, space may actually enhance or inhibit cooperation. Here we investigate and link the microscopic interaction between individuals to the characteristics of the emerging macroscopic patterns generated by the spatial invasion process of cooperators in a world of defectors. In our simulations, individuals are located on a square lattice with Moore neighborhood and update their strategies by probabilistically imitating the strategies of better performing neighbors. Under sufficiently benign conditions, cooperators can survive in both games. After rapid local equilibration, cooperators expand quadratically until global saturation is reached. Under favorable conditions, cooperators expand as a large contiguous cluster in both games with minor differences concerning the shape of embedded defectors. Under less favorable conditions, however, distinct differences arise. In the prisoner's dilemma, cooperators break up into isolated, compact clusters. The compact clustering reduces exploitation and leads to positive assortment, such that cooperators interact more frequently with other cooperators than with defectors. In contrast, in the snowdrift game, cooperators form small, dendritic clusters, which results in negative assortment and cooperators interact more frequently with defectors than with other cooperators. In order to characterize and quantify the emerging spatial patterns, we introduce a measure for the cluster shape and demonstrate that the macroscopic patterns can be used to determine the characteristics of the underlying microscopic interactions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Feng Fu
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA.
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20
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Koike S, Nakamaru M, Tsujimoto M. Evolution of cooperation in rotating indivisible goods game. J Theor Biol 2010; 264:143-53. [PMID: 20064533 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.12.030] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/24/2009] [Accepted: 12/31/2009] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
Abstract
Collective behavior is theoretically and experimentally studied through a public goods game in which players contribute resources or efforts to produce goods (or pool), which are then divided equally among all players regardless of the amount of their contribution. However, if goods are indivisible, only one player can receive the goods. In this case, the problem is how to distribute indivisible goods, and here therefore we propose a new game, namely the "rotating indivisible goods game." In this game, the goods are not divided but distributed by regular rotation. An example is rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs), which exist all over the world and serve as efficient and informal institutions for collecting savings for small investments. In a ROSCA, members regularly contribute money to produce goods and to distribute them to each member on a regular rotation. It has been pointed out that ROSCA members are selected based on their reliability or reputation, and that defectors who stop contributing are excluded. We elucidate mechanisms that sustain cooperation in rotating indivisible goods games by means of evolutionary simulations. First, we investigate the effect of the peer selection rule by which the group chooses members based on the players reputation, also by which players choose groups based on their reputation. Regardless of the peer selection rule, cooperation is not sustainable in a rotating indivisible goods game. Second, we introduce the forfeiture rule that forbids a member who has not contributed earlier from receiving goods. These analyses show that employing these two rules can sustain cooperation in the rotating indivisible goods game, although employing either of the two cannot. Finally, we prove that evolutionary simulation can be a tool for investigating institutional designs that promote cooperation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Shimpei Koike
- Department of Value and Decision Science, Tokyo Institute of Technology, 2-12-1, O-okayama, Meguro, Tokyo 152-8552, Japan.
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21
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Lion S, van Baalen M. The evolution of juvenile-adult interactions in populations structured in age and space. Theor Popul Biol 2009; 76:132-45. [DOI: 10.1016/j.tpb.2009.05.005] [Citation(s) in RCA: 13] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/29/2008] [Revised: 05/21/2009] [Accepted: 05/27/2009] [Indexed: 11/25/2022]
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22
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Ezoe H. Dual lattice model of the evolution of facultative symbiosis with continuous Prisoner's Dilemma game. J Theor Biol 2009; 259:744-50. [PMID: 19409909 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.04.023] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/19/2008] [Revised: 04/23/2009] [Accepted: 04/23/2009] [Indexed: 10/20/2022]
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23
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Devlin S, Treloar T. Cooperation in an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma on networks with degree-degree correlations. PHYSICAL REVIEW. E, STATISTICAL, NONLINEAR, AND SOFT MATTER PHYSICS 2009; 80:026105. [PMID: 19792198 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.80.026105] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/10/2009] [Indexed: 05/28/2023]
Abstract
We study the effects of degree-degree correlations on the success of cooperation in an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma played on a random network. When degree-degree correlations are not present, the standardized variance of the network's degree distribution has been shown to be an accurate analytical measure of network heterogeneity that can be used to predict the success of cooperation. In this paper, we use a local-mechanism interpretation of standardized variance to give a generalization to graphs with degree-degree correlations. Two distinct mechanisms are shown to influence cooperation levels on these types of networks. The first is an intrinsic measurement of base-line heterogeneity coming from the network's degree distribution. The second is the increase in heterogeneity coming from the degree-degree correlations present in the network. A strong linear relationship is found between these two parameters and the average cooperation level in an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma on a network.
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Affiliation(s)
- Stephen Devlin
- Mathematics Department, University of San Francisco, 2130 Fulton Street, San Francisco, California 94117, USA
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Moyano LG, Sánchez A. Evolving learning rules and emergence of cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma. J Theor Biol 2009; 259:84-95. [PMID: 19285509 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.03.002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 56] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/08/2008] [Revised: 03/02/2009] [Accepted: 03/02/2009] [Indexed: 11/17/2022]
Abstract
In the evolutionary Prisoner's dilemma (PD) game, agents play with each other and update their strategies in every generation according to some microscopic dynamical rule. In its spatial version, agents do not play with every other but, instead, interact only with their neighbours, thus mimicking the existing of a social or contact network that defines who interacts with whom. In this work, we explore evolutionary, spatial PD systems consisting of two types of agents, each with a certain update (reproduction, learning) rule. We investigate two different scenarios: in the first case, update rules remain fixed for the entire evolution of the system; in the second case, agents update both strategy and update rule in every generation. We show that in a well-mixed population the evolutionary outcome is always full defection. We subsequently focus on two-strategy competition with nearest-neighbour interactions on the contact network and synchronised update of strategies. Our results show that, for an important range of the parameters of the game, the final state of the system is largely different from that arising from the usual setup of a single, fixed dynamical rule. Furthermore, the results are also very different if update rules are fixed or evolve with the strategies. In these respect, we have studied representative update rules, finding that some of them may become extinct while others prevail. We describe the new and rich variety of final outcomes that arise from this co-evolutionary dynamics. We include examples of other neighbourhoods and asynchronous updating that confirm the robustness of our conclusions. Our results pave the way to an evolutionary rationale for modelling social interactions through game theory with a preferred set of update rules.
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Affiliation(s)
- Luis G Moyano
- Departamento de Matemáticas, Grupo Interdisciplinar de Sistemas Complejos, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Leganés, Madrid, Spain
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Sekiguchi T, Nakamaru M. Effect of the presence of empty sites on the evolution of cooperation by costly punishment in spatial games. J Theor Biol 2008; 256:297-304. [PMID: 18952110 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.09.025] [Citation(s) in RCA: 22] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/12/2008] [Revised: 09/24/2008] [Accepted: 09/25/2008] [Indexed: 11/18/2022]
Abstract
Cooperation and spiteful behavior are still evolutionary puzzles. Costly punishment, for which the game payoff is the same as that of spiteful behavior, is one mechanism for promoting the evolution of cooperation. A spatially structured population facilitates the evolution of either cooperation or spite/punishment if cooperation is linked explicitly or implicitly with spite/punishment; a cooperator cooperates with another cooperator and punishes/spites the other type of player. Different updating rules in the evolutionary game produce different evolutionary outcomes: with one updating rule-the score-dependent viability model, in which a player dies with a probability inversely proportional to the game score and the resulting unoccupied site is colonized by one player chosen randomly-the evolution of spite/punishment is promoted more than with the other updating rule-the score-dependent fertility model, in which, after a player dies randomly, the site is colonized by a player with a higher game score. If the population has empty sites, spiteful players or punishers should have less chance to interact with others and then spite/punish others. Thus the presence of empty sites would affect the evolutionary dynamics of spite/punishment. Here, we investigated whether the presence of empty sites discourages the evolution of spite/punishment in both a lattice-structured population and a completely mixing population where players interact with others randomly, especially when the score-dependent viability model is adopted. In the lattice-structured population adopting this viability model, the presence of empty sites promoted the evolution of cooperation and did not reduce the effect of spite/punishment. In the completely mixing population, the presence of empty sites did not promote evolution of cooperation by punishment. The evolutionary dynamics of the score-dependent viability model with empty sites were close to those of the score-dependent fertility model.
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Affiliation(s)
- Takuya Sekiguchi
- Department of Value and Decision Science, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Tokyo, Japan.
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Curran D, O’Riordan C, Sorensen H. The evolution of donators in a common-pool resource problem. Artif Intell Rev 2008. [DOI: 10.1007/s10462-008-9077-2] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
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Számadó S, Szalai F, Scheuring I. The effect of dispersal and neighbourhood in games of cooperation. J Theor Biol 2008; 253:221-7. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.02.037] [Citation(s) in RCA: 20] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/12/2007] [Revised: 02/27/2008] [Accepted: 02/27/2008] [Indexed: 10/22/2022]
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Jiménez R, Lugo H, Cuesta JA, Sánchez A. Emergence and resilience of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma via a reward mechanism. J Theor Biol 2008; 250:475-83. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.10.010] [Citation(s) in RCA: 78] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/05/2007] [Revised: 09/13/2007] [Accepted: 10/10/2007] [Indexed: 11/25/2022]
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Abstract
Spatial self-structuring has been a focus of recent interest among evolutionary ecologists. We review recent developments in the study of the interplay between spatial self-structuring and evolution. We first discuss the relative merits of the various theoretical approaches to spatial modelling in ecology. Second, we synthesize the main theoretical studies of the evolution of cooperation in spatially structured populations. We show that population viscosity is generally beneficial to cooperation, because cooperators can reap additional benefits from being clustered. A similar mechanism can explain the evolution of honest communication and of reduced virulence in host-parasite interactions. We also discuss some recent innovative empirical results that test these theories. Third, we show the relevance of these results to the general field of evolutionary ecology. An important conclusion is that kin selection is the main process that drives evolution of cooperation in viscous populations. Many results of kin selection theory can be recovered as emergent properties of spatial ecological dynamics. We discuss the implications of these results for the study of multilevel selection and evolutionary transitions. We conclude by sketching some perspectives for future research, with a particular emphasis on the topics of evolutionary branching, criticality, spatial fluctuations and experimental tests of theoretical predictions. Space is the place - Sun Ra.
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Affiliation(s)
- Sébastien Lion
- Ecole normale supérieure, UMR 7625 Fonctionnement et Evolution des Systèmes Ecologiques, Paris, F-75005, France.
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Golubski AJ. Interactive effects of builders and exploiters on environmental quality and the outcome of competition between the two. J Theor Biol 2007; 249:46-57. [PMID: 17706679 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.06.018] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/06/2006] [Revised: 06/22/2007] [Accepted: 06/25/2007] [Indexed: 11/24/2022]
Abstract
The implications of spatial and temporal structure for the maintenance of mutualism, altruism, and niche construction or ecosystem engineering have been explored by many theoretical models. Part of what these models have shown is that organisms that give up some amount of potential short-term gain in order to improve the quality of their environment can, in a variety of scenarios, persist in the face of more exploitative competitors if structure in environmental quality allows the former to preferentially benefit from their investments. The models presented here consider the additional implications of interactions between competitors in their effects on their environment (recently documented in multiple systems). Relative to when competitor types were additive, synergistic effects promoted coexistence and antagonistic effects promoted founder effects (but favored the less exploitative type when both had equal initial frequencies). Spatial and temporal patterns of patch quality and occupancy also differed markedly between scenarios, even where all three scenarios generated the same qualitative outcome. These models show that understanding both the scale over which organisms affect their environment and the degree to which organisms interact in such effects are important for interpreting patterns in environmental quality, predicting the effects of organism-environment feedback on competition, and explaining the persistence of mutualistic traits.
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Affiliation(s)
- Antonio J Golubski
- Department of Biological Sciences (M/C 066), University of Illinois at Chicago, 845 West Taylor, Chicago, IL 60607, USA.
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Langer P, Nowak MA, Hauert C. Spatial invasion of cooperation. J Theor Biol 2007; 250:634-41. [PMID: 18068731 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.11.002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 88] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/13/2007] [Revised: 10/26/2007] [Accepted: 11/01/2007] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
The evolutionary puzzle of cooperation describes situations where cooperators provide a fitness benefit to other individuals at some cost to themselves. Under Darwinian selection, the evolution of cooperation is a conundrum, whereas non-cooperation (or defection) is not. In the absence of supporting mechanisms, cooperators perform poorly and decrease in abundance. Evolutionary game theory provides a powerful mathematical framework to address the problem of cooperation using the prisoner's dilemma. One well-studied possibility to maintain cooperation is to consider structured populations, where each individual interacts only with a limited subset of the population. This enables cooperators to form clusters such that they are more likely to interact with other cooperators instead of being exploited by defectors. Here we present a detailed analysis of how a few cooperators invade and expand in a world of defectors. If the invasion succeeds, the expansion process takes place in two stages: first, cooperators and defectors quickly establish a local equilibrium and then they uniformly expand in space. The second stage provides good estimates for the global equilibrium frequencies of cooperators and defectors. Under hospitable conditions, cooperators typically form a single, ever growing cluster interspersed with specks of defectors, whereas under more hostile conditions, cooperators form isolated, compact clusters that minimize exploitation by defectors. We provide the first quantitative assessment of the way cooperators arrange in space during invasion and find that the macroscopic properties and the emerging spatial patterns reveal information about the characteristics of the underlying microscopic interactions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Philipp Langer
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, One Brattle Square, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA.
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Vainstein MH, T C Silva A, Arenzon JJ. Does mobility decrease cooperation? J Theor Biol 2007; 244:722-8. [PMID: 17055534 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2006.09.012] [Citation(s) in RCA: 161] [Impact Index Per Article: 9.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/25/2006] [Revised: 08/29/2006] [Accepted: 09/08/2006] [Indexed: 10/24/2022]
Abstract
We explore the minimal conditions for sustainable cooperation on a spatially distributed population of memoryless, unconditional strategies (cooperators and defectors) in presence of unbiased, non-contingent mobility in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. We find that cooperative behavior is not only possible but may even be enhanced by such an "always-move" rule, when compared with the strongly viscous ("never-move") case. In addition, mobility also increases the capability of cooperation to emerge and invade a population of defectors, what may have a fundamental role in the problem of the onset of cooperation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Mendeli H Vainstein
- Instituto de Física and International Center of Condensed Matter Physics, Universidade de Brasília, CP 04513, 70919-97 Brasília DF, Brazil
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Kun Á, Boza G, Scheuring I. Asynchronous snowdrift game with synergistic effect as a model of cooperation. Behav Ecol 2006. [DOI: 10.1093/beheco/ark009] [Citation(s) in RCA: 27] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
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