Garay J, Garay BM, Varga Z, Csiszár V, Móri TF. To save or not to save your family member's life? Evolutionary stability of self-sacrificing life history strategy in monogamous sexual populations.
BMC Evol Biol 2019;
19:147. [PMID:
31324139 PMCID:
PMC6642471 DOI:
10.1186/s12862-019-1478-0]
[Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/27/2019] [Accepted: 07/16/2019] [Indexed: 11/10/2022] Open
Abstract
BACKGROUND
For the understanding of human nature, the evolutionary roots of human moral behaviour are a key precondition. Our question is as follows: Can the altruistic moral rule "Risk your life to save your family members, if you want them to save your life" be evolutionary stable? There are three research approaches to investigate this problem: kin selection, group selection and population genetics modelling. The present study is strictly based on the last approach.
RESULTS
We consider monogamous and exogamous families, where at an autosomal locus, dominant-recessive alleles determine the phenotypes in a sexual population. Since all individuals' survival rate is determined by their altruistic family members, we introduce a new population genetics model based on the mating table approach and adapt the verbal definition of evolutionary stability to genotypes. In general, when the resident is recessive, a homozygote is an evolutionarily stable genotype (ESG), if the number of survivors of the resident genotype of the resident homozygote family is greater than that of non-resident heterozygote survivors of the family of the resident homozygote and mutant heterozygote genotypes. Using the introduced genotype dynamics we proved that in the recessive case ESG implies local stability of the altruistic genotype. We apply our general ESG conditions for self-sacrificing life history strategy when the number of new-born offspring does not depend on interactions within the family and the interactions are additive. We find that in this case our ESG conditions give back Hamilton's rule for evolutionary stability of the self-sacrificing life history strategy.
CONCLUSIONS
In spite of the fact that the kidney transplantations was not a selection factor during the earlier human evolution, nowadays "self-sacrificing" can be observed in the live donor kidney transplantations, when the donor is one of the family members. It seems that selection for self-sacrificing in family produced an innate moral tendency in modulating social cognition in human brain.
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