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Crespi BJ, Flinn MV, Summers K. Runaway Social Selection in Human Evolution. Front Ecol Evol 2022. [DOI: 10.3389/fevo.2022.894506] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Darwin posited that social competition among conspecifics could be a powerful selective pressure. Alexander proposed a model of human evolution involving a runaway process of social competition based on Darwin’s insight. Here we briefly review Alexander’s logic, and then expand upon his model by elucidating six core arenas of social selection that involve runaway, positive-feedback processes, and that were likely involved in the evolution of the remarkable combination of adaptations in humans. We discuss how these ideas fit with the hypothesis that a key life history innovation that opened the door to runaway social selection, and cumulative culture, during hominin evolution was increased cooperation among individuals in small fission-fusion groups.
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2
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Ohdaira T. The probabilistic pool punishment proportional to the difference of payoff outperforms previous pool and peer punishment. Sci Rep 2022; 12:6604. [PMID: 35459880 PMCID: PMC9033862 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-022-10582-5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/17/2022] [Accepted: 04/08/2022] [Indexed: 11/22/2022] Open
Abstract
The public goods game is a multiplayer version of the prisoner’s dilemma game. In the public goods game, punishment on defectors is necessary to encourage cooperation. There are two types of punishment: peer punishment and pool punishment. Comparing pool punishment with peer punishment, pool punishment is disadvantageous in comparison with peer punishment because pool punishment incurs fixed costs especially if second-order free riders (those who invest in public goods but do not punish defectors) are not punished. In order to eliminate such a flaw of pool punishment, this study proposes the probabilistic pool punishment proportional to the difference of payoff. In the proposed pool punishment, each punisher pays the cost to the punishment pool with the probability proportional to the difference of payoff between his/her payoff and the average payoff of his/her opponents. Comparing the proposed pool punishment with previous pool and peer punishment, in pool punishment of previous studies, cooperators who do not punish defectors become dominant instead of pool punishers with fixed costs. However, in the proposed pool punishment, more punishers and less cooperators coexist, and such state is more robust against the invasion of defectors due to mutation than those of previous pool and peer punishment. The average payoff is also comparable to peer punishment of previous studies.
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Affiliation(s)
- Tetsushi Ohdaira
- Institute of Information and Media, Aoyama Gakuin University, 5-10-1 Fuchinobe, Chuo-ku, Sagamihara-city, Kanagawa, 252-5258, Japan.
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Nakamaru M, Onuma A. Ecological features benefiting sustainable harvesters in socio-ecological systems: a case study of Swiftlets in Malaysia. ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS : A PUBLICATION OF THE ECOLOGICAL SOCIETY OF AMERICA 2021; 31:e02413. [PMID: 34260776 DOI: 10.1002/eap.2413] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/27/2020] [Revised: 12/17/2020] [Accepted: 03/22/2021] [Indexed: 06/13/2023]
Abstract
A major challenge in biodiversity management is overharvesting by unsustainable harvesters. If a scenario could be created where sustainable harvesters benefit more than the unsustainable ones, even in the short term, the issue of overharvesting would be solved. Everyone would then follow the lead of sustainable harvesters. However, creating such a scenario is not an easy task; the difficulty is intensified if the habitat is open access and there is no property rights system. Swiftlets in Sarawak, Malaysia, present a special case where sustainable harvesters are believed to be more beneficial than unsustainable harvesters. Edible nests built by adult Swiftlets are used as ingredients for a traditional luxurious soup in Chinese cuisine. A rise in nest prices has increased the instances of unsustainable harvesters wrongfully collecting nests along with the eggs and fledglings, which are then abandoned. Swiftlets live in caves and build nests on cave ceilings. It is known that Swiftlets escape from cave ceilings when these harvesters take the nests, never to return to the same place. This ecological feature appears to work as the Swiftlet's indirect punishment against unsustainable harvesters. This study constructs a stage-structured population model and examines the effect of property rights and the indirect punishment by Swiftlets on the population dynamics of the bird, and on the economic return of both sustainable and unsustainable harvesters. Our findings are as follows: the indirect punishment by Swiftlets provides sustainable harvesters a higher short-term return than unsustainable harvesters under the property rights system, as long as Swiftlets return to their original cave after escaping from the unsustainable harvesters. While previous studies regarding the management of the commons have stressed the importance of rules and regulations for sustainable harvesting without considering the ecological uniqueness of each species, this study suggests that ecological exploration and the discovery of ecological features are also essential for designing a sustainable framework.
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Affiliation(s)
- Mayuko Nakamaru
- School of Environment and Society, Tokyo Institute of Technology, 3-3-6, Shibaura, Minato, Tokyo, 108-0023, Japan
- Graduate School of Decision Science and Technology, Tokyo Institute of Technology, 2-12-1, Ookayama, Meguro, Tokyo, 152-8552, Japan
| | - Ayumi Onuma
- Keio University, 2-15-45, Mita, Minato, Tokyo, 108-8345, Japan
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4
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Governance of risky public goods under graduated punishment. J Theor Biol 2020; 505:110423. [PMID: 32726648 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2020.110423] [Citation(s) in RCA: 13] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/31/2020] [Revised: 07/16/2020] [Accepted: 07/20/2020] [Indexed: 11/27/2022]
Abstract
Ensuring global cooperation often poses governance problems shadowed by the tragedy of the commons, as wrong-doers enjoy the benefits set up by right-doers at no cost. Institutional punishment of wrong-doers is well-known to curtail their impetus as free-riders. However, institutions often have limited scope in imposing sanctions, more so when these are strict and potentially viewed as disproportionate. Inspired by the design principles proposed by the late Nobel Prize Elinor Ostrom, here we study the evolution and impact of a new form of institutional sanctioning, where punishment is graduated, growing with the incidence of free-riding. We develop an analytical model capable of identifying the conditions under which this design principle is conducive to the self-organization of stable institutions and cooperation. We employ evolutionary game theory in finite populations and non-linear public goods dilemmas in the presence of risk of global losses whose solution requires the self-organization of decision makers into an overall cooperative state. We show that graduated punishment is more effective in promoting widespread cooperation than conventional forms of punishment studied to date, being also less severe and thus, presumably, easier to implement. This effect is enhanced whenever the costs of its implementation are positively correlated with the severity of punishment. We frame our model within the context of the global reduction of carbon emissions, but the results are shown to be general enough to be applicable to other collective action problems, shedding further light into the origins of Human institutions.
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5
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Voluntary vaccination dilemma with evolving psychological perceptions. J Theor Biol 2017; 439:65-75. [PMID: 29199090 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.11.011] [Citation(s) in RCA: 20] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/24/2017] [Revised: 10/28/2017] [Accepted: 11/15/2017] [Indexed: 11/20/2022]
Abstract
Voluntary vaccination is a universal control protocol for infectious diseases. Yet there exists a social dilemma between individual benefits and public health: non-vaccinators free ride via the herd immunity from adequate vaccinators who bear vaccination cost. This is due to the interplay between disease prevalence and individual vaccinating behavior. To complicate matters further, individual vaccinating behavior depends on the perceived vaccination cost rather than the actual one. The perception of vaccination cost is an individual trait, which varies from person to person, and evolves in response to the disease prevalence and vaccination coverage. To explore how evolving perception shapes individual vaccinating behavior and thus the vaccination dynamics, we provide a model combining epidemic dynamics with evolutionary game theory which captures the voluntary vaccination dilemma. In particular, individuals adjust their perception based on the inertia effect in psychology and then update their vaccinating behavior through imitating the behavior of a more successful peer. We find that i) vaccination is acceptable when the expected vaccination cost considering perception and actual vaccination cost is less than the maximum of the expected non-vaccination cost; ii) the evolution of perception is a "double-edged sword" for vaccination dynamics: it can improve vaccination coverage when most individuals perceive exaggerated vaccination cost, and it inhibits vaccination coverage in the other cases.
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6
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The extended reciprocity: Strong belief outperforms persistence. J Theor Biol 2017; 421:16-27. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.03.021] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/25/2016] [Revised: 03/15/2017] [Accepted: 03/20/2017] [Indexed: 11/22/2022]
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Altruistic punishment does not increase with the severity of norm violations in the field. Nat Commun 2016; 7:13327. [PMID: 27802261 PMCID: PMC5097122 DOI: 10.1038/ncomms13327] [Citation(s) in RCA: 24] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/06/2016] [Accepted: 09/22/2016] [Indexed: 11/08/2022] Open
Abstract
The degree of human cooperation among strangers is a major evolutionary puzzle. A prominent explanation is that cooperation is maintained because many individuals have a predisposition to punish those violating group-beneficial norms. A critical condition for cooperation to evolve in evolutionary models is that punishment increases with the severity of the violation. Here we present evidence from a field experiment with real-life interactions that, unlike in lab experiments, altruistic punishment does not increase with the severity of the violation, regardless of whether it is direct (confronting a violator) or indirect (withholding help). We also document growing concerns for counter-punishment as the severity of the violation increases, indicating that the marginal cost of direct punishment increases with the severity of violations. The evidence suggests that altruistic punishment may not provide appropriate incentives to deter large violations. Our findings thus offer a rationale for the emergence of formal institutions for promoting large-scale cooperation among strangers. Lab experiments have shown that people will punish violators of social norms, with the severity of punishment increasing with the degree of violation. Here, Balafoutas et al. show that, outside of the lab, larger violations are not punished more severely and are associated with a greater risk of reprisal.
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Evolution of cooperation by the introduction of the probabilistic peer-punishment based on the difference of payoff. Sci Rep 2016; 6:25413. [PMID: 27146347 PMCID: PMC4857114 DOI: 10.1038/srep25413] [Citation(s) in RCA: 13] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/16/2016] [Accepted: 04/13/2016] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
There are two types of costly punishment, i.e. peer-punishment and pool-punishment. While peer-punishment applies direct face to face punishment, pool-punishment is based on multi-point, collective interaction among group members. Regarding those two types of costly punishment, peer-punishment is especially considered to have the flaws that it lowers the average payoff of all players as well as pool-punishment does, and facilitates antisocial behaviour like retaliation of a defector on a cooperator. Here, this study proposes the new peer-punishment that punishment to an opponent player works at high probability when an opponent one is uncooperative, and the difference of payoff between a player and an opponent one becomes large in order to prevent such antisocial behaviour. It is natural to think that players of high payoff do not expect to punish others of lower payoff because they do not have any complaints regarding their economic wealth. The author shows that the introduction of the proposed peer-punishment increases both the number of cooperative players and the average payoff of all players in various types of topology of connections between players.
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Should Law Keep Pace with Society? Relative Update Rates Determine the Co-Evolution of Institutional Punishment and Citizen Contributions to Public Goods. GAMES 2015. [DOI: 10.3390/g6020124] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
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10
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Sasaki T, Okada I. Cheating is evolutionarily assimilated with cooperation in the continuous snowdrift game. Biosystems 2015; 131:51-9. [PMID: 25868940 PMCID: PMC4441111 DOI: 10.1016/j.biosystems.2015.04.002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 15] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/21/2015] [Revised: 04/06/2015] [Accepted: 04/07/2015] [Indexed: 01/14/2023]
Abstract
We fully analyze continuous snowdrift games with quadratic payoff functions in diversified populations. It is well known that classical snowdrift games maintain the coexistence of cooperators and cheaters. We clarify that the continuous snowdrift games often lead to assimilation of cooperators and cheaters. Allowing the gradual evolution of cooperative behavior can facilitate social inequity aversion in joint ventures.
It is well known that in contrast to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the snowdrift game can lead to a stable coexistence of cooperators and cheaters. Recent theoretical evidence on the snowdrift game suggests that gradual evolution for individuals choosing to contribute in continuous degrees can result in the social diversification to a 100% contribution and 0% contribution through so-called evolutionary branching. Until now, however, game-theoretical studies have shed little light on the evolutionary dynamics and consequences of the loss of diversity in strategy. Here, we analyze continuous snowdrift games with quadratic payoff functions in dimorphic populations. Subsequently, conditions are clarified under which gradual evolution can lead a population consisting of those with 100% contribution and those with 0% contribution to merge into one species with an intermediate contribution level. The key finding is that the continuous snowdrift game is more likely to lead to assimilation of different cooperation levels rather than maintenance of diversity. Importantly, this implies that allowing the gradual evolution of cooperative behavior can facilitate social inequity aversion in joint ventures that otherwise could cause conflicts that are based on commonly accepted notions of fairness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Tatsuya Sasaki
- Faculty of Mathematics, University of Vienna, 1090 Vienna, Austria; Evolution and Ecology Program, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), 2361 Laxenburg, Austria.
| | - Isamu Okada
- Department of Business Administration, Soka University, 192-8577 Tokyo, Japan; Department of Information Systems and Operations, Vienna University of Economics and Business, 1020 Vienna, Austria
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11
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Lee JH, Sigmund K, Dieckmann U, Iwasa Y. Games of corruption: How to suppress illegal logging. J Theor Biol 2015; 367:1-13. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.10.037] [Citation(s) in RCA: 38] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/01/2014] [Revised: 10/23/2014] [Accepted: 10/29/2014] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
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12
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Lee JH, Iwasa Y. Modeling socio-economic aspects of ecosystem management and biodiversity conservation. POPUL ECOL 2013. [DOI: 10.1007/s10144-013-0423-0] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/26/2022]
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13
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Iwasa Y, Lee JH. Graduated punishment is efficient in resource management if people are heterogeneous. J Theor Biol 2013; 333:117-25. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2013.05.007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 23] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/20/2012] [Revised: 05/08/2013] [Accepted: 05/10/2013] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
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14
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Dercole F, De Carli M, Della Rossa F, Papadopoulos AV. Overpunishing is not necessary to fix cooperation in voluntary public goods games. J Theor Biol 2013; 326:70-81. [PMID: 23228364 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.11.034] [Citation(s) in RCA: 15] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/14/2012] [Revised: 11/06/2012] [Accepted: 11/29/2012] [Indexed: 10/27/2022]
Abstract
The fixation of cooperation among unrelated individuals is one of the fundamental problems in biology and social sciences. It is investigated by means of public goods games, the generalization of the prisoner's dilemma to more than two players. In compulsory public goods games, defect is the dominant strategy, while voluntary participation overcomes the social dilemma by allowing a cyclic coexistence of cooperators, defectors, and non-participants. Experimental and theoretical research has shown how the combination of voluntary participation and altruistic punishment-punishing antisocial behaviors at a personal cost-provides a solution to the problem, as long as antisocial punishment-the punishing of cooperators-is not allowed. Altruistic punishment can invade at low participation and pave the way to the fixation of cooperation. Specifically, defectors are overpunished, in the sense that their payoff is reduced by a sanction proportional to the number of punishers in the game. Here we show that qualitatively equivalent results can be achieved with a milder punishing mechanism, where defectors only risk a fixed penalty per round-as in many real situations-and the cost of punishment is shared among the punishers. The payoffs for the four strategies-cooperate, defect, abstain, and cooperate-&-punish-are derived and the corresponding replicator dynamics analyzed in full detail.
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Affiliation(s)
- Fabio Dercole
- DEI, Politecnico di Milano, Via Ponzio 34/5, 20133 Milano, Italy.
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15
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Shimao H, Nakamaru M. Strict or graduated punishment? Effect of punishment strictness on the evolution of cooperation in continuous public goods games. PLoS One 2013; 8:e59894. [PMID: 23555826 PMCID: PMC3610843 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0059894] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/09/2012] [Accepted: 02/21/2013] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Whether costly punishment encourages cooperation is one of the principal questions in studies on the evolution of cooperation and social sciences. In society, punishment helps deter people from flouting rules in institutions. Specifically, graduated punishment is a design principle for long-enduring common-pool resource institutions. In this study, we investigate whether graduated punishment can promote a higher cooperation level when each individual plays the public goods game and has the opportunity to punish others whose cooperation levels fall below the punisher's threshold. We then examine how spatial structure affects evolutionary dynamics when each individual dies inversely proportional to the game score resulting from the social interaction and another player is randomly chosen from the population to produce offspring to fill the empty site created after a player's death. Our evolutionary simulation outcomes demonstrate that stricter punishment promotes increased cooperation more than graduated punishment in a spatially structured population, whereas graduated punishment increases cooperation more than strict punishment when players interact with randomly chosen opponents from the population. The mathematical analysis also supports the results.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hajime Shimao
- Department of Value and Decision Science, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Meguro-ku, Tokyo, Japan
| | - Mayuko Nakamaru
- Department of Value and Decision Science, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Meguro-ku, Tokyo, Japan
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Abstract
The exclusion of freeriders from common privileges or public acceptance is widely found in the real world. Current models on the evolution of cooperation with incentives mostly assume peer sanctioning, whereby a punisher imposes penalties on freeriders at a cost to itself. It is well known that such costly punishment has two substantial difficulties. First, a rare punishing cooperator barely subverts the asocial society of freeriders, and second, natural selection often eliminates punishing cooperators in the presence of non-punishing cooperators (namely, 'second-order' freeriders). We present a game-theoretical model of social exclusion in which a punishing cooperator can exclude freeriders from benefit sharing. We show that such social exclusion can overcome the above-mentioned difficulties even if it is costly and stochastic. The results do not require a genetic relationship, repeated interaction, reputation or group selection. Instead, only a limited number of freeriders are required to prevent the second-order freeriders from eroding the social immune system.
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Affiliation(s)
- Tatsuya Sasaki
- Evolution and Ecology Program, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Schlossplatz 1, 2631 Laxenburg, Austria.
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Van Dyken JD, Wade MJ. Origins of altruism diversity II: Runaway coevolution of altruistic strategies via "reciprocal niche construction". Evolution 2012; 66:2498-513. [PMID: 22834748 PMCID: PMC3408633 DOI: 10.1111/j.1558-5646.2012.01629.x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 29] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/28/2022]
Abstract
Understanding the evolution of altruism requires knowledge of both its constraints and its drivers. Here we show that, paradoxically, ecological constraints on altruism may ultimately be its strongest driver. We construct a two-trait, coevolutionary adaptive dynamics model of social evolution in a genetically structured population with local resource competition. The intensity of local resource competition, which influences the direction and strength of social selection and which is typically treated as a static parameter, is here allowed to be an evolvable trait. Evolution of survival/fecundity altruism, which requires weak local competition, increases local competition as it evolves, creating negative environmental feedback that ultimately inhibits its further evolutionary advance. Alternatively, evolution of resource-based altruism, which requires strong local competition, weakens local competition as it evolves, also ultimately causing its own evolution to stall. When evolving independently, these altruistic strategies are intrinsically self-limiting. However, the coexistence of these two altruism types transforms the negative ecoevolutionary feedback generated by each strategy on itself into positive feedback on the other, allowing the presence of one trait to drive the evolution of the other. We call this feedback conversion "reciprocal niche construction." In the absence of constraints, this process leads to runaway coevolution of altruism types. We discuss applications to the origins and evolution of eusociality, division of labor, the inordinate ecological success of eusocial species, and the interaction between technology and demography in human evolution. Our theory suggests that the evolution of extreme sociality may often be an autocatalytic process.
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Deng K, Li Z, Kurokawa S, Chu T. Rare but severe concerted punishment that favors cooperation. Theor Popul Biol 2012; 81:284-91. [DOI: 10.1016/j.tpb.2012.02.005] [Citation(s) in RCA: 21] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/20/2011] [Revised: 02/13/2012] [Accepted: 02/22/2012] [Indexed: 11/26/2022]
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The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2012; 109:1165-9. [PMID: 22232694 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1115219109] [Citation(s) in RCA: 96] [Impact Index Per Article: 8.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Self-interest frequently causes individuals engaged in joint enterprises to choose actions that are counterproductive. Free-riders can invade a society of cooperators, causing a tragedy of the commons. Such social dilemmas can be overcome by positive or negative incentives. Even though an incentive-providing institution may protect a cooperative society from invasion by free-riders, it cannot always convert a society of free-riders to cooperation. In the latter case, both norms, cooperation and defection, are stable: To avoid a collapse to full defection, cooperators must be sufficiently numerous initially. A society of free-riders is then caught in a social trap, and the institution is unable to provide an escape, except at a high, possibly prohibitive cost. Here, we analyze the interplay of (a) incentives provided by institutions and (b) the effects of voluntary participation. We show that this combination fundamentally improves the efficiency of incentives. In particular, optional participation allows institutions punishing free-riders to overcome the social dilemma at a much lower cost, and to promote a globally stable regime of cooperation. This removes the social trap and implies that whenever a society of cooperators cannot be invaded by free-riders, it will necessarily become established in the long run, through social learning, irrespective of the initial number of cooperators. We also demonstrate that punishing provides a "lighter touch" than rewarding, guaranteeing full cooperation at considerably lower cost.
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20
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Replicator dynamics in public goods games with reward funds. J Theor Biol 2011; 287:109-14. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.07.026] [Citation(s) in RCA: 60] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/14/2011] [Revised: 07/23/2011] [Accepted: 07/26/2011] [Indexed: 11/19/2022]
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21
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Cressman R, Song JW, Zhang BY, Tao Y. Cooperation and evolutionary dynamics in the public goods game with institutional incentives. J Theor Biol 2011; 299:144-51. [PMID: 21843530 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.07.030] [Citation(s) in RCA: 41] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/13/2011] [Revised: 05/30/2011] [Accepted: 07/28/2011] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
Abstract
The one-shot public goods game is extended to include institutional incentives (i.e. reward and/or punishment) that are meant to promote cooperation. It is shown that the Nash equilibrium (NE) outcomes predict either partial or fully cooperative behavior in these extended multi-player games with a continuous strategy space. Furthermore, for some incentive schemes, multiple NE outcomes are shown to emerge. Stability of all these equilibria under standard evolutionary dynamics (i.e. the replicator equation and the canonical equation of adaptive dynamics) is characterized.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ross Cressman
- Department of Mathematics, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada.
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22
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How inconsistency between attitude and behavior persists through cultural transmission. J Theor Biol 2011; 271:124-35. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.11.044] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/16/2010] [Revised: 11/26/2010] [Accepted: 11/29/2010] [Indexed: 11/19/2022]
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23
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Strengthening strong reciprocity. J Theor Biol 2011; 268:141-5. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.09.037] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/26/2010] [Revised: 09/24/2010] [Accepted: 09/26/2010] [Indexed: 11/15/2022]
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24
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Rand DG, Armao JJ, Nakamaru M, Ohtsuki H. Anti-social punishment can prevent the co-evolution of punishment and cooperation. J Theor Biol 2010; 265:624-32. [PMID: 20540952 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.06.010] [Citation(s) in RCA: 145] [Impact Index Per Article: 10.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/01/2009] [Revised: 06/04/2010] [Accepted: 06/04/2010] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
Abstract
The evolution of cooperation is one of the great puzzles in evolutionary biology. Punishment has been suggested as one solution to this problem. Here punishment is generally defined as incurring a cost to inflict harm on a wrong-doer. In the presence of punishers, cooperators can gain higher payoffs than non-cooperators. Therefore cooperation may evolve as long as punishment is prevalent in the population. Theoretical models have revealed that spatial structure can favor the co-evolution of punishment and cooperation, by allowing individuals to only play and compete with those in their immediate neighborhood. However, those models have usually assumed that punishment is always targeted at non-cooperators. In light of recent empirical evidence of punishment targeted at cooperators, we relax this assumption and study the effect of so-called 'anti-social punishment'. We find that evolution can favor anti-social punishment, and that when anti-social punishment is possible costly punishment no longer promotes cooperation. As there is no reason to assume that cooperators cannot be the target of punishment during evolution, our results demonstrate serious restrictions on the ability of costly punishment to allow the evolution of cooperation in spatially structured populations. Our results also help to make sense of the empirical observation that defectors will sometimes pay to punish cooperators.
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Affiliation(s)
- David G Rand
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA.
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25
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Koike S, Nakamaru M, Tsujimoto M. Evolution of cooperation in rotating indivisible goods game. J Theor Biol 2010; 264:143-53. [PMID: 20064533 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.12.030] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/24/2009] [Accepted: 12/31/2009] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
Abstract
Collective behavior is theoretically and experimentally studied through a public goods game in which players contribute resources or efforts to produce goods (or pool), which are then divided equally among all players regardless of the amount of their contribution. However, if goods are indivisible, only one player can receive the goods. In this case, the problem is how to distribute indivisible goods, and here therefore we propose a new game, namely the "rotating indivisible goods game." In this game, the goods are not divided but distributed by regular rotation. An example is rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs), which exist all over the world and serve as efficient and informal institutions for collecting savings for small investments. In a ROSCA, members regularly contribute money to produce goods and to distribute them to each member on a regular rotation. It has been pointed out that ROSCA members are selected based on their reliability or reputation, and that defectors who stop contributing are excluded. We elucidate mechanisms that sustain cooperation in rotating indivisible goods games by means of evolutionary simulations. First, we investigate the effect of the peer selection rule by which the group chooses members based on the players reputation, also by which players choose groups based on their reputation. Regardless of the peer selection rule, cooperation is not sustainable in a rotating indivisible goods game. Second, we introduce the forfeiture rule that forbids a member who has not contributed earlier from receiving goods. These analyses show that employing these two rules can sustain cooperation in the rotating indivisible goods game, although employing either of the two cannot. Finally, we prove that evolutionary simulation can be a tool for investigating institutional designs that promote cooperation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Shimpei Koike
- Department of Value and Decision Science, Tokyo Institute of Technology, 2-12-1, O-okayama, Meguro, Tokyo 152-8552, Japan.
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