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Khalil N, Leyva I, Almendral JA, Sendiña-Nadal I. Deterministic and stochastic cooperation transitions in evolutionary games on networks. Phys Rev E 2023; 107:054302. [PMID: 37329013 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.107.054302] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/05/2022] [Accepted: 04/17/2023] [Indexed: 06/18/2023]
Abstract
Although the cooperative dynamics emerging from a network of interacting players has been exhaustively investigated, it is not yet fully understood when and how network reciprocity drives cooperation transitions. In this work, we investigate the critical behavior of evolutionary social dilemmas on structured populations by using the framework of master equations and Monte Carlo simulations. The developed theory describes the existence of absorbing, quasiabsorbing, and mixed strategy states and the transition nature, continuous or discontinuous, between the states as the parameters of the system change. In particular, when the decision-making process is deterministic, in the limit of zero effective temperature of the Fermi function, we find that the copying probabilities are discontinuous functions of the system's parameters and of the network degrees sequence. This may induce abrupt changes in the final state for any system size, in excellent agreement with the Monte Carlo simulation results. Our analysis also reveals the existence of continuous and discontinuous phase transitions for large systems as the temperature increases, which is explained in the mean-field approximation. Interestingly, for some game parameters, we find optimal "social temperatures" maximizing or minimizing the cooperation frequency or density.
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Affiliation(s)
- Nagi Khalil
- Complex Systems Group & GISC, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, Móstoles, 28933 Madrid, Spain
| | - I Leyva
- Complex Systems Group & GISC, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, Móstoles, 28933 Madrid, Spain
- Center for Biomedical Technology, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Pozuelo de Alarcón, 28223 Madrid, Spain
| | - J A Almendral
- Complex Systems Group & GISC, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, Móstoles, 28933 Madrid, Spain
- Center for Biomedical Technology, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Pozuelo de Alarcón, 28223 Madrid, Spain
| | - I Sendiña-Nadal
- Complex Systems Group & GISC, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, Móstoles, 28933 Madrid, Spain
- Center for Biomedical Technology, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Pozuelo de Alarcón, 28223 Madrid, Spain
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2
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Coggan H, Page KM. The role of evolutionary game theory in spatial and non-spatial models of the survival of cooperation in cancer: a review. JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY, INTERFACE 2022; 19:20220346. [PMID: 35975562 PMCID: PMC9382458 DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2022.0346] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/15/2022]
Abstract
Evolutionary game theory (EGT) is a branch of mathematics which considers populations of individuals interacting with each other to receive pay-offs. An individual’s pay-off is dependent on the strategy of its opponent(s) as well as on its own, and the higher its pay-off, the higher its reproductive fitness. Its offspring generally inherit its interaction strategy, subject to random mutation. Over time, the composition of the population shifts as different strategies spread or are driven extinct. In the last 25 years there has been a flood of interest in applying EGT to cancer modelling, with the aim of explaining how cancerous mutations spread through healthy tissue and how intercellular cooperation persists in tumour-cell populations. This review traces this body of work from theoretical analyses of well-mixed infinite populations through to more realistic spatial models of the development of cooperation between epithelial cells. We also consider work in which EGT has been used to make experimental predictions about the evolution of cancer, and discuss work that remains to be done before EGT can make large-scale contributions to clinical treatment and patient outcomes.
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Affiliation(s)
- Helena Coggan
- Department of Mathematics, University College London, London, UK
| | - Karen M Page
- Department of Mathematics, University College London, London, UK
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3
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Li Z, Chen X, Yang HX, Szolnoki A. Game-theoretical approach for opinion dynamics on social networks. CHAOS (WOODBURY, N.Y.) 2022; 32:073117. [PMID: 35907745 DOI: 10.1063/5.0084178] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/04/2022] [Accepted: 06/21/2022] [Indexed: 06/15/2023]
Abstract
Opinion dynamics on social networks have received considerable attentions in recent years. Nevertheless, just a few works have theoretically analyzed the condition in which a certain opinion can spread in the whole structured population. In this article, we propose an evolutionary game approach for a binary opinion model to explore the conditions for an opinion's spreading. Inspired by real-life observations, we assume that an agent's choice to select an opinion is not random but is based on a score rooted from both public knowledge and the interactions with neighbors. By means of coalescing random walks, we obtain a condition in which opinion A can be favored to spread on social networks in the weak selection limit. We find that the successfully spreading condition of opinion A is closely related to the basic scores of binary opinions, the feedback scores on opinion interactions, and the structural parameters including the edge weights, the weighted degrees of vertices, and the average degree of the network. In particular, when individuals adjust their opinions based solely on the public information, the vitality of opinion A depends exclusively on the difference of basic scores of A and B. When there are no negative (positive) feedback interactions between connected individuals, we find that the success of opinion A depends on the ratio of the obtained positive (negative) feedback scores of competing opinions. To complete our study, we perform computer simulations on fully connected, small-world, and scale-free networks, respectively, which support and confirm our theoretical findings.
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Affiliation(s)
- Zhifang Li
- School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China
| | - Xiaojie Chen
- School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China
| | - Han-Xin Yang
- Department of Physics, Fuzhou University, Fuzhou 350108, China
| | - Attila Szolnoki
- Institute of Technical Physics and Materials Science, Centre for Energy Research, P.O. Box 49, H-1525 Budapest, Hungary
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4
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Direct Reciprocity and Model-Predictive Strategy Update Explain the Network Reciprocity Observed in Socioeconomic Networks. GAMES 2020. [DOI: 10.3390/g11010016] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
Network reciprocity has been successfully put forward (since M. A. Nowak and R. May’s, 1992, influential paper) as the simplest mechanism—requiring no strategical complexity—supporting the evolution of cooperation in biological and socioeconomic systems. The mechanism is actually the network, which makes agents’ interactions localized, while network reciprocity is the property of the underlying evolutionary process to favor cooperation in sparse rather than dense networks. In theoretical models, the property holds under imitative evolutionary processes, whereas cooperation disappears in any network if imitation is replaced by the more rational best-response rule of strategy update. In social experiments, network reciprocity has been observed, although the imitative behavior did not emerge. What did emerge is a form of conditional cooperation based on direct reciprocity—the propensity to cooperate with neighbors who previously cooperated. To resolve this inconsistency, network reciprocity has been recently shown in a model that rationally confronts the two main behaviors emerging in experiments—reciprocal cooperation and unconditional defection—with rationality introduced by extending the best-response rule to a multi-step predictive horizon. However, direct reciprocity was implemented in a non-standard way, by allowing cooperative agents to temporarily cut the interaction with defecting neighbors. Here, we make this result robust to the way cooperators reciprocate, by implementing direct reciprocity with the standard tit-for-tat strategy and deriving similar results.
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5
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Chen X, Brännström Å, Dieckmann U. Parent-preferred dispersal promotes cooperation in structured populations. Proc Biol Sci 2020; 286:20181949. [PMID: 30963948 DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2018.1949] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Dispersal is a key process for the emergence of social and biological behaviours. Yet, little attention has been paid to dispersal's effects on the evolution of cooperative behaviour in structured populations. To address this issue, we propose two new dispersal modes, parent-preferred and offspring-preferred dispersal, incorporate them into the birth-death update rule, and consider the resultant strategy evolution in the prisoner's dilemma on random-regular, small-world, and scale-free networks, respectively. We find that parent-preferred dispersal favours the evolution of cooperation in these different types of population structures, while offspring-preferred dispersal inhibits the evolution of cooperation in homogeneous populations. On scale-free networks when the strength of parent-preferred dispersal is weak, cooperation can be enhanced at intermediate strengths of offspring-preferred dispersal, and cooperators can coexist with defectors at high strengths of offspring-preferred dispersal. Moreover, our theoretical analysis based on the pair-approximation method corroborates the evolutionary outcomes on random-regular networks. We also incorporate the two new dispersal modes into three other update rules (death-birth, imitation, and pairwise comparison updating), and find that similar results about the effects of parent-preferred and offspring-preferred dispersal can again be observed in the aforementioned different types of population structures. Our work, thus, unveils robust effects of preferential dispersal modes on the evolution of cooperation in different interactive environments.
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Affiliation(s)
- Xiaojie Chen
- 1 School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China , Chengdu 611731 , People's Republic of China.,2 Evolution and Ecology Program, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) , Schlossplatz 1, 2361 Laxenburg , Austria
| | - Åke Brännström
- 2 Evolution and Ecology Program, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) , Schlossplatz 1, 2361 Laxenburg , Austria.,3 Department of Mathematics and Mathematical Statistics, Umeå University , 90187 Umeå , Sweden
| | - Ulf Dieckmann
- 2 Evolution and Ecology Program, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) , Schlossplatz 1, 2361 Laxenburg , Austria
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6
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Marques ICP, Franco M. Cooperation networks in the area of health: systematic literature review. Scientometrics 2020. [DOI: 10.1007/s11192-019-03341-3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/25/2022]
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7
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Direct reciprocity and model-predictive rationality explain network reciprocity over social ties. Sci Rep 2019; 9:5367. [PMID: 30931975 PMCID: PMC6443768 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-019-41547-w] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/21/2018] [Accepted: 02/28/2019] [Indexed: 11/16/2022] Open
Abstract
Since M. A. Nowak & R. May’s (1992) influential paper, limiting each agent’s interactions to a few neighbors in a network of contacts has been proposed as the simplest mechanism to support the evolution of cooperation in biological and socio-economic systems. The network allows cooperative agents to self-assort into clusters, within which they reciprocate cooperation. This (induced) network reciprocity has been observed in several theoreticalmodels and shown to predict the fixation of cooperation under a simple rule: the benefit produced by an act of cooperation must outweigh the cost of cooperating with all neighbors. However, the experimental evidence among humans is controversial: though the rule seems to be confirmed, the underlying modeling assumptions are not. Specifically, models assume that agents update their strategies by imitating better performing neighbors, even though imitation lacks rationality when interactions are far from all-to-all. Indeed, imitation did not emerge in experiments. What did emerge is that humans are conditioned by their own mood and that, when in a cooperative mood, they reciprocate cooperation. To help resolve the controversy, we design a model in which we rationally confront the two main behaviors emerging from experiments—reciprocal cooperation and unconditional defection—in a networked prisoner’s dilemma. Rationality is introduced by means of a predictive rule for strategy update and is bounded by the assumed model society. We show that both reciprocity and a multi-step predictive horizon are necessary to stabilize cooperation, and sufficient for its fixation, provided the game benefit-to-cost ratio is larger than a measure of network connectivity. We hence rediscover the rule of network reciprocity, underpinned however by a different evolutionary mechanism.
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8
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Utkovski Z, Stojkoski V, Basnarkov L, Kocarev L. Promoting cooperation by preventing exploitation: The role of network structure. Phys Rev E 2017; 96:022315. [PMID: 28950484 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.96.022315] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/07/2017] [Indexed: 06/07/2023]
Abstract
A growing body of empirical evidence indicates that social and cooperative behavior can be affected by cognitive and neurological factors, suggesting the existence of state-based decision-making mechanisms that may have emerged by evolution. Motivated by these observations, we propose a simple mechanism of anonymous network interactions identified as a form of generalized reciprocity-a concept organized around the premise "help anyone if helped by someone'-and study its dynamics on random graphs. In the presence of such a mechanism, the evolution of cooperation is related to the dynamics of the levels of investments (i.e., probabilities of cooperation) of the individual nodes engaging in interactions. We demonstrate that the propensity for cooperation is determined by a network centrality measure here referred to as neighborhood importance index and discuss relevant implications to natural and artificial systems. To address the robustness of the state-based strategies to an invasion of defectors, we additionally provide an analysis which redefines the results for the case when a fraction of the nodes behave as unconditional defectors.
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Affiliation(s)
- Zoran Utkovski
- Fraunhofer Heinrich Hertz Institute, Einsteinufer 37, 10587 Berlin, Germany
| | - Viktor Stojkoski
- Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts, P.O. Box 428, 1000 Skopje, Republic of Macedonia
| | - Lasko Basnarkov
- Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts, P.O. Box 428, 1000 Skopje, Republic of Macedonia
- Faculty of Computer Science and Engineering, Ss. Cyril and Methodius University, P.O. Box 393, 1000 Skopje, Republic of Macedonia
| | - Ljupco Kocarev
- Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts, P.O. Box 428, 1000 Skopje, Republic of Macedonia
- Faculty of Computer Science and Engineering, Ss. Cyril and Methodius University, P.O. Box 393, 1000 Skopje, Republic of Macedonia
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9
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Pichler E, Shapiro AM. Public goods games on adaptive coevolutionary networks. CHAOS (WOODBURY, N.Y.) 2017; 27:073107. [PMID: 28764410 DOI: 10.1063/1.4991679] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/07/2023]
Abstract
Productive societies feature high levels of cooperation and strong connections between individuals. Public Goods Games (PGGs) are frequently used to study the development of social connections and cooperative behavior in model societies. In such games, contributions to the public good are made only by cooperators, while all players, including defectors, reap public goods benefits, which are shares of the contributions amplified by a synergy factor. Classic results of game theory show that mutual defection, as opposed to cooperation, is the Nash Equilibrium of PGGs in well-mixed populations, where each player interacts with all others. In this paper, we explore the coevolutionary dynamics of a low information public goods game on a complex network in which players adapt to their environment in order to increase individual payoffs relative to past payoffs parameterized by greediness. Players adapt by changing their strategies, either to cooperate or to defect, and by altering their social connections. We find that even if players do not know other players' strategies and connectivity, cooperation can arise and persist despite large short-term fluctuations.
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Affiliation(s)
- Elgar Pichler
- Department of Chemistry and Chemical Biology, Northeastern University, Boston, Massachusetts 02115, USA
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10
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Allen B, Lippner G, Chen YT, Fotouhi B, Momeni N, Yau ST, Nowak MA. Evolutionary dynamics on any population structure. Nature 2017; 544:227-230. [PMID: 28355181 DOI: 10.1038/nature21723] [Citation(s) in RCA: 184] [Impact Index Per Article: 26.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/31/2016] [Accepted: 02/23/2017] [Indexed: 11/10/2022]
Abstract
Evolution occurs in populations of reproducing individuals. The structure of a population can affect which traits evolve. Understanding evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations remains difficult. Mathematical results are known for special structures in which all individuals have the same number of neighbours. The general case, in which the number of neighbours can vary, has remained open. For arbitrary selection intensity, the problem is in a computational complexity class that suggests there is no efficient algorithm. Whether a simple solution for weak selection exists has remained unanswered. Here we provide a solution for weak selection that applies to any graph or network. Our method relies on calculating the coalescence times of random walks. We evaluate large numbers of diverse population structures for their propensity to favour cooperation. We study how small changes in population structure-graph surgery-affect evolutionary outcomes. We find that cooperation flourishes most in societies that are based on strong pairwise ties.
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Affiliation(s)
- Benjamin Allen
- Department of Mathematics, Emmanuel College, Boston, Massachusetts, USA.,Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA.,Center for Mathematical Sciences and Applications, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA
| | - Gabor Lippner
- Center for Mathematical Sciences and Applications, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA.,Department of Mathematics, Northeastern University, Boston, Massachusetts, USA
| | - Yu-Ting Chen
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA.,Center for Mathematical Sciences and Applications, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA.,Department of Mathematics, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, Tennessee, USA
| | - Babak Fotouhi
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA.,Institute for Quantitative Social Sciences, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA
| | - Naghmeh Momeni
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA.,Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, McGill University, Montreal, Canada
| | - Shing-Tung Yau
- Center for Mathematical Sciences and Applications, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA.,Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA
| | - Martin A Nowak
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA.,Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA.,Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA
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11
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Li A, Broom M, Du J, Wang L. Evolutionary dynamics of general group interactions in structured populations. Phys Rev E 2016; 93:022407. [PMID: 26986362 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.93.022407] [Citation(s) in RCA: 19] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/16/2015] [Indexed: 06/05/2023]
Abstract
The evolution of populations is influenced by many factors, and the simple classical models have been developed in a number of important ways. Both population structure and multiplayer interactions have been shown to significantly affect the evolution of important properties, such as the level of cooperation or of aggressive behavior. Here we combine these two key factors and develop the evolutionary dynamics of general group interactions in structured populations represented by regular graphs. The traditional linear and threshold public goods games are adopted as models to address the dynamics. We show that for linear group interactions, population structure can favor the evolution of cooperation compared to the well-mixed case, and we see that the more neighbors there are, the harder it is for cooperators to persist in structured populations. We further show that threshold group interactions could lead to the emergence of cooperation even in well-mixed populations. Here population structure sometimes inhibits cooperation for the threshold public goods game, where depending on the benefit to cost ratio, the outcomes are bistability or a monomorphic population of defectors or cooperators. Our results suggest, counterintuitively, that structured populations are not always beneficial for the evolution of cooperation for nonlinear group interactions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Aming Li
- Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China
- Center for Complex Network Research and Department of Physics, Northeastern University, Boston, Massachusetts 02115, USA
- Department of Physics, Physics of Living Systems Group, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139, USA
| | - Mark Broom
- Department of Mathematics, City University London, Northampton Square, London EC1V 0HB, UK
| | - Jinming Du
- Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China
| | - Long Wang
- Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China
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12
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Li A, Wang L. Evolutionary dynamics of synergistic and discounted group interactions in structured populations. J Theor Biol 2015; 377:57-65. [PMID: 25890033 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.04.008] [Citation(s) in RCA: 13] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/04/2015] [Revised: 04/01/2015] [Accepted: 04/06/2015] [Indexed: 10/23/2022]
Abstract
The emergence of cooperation between unrelated individuals enables researchers to study how the collective cooperative behavior survives in a world where egoists could get more short-term benefits. The spatial multi-player games, which invoke interactions between individuals who are not directly linked by the interactive networks, are drawing more and more attention in exploring the evolution of cooperation. Here we address the evolutionary dynamics in infinite structured populations with discounted, linear, and synergistic group interactions. The five classical scenarios are recovered from the dynamics: (i) dominating defection, (ii) dominating cooperation, (iii) co-existence, (iv) bi-stability, and (v) neutral variants. For linear interactions, the evolutionary dynamics is equivalent to that in finite as well as the well-mixed counterparts, which can be achieved by a payoff matrix transformation, and it illustrates that the more neighbors there are, the harder the cooperators survive. Yet both cooperation and defection emerge easier in finite populations than in infinite for discounted and synergistic interactions. Counterintuitively, we find that the synergistic group interactions always raise cooperators׳ barriers to occupy the population with the increase of the number of neighbors in infinite structured populations. Our results go against the common belief that synergistic interactions are necessarily beneficial for the cooperative behavior.
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Affiliation(s)
- Aming Li
- Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China; Center for Complex Network Research and Department of Physics, Northeastern University, Boston, MA 02115, USA.
| | - Long Wang
- Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China.
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13
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Tamura K, Kobayashi Y, Ihara Y. Evolution of individual versus social learning on social networks. J R Soc Interface 2015; 12:20141285. [PMID: 25631568 DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2014.1285] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
A number of studies have investigated the roles played by individual and social learning in cultural phenomena and the relative advantages of the two learning strategies in variable environments. Because social learning involves the acquisition of behaviours from others, its utility depends on the availability of 'cultural models' exhibiting adaptive behaviours. This indicates that social networks play an essential role in the evolution of learning. However, possible effects of social structure on the evolution of learning have not been fully explored. Here, we develop a mathematical model to explore the evolutionary dynamics of learning strategies on social networks. We first derive the condition under which social learners (SLs) are selectively favoured over individual learners in a broad range of social network. We then obtain an analytical approximation of the long-term average frequency of SLs in homogeneous networks, from which we specify the condition, in terms of three relatedness measures, for social structure to facilitate the long-term evolution of social learning. Finally, we evaluate our approximation by Monte Carlo simulations in complete graphs, regular random graphs and scale-free networks. We formally show that whether social structure favours the evolution of social learning is determined by the relative magnitudes of two effects of social structure: localization in competition, by which competition between learning strategies is evaded, and localization in cultural transmission, which slows down the spread of adaptive traits. In addition, our estimates of the relatedness measures suggest that social structure disfavours the evolution of social learning when selection is weak.
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Affiliation(s)
- Kohei Tamura
- Department of Biological Sciences, Graduate School of Science, The University of Tokyo, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-0033, Japan Department of Creative Informatics, Graduate School of Information Science and Technology, The University of Tokyo, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-8656, Japan CREST, JST, 4-1-8, Honcho, Kawaguchi, Saitama 332-0012, Japan
| | - Yutaka Kobayashi
- Department of Management, Kochi University of Technology, Tosayamada, Kami-city, Kochi 782-8502, Japan
| | - Yasuo Ihara
- Department of Biological Sciences, Graduate School of Science, The University of Tokyo, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-0033, Japan
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14
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Li C, Zhang B, Cressman R, Tao Y. Evolution of cooperation in a heterogeneous graph: fixation probabilities under weak selection. PLoS One 2013; 8:e66560. [PMID: 23818942 PMCID: PMC3688584 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0066560] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/24/2012] [Accepted: 05/09/2013] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
It has been shown that natural selection favors cooperation in a homogenous graph if the benefit-to-cost ratio exceeds the degree of the graph. However, most graphs related to interactions in real populations are heterogeneous, in which some individuals have many more neighbors than others. In this paper, we introduce a new state variable to measure the time evolution of cooperation in a heterogeneous graph. Based on the diffusion approximation, we find that the fixation probability of a single cooperator depends crucially on the number of its neighbors. Under weak selection, a cooperator with more neighbors has a larger probability of fixation in the population. We then investigate the average fixation probability of a randomly chosen cooperator. If a cooperator pays a cost for each of its neighbors (the so called fixed cost per game case), natural selection favors cooperation if the benefit-to-cost ratio is larger than the average degree. In contrast, if a cooperator pays a fixed cost and all its neighbors share the benefit (the fixed cost per individual case), cooperation is favored if the benefit-to-cost ratio is larger than the harmonic mean of the degree distribution. Moreover, increasing the graph heterogeneity will reduce the effect of natural selection.
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Affiliation(s)
- Cong Li
- Key Lab of Animal Ecology and Conservational Biology, Institute of Zoology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, P.R. China
| | - Boyu Zhang
- School of Mathematical Sciences, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, P.R. China
- * E-mail: (BZ); (RC)
| | - Ross Cressman
- Department of Mathematics, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada
- * E-mail: (BZ); (RC)
| | - Yi Tao
- Key Lab of Animal Ecology and Conservational Biology, Institute of Zoology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, P.R. China
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15
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Devlin S, Treloar T. Network-based criterion for the success of cooperation in an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma. Phys Rev E 2012; 86:026113. [PMID: 23005831 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.86.026113] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/25/2012] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
Abstract
We consider an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma on a random network. We introduce a simple quantitative network-based parameter and show that it effectively predicts the success of cooperation in simulations on the network. The criterion is shown to be accurate on a variety of networks with degree distributions ranging from regular to Poisson to scale free. The parameter allows for comparisons of random networks regardless of their underlying topology. Finally, we draw analogies between the criterion for the success of cooperation introduced here and existing criteria in other contexts.
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Affiliation(s)
- Stephen Devlin
- Department of Mathematics, University of San Francisco, San Francisco, California 94117, USA
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