1
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Schimit PH, Pereira FH, Broom M. Good predictors for the fixation probability on complex networks of multi-player games using territorial interactions. ECOLOGICAL COMPLEXITY 2022. [DOI: 10.1016/j.ecocom.2022.101017] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/17/2022]
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2
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Kroumi D, Martin É, Lessard S. Evolution of cooperation with respect to fixation probabilities in multi-player games with random payoffs. Theor Popul Biol 2022; 145:1-21. [PMID: 35181344 DOI: 10.1016/j.tpb.2022.02.001] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/28/2021] [Revised: 02/03/2022] [Accepted: 02/04/2022] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
Abstract
We study the effect of variability in payoffs on the evolution of cooperation (C) against defection (D) in multi-player games in a finite well-mixed population. We show that an increase in the covariance between any two payoffs to D, or a decrease in the covariance between any two payoffs to C, increases the probability of ultimate fixation of C when represented once, and decreases the corresponding fixation probability for D. This is also the case with an increase in the covariance between any payoff to C and any payoff to D if and only if the sum of the numbers of C-players in the group associated with these payoffs is large enough compared to the group size. In classical social dilemmas with random cost and benefit for cooperation, the evolution of C is more likely to occur if the variances of the cost and benefit, as well as the group size, are small, while the covariance between cost and benefit is large.
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Affiliation(s)
- Dhaker Kroumi
- Department of Mathematics and Statistics, King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals, Dhahran 31261, Saudi Arabia.
| | - Éloi Martin
- Département de mathématiques et de statistique, Université de Montréal, C.P. 6128, Succursale Centre-ville, Montréal, QC H3C 3J7, Canada
| | - Sabin Lessard
- Département de mathématiques et de statistique, Université de Montréal, C.P. 6128, Succursale Centre-ville, Montréal, QC H3C 3J7, Canada
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3
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McAvoy A, Rao A, Hauert C. Intriguing effects of selection intensity on the evolution of prosocial behaviors. PLoS Comput Biol 2021; 17:e1009611. [PMID: 34780464 PMCID: PMC8629389 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1009611] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/04/2021] [Revised: 11/29/2021] [Accepted: 11/03/2021] [Indexed: 12/05/2022] Open
Abstract
In many models of evolving populations, genetic drift has an outsized role relative to natural selection, or vice versa. While there are many scenarios in which one of these two assumptions is reasonable, intermediate balances between these forces are also biologically relevant. In this study, we consider some natural axioms for modeling intermediate selection intensities, and we explore how to quantify the long-term evolutionary dynamics of such a process. To illustrate the sensitivity of evolutionary dynamics to drift and selection, we show that there can be a “sweet spot” for the balance of these two forces, with sufficient noise for rare mutants to become established and sufficient selection to spread. This balance allows prosocial traits to evolve in evolutionary models that were previously thought to be unconducive to the emergence and spread of altruistic behaviors. Furthermore, the effects of selection intensity on long-run evolutionary outcomes in these settings, such as when there is global competition for reproduction, can be highly non-monotonic. Although intermediate selection intensities (neither weak nor strong) are notoriously difficult to study analytically, they are often biologically relevant; and the results we report suggest that they can elicit novel and rich dynamics in the evolution of prosocial behaviors. Theoretical models of populations have been useful for assessing when and how traits spread, in large part because they are simple. Rather than being used to reproduce empirical data, these idealized models involve relatively few parameters and are utilized to gain a qualitative understanding of what promotes or suppresses a trait. For prosocial traits, which entail a cost to self to help another, one thing that mathematical models often suggest is that competition to reproduce must be localized, meaning an individual must be fitter than just a small subset of the population in order to produce an offspring. We show here that this finding is not robust. Such traits can indeed proliferate when there is global competition for reproduction, which we demonstrate by increasing the degree to which payoffs from games affect birth rates. Since this kind of “stronger selection” has also been observed empirically, we discuss how it is incorporated into theoretical models more broadly.
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Affiliation(s)
- Alex McAvoy
- Department of Mathematics, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, United States of America
- Center for Mathematical Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, United States of America
- * E-mail:
| | - Andrew Rao
- Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States of America
| | - Christoph Hauert
- Department of Mathematics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada
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4
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Strategically influencing an uncertain future. Sci Rep 2020; 10:12169. [PMID: 32699305 PMCID: PMC7376051 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-020-69006-x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/16/2020] [Accepted: 06/16/2020] [Indexed: 11/08/2022] Open
Abstract
Many of today's most pressing societal concerns require decisions which take into account a distant and uncertain future. Recent developments in strategic decision-making suggest that individuals, or a small group of individuals, can unilaterally influence the collective outcome of such complex social dilemmas. However, these results do not account for the extent to which decisions are moderated by uncertainty in the probability or timing of future outcomes that characterise the valuation of a (distant) uncertain future. Here we develop a general framework that captures interactions among uncertainty, the resulting time-inconsistent discounting, and their consequences for decision-making processes. In deterministic limits, existing theories can be recovered. More importantly, new insights are obtained into the possibilities for strategic influence when the valuation of the future is uncertain. We show that in order to unilaterally promote and sustain cooperation in social dilemmas, decisions of generous and extortionate strategies should be adjusted to the level of uncertainty. In particular, generous payoff relations cannot be enforced during periods of greater risk (which we term the "generosity gap"), unless the strategic enforcer orients their strategy towards a more distant future by consistently choosing "selfless" cooperative decisions; likewise, the possibilities for extortion are directly limited by the level of uncertainty. Our results have implications for policies that aim to solve societal concerns with consequences for a distant future and provides a theoretical starting point for investigating how collaborative decision-making can help solve long-standing societal dilemmas.
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5
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Erovenko IV, Bauer J, Broom M, Pattni K, Rychtář J. The effect of network topology on optimal exploration strategies and the evolution of cooperation in a mobile population. Proc Math Phys Eng Sci 2019; 475:20190399. [PMID: 31736650 DOI: 10.1098/rspa.2019.0399] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/27/2019] [Accepted: 09/05/2019] [Indexed: 12/11/2022] Open
Abstract
We model a mobile population interacting over an underlying spatial structure using a Markov movement model. Interactions take the form of public goods games, and can feature an arbitrary group size. Individuals choose strategically to remain at their current location or to move to a neighbouring location, depending upon their exploration strategy and the current composition of their group. This builds upon previous work where the underlying structure was a complete graph (i.e. there was effectively no structure). Here, we consider alternative network structures and a wider variety of, mainly larger, populations. Previously, we had found when cooperation could evolve, depending upon the values of a range of population parameters. In our current work, we see that the complete graph considered before promotes stability, with populations of cooperators or defectors being relatively hard to replace. By contrast, the star graph promotes instability, and often neither type of population can resist replacement. We discuss potential reasons for this in terms of network topology.
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Affiliation(s)
- Igor V Erovenko
- Department of Mathematics and Statistics, University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Greensboro, NC 27402, USA
| | - Johann Bauer
- Department of Mathematics, City, University of London, Northampton Square, London EC1V 0HB, UK
| | - Mark Broom
- Department of Mathematics, City, University of London, Northampton Square, London EC1V 0HB, UK
| | - Karan Pattni
- Department of Mathematical Sciences, University of Liverpool, Liverpool L69 3BX, UK
| | - Jan Rychtář
- Department of Mathematics and Applied Mathematics, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA 23284-2014, USA
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6
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Hindersin L, Wu B, Traulsen A, García J. Computation and Simulation of Evolutionary Game Dynamics in Finite Populations. Sci Rep 2019; 9:6946. [PMID: 31061385 PMCID: PMC6502801 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-019-43102-z] [Citation(s) in RCA: 24] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/22/2018] [Accepted: 04/11/2019] [Indexed: 11/23/2022] Open
Abstract
The study of evolutionary dynamics increasingly relies on computational methods, as more and more cases outside the range of analytical tractability are explored. The computational methods for simulation and numerical approximation of the relevant quantities are diverging without being compared for accuracy and performance. We thoroughly investigate these algorithms in order to propose a reliable standard. For expositional clarity we focus on symmetric 2 × 2 games leading to one-dimensional processes, noting that extensions can be straightforward and lessons will often carry over to more complex cases. We provide time-complexity analysis and systematically compare three families of methods to compute fixation probabilities, fixation times and long-term stationary distributions for the popular Moran process. We provide efficient implementations that substantially improve wall times over naive or immediate implementations. Implications are also discussed for the Wright-Fisher process, as well as structured populations and multiple types.
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Affiliation(s)
- Laura Hindersin
- Department of Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Plön, Germany
| | - Bin Wu
- School of Science, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing, China
| | - Arne Traulsen
- Department of Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Plön, Germany.
| | - Julian García
- Faculty of Information Technology, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia
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7
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Su Q, Zhou L, Wang L. Evolutionary multiplayer games on graphs with edge diversity. PLoS Comput Biol 2019; 15:e1006947. [PMID: 30933968 PMCID: PMC6459562 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1006947] [Citation(s) in RCA: 20] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/18/2018] [Revised: 04/11/2019] [Accepted: 03/12/2019] [Indexed: 11/20/2022] Open
Abstract
Evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations has been extensively explored in past decades. However, most previous studies assume that payoffs of individuals are fully determined by the strategic behaviors of interacting parties, and social ties between them only serve as the indicator of the existence of interactions. This assumption neglects important information carried by inter-personal social ties such as genetic similarity, geographic proximity, and social closeness, which may crucially affect the outcome of interactions. To model these situations, we present a framework of evolutionary multiplayer games on graphs with edge diversity, where different types of edges describe diverse social ties. Strategic behaviors together with social ties determine the resulting payoffs of interactants. Under weak selection, we provide a general formula to predict the success of one behavior over the other. We apply this formula to various examples which cannot be dealt with using previous models, including the division of labor and relationship- or edge-dependent games. We find that labor division can promote collective cooperation markedly. The evolutionary process based on relationship-dependent games can be approximated by interactions under a transformed and unified game. Our work stresses the importance of social ties and provides effective methods to reduce the calculating complexity in analyzing the evolution of realistic systems.
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Affiliation(s)
- Qi Su
- Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing, China
- Center for Polymer Studies, Department of Physics, Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America
| | - Lei Zhou
- Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing, China
| | - Long Wang
- Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing, China
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8
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Schimit PHT, Pattni K, Broom M. Dynamics of multiplayer games on complex networks using territorial interactions. Phys Rev E 2019; 99:032306. [PMID: 30999523 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.99.032306] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/03/2018] [Indexed: 06/09/2023]
Abstract
The modeling of evolution in structured populations has been significantly advanced by evolutionary graph theory, which incorporates pairwise relationships between individuals on a network. More recently, a new framework has been developed to allow for multiplayer interactions of variable size in more flexible and potentially changing population structures. While the theory within this framework has been developed and simple structures considered, there has been no systematic consideration of a large range of different population structures, which is the subject of this paper. We consider a large range of underlying graphical structures for the territorial raider model, the most commonly used model in the new structure, and consider a variety of important properties of our structures with the aim of finding factors that determine the fixation probability of mutants. We find that the graphical temperature and the average group size, as previously defined, are strong predictors of fixation probability, while all other properties considered are poor predictors, although the clustering coefficient is a useful secondary predictor when combined with either temperature or group size. The relationship between temperature or average group size and fixation probability is sometimes, however, nonmonotonic, with a directional reverse occurring around the temperature associated with what we term "completely mixed" populations in the case of the hawk-dove game, but not the public goods game.
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Affiliation(s)
- Pedro H T Schimit
- Informatics and Knowledge Management Graduate Program, Universidade Nove de Julho, Rua Vergueiro, 235/249, CEP 01504-000, São Paulo, São Paulo, Brazil
| | - Karan Pattni
- Department of Mathematical Sciences, University of Liverpool, Mathematical Sciences Building, Liverpool L69 7ZL, United Kingdom
| | - Mark Broom
- Department of Mathematics, City, University of London, Northampton Square, London EC1V 0HB, United Kingdom
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9
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Broom M, Pattni K, Rychtář J. Generalized Social Dilemmas: The Evolution of Cooperation in Populations with Variable Group Size. Bull Math Biol 2018; 81:4643-4674. [PMID: 30560442 PMCID: PMC6874626 DOI: 10.1007/s11538-018-00545-1] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/11/2017] [Accepted: 11/28/2018] [Indexed: 11/03/2022]
Abstract
Evolutionary game theory is an important tool to model animal and human behaviour. A key class of games is the social dilemmas, where cooperation benefits the group but defection benefits the individual within any group. Previous works have considered which games qualify as social dilemmas, and different categories of dilemmas, but have generally concentrated on fixed sizes of interacting groups. In this paper, we develop a systematic investigation of social dilemmas on all group sizes. This allows for a richer definition of social dilemmas. For example, while increasing a group size to include another defector is always bad for all existing group members, extra cooperators can be good or bad, depending upon the particular dilemma and group size. We consider a number of commonly used social dilemmas in this context and in particular show the effect of variability in group sizes for the example of a population comprising negative binomially distributed group sizes. The most striking effect is that increasing the variability in group sizes for non-threshold public goods games is favourable for the evolution of cooperation. The situation for threshold public goods games and commons dilemmas is more complex.
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Affiliation(s)
- Mark Broom
- Department of Mathematics, City, University of London, Northampton Square, London, EC1V 0HB, UK.
| | - Karan Pattni
- Department of Mathematical Sciences, The University of Liverpool, Mathematical Sciences Building, Liverpool, L69 7ZL, UK
| | - Jan Rychtář
- Department of Mathematics and Statistics, The University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Greensboro, NC, 27412, USA
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10
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Zhang C, Li Q, Xu Z, Zhang J. Stochastic dynamics of division of labor games in finite populations. Knowl Based Syst 2018. [DOI: 10.1016/j.knosys.2018.04.036] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/17/2022]
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11
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Pattni K, Broom M, Rychtář J. Evolutionary dynamics and the evolution of multiplayer cooperation in a subdivided population. J Theor Biol 2017; 429:105-115. [PMID: 28666764 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.06.034] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/06/2016] [Revised: 06/22/2017] [Accepted: 06/26/2017] [Indexed: 11/27/2022]
Abstract
The classical models of evolution have been developed to incorporate structured populations using evolutionary graph theory and, more recently, a new framework has been developed to allow for more flexible population structures which potentially change through time and can accommodate multiplayer games with variable group sizes. In this paper we extend this work in three key ways. Firstly by developing a complete set of evolutionary dynamics so that the range of dynamic processes used in classical evolutionary graph theory can be applied. Secondly, by building upon previous models to allow for a general subpopulation structure, where all subpopulation members have a common movement distribution. Subpopulations can have varying levels of stability, represented by the proportion of interactions occurring between subpopulation members; in our representation of the population all subpopulation members are represented by a single vertex. In conjunction with this we extend the important concept of temperature (the temperature of a vertex is the sum of all the weights coming into that vertex; generally, the higher the temperature, the higher the rate of turnover of individuals at a vertex). Finally, we have used these new developments to consider the evolution of cooperation in a class of populations which possess this subpopulation structure using a multiplayer public goods game. We show that cooperation can evolve providing that subpopulations are sufficiently stable, with the smaller the subpopulations the easier it is for cooperation to evolve. We introduce a new concept of temperature, namely "subgroup temperature", which can be used to explain our results.
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Affiliation(s)
- Karan Pattni
- Department of Mathematics, City, University of London, Northampton Square, London EC1V 0HB, UK.
| | - Mark Broom
- Department of Mathematics, City, University of London, Northampton Square, London EC1V 0HB, UK.
| | - Jan Rychtář
- Department of Mathematics and Statistics, The University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Greensboro NC 27412, USA.
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12
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Kurokawa S. Which facilitates the evolution of cooperation more, retaliation or persistence? Math Biosci 2017; 289:20-28. [PMID: 28431890 DOI: 10.1016/j.mbs.2017.04.002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/07/2016] [Revised: 02/14/2017] [Accepted: 04/17/2017] [Indexed: 11/25/2022]
Abstract
The existence of cooperation in this world is a mysterious phenomenon. One of the mechanisms that explain the evolution of cooperation is repeated interaction. If interactions between the same individuals repeat and individuals cooperate conditionally, cooperation can evolve. A previous study pointed out that if individuals have persistence (i.e., imitate its "own" behavior in the last move), cooperation can evolve. However, retaliation and persistence are not mutually exclusive decisions, but rather a trade-off in the decision making process of individuals. Players can refer to the opponent's behavior and if the actor and the opponent opted for the different alternative in the last move, conditional cooperators have to give up either retaliation or persistence. The previous study also investigated this, and has revealed that the individual should give more importance to retaliation than to persistence. However, this study has assumed that the errors in perception are absent. In this world, errors in perception are present, and trying to imitate the opponent player can sometimes end in failure. And, it might be that imitating the focal player, which definitely ends in success, is more beneficial than trying to imitate the opponent player, which can end in failure especially when the error rate in recognition is large. Here, this paper uses evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) analysis and analyzes the stability for reactive strategies against the invasion by unconditional defectors in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game. And our analysis reveals that even if we take errors in perception into consideration, retaliation facilitates the evolution of cooperation more than persistence unexpectedly. In addition, we analyze the stability for reactive cooperators against the invasion by a strategy other than unconditional defectors. Moreover, we also analyze the deterministic model in which unconditional cooperators, unconditional defectors, and the reactive strategy at the same time.
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Affiliation(s)
- Shun Kurokawa
- Graduate School of Agriculture, Kyoto University, Oiwake-cho, Kitashirakawa, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8502, Japan; Institute of Zoology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Datun Road, Chaoyang, Beijing 100101, PR China.
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13
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Abstract
Spatial structure greatly affects the evolution of cooperation. While in two-player games the condition for cooperation to evolve depends on a single structure coefficient, in multiplayer games the condition might depend on several structure coefficients, making it difficult to compare different population structures. We propose a solution to this issue by introducing two simple ways of ordering population structures: the containment order and the volume order. If population structure is greater than population structure in the containment or the volume order, then can be considered a stronger promoter of cooperation. We provide conditions for establishing the containment order, give general results on the volume order, and illustrate our theory by comparing different models of spatial games and associated update rules. Our results hold for a large class of population structures and can be easily applied to specific cases once the structure coefficients have been calculated or estimated.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jorge Peña
- Department of Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, August-Thienemann-Straße 2, Plön 24306, Germany
| | - Bin Wu
- Department of Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, August-Thienemann-Straße 2, Plön 24306, Germany
| | - Arne Traulsen
- Department of Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, August-Thienemann-Straße 2, Plön 24306, Germany
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14
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Kurokawa S. Unified and simple understanding for the evolution of conditional cooperators. Math Biosci 2016; 282:16-20. [PMID: 27693301 DOI: 10.1016/j.mbs.2016.09.012] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/10/2016] [Revised: 09/17/2016] [Accepted: 09/20/2016] [Indexed: 02/05/2023]
Abstract
Cooperation is a mysterious phenomenon which is observed in this world. The potential explanation is a repeated interaction. Cooperation is established if individuals meet the same opponent repeatedly and cooperate conditionally. Previous studies have analyzed the following four as characters of conditional cooperators mainly. (i) niceness (i.e., when a conditional cooperator meets an opponent in the first place, he (she) cooperates or defects), (ii) optimism (when a conditional cooperator meets an opponent in the past, but he (she) did not get access to information about the opponent's behavior in the previous round, he (she) cooperates or defects), (iii) generosity (even when a conditional cooperator knows that an opponent defected in the previous round, he (she) cooperates or defects) and (iv) retaliation (a conditional cooperator cooperates with a cooperator with a higher probability than with a defector). Previous works deal with these four characters mainly. However, these four characters basically have been regarded as distinct topics and unified understanding has not been done fully. Here we, by studying the iterated prisoner's dilemma game (in particular, additive games) and using evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) analysis, find that when retaliation is large, the condition under which conditional cooperators are stable against the invasion by an unconditional defector is loose, while none of "niceness", "optimism", and "generosity" makes impact on the condition under which conditional cooperators are stable against an invasion by an unconditional defector. Furthermore, we show that we can understand "niceness", "optimism", and "generosity" uniformly by using one parameter indicating "cooperative", and when the conditional cooperators have large "retaliation" enough to resist an invasion by an unconditional defector, natural selection favors more "cooperative" conditional cooperators to invade the resident conditional cooperative strategy. Moreover, we show that these results are robust even when taking the existence of mistakes in behavior into consideration.
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Affiliation(s)
- Shun Kurokawa
- Graduate School of Agriculture, Kyoto University, Oiwake-cho, Kitashirakawa, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8502, Japan; Institute of Zoology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Datun Road, Chaoyang, Beijing 100101, PR China.
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15
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van Veelen M, Allen B, Hoffman M, Simon B, Veller C. Hamilton's rule. J Theor Biol 2016; 414:176-230. [PMID: 27569292 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2016.08.019] [Citation(s) in RCA: 23] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/09/2015] [Revised: 07/20/2016] [Accepted: 08/13/2016] [Indexed: 10/21/2022]
Abstract
This paper reviews and addresses a variety of issues relating to inclusive fitness. The main question is: are there limits to the generality of inclusive fitness, and if so, what are the perimeters of the domain within which inclusive fitness works? This question is addressed using two well-known tools from evolutionary theory: the replicator dynamics, and adaptive dynamics. Both are combined with population structure. How generally Hamilton's rule applies depends on how costs and benefits are defined. We therefore consider costs and benefits following from Karlin and Matessi's (1983) "counterfactual method", and costs and benefits as defined by the "regression method" (Gardner et al., 2011). With the latter definition of costs and benefits, Hamilton's rule always indicates the direction of selection correctly, and with the former it does not. How these two definitions can meaningfully be interpreted is also discussed. We also consider cases where the qualitative claim that relatedness fosters cooperation holds, even if Hamilton's rule as a quantitative prediction does not. We furthermore find out what the relation is between Hamilton's rule and Fisher's Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection. We also consider cancellation effects - which is the most important deepening of our understanding of when altruism is selected for. Finally we also explore the remarkable (im)possibilities for empirical testing with either definition of costs and benefits in Hamilton's rule.
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Affiliation(s)
- Matthijs van Veelen
- Department of Economics and Business, University of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 11, 1018 WB Amsterdam, The Netherlands; Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA.
| | - Benjamin Allen
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA; Department of Mathematics, Emmanuel College, MA 02115, USA; Center for Mathematical Sciences and Applications, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
| | - Moshe Hoffman
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA; Rady School of Management, UC San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093, USA; Department of Computer Science and Engineering, UC San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093, USA
| | - Burton Simon
- Department of Mathematical and Statistical Sciences, University of Colorado Denver, Denver, CO 80202, USA
| | - Carl Veller
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA; Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
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16
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17
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Evolutionary Games of Multiplayer Cooperation on Graphs. PLoS Comput Biol 2016; 12:e1005059. [PMID: 27513946 PMCID: PMC4981334 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005059] [Citation(s) in RCA: 35] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/21/2016] [Accepted: 07/12/2016] [Indexed: 11/24/2022] Open
Abstract
There has been much interest in studying evolutionary games in structured populations, often modeled as graphs. However, most analytical results so far have only been obtained for two-player or linear games, while the study of more complex multiplayer games has been usually tackled by computer simulations. Here we investigate evolutionary multiplayer games on graphs updated with a Moran death-Birth process. For cycles, we obtain an exact analytical condition for cooperation to be favored by natural selection, given in terms of the payoffs of the game and a set of structure coefficients. For regular graphs of degree three and larger, we estimate this condition using a combination of pair approximation and diffusion approximation. For a large class of cooperation games, our approximations suggest that graph-structured populations are stronger promoters of cooperation than populations lacking spatial structure. Computer simulations validate our analytical approximations for random regular graphs and cycles, but show systematic differences for graphs with many loops such as lattices. In particular, our simulation results show that these kinds of graphs can even lead to more stringent conditions for the evolution of cooperation than well-mixed populations. Overall, we provide evidence suggesting that the complexity arising from many-player interactions and spatial structure can be captured by pair approximation in the case of random graphs, but that it need to be handled with care for graphs with high clustering. Cooperation can be defined as the act of providing fitness benefits to other individuals, often at a personal cost. When interactions occur mainly with neighbors, assortment of strategies can favor cooperation but local competition can undermine it. Previous research has shown that a single coefficient can capture this trade-off when cooperative interactions take place between two players. More complicated, but also more realistic, models of cooperative interactions involving multiple players instead require several such coefficients, making it difficult to assess the effects of population structure. Here, we obtain analytical approximations for the coefficients of multiplayer games in graph-structured populations. Computer simulations show that, for particular instances of multiplayer games, these approximate coefficients predict the condition for cooperation to be promoted in random graphs well, but fail to do so in graphs with more structure, such as lattices. Our work extends and generalizes established results on the evolution of cooperation on graphs, but also highlights the importance of explicitly taking into account higher-order statistical associations in order to assess the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in spatially structured populations.
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Li A, Broom M, Du J, Wang L. Evolutionary dynamics of general group interactions in structured populations. Phys Rev E 2016; 93:022407. [PMID: 26986362 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.93.022407] [Citation(s) in RCA: 19] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/16/2015] [Indexed: 06/05/2023]
Abstract
The evolution of populations is influenced by many factors, and the simple classical models have been developed in a number of important ways. Both population structure and multiplayer interactions have been shown to significantly affect the evolution of important properties, such as the level of cooperation or of aggressive behavior. Here we combine these two key factors and develop the evolutionary dynamics of general group interactions in structured populations represented by regular graphs. The traditional linear and threshold public goods games are adopted as models to address the dynamics. We show that for linear group interactions, population structure can favor the evolution of cooperation compared to the well-mixed case, and we see that the more neighbors there are, the harder it is for cooperators to persist in structured populations. We further show that threshold group interactions could lead to the emergence of cooperation even in well-mixed populations. Here population structure sometimes inhibits cooperation for the threshold public goods game, where depending on the benefit to cost ratio, the outcomes are bistability or a monomorphic population of defectors or cooperators. Our results suggest, counterintuitively, that structured populations are not always beneficial for the evolution of cooperation for nonlinear group interactions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Aming Li
- Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China
- Center for Complex Network Research and Department of Physics, Northeastern University, Boston, Massachusetts 02115, USA
- Department of Physics, Physics of Living Systems Group, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139, USA
| | - Mark Broom
- Department of Mathematics, City University London, Northampton Square, London EC1V 0HB, UK
| | - Jinming Du
- Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China
| | - Long Wang
- Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China
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19
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Hilbe C, Wu B, Traulsen A, Nowak MA. Evolutionary performance of zero-determinant strategies in multiplayer games. J Theor Biol 2015; 374:115-24. [PMID: 25843220 PMCID: PMC4425415 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.03.032] [Citation(s) in RCA: 54] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/29/2014] [Revised: 03/12/2015] [Accepted: 03/24/2015] [Indexed: 12/02/2022]
Abstract
Repetition is one of the key mechanisms to maintain cooperation. In long-term relationships, in which individuals can react to their peers׳ past actions, evolution can promote cooperative strategies that would not be stable in one-shot encounters. The iterated prisoner׳s dilemma illustrates the power of repetition. Many of the key strategies for this game, such as ALLD, ALLC, Tit-for-Tat, or generous Tit-for-Tat, share a common property: players using these strategies enforce a linear relationship between their own payoff and their co-player׳s payoff. Such strategies have been termed zero-determinant (ZD). Recently, it was shown that ZD strategies also exist for multiplayer social dilemmas, and here we explore their evolutionary performance. For small group sizes, ZD strategies play a similar role as for the repeated prisoner׳s dilemma: extortionate ZD strategies are critical for the emergence of cooperation, whereas generous ZD strategies are important to maintain cooperation. In large groups, however, generous strategies tend to become unstable and selfish behaviors gain the upper hand. Our results suggest that repeated interactions alone are not sufficient to maintain large-scale cooperation. Instead, large groups require further mechanisms to sustain cooperation, such as the formation of alliances or institutions, or additional pairwise interactions between group members.
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Affiliation(s)
- Christian Hilbe
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge MA 02138, USA.
| | - Bin Wu
- Department of Evolutionary Theory, Max-Planck-Institute for Evolutionary Biology, August-Thienemann-Straße 2, 24306 Plön, Germany
| | - Arne Traulsen
- Department of Evolutionary Theory, Max-Planck-Institute for Evolutionary Biology, August-Thienemann-Straße 2, 24306 Plön, Germany
| | - Martin A Nowak
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge MA 02138, USA; Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge MA 02138, USA; Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge MA 02138, USA
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20
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Structure coefficients and strategy selection in multiplayer games. J Math Biol 2015; 72:203-38. [PMID: 25842359 DOI: 10.1007/s00285-015-0882-3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 18] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/08/2014] [Revised: 01/21/2015] [Indexed: 10/23/2022]
Abstract
Evolutionary processes based on two-player games such as the Prisoner's Dilemma or Snowdrift Game are abundant in evolutionary game theory. These processes, including those based on games with more than two strategies, have been studied extensively under the assumption that selection is weak. However, games involving more than two players have not received the same level of attention. To address this issue, and to relate two-player games to multiplayer games, we introduce a notion of reducibility for multiplayer games that captures what it means to break down a multiplayer game into a sequence of interactions with fewer players. We discuss the role of reducibility in structured populations, and we give examples of games that are irreducible in any population structure. Since the known conditions for strategy selection, otherwise known as [Formula: see text]-rules, have been established only for two-player games with multiple strategies and for multiplayer games with two strategies, we extend these rules to multiplayer games with many strategies to account for irreducible games that cannot be reduced to those simpler types of games. In particular, we show that the number of structure coefficients required for a symmetric game with [Formula: see text]-player interactions and [Formula: see text] strategies grows in [Formula: see text] like [Formula: see text]. Our results also cover a type of ecologically asymmetric game based on payoff values that are derived not only from the strategies of the players, but also from their spatial positions within the population.
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Broom M, Lafaye C, Pattni K, Rychtář J. A study of the dynamics of multi-player games on small networks using territorial interactions. J Math Biol 2015; 71:1551-74. [DOI: 10.1007/s00285-015-0868-1] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/02/2014] [Revised: 02/26/2015] [Indexed: 10/23/2022]
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22
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Zhang W, Li YS, Du P, Xu C, Hui PM. Phase transitions in a coevolving snowdrift game with costly rewiring. PHYSICAL REVIEW. E, STATISTICAL, NONLINEAR, AND SOFT MATTER PHYSICS 2014; 90:052819. [PMID: 25493846 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.90.052819] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/27/2014] [Indexed: 06/04/2023]
Abstract
We propose and study a dissatisfied adaptive snowdrift game with a payoff parameter r that incorporates a cost for rewiring a connection. An agent, facing adverse local environment, may switch action without a cost or rewire an existing link with a cost a so as to attain a better competing environment. Detailed numerical simulations reveal nontrivial and nonmonotonic dependence of the frequency of cooperation and the densities of different types of links on a and r. A theory that treats the cooperative and noncooperative agents separately and accounts for spatial correlation up to neighboring agents is formulated. The theory gives results that are in good agreement with simulations. The frequency of cooperation f_{C} is enhanced (suppressed) at high rewiring cost relative to that at low rewiring cost when r is small (large). For a given value of r, there exists a critical value of the rewiring cost below which the system evolves into a phase of frozen dynamics with isolated noncooperative agents segregated from a cluster of cooperative agents, and above which the system evolves into a connected population of mixed actions with continual dynamics. The phase boundary on the a-r phase space that separates the two phases with distinct structural, population and dynamical properties is mapped out. The phase diagram reveals that, as a general feature, for small r (small a), the disconnected and segregated phase can survive over a wider range of a(r).
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Affiliation(s)
- W Zhang
- Department of Electronics and Communication Engineering, Suzhou Institute of Industrial Technology, Suzhou, 215104, China
| | - Y S Li
- College of Physics, Optoelectronics and Energy, Soochow University, Suzhou, 215006, China
| | - P Du
- College of Physics, Optoelectronics and Energy, Soochow University, Suzhou, 215006, China
| | - C Xu
- College of Physics, Optoelectronics and Energy, Soochow University, Suzhou, 215006, China
| | - P M Hui
- Department of Physics and Institute of Theoretical Physics, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, New Territories, Hong Kong SAR, China
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23
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Li A, Wu B, Wang L. Cooperation with both synergistic and local interactions can be worse than each alone. Sci Rep 2014; 4:5536. [PMID: 24985887 PMCID: PMC4078301 DOI: 10.1038/srep05536] [Citation(s) in RCA: 33] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/27/2014] [Accepted: 06/16/2014] [Indexed: 11/25/2022] Open
Abstract
Cooperation is ubiquitous ranging from multicellular organisms to human societies. Population structures indicating individuals' limited interaction ranges are crucial to understand this issue. But it remains unknown to what extend multiple interactions involving nonlinearity in payoff influence the cooperation in structured populations. Here we show a rule, which determines the emergence and stabilization of cooperation, under multiple discounted, linear, and synergistic interactions. The rule is validated by simulations in homogenous and heterogenous structured populations. We find that the more neighbours there are the harder for cooperation to evolve for multiple interactions with linearity and discounting. For synergistic scenario, however, distinct from its pairwise counterpart, moderate number of neighbours can be the worst, indicating that synergistic interactions work with strangers but not with neighbours. Our results suggest that the combination of different factors which promotes cooperation alone can be worse than that with every single factor.
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Affiliation(s)
- Aming Li
- Center for Systems and Control, State Key Laboratory for Turbulence and Complex Systems, College of Engineering, Peking University, 100871 Beijing, China
| | - Bin Wu
- Department of Evolutionary Theory, Max-Planck-Institute for Evolutionary Biology, August-Thienemann-Str. 2, 24306 Plön, Germany
| | - Long Wang
- Center for Systems and Control, State Key Laboratory for Turbulence and Complex Systems, College of Engineering, Peking University, 100871 Beijing, China
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24
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Jeong HC, Oh SY, Allen B, Nowak MA. Optional games on cycles and complete graphs. J Theor Biol 2014; 356:98-112. [PMID: 24780293 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.04.025] [Citation(s) in RCA: 24] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/18/2014] [Revised: 04/16/2014] [Accepted: 04/17/2014] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
We study stochastic evolution of optional games on simple graphs. There are two strategies, A and B, whose interaction is described by a general payoff matrix. In addition, there are one or several possibilities to opt out from the game by adopting loner strategies. Optional games lead to relaxed social dilemmas. Here we explore the interaction between spatial structure and optional games. We find that increasing the number of loner strategies (or equivalently increasing mutational bias toward loner strategies) facilitates evolution of cooperation both in well-mixed and in structured populations. We derive various limits for weak selection and large population size. For some cases we derive analytic results for strong selection. We also analyze strategy selection numerically for finite selection intensity and discuss combined effects of optionality and spatial structure.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hyeong-Chai Jeong
- Department of Physics, Sejong University, Gangjingu, Seoul 143-747, Republic of Korea; Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 20138, USA
| | - Seung-Yoon Oh
- Department of Physics, Sejong University, Gangjingu, Seoul 143-747, Republic of Korea
| | - Benjamin Allen
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 20138, USA; Department of Mathematics, Emmanuel College, Boston, MA 02115, USA
| | - Martin A Nowak
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 20138, USA; Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 20138, USA; Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 20138, USA
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25
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Dynamic Properties of Evolutionary Multi-player Games in Finite Populations. GAMES 2013. [DOI: 10.3390/g4020182] [Citation(s) in RCA: 63] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
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26
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Fu F, Nowaks MA. Global migration can lead to stronger spatial selection than local migration. JOURNAL OF STATISTICAL PHYSICS 2013; 151:637-653. [PMID: 23853390 PMCID: PMC3706309 DOI: 10.1007/s10955-012-0631-6] [Citation(s) in RCA: 15] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 05/29/2023]
Abstract
The outcome of evolutionary processes depends on population structure. It is well known that mobility plays an important role in affecting evolutionary dynamics in group structured populations. But it is largely unknown whether global or local migration leads to stronger spatial selection and would therefore favor to a larger extent the evolution of cooperation. To address this issue, we quantify the impacts of these two migration patterns on the evolutionary competition of two strategies in a finite island model. Global migration means that individuals can migrate from any one island to any other island. Local migration means that individuals can only migrate between islands that are nearest neighbors; we study a simple geometry where islands are arranged on a one-dimensional, regular cycle. We derive general results for weak selection and large population size. Our key parameters are: the number of islands, the migration rate and the mutation rate. Surprisingly, our comparative analysis reveals that global migration can lead to stronger spatial selection than local migration for a wide range of parameter conditions. Our work provides useful insights into understanding how different mobility patterns affect evolutionary processes.
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Affiliation(s)
- Feng Fu
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
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27
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Kurokawa S, Ihara Y. Evolution of social behavior in finite populations: A payoff transformation in general -player games and its implications. Theor Popul Biol 2013. [DOI: 10.1016/j.tpb.2012.11.004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 30] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
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28
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Tarnita CE, Taubes CH, Nowak MA. Evolutionary construction by staying together and coming together. J Theor Biol 2012. [PMID: 23206384 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.11.022] [Citation(s) in RCA: 59] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/27/2022]
Abstract
The evolutionary trajectory of life on earth is one of increasing size and complexity. Yet the standard equations of evolutionary dynamics describe mutation and selection among similar organisms that compete on the same level of organization. Here we begin to outline a mathematical theory that might help to explore how evolution can be constructive, how natural selection can lead from lower to higher levels of organization. We distinguish two fundamental operations, which we call 'staying together' and 'coming together'. Staying together means that individuals form larger units by not separating after reproduction, while coming together means that independent individuals form aggregates. Staying together can lead to specialization and division of labor, but the developmental program must evolve in the basic unit. Coming together can be creative by combining units with different properties. Both operations have been identified in the context of multicellularity, but they have been treated very similarly. Here we point out that staying together and coming together can be found at every level of biological construction and moreover that they face different evolutionary problems. The distinction is particularly clear in the context of cooperation and defection. For staying together the stability of cooperation takes the form of a developmental error threshold, while coming together leads to evolutionary games and requires a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. We use our models to discuss simple aspects of the evolution of protocells, eukarya, multi-cellularity and animal societies.
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Affiliation(s)
- Corina E Tarnita
- Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08540, USA.
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29
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Allen B, Nowak MA. Evolutionary shift dynamics on a cycle. J Theor Biol 2012; 311:28-39. [PMID: 22814475 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.07.006] [Citation(s) in RCA: 15] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/22/2011] [Revised: 06/26/2012] [Accepted: 07/06/2012] [Indexed: 01/06/2023]
Abstract
We present a new model of evolutionary dynamics in one-dimensional space. Individuals are arranged on a cycle. When a new offspring is born, another individual dies and the rest shift around the cycle to make room. This rule, which is inspired by spatial evolution in somatic tissue and microbial colonies, has the remarkable property that, in the limit of large population size, evolution acts to maximize the payoff of the whole population. Therefore, social dilemmas, in which some individuals benefit at the expense of others, are resolved. We demonstrate this principle for both discrete and continuous games. We also discuss extensions of our model to other one-dimensional spatial configurations. We conclude that shift dynamics in one dimension is an unusually strong promoter of cooperative behavior.
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Affiliation(s)
- Benjamin Allen
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, One Brattle Square, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA.
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30
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A general framework for analysing multiplayer games in networks using territorial interactions as a case study. J Theor Biol 2012; 302:70-80. [PMID: 22406262 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.02.025] [Citation(s) in RCA: 30] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/01/2011] [Revised: 02/23/2012] [Accepted: 02/25/2012] [Indexed: 11/22/2022]
Abstract
Recently, models of evolution have begun to incorporate structured populations, including spatial structure, through the modelling of evolutionary processes on graphs (evolutionary graph theory). One limitation of this otherwise quite general framework is that interactions are restricted to pairwise ones, through the edges connecting pairs of individuals. Yet, many animal interactions can involve many players, and theoretical models also describe such multiplayer interactions. We shall discuss a more general modelling framework of interactions of structured populations with the focus on competition between territorial animals, where each animal or animal group has a "home range" which overlaps with a number of others, and interactions between various group sizes are possible. Depending upon the behaviour concerned we can embed the results of different evolutionary games within our structure, as occurs for pairwise games such as the Prisoner's Dilemma or the Hawk-Dove game on graphs. We discuss some examples together with some important differences between this approach and evolutionary graph theory.
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Abstract
Public goods games are models of social dilemmas where cooperators pay a cost for the production of a public good while defectors free ride on the contributions of cooperators. In the traditional framework of evolutionary game theory, the payoffs of cooperators and defectors result from interactions in groups formed by binomial sampling from an infinite population. Despite empirical evidence showing that group-size distributions in nature are highly heterogeneous, most models of social evolution assume that the group size is constant. In this article, I remove this assumption and explore the effects of having random group sizes on the evolutionary dynamics of public goods games. By a straightforward application of Jensen's inequality, I show that the outcome of general nonlinear public goods games depends not only on the average group size but also on the variance of the group-size distribution. This general result is illustrated with two nonlinear public goods games (the public goods game with discounting or synergy and the N-person volunteer's dilemma) and three different group-size distributions (Poisson, geometric, and Waring). The results suggest that failing to acknowledge the natural variation of group sizes can lead to an underestimation of the actual level of cooperation exhibited in evolving populations.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jorge Peña
- Institut de Mathématiques Appliquées (IMA), Université de Lausanne, CH-1015, Lausanne, Switzerland E-mail:
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