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Ramírez MA, Smerlak M, Traulsen A, Jost J. Diversity enables the jump towards cooperation for the Traveler's Dilemma. Sci Rep 2023; 13:1441. [PMID: 36697467 PMCID: PMC9876901 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-023-28600-5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/25/2022] [Accepted: 01/20/2023] [Indexed: 01/26/2023] Open
Abstract
Social dilemmas are situations in which collective welfare is at odds with individual gain. One widely studied example, due to the conflict it poses between human behaviour and game theoretic reasoning, is the Traveler's Dilemma. The dilemma relies on the players' incentive to undercut their opponent at the expense of losing a collective high payoff. Such individual incentive leads players to a systematic mutual undercutting until the lowest possible payoff is reached, which is the game's unique Nash equilibrium. However, if players were satisfied with a high payoff -that is not necessarily higher than their opponent's- they would both be better off individually and collectively. Here, we explain how it is possible to converge to this cooperative high payoff equilibrium. Our analysis focuses on decomposing the dilemma into a local and a global game. We show that players need to escape the local maximisation and jump to the global game, in order to reach the cooperative equilibrium. Using a dynamic approach, based on evolutionary game theory and learning theory models, we find that diversity, understood as the presence of suboptimal strategies, is the general mechanism that enables the jump towards cooperation.
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Affiliation(s)
- María Alejandra Ramírez
- Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Plön, 24306, Germany. .,Max Planck Institute for Mathematics in the Sciences, Leipzig, 04103, Germany.
| | - Matteo Smerlak
- Max Planck Institute for Mathematics in the Sciences, Leipzig, 04103, Germany
| | - Arne Traulsen
- Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Plön, 24306, Germany
| | - Jürgen Jost
- Max Planck Institute for Mathematics in the Sciences, Leipzig, 04103, Germany.,Santa Fe Institute for the Sciences of Complexity, Santa Fe, NM, 87501, USA
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Lim IS. Stochastic evolutionary dynamics of trust games with asymmetric parameters. Phys Rev E 2020; 102:062419. [PMID: 33466027 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.102.062419] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/22/2020] [Accepted: 12/01/2020] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
Abstract
Trusting in others and reciprocating that trust with trustworthy actions are crucial to successful and prosperous societies. The trust game has been widely used to quantitatively study trust and trustworthiness, involving a sequential exchange between an investor and a trustee. Deterministic evolutionary game theory predicts no trust and no trustworthiness, whereas the behavioral experiments with the one-shot anonymous trust game show that people substantially trust and respond trustworthily. To explain these discrepancies, previous works often turn to additional mechanisms, which are borrowed from other games such as the prisoner's dilemma. Although these mechanisms lead to the evolution of trust and trustworthiness to an extent, the optimal or the most common strategy often involves no trustworthiness. In this paper, we study the impact of asymmetric demographic parameters (e.g., different population sizes) on game dynamics of the trust game. We show that, in a weak-mutation limit, stochastic evolutionary dynamics with the asymmetric parameters can lead to the evolution of high trust and high trustworthiness without any additional mechanisms in well-mixed finite populations. Even full trust and near full trustworthiness can be the most common strategies. These results are qualitatively different from those of the previous works. Our results thereby demonstrate rich evolutionary dynamics of the asymmetric trust game.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ik Soo Lim
- School of Computer Science and Electrical Engineering, Bangor University, Dean Street, Bangor, Gwynedd LL57 1UT, United Kingdom
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3
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Abstract
Cooperation in social dilemmas plays a pivotal role in the formation of systems at all levels of complexity, from replicating molecules to multi-cellular organisms to human and animal societies. In spite of its ubiquity, the origin and stability of cooperation pose an evolutionary conundrum, since cooperation, though beneficial to others, is costly to the individual cooperator. Thus natural selection would be expected to favor selfish behavior in which individuals reap the benefits of cooperation without bearing the costs of cooperating themselves. Many proximate mechanisms have been proposed to account for the origin and maintenance of cooperation, including kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, and evolution in structured populations. Despite the apparent diversity of these approaches they all share a unified underlying logic: namely, each mechanism results in assortative interactions in which individuals using the same strategy interact with a higher probability than they would at random. Here we study the evolution of cooperation in both discrete strategy and continuous strategy social dilemmas with assortative interactions. For the sake of tractability, assortativity is modeled by an individual interacting with another of the same type with probability r and interacting with a random individual in the population with probability 1−r, where r is a parameter that characterizes the degree of assortativity in the system. For discrete strategy social dilemmas we use both a generalization of replicator dynamics and individual-based simulations to elucidate the donation, snowdrift, and sculling games with assortative interactions, and determine the analogs of Hamilton’s rule, which govern the evolution of cooperation in these games. For continuous strategy social dilemmas we employ both a generalization of deterministic adaptive dynamics and individual-based simulations to study the donation, snowdrift, and tragedy of the commons games, and determine the effect of assortativity on the emergence and stability of cooperation.
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Iyer S, Killingback T. Evolution of Cooperation in Social Dilemmas on Complex Networks. PLoS Comput Biol 2016; 12:e1004779. [PMID: 26928428 PMCID: PMC4771135 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004779] [Citation(s) in RCA: 24] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/30/2015] [Accepted: 01/31/2016] [Indexed: 11/19/2022] Open
Abstract
Cooperation in social dilemmas is essential for the functioning of systems at multiple levels of complexity, from the simplest biological organisms to the most sophisticated human societies. Cooperation, although widespread, is fundamentally challenging to explain evolutionarily, since natural selection typically favors selfish behavior which is not socially optimal. Here we study the evolution of cooperation in three exemplars of key social dilemmas, representing the prisoner's dilemma, hawk-dove and coordination classes of games, in structured populations defined by complex networks. Using individual-based simulations of the games on model and empirical networks, we give a detailed comparative study of the effects of the structural properties of a network, such as its average degree, variance in degree distribution, clustering coefficient, and assortativity coefficient, on the promotion of cooperative behavior in all three classes of games.
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Affiliation(s)
- Swami Iyer
- Computer Science Department, University of Massachusetts, Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America
| | - Timothy Killingback
- Mathematics Department, University of Massachusetts, Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America
- * E-mail:
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Iyer S, Killingback T. Evolutionary dynamics of the traveler's dilemma and minimum-effort coordination games on complex networks. Phys Rev E 2014; 90:042134. [PMID: 25375465 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.90.042134] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/03/2014] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
Abstract
The traveler's dilemma game and the minimum-effort coordination game are social dilemmas that have received significant attention resulting from the fact that the predictions of classical game theory are inconsistent with the results found when the games are studied experimentally. Moreover, both the traveler's dilemma and the minimum-effort coordination games have potentially important applications in evolutionary biology. Interestingly, standard deterministic evolutionary game theory, as represented by the replicator dynamics in a well-mixed population, is also inadequate to account for the behavior observed in these games. Here we study the evolutionary dynamics of both these games in populations with interaction patterns described by a variety of complex network topologies. We investigate the evolutionary dynamics of these games through agent-based simulations on both model and empirical networks. In particular, we study the effects of network clustering and assortativity on the evolutionary dynamics of both games. In general, we show that the evolutionary behavior of the traveler's dilemma and minimum-effort coordination games on complex networks is in good agreement with that observed experimentally. Thus, formulating the traveler's dilemma and the minimum-effort coordination games on complex networks neatly resolves the paradoxical aspects of these games.
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Affiliation(s)
- Swami Iyer
- Department of Physics, University of Massachusetts, Boston, Massachusetts 02125-3393, USA
| | - Timothy Killingback
- Department of Mathematics, University of Massachusetts, Boston, Massachusetts 02125-3393, USA
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P Hauser O, A Nowak M, G Rand D. Punishment does not promote cooperation under exploration dynamics when anti-social punishment is possible. J Theor Biol 2014; 360:163-171. [PMID: 25014473 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.06.041] [Citation(s) in RCA: 41] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/26/2013] [Revised: 04/29/2014] [Accepted: 06/30/2014] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
Abstract
It has been argued that punishment promotes the evolution of cooperation when mutation rates are high (i.e. when agents engage in 'exploration dynamics'). Mutations maintain a steady supply of agents that punish free-riders, and thus free-riders are at a disadvantage. Recent experiments, however, have demonstrated that free-riders sometimes also pay to punish cooperators. Inspired by these empirical results, theoretical work has explored evolutionary dynamics where mutants are rare, and found that punishment does not promote the evolution of cooperation when this 'anti-social punishment' is allowed. Here we extend previous theory by studying the effect of anti-social punishment on the evolution of cooperation across higher mutation rates, and by studying voluntary as well as compulsory Public Goods Games. We find that for intermediate and high mutation rates, adding punishment does not promote cooperation in either compulsory or voluntary public goods games if anti-social punishment is possible. This is because mutations generate agents that punish cooperators just as frequently as agents that punish defectors, and these two effects cancel each other out. These results raise questions about the effectiveness of punishment for promoting cooperation when mutations are common, and highlight how decisions about which strategies to include in the strategy set can have profound effects on the resulting dynamics.
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Affiliation(s)
- Oliver P Hauser
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA; Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA
| | - Martin A Nowak
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA; Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA; Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA
| | - David G Rand
- Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA; Department of Economics, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA; Program in Cognitive Science, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA; School of Management, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA.
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An application of evolutionary game theory to social dilemmas: the traveler's dilemma and the minimum effort coordination game. PLoS One 2014; 9:e93988. [PMID: 24709851 PMCID: PMC3977969 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0093988] [Citation(s) in RCA: 13] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/13/2014] [Accepted: 03/11/2014] [Indexed: 11/19/2022] Open
Abstract
The Traveler's Dilemma game and the Minimum Effort Coordination game are two social dilemmas that have attracted considerable attention due to the fact that the predictions of classical game theory are at odds with the results found when the games are studied experimentally. Moreover, a direct application of deterministic evolutionary game theory, as embodied in the replicator dynamics, to these games does not explain the observed behavior. In this work, we formulate natural variants of these two games as smoothed continuous-strategy games. We study the evolutionary dynamics of these continuous-strategy games, both analytically and through agent-based simulations, and show that the behavior predicted theoretically is in accord with that observed experimentally. Thus, these variants of the Traveler's Dilemma and the Minimum Effort Coordination games provide a simple resolution of the paradoxical behavior associated with the original games.
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Abstract
Social dilemmas are situations in which collective interests are at odds with private interests: pollution, depletion of natural resources, and intergroup conflicts, are at their core social dilemmas. Because of their multidisciplinarity and their importance, social dilemmas have been studied by economists, biologists, psychologists, sociologists, and political scientists. These studies typically explain tendency to cooperation by dividing people in proself and prosocial types, or appealing to forms of external control or, in iterated social dilemmas, to long-term strategies. But recent experiments have shown that cooperation is possible even in one-shot social dilemmas without forms of external control and the rate of cooperation typically depends on the payoffs. This makes impossible a predictive division between proself and prosocial people and proves that people have attitude to cooperation by nature. The key innovation of this article is in fact to postulate that humans have attitude to cooperation by nature and consequently they do not act a priori as single agents, as assumed by standard economic models, but they forecast how a social dilemma would evolve if they formed coalitions and then they act according to their most optimistic forecast. Formalizing this idea we propose the first predictive model of human cooperation able to organize a number of different experimental findings that are not explained by the standard model. We show also that the model makes satisfactorily accurate quantitative predictions of population average behavior in one-shot social dilemmas.
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Rand DG, Nowak MA. Human cooperation. Trends Cogn Sci 2013; 17:413-25. [DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2013.06.003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 731] [Impact Index Per Article: 66.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/01/2013] [Revised: 06/04/2013] [Accepted: 06/06/2013] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
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Evolution of cooperation in spatial traveler's dilemma game. PLoS One 2013; 8:e58597. [PMID: 23526998 PMCID: PMC3603963 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0058597] [Citation(s) in RCA: 14] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/19/2012] [Accepted: 02/05/2013] [Indexed: 11/29/2022] Open
Abstract
Traveler's dilemma (TD) is one of social dilemmas which has been well studied in the economics community, but it is attracted little attention in the physics community. The TD game is a two-person game. Each player can select an integer value between and () as a pure strategy. If both of them select the same value, the payoff to them will be that value. If the players select different values, say and (), then the payoff to the player who chooses the small value will be and the payoff to the other player will be . We term the player who selects a large value as the cooperator, and the one who chooses a small value as the defector. The reason is that if both of them select large values, it will result in a large total payoff. The Nash equilibrium of the TD game is to choose the smallest value . However, in previous behavioral studies, players in TD game typically select values that are much larger than , and the average selected value exhibits an inverse relationship with . To explain such anomalous behavior, in this paper, we study the evolution of cooperation in spatial traveler's dilemma game where the players are located on a square lattice and each player plays TD games with his neighbors. Players in our model can adopt their neighbors' strategies following two standard models of spatial game dynamics. Monte-Carlo simulation is applied to our model, and the results show that the cooperation level of the system, which is proportional to the average value of the strategies, decreases with increasing until is greater than the critical value where cooperation vanishes. Our findings indicate that spatial reciprocity promotes the evolution of cooperation in TD game and the spatial TD game model can interpret the anomalous behavior observed in previous behavioral experiments.
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12
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Abstract
Classical economic models assume that people are fully rational and selfish, while experiments often point to different conclusions. A canonical example is the Ultimatum Game: one player proposes a division of a sum of money between herself and a second player, who either accepts or rejects. Based on rational self-interest, responders should accept any nonzero offer and proposers should offer the smallest possible amount. Traditional, deterministic models of evolutionary game theory agree: in the one-shot anonymous Ultimatum Game, natural selection favors low offers and demands. Experiments instead show a preference for fairness: often responders reject low offers and proposers make higher offers than needed to avoid rejection. Here we show that using stochastic evolutionary game theory, where agents make mistakes when judging the payoffs and strategies of others, natural selection favors fairness. Across a range of parameters, the average strategy matches the observed behavior: proposers offer between 30% and 50%, and responders demand between 25% and 40%. Rejecting low offers increases relative payoff in pairwise competition between two strategies and is favored when selection is sufficiently weak. Offering more than you demand increases payoff when many strategies are present simultaneously and is favored when mutation is sufficiently high. We also perform a behavioral experiment and find empirical support for these theoretical findings: uncertainty about the success of others is associated with higher demands and offers; and inconsistency in the behavior of others is associated with higher offers but not predictive of demands. In an uncertain world, fairness finishes first.
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