Heterogeneity in background fitness acts as a suppressor of selection

Counterintuitive properties of evolutionary measures: A stochastic process study in cyclic population structures with periodic environments

Local environmental interactions are a major factor in determining the success of a new mutant in structured populations. Spatial variations in the concentration of genotype-specific resources change the fitness of competing strategies locally and thus can drastically change the outcome of evolutionary processes in unintuitive ways. The question is how such local environmental variations in network population structures change the condition for selection and fixation probability of an advantageous (or deleterious) mutant. We consider linear graph structures and focus on the case where resources have a spatial periodic pattern. This is the simplest model with two parameters, length scale and fitness scales, representing heterogeneity. We calculate fixation probability and fixation times for a constant population birth-death process as fitness heterogeneity and period vary. Fixation probability is affected by not only the level of fitness heterogeneity but also spatial scale of resources variations set by period of distribution T. We identify conditions for which a previously a deleterious mutant (in a uniform environment) becomes beneficial as fitness heterogeneity is increased. We observe cases where the fixation probability of both mutant and resident types are more than their neutral value, 1/N, simultaneously. This coincides with exponential increase in time to fixation which points to potential coexistence of resident and mutant types. Finally, we discuss the effect of the 'fitness shift' where the fitness function of two types has a phase difference. We observe significant increases (or decreases) in the fixation probability of the mutant as a result of such phase shift.

Game-theoretical approach for opinion dynamics on social networks

Opinion dynamics on social networks have received considerable attentions in recent years. Nevertheless, just a few works have theoretically analyzed the condition in which a certain opinion can spread in the whole structured population. In this article, we propose an evolutionary game approach for a binary opinion model to explore the conditions for an opinion's spreading. Inspired by real-life observations, we assume that an agent's choice to select an opinion is not random but is based on a score rooted from both public knowledge and the interactions with neighbors. By means of coalescing random walks, we obtain a condition in which opinion A can be favored to spread on social networks in the weak selection limit. We find that the successfully spreading condition of opinion A is closely related to the basic scores of binary opinions, the feedback scores on opinion interactions, and the structural parameters including the edge weights, the weighted degrees of vertices, and the average degree of the network. In particular, when individuals adjust their opinions based solely on the public information, the vitality of opinion A depends exclusively on the difference of basic scores of A and B. When there are no negative (positive) feedback interactions between connected individuals, we find that the success of opinion A depends on the ratio of the obtained positive (negative) feedback scores of competing opinions. To complete our study, we perform computer simulations on fully connected, small-world, and scale-free networks, respectively, which support and confirm our theoretical findings.

The Moran process on 2-chromatic graphs

Resources are rarely distributed uniformly within a population. Heterogeneity in the concentration of a drug, the quality of breeding sites, or wealth can all affect evolutionary dynamics. In this study, we represent a collection of properties affecting the fitness at a given location using a color. A green node is rich in resources while a red node is poorer. More colors can represent a broader spectrum of resource qualities. For a population evolving according to the birth-death Moran model, the first question we address is which structures, identified by graph connectivity and graph coloring, are evolutionarily equivalent. We prove that all properly two-colored, undirected, regular graphs are evolutionarily equivalent (where “properly colored” means that no two neighbors have the same color). We then compare the effects of background heterogeneity on properly two-colored graphs to those with alternative schemes in which the colors are permuted. Finally, we discuss dynamic coloring as a model for spatiotemporal resource fluctuations, and we illustrate that random dynamic colorings often diminish the effects of background heterogeneity relative to a proper two-coloring.

Heterogeneity in environmental conditions can have profound effects on long-term evolutionary outcomes in structured populations. We consider a population evolving on a colored graph, wherein the color of a node represents the resources at that location. Using a combination of analytical and numerical methods, we quantify the effects of background heterogeneity on a population’s dynamics. In addition to considering the notion of an “optimal” coloring with respect to mutant invasion, we also study the effects of dynamic spatial redistribution of resources as the population evolves. Although the effects of static background heterogeneity can be quite striking, these effects are often attenuated by the movement (or “flow”) of the underlying resources.

Social dilemmas among unequals

Direct reciprocity is a powerful mechanism for the evolution of cooperation on the basis of repeated interactions^1-4. It requires that interacting individuals are sufficiently equal, such that everyone faces similar consequences when they cooperate or defect. Yet inequality is ubiquitous among humans^5,6 and is generally considered to undermine cooperation and welfare^7-10. Most previous models of reciprocity do not include inequality^11-15. These models assume that individuals are the same in all relevant aspects. Here we introduce a general framework to study direct reciprocity among unequal individuals. Our model allows for multiple sources of inequality. Subjects can differ in their endowments, their productivities and in how much they benefit from public goods. We find that extreme inequality prevents cooperation. But if subjects differ in productivity, some endowment inequality can be necessary for cooperation to prevail. Our mathematical predictions are supported by a behavioural experiment in which we vary the endowments and productivities of the subjects. We observe that overall welfare is maximized when the two sources of heterogeneity are aligned, such that more productive individuals receive higher endowments. By contrast, when endowments and productivities are misaligned, cooperation quickly breaks down. Our findings have implications for policy-makers concerned with equity, efficiency and the provisioning of public goods.

Fixation time in evolutionary graphs: A mean-field approach

Using an analytical method we calculate average conditional fixation time of mutants in a general graph-structured population of two types of species. The method is based on Markov chains and uses a mean-field approximation to calculate the corresponding transition matrix. Analytical results are compared with the results of simulation of the Moran process on a number of network structures.

Invisible inequality leads to punishing the poor and rewarding the rich

Four experiments examine how lack of awareness of inequality affect behaviour towards the rich and poor. In Experiment 1, participants who became aware that wealthy individuals donated a smaller percentage of their income switched from rewarding the wealthy to rewarding the poor. In Experiments 2 and 3, participants who played a public goods game – and were assigned incomes reflective of the US income distribution either at random or on merit – punished the poor (for small absolute contributions) and rewarded the rich (for large absolute contributions) when incomes were unknown; when incomes were revealed, participants punished the rich (for their low percentage of income contributed) and rewarded the poor (for their high percentage of income contributed). In Experiment 4, participants provided with public education contributions for five New York school districts levied additional taxes on mostly poorer school districts when incomes were unknown, but targeted wealthier districts when incomes were revealed. These results shed light on how income transparency shapes preferences for equity and redistribution. We discuss implications for policy-makers.

Knowing the past improves cooperation in the future

Cooperation is the cornerstone of human evolutionary success. Like no other species, we champion the sacrifice of personal benefits for the common good, and we work together to achieve what we are unable to achieve alone. Knowledge and information from past generations is thereby often instrumental in ensuring we keep cooperating rather than deteriorating to less productive ways of coexistence. Here we present a mathematical model based on evolutionary game theory that shows how using the past as the benchmark for evolutionary success, rather than just current performance, significantly improves cooperation in the future. Interestingly, the details of just how the past is taken into account play only second-order importance, whether it be a weighted average of past payoffs or just a single payoff value from the past. Cooperation is promoted because information from the past disables fast invasions of defectors, thus enhancing the long-term benefits of cooperative behavior.

Environmental fitness heterogeneity in the Moran process

Many mathematical models of evolution assume that all individuals experience the same environment. Here, we study the Moran process in heterogeneous environments. The population is of finite size with two competing types, which are exposed to a fixed number of environmental conditions. Reproductive rate is determined by both the type and the environment. We first calculate the condition for selection to favour the mutant relative to the resident wild-type. In large populations, the mutant is favoured if and only if the mutant's spatial average reproductive rate exceeds that of the resident. But environmental heterogeneity elucidates an interesting asymmetry between the mutant and the resident. Specifically, mutant heterogeneity suppresses its fixation probability; if this heterogeneity is strong enough, it can even completely offset the effects of selection (including in large populations). By contrast, resident heterogeneity has no effect on a mutant's fixation probability in large populations and can amplify it in small populations.

Beyond replicator dynamics: From frequency to density dependent models of evolutionary games

Game theoretic models of evolution such as the Hawk-Dove game assume that individuals gain fitness (which is a proxy of the per capita population growth rate) in pair-wise contests only. These models assume that the equilibrium distribution of phenotypes involved (e.g., Hawks and Doves) in the population is given by the Hardy-Weinberg law, which is based on instantaneous, random pair formation. On the other hand, models of population dynamics do not consider pairs, newborns are produced by singles, and interactions between phenotypes or species are described by the mass action principle. This article links game theoretic and population approaches. It shows that combining distribution dynamics with population dynamics can lead to stable coexistence of Hawk and Dove population numbers in models that do not assume a priori that fitness is negative density dependent. Our analysis shows clearly that the interior Nash equilibrium of the Hawk and Dove model depends both on population size and on interaction times between different phenotypes in the population. This raises the question of the applicability of classic evolutionary game theory that requires all interactions take the same amount of time and that all single individuals have the same payoff per unit of time, to real populations. Furthermore, by separating individual fitness into birth and death effects on singles and pairs, it is shown that stable coexistence in these models depends on the time-scale of the distribution dynamics relative to the population dynamics. When explicit density-dependent fitness is included through competition over a limited resource, the combined dynamics of the Hawk-Dove model often lead to Dove extinction no matter how costly fighting is for Hawk pairs.

Interaction rates, vital rates, background fitness and replicator dynamics: how to embed evolutionary game structure into realistic population dynamics

In this paper we are concerned with how aggregated outcomes of individual behaviours, during interactions with other individuals (games) or with environmental factors, determine the vital rates constituting the growth rate of the population. This approach needs additional elements, namely the rates of event occurrence (interaction rates). Interaction rates describe the distribution of the interaction events in time, which seriously affects the population dynamics, as is shown in this paper. This leads to the model of a population of individuals playing different games, where focal game affected by the considered trait can be extracted from the general model, and the impact on the dynamics of other events (which is not neutral) can be described by an average background fertility and mortality. This leads to a distinction between two types of background fitness, strategically neutral elements of the focal games (correlated with the focal game events) and the aggregated outcomes of other interactions (independent of the focal game). The new approach is useful for clarification of the biological meaning of concepts such as weak selection. Results are illustrated by a Hawk-Dove example.

Conditional punishment is a double-edged sword in promoting cooperation

Punishment is widely recognized as an effective approach for averting from exploitation by free-riders in human society. However, punishment is costly, and thus rational individuals are unwilling to take the punishing action, resulting in the second-order free-rider problem. Recent experimental study evidences that individuals prefer conditional punishment, and their punishing decision depends on other members' punishing decisions. In this work, we thus propose a theoretical model for conditional punishment and investigate how such conditional punishment influences cooperation in the public goods game. Considering conditional punishers only take the punishing action when the number of unconditional punishers exceeds a threshold number, we demonstrate that such conditional punishment induces the effect of a double-edged sword on the evolution of cooperation both in well-mixed and structured populations. Specifically, when it is relatively easy for conditional punishers to engage in the punishment activity corresponding to a low threshold value, cooperation can be promoted in comparison with the case without conditional punishment. Whereas when it is relatively difficult for conditional punishers to engage in the punishment activity corresponding to a high threshold value, cooperation is inhibited in comparison with the case without conditional punishment. Moreover, we verify that such double-edged sword effect exists in a wide range of model parameters and can be still observed in other different punishment regimes.

Role-separating ordering in social dilemmas controlled by topological frustration

''Three is a crowd" is an old proverb that applies as much to social interactions as it does to frustrated configurations in statistical physics models. Accordingly, social relations within a triangle deserve special attention. With this motivation, we explore the impact of topological frustration on the evolutionary dynamics of the snowdrift game on a triangular lattice. This topology provides an irreconcilable frustration, which prevents anticoordination of competing strategies that would be needed for an optimal outcome of the game. By using different strategy updating protocols, we observe complex spatial patterns in dependence on payoff values that are reminiscent to a honeycomb-like organization, which helps to minimize the negative consequence of the topological frustration. We relate the emergence of these patterns to the microscopic dynamics of the evolutionary process, both by means of mean-field approximations and Monte Carlo simulations. For comparison, we also consider the same evolutionary dynamics on the square lattice, where of course the topological frustration is absent. However, with the deletion of diagonal links of the triangular lattice, we can gradually bridge the gap to the square lattice. Interestingly, in this case the level of cooperation in the system is a direct indicator of the level of topological frustration, thus providing a method to determine frustration levels in an arbitrary interaction network.

From degree-correlated to payoff-correlated activity for an optimal resolution of social dilemmas

An active participation of players in evolutionary games depends on several factors, ranging from personal stakes to the properties of the interaction network. Diverse activity patterns thus have to be taken into account when studying the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas. Here we study the weak prisoner's dilemma game, where the activity of each player is determined in a probabilistic manner either by its degree or by its payoff. While degree-correlated activity introduces cascading failures of cooperation that are particularly severe on scale-free networks with frequently inactive hubs, payoff-correlated activity provides a more nuanced activity profile, which ultimately hinders systemic breakdowns of cooperation. To determine optimal conditions for the evolution of cooperation, we introduce an exponential decay to payoff-correlated activity that determines how fast the activity of a player returns to its default state. We show that there exists an intermediate decay rate at which the resolution of the social dilemma is optimal. This can be explained by the emerging activity patterns of players, where the inactivity of hubs is compensated effectively by the increased activity of average-degree players, who through their collective influence in the network sustain a higher level of cooperation. The sudden drops in the fraction of cooperators observed with degree-correlated activity therefore vanish, and so does the need for the lengthy spatiotemporal reorganization of compact cooperative clusters. The absence of such asymmetric dynamic instabilities thus leads to an optimal resolution of social dilemmas, especially when the conditions for the evolution of cooperation are strongly adverse.

Modeling Invasion Dynamics with Spatial Random-Fitness Due to Micro-Environment

Numerous experimental studies have demonstrated that the microenvironment is a key regulator influencing the proliferative and migrative potentials of species. Spatial and temporal disturbances lead to adverse and hazardous microenvironments for cellular systems that is reflected in the phenotypic heterogeneity within the system. In this paper, we study the effect of microenvironment on the invasive capability of species, or mutants, on structured grids (in particular, square lattices) under the influence of site-dependent random proliferation in addition to a migration potential. We discuss both continuous and discrete fitness distributions. Our results suggest that the invasion probability is negatively correlated with the variance of fitness distribution of mutants (for both advantageous and neutral mutants) in the absence of migration of both types of cells. A similar behaviour is observed even in the presence of a random fitness distribution of host cells in the system with neutral fitness rate. In the case of a bimodal distribution, we observe zero invasion probability until the system reaches a (specific) proportion of advantageous phenotypes. Also, we find that the migrative potential amplifies the invasion probability as the variance of fitness of mutants increases in the system, which is the exact opposite in the absence of migration. Our computational framework captures the harsh microenvironmental conditions through quenched random fitness distributions and migration of cells, and our analysis shows that they play an important role in the invasion dynamics of several biological systems such as bacterial micro-habitats, epithelial dysplasia, and metastasis. We believe that our results may lead to more experimental studies, which can in turn provide further insights into the role and impact of heterogeneous environments on invasion dynamics.

Counterintuitive properties of the fixation time in network-structured populations

Evolutionary dynamics on graphs can lead to many interesting and counterintuitive findings. We study the Moran process, a discrete time birth-death process, that describes the invasion of a mutant type into a population of wild-type individuals. Remarkably, the fixation probability of a single mutant is the same on all regular networks. But non-regular networks can increase or decrease the fixation probability. While the time until fixation formally depends on the same transition probabilities as the fixation probabilities, there is no obvious relation between them. For example, an amplifier of selection, which increases the fixation probability and thus decreases the number of mutations needed until one of them is successful, can at the same time slow down the process of fixation. Based on small networks, we show analytically that (i) the time to fixation can decrease when links are removed from the network and (ii) the node providing the best starting conditions in terms of the shortest fixation time depends on the fitness of the mutant. Our results are obtained analytically on small networks, but numerical simulations show that they are qualitatively valid even in much larger populations.

Asymmetric Evolutionary Games

Evolutionary game theory is a powerful framework for studying evolution in populations of interacting individuals. A common assumption in evolutionary game theory is that interactions are symmetric, which means that the players are distinguished by only their strategies. In nature, however, the microscopic interactions between players are nearly always asymmetric due to environmental effects, differing baseline characteristics, and other possible sources of heterogeneity. To model these phenomena, we introduce into evolutionary game theory two broad classes of asymmetric interactions: ecological and genotypic. Ecological asymmetry results from variation in the environments of the players, while genotypic asymmetry is a consequence of the players having differing baseline genotypes. We develop a theory of these forms of asymmetry for games in structured populations and use the classical social dilemmas, the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Snowdrift Game, for illustrations. Interestingly, asymmetric games reveal essential differences between models of genetic evolution based on reproduction and models of cultural evolution based on imitation that are not apparent in symmetric games.

Biological interactions, even between members of the same species, are almost always asymmetric due to differences in size, access to resources, or past interactions. However, classical game-theoretical models of evolution fail to account for sources of asymmetry in a comprehensive manner. Here, we extend the theory of evolutionary games to two general classes of asymmetry arising from environmental variation and individual differences, covering much of the heterogeneity observed in nature. If selection is weak, evolutionary processes based on asymmetric interactions behave macroscopically like symmetric games with payoffs that may depend on the resource distribution in the population or its structure. Asymmetry uncovers differences between genetic and cultural evolution that are not apparent when interactions are symmetric.