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Peña J, Heifetz A, Nöldeke G. The shirker's dilemma and the prospect of cooperation in large groups. Theor Popul Biol 2024; 155:10-23. [PMID: 38000514 DOI: 10.1016/j.tpb.2023.11.001] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/12/2023] [Revised: 10/23/2023] [Accepted: 11/12/2023] [Indexed: 11/26/2023]
Abstract
Cooperation usually becomes harder to sustain as groups become larger because incentives to shirk increase with the number of potential contributors to collective action. But is this always the case? Here we study a binary-action cooperative dilemma where a public good is provided as long as not more than a given number of players shirk from a costly cooperative task. We find that at the stable polymorphic equilibrium, which exists when the cost of cooperation is low enough, the probability of cooperating increases with group size and reaches a limit of one when the group size tends to infinity. Nevertheless, increasing the group size may increase or decrease the probability that the public good is provided at such an equilibrium, depending on the cost value. We also prove that the expected payoff to individuals at the stable polymorphic equilibrium (i.e., their fitness) decreases with group size. For low enough costs of cooperation, both the probability of provision of the public good and the expected payoff converge to positive values in the limit of large group sizes. However, we also find that the basin of attraction of the stable polymorphic equilibrium is a decreasing function of group size and shrinks to zero in the limit of very large groups. Overall, we demonstrate non-trivial comparative statics with respect to group size in an otherwise simple collective action problem.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jorge Peña
- Department of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Toulouse School of Economics, France; Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse, France; Department of Human Behavior, Ecology and Culture, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Germany.
| | - Aviad Heifetz
- Department of Management and Economics, Open University of Israel, Israel.
| | - Georg Nöldeke
- Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Basel, Switzerland.
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2
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Traulsen A, Glynatsi NE. The future of theoretical evolutionary game theory. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2023; 378:20210508. [PMID: 36934760 PMCID: PMC10024985 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2021.0508] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/04/2022] [Accepted: 12/06/2022] [Indexed: 03/21/2023] Open
Abstract
Evolutionary game theory is a truly interdisciplinary subject that goes well beyond the limits of biology. Mathematical minds get hooked up in simple models for evolution and often gradually move into other parts of evolutionary biology or ecology. Social scientists realize how much they can learn from evolutionary thinking and gradually transfer insight that was originally generated in biology. Computer scientists can use their algorithms to explore a new field where machines not only learn from the environment, but also from each other. The breadth of the field and the focus on a few very popular issues, such as cooperation, comes at a price: several insights are re-discovered in different fields under different labels with different heroes and modelling traditions. For example, reciprocity or spatial structure are treated differently. Will we continue to develop things in parallel? Or can we converge to a single set of ideas, a single tradition and eventually a single software repository? Or will these fields continue to cross-fertilize each other, learning from each other and engaging in a constructive exchange between fields? Ultimately, the popularity of evolutionary game theory rests not only on its explanatory power, but also on the intuitive character of its models. This article is part of the theme issue 'Half a century of evolutionary games: a synthesis of theory, application and future directions'.
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Affiliation(s)
- Arne Traulsen
- Department of Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Plön 24306, Germany
| | - Nikoleta E. Glynatsi
- Max Planck Research Group: Dynamics of Social Behavior, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Plön 24306, Germany
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3
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Kristensen NP, Ohtsuki H, Chisholm RA. Ancestral social environments plus nonlinear benefits can explain cooperation in human societies. Sci Rep 2022; 12:20252. [PMID: 36424400 PMCID: PMC9691629 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-022-24590-y] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/18/2022] [Accepted: 11/17/2022] [Indexed: 11/26/2022] Open
Abstract
Human cooperation (paying a cost to benefit others) is puzzling from a Darwinian perspective, particularly in groups with strangers who cannot repay nor are family members. The beneficial effects of cooperation typically increase nonlinearly with the number of cooperators, e.g., increasing returns when cooperation is low and diminishing returns when cooperation is high. Such nonlinearity can allow cooperation between strangers to persist evolutionarily if a large enough proportion of the population are already cooperators. However, if a lone cooperator faces a conflict between the group's and its own interests (a social dilemma), that raises the question of how cooperation arose in the first place. We use a mathematically tractable evolutionary model to formalise a chronological narrative that has previously only been investigated verbally: given that ancient humans interacted mostly with family members (genetic homophily), cooperation evolved first by kin selection, and then persisted in situations with nonlinear benefits as homophily declined or even if interactions with strangers became the norm. The model also predicts the coexistence of cooperators and defectors observed in the human population (polymorphism), and may explain why cooperators in behavioural experiments prefer to condition their contribution on the contributions of others (conditional cooperation in public goods games).
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Affiliation(s)
- Nadiah P. Kristensen
- grid.4280.e0000 0001 2180 6431Department of Biological Sciences, National University of Singapore, 16 Science Drive 4, Singapore, 117558 Singapore
| | - Hisashi Ohtsuki
- grid.275033.00000 0004 1763 208XDepartment of Evolutionary Studies of Biosystems, School of Advanced Sciences, SOKENDAI, Shonan Village, Hayama, Kanagawa 240-0193 Japan ,grid.275033.00000 0004 1763 208XResearch Center for Integrative Evolutionary Science, School of Advanced Sciences, SOKENDAI, Shonan Village, Hayama, Kanagawa 240-0193 Japan
| | - Ryan A. Chisholm
- grid.4280.e0000 0001 2180 6431Department of Biological Sciences, National University of Singapore, 16 Science Drive 4, Singapore, 117558 Singapore
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4
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Coggan H, Page KM. The role of evolutionary game theory in spatial and non-spatial models of the survival of cooperation in cancer: a review. JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY, INTERFACE 2022; 19:20220346. [PMID: 35975562 PMCID: PMC9382458 DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2022.0346] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/15/2022]
Abstract
Evolutionary game theory (EGT) is a branch of mathematics which considers populations of individuals interacting with each other to receive pay-offs. An individual’s pay-off is dependent on the strategy of its opponent(s) as well as on its own, and the higher its pay-off, the higher its reproductive fitness. Its offspring generally inherit its interaction strategy, subject to random mutation. Over time, the composition of the population shifts as different strategies spread or are driven extinct. In the last 25 years there has been a flood of interest in applying EGT to cancer modelling, with the aim of explaining how cancerous mutations spread through healthy tissue and how intercellular cooperation persists in tumour-cell populations. This review traces this body of work from theoretical analyses of well-mixed infinite populations through to more realistic spatial models of the development of cooperation between epithelial cells. We also consider work in which EGT has been used to make experimental predictions about the evolution of cancer, and discuss work that remains to be done before EGT can make large-scale contributions to clinical treatment and patient outcomes.
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Affiliation(s)
- Helena Coggan
- Department of Mathematics, University College London, London, UK
| | - Karen M Page
- Department of Mathematics, University College London, London, UK
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5
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Farrokhian N, Maltas J, Dinh M, Durmaz A, Ellsworth P, Hitomi M, McClure E, Marusyk A, Kaznatcheev A, Scott JG. Measuring competitive exclusion in non-small cell lung cancer. SCIENCE ADVANCES 2022; 8:eabm7212. [PMID: 35776787 PMCID: PMC10883359 DOI: 10.1126/sciadv.abm7212] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/15/2023]
Abstract
In this study, we experimentally measure the frequency-dependent interactions between a gefitinib-resistant non-small cell lung cancer population and its sensitive ancestor via the evolutionary game assay. We show that cost of resistance is insufficient to accurately predict competitive exclusion and that frequency-dependent growth rate measurements are required. Using frequency-dependent growth rate data, we then show that gefitinib treatment results in competitive exclusion of the ancestor, while the absence of treatment results in a likely, but not guaranteed, exclusion of the resistant strain. Then, using simulations, we demonstrate that incorporating ecological growth effects can influence the predicted extinction time. In addition, we show that higher drug concentrations may not lead to the optimal reduction in tumor burden. Together, these results highlight the potential importance of frequency-dependent growth rate data for understanding competing populations, both in the laboratory and as we translate adaptive therapy regimens to the clinic.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Jeff Maltas
- Department of Translational Hematology and Oncology Research, Cleveland Clinic, Cleveland, OH, USA
| | - Mina Dinh
- Department of Translational Hematology and Oncology Research, Cleveland Clinic, Cleveland, OH, USA
| | | | | | - Masahiro Hitomi
- Department of Translational Hematology and Oncology Research, Cleveland Clinic, Cleveland, OH, USA
| | - Erin McClure
- Department of Translational Hematology and Oncology Research, Cleveland Clinic, Cleveland, OH, USA
| | - Andriy Marusyk
- Department of Cancer Physiology, Moffitt Cancer Center, Tampa, FL, USA
| | - Artem Kaznatcheev
- Department of Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
| | - Jacob G Scott
- CWRU School of Medicine, Cleveland, OH, USA
- Department of Translational Hematology and Oncology Research, Cleveland Clinic, Cleveland, OH, USA
- Department of Radiation Oncology, Cleveland Clinic, Cleveland, OH, USA
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6
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Czuppon P, Traulsen A. Understanding evolutionary and ecological dynamics using a continuum limit. Ecol Evol 2021; 11:5857-5873. [PMID: 34141189 PMCID: PMC8207364 DOI: 10.1002/ece3.7205] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/06/2020] [Revised: 12/08/2020] [Accepted: 12/23/2020] [Indexed: 01/08/2023] Open
Abstract
Continuum limits in the form of stochastic differential equations are typically used in theoretical population genetics to account for genetic drift or more generally, inherent randomness of the model. In evolutionary game theory and theoretical ecology, however, this method is used less frequently to study demographic stochasticity. Here, we review the use of continuum limits in ecology and evolution. Starting with an individual-based model, we derive a large population size limit, a (stochastic) differential equation which is called continuum limit. By example of the Wright-Fisher diffusion, we outline how to compute the stationary distribution, the fixation probability of a certain type, and the mean extinction time using the continuum limit. In the context of the logistic growth equation, we approximate the quasi-stationary distribution in a finite population.
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Affiliation(s)
- Peter Czuppon
- Institute of Ecology and Environmental Sciences ParisUPECCNRSIRDINRASorbonne UniversitéParisFrance
- Centre Interdisciplinaire de Recherche en BiologieCNRSCollège de FrancePSL Research UniversityParisFrance
- Department of Evolutionary TheoryMax Planck Institute for Evolutionary BiologyPlönGermany
| | - Arne Traulsen
- Department of Evolutionary TheoryMax Planck Institute for Evolutionary BiologyPlönGermany
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7
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High thresholds encouraging the evolution of cooperation in threshold public-good games. Sci Rep 2020; 10:5863. [PMID: 32246013 PMCID: PMC7125178 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-020-62626-3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/24/2019] [Accepted: 03/16/2020] [Indexed: 11/22/2022] Open
Abstract
For a well-mixed population, we consider a threshold public good game where group members only obtain benefits from a public good if a sufficiently large number of them cooperates. We investigate the effect of an increase in the threshold on the level of cooperation that evolves. It is shown that for sufficiently large participation costs, the level of cooperation is higher for low and for high thresholds, than it is for intermediate thresholds – where in the latter case cooperation may not evolve at all. The counterintuitive effect where an increase in the threshold from an intermediate to a high one decreases the probability of cooperation, is related to the so-called common-enemy hypothesis of the evolution of cooperation. We further apply our analysis to assess the relative weight of different game types across the parameter space, and show that game types where either a small, or a large fraction of the population evolves as cooperators, receive more weight compared to game types where an intermediate fraction of cooperators evolves.
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8
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Hindersin L, Wu B, Traulsen A, García J. Computation and Simulation of Evolutionary Game Dynamics in Finite Populations. Sci Rep 2019; 9:6946. [PMID: 31061385 PMCID: PMC6502801 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-019-43102-z] [Citation(s) in RCA: 24] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/22/2018] [Accepted: 04/11/2019] [Indexed: 11/23/2022] Open
Abstract
The study of evolutionary dynamics increasingly relies on computational methods, as more and more cases outside the range of analytical tractability are explored. The computational methods for simulation and numerical approximation of the relevant quantities are diverging without being compared for accuracy and performance. We thoroughly investigate these algorithms in order to propose a reliable standard. For expositional clarity we focus on symmetric 2 × 2 games leading to one-dimensional processes, noting that extensions can be straightforward and lessons will often carry over to more complex cases. We provide time-complexity analysis and systematically compare three families of methods to compute fixation probabilities, fixation times and long-term stationary distributions for the popular Moran process. We provide efficient implementations that substantially improve wall times over naive or immediate implementations. Implications are also discussed for the Wright-Fisher process, as well as structured populations and multiple types.
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Affiliation(s)
- Laura Hindersin
- Department of Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Plön, Germany
| | - Bin Wu
- School of Science, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing, China
| | - Arne Traulsen
- Department of Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Plön, Germany.
| | - Julian García
- Faculty of Information Technology, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia
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9
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Kaznatcheev A, Peacock J, Basanta D, Marusyk A, Scott JG. Fibroblasts and alectinib switch the evolutionary games played by non-small cell lung cancer. Nat Ecol Evol 2019; 3:450-456. [PMID: 30778184 PMCID: PMC6467526 DOI: 10.1038/s41559-018-0768-z] [Citation(s) in RCA: 71] [Impact Index Per Article: 14.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/23/2017] [Accepted: 11/22/2018] [Indexed: 01/22/2023]
Abstract
Heterogeneity in strategies for survival and proliferation among the cells which constitute a tumour is a driving force behind the evolution of resistance to cancer therapy. The rules mapping the tumour’s strategy distribution to the fitness of individual strategies can be represented as an evolutionary game. We develop a game assay to measure effective evolutionary games in co-cultures of non-small cell lung cancer cells which are sensitive and resistant to the anaplastic lymphoma kinase inhibitor Alectinib. The games are not only quantitatively different between different environments, but targeted therapy and cancer associated fibroblasts qualitatively switch the type of game being played by the in-vitro population from Leader to Deadlock. This observation provides empirical confirmation of a central theoretical postulate of evolutionary game theory in oncology: we can treat not only the player, but also the game. Although we concentrate on measuring games played by cancer cells, the measurement methodology we develop can be used to advance the study of games in other microscopic systems by providing a quantitative description of non-cell-autonomous effects.
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Affiliation(s)
- Artem Kaznatcheev
- Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK. .,Department of Translational Hematology and Oncology Research, Cleveland Clinic, Cleveland, OH, USA.
| | - Jeffrey Peacock
- Department of Radiation Oncology, Moffitt Cancer Center, Tampa, FL, USA
| | - David Basanta
- Department of Integrated Mathematical Oncology, Moffitt Cancer Center, Tampa, FL, USA
| | - Andriy Marusyk
- Department of Cancer Physiology, Moffitt Cancer Center, Tampa, FL, USA.
| | - Jacob G Scott
- Department of Translational Hematology and Oncology Research, Cleveland Clinic, Cleveland, OH, USA. .,Department of Radiation Oncology, Cleveland Clinic, Cleveland, OH, USA.
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10
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Patel M, Raymond B, Bonsall MB, West SA. Crystal toxins and the volunteer's dilemma in bacteria. J Evol Biol 2019; 32:310-319. [PMID: 30672052 PMCID: PMC6487926 DOI: 10.1111/jeb.13415] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/18/2018] [Revised: 01/11/2019] [Accepted: 01/15/2019] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
Abstract
The growth and virulence of the bacteria Bacillus thuringiensis depend on the production of Cry toxins, which are used to perforate the gut of its host. Successful invasion of the host relies on producing a threshold amount of toxin, after which there is no benefit from producing more toxin. Consequently, the production of Cry toxin appears to be a different type of social problem compared with the public goods scenarios that bacteria usually encounter. We show that selection for toxin production is a volunteer's dilemma. We make specific predictions that (a) selection for toxin production depends upon an interplay between the number of bacterial cells that each host ingests and the genetic relatedness between those cells; (b) cheats that do not produce toxin gain an advantage when at low frequencies, and at high bacterial density, allowing them to be maintained in a population alongside toxin‐producing cells. More generally, our results emphasize the diversity of the social games that bacteria play.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Ben Raymond
- College of Life and Environmental Science, University of Exeter, Penryn, Cornwall, UK
| | | | - Stuart A West
- Department of Zoology, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
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11
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Chalub FACC, Souza MO. From Fixation Probabilities to d-player Games: An Inverse Problem in Evolutionary Dynamics. Bull Math Biol 2019; 81:4625-4642. [PMID: 30635836 DOI: 10.1007/s11538-018-00566-w] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/14/2017] [Accepted: 12/27/2018] [Indexed: 10/27/2022]
Abstract
The probability that the frequency of a particular trait will eventually become unity, the so-called fixation probability, is a central issue in the study of population evolution. Its computation, once we are given a stochastic finite population model without mutations and a (possibly frequency dependent) fitness function, is straightforward and it can be done in several ways. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the fixation probability is an important macroscopic property of the population, its precise knowledge does not give any clear information about the interaction patterns among individuals in the population. Here we address the inverse problem: from a given fixation pattern and population size, we want to infer what is the game being played by the population. This is done by first exploiting the framework developed in Chalub and Souza (J Math Biol 75:1735-1774, 2017), which yields a fitness function that realises this fixation pattern in the Wright-Fisher model. This fitness function always exists, but it is not necessarily unique. Subsequently, we show that any such fitness function can be approximated, with arbitrary precision, using d-player game theory, provided d is large enough. The pay-off matrix that emerges naturally from the approximating game will provide useful information about the individual interaction structure that is not itself apparent in the fixation pattern. We present extensive numerical support for our conclusions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Fabio A C C Chalub
- Departamento de Matemática and Centro de Matemática e Apliçoes, Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Quinta da Torre, 2829-516, Caparica, Portugal
| | - Max O Souza
- Instituto de Matemática e Estatística, Universidade Federal Fluminense, R. Prof. Marcos Waldemar de Freitas Reis, s/n, Niterói, RJ, 24210-201, Brasil.
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12
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De Jaegher K. Harsh environments: Multi-player cooperation with excludability and congestion. J Theor Biol 2019; 460:18-36. [PMID: 30296445 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2018.10.006] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/17/2018] [Revised: 09/28/2018] [Accepted: 10/02/2018] [Indexed: 10/28/2022]
Abstract
The common-enemy hypothesis of by-product mutualism proposes that organisms are more likely to cooperate when facing the common enemy of a harsher environment. Micro-foundations of this hypothesis have so far focused on the case where cooperation consists of the production of a pure public good. In this case, the effect of a harsher environment is ambiguous: not only a common-enemy effect is possible, but also an opposite, competing effect where the harsher environment reduces the probability of cooperation. This paper shows that unambiguous effects of a harsher environment are predicted when considering the realistic case where the collective good produced is excludable (in the sense that whether or not a player benefits from the collective good depends on whether or not he is contributing) and/or congestible (in the sense that the benefits the individual player obtains from the collective good are affected by the number of contributing players). In particular, the competing effect is systematically predicted for club goods, where defectors are excluded from the benefits of the collective good. A common-enemy effect is instead systematically predicted for charity goods, where cooperators are excluded from the benefits of the collective good. These effects are maintained for congestible club goods and for congestible charity goods. As the degree to which a collective good is excludable can be meaningfully compared across different instances of cooperation, these contrasting predictions for public good, charity goods and club goods yield testable hypotheses for the common-enemy hypothesis of by-product mutualism.
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Affiliation(s)
- Kris De Jaegher
- Utrecht University School of Economics, Utrecht University, Kriekenpitplein 21-22, 3584EC Utrecht, The Netherlands.
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13
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Duong MH, Tran HM, Han TA. On the distribution of the number of internal equilibria in random evolutionary games. J Math Biol 2019; 78:331-371. [PMID: 30069646 PMCID: PMC6437138 DOI: 10.1007/s00285-018-1276-0] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/08/2018] [Revised: 07/12/2018] [Indexed: 11/02/2022]
Abstract
The analysis of equilibrium points is of great importance in evolutionary game theory with numerous practical ramifications in ecology, population genetics, social sciences, economics and computer science. In contrast to previous analytical approaches which primarily focus on computing the expected number of internal equilibria, in this paper we study the distribution of the number of internal equilibria in a multi-player two-strategy random evolutionary game. We derive for the first time a closed formula for the probability that the game has a certain number of internal equilibria, for both normal and uniform distributions of the game payoff entries. In addition, using Descartes' rule of signs and combinatorial methods, we provide several universal upper and lower bound estimates for this probability, which are independent of the underlying payoff distribution. We also compare our analytical results with those obtained from extensive numerical simulations. Many results of this paper are applicable to a wider class of random polynomials that are not necessarily from evolutionary games.
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Affiliation(s)
- Manh Hong Duong
- School of Mathematics, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, B15 2TT UK
| | - Hoang Minh Tran
- Data Analytics Department, Esmart Systems, 1783 Halden, Norway
| | - The Anh Han
- School of Computing, Media & the Arts, Teesside University, Middlesbrough, TS1 3BX UK
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14
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Evolution of Groupwise Cooperation: Generosity, Paradoxical Behavior, and Non-Linear Payoff Functions. GAMES 2018. [DOI: 10.3390/g9040100] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/27/2023]
Abstract
Evolution of cooperation by reciprocity has been studied using two-player and n-player repeated prisoner’s dilemma games. An interesting feature specific to the n-player case is that players can vary in generosity, or how many defections they tolerate in a given round of a repeated game. Reciprocators are quicker to detect defectors to withdraw further cooperation when less generous, and better at maintaining a long-term cooperation in the presence of rare defectors when more generous. A previous analysis on a stochastic evolutionary model of the n-player repeated prisoner’s dilemma has shown that the fixation probability of a single reciprocator in a population of defectors can be maximized for a moderate level of generosity. However, the analysis is limited in that it considers only tit-for-tat-type reciprocators within the conventional linear payoff assumption. Here we extend the previous study by removing these limitations and show that, if the games are repeated sufficiently many times, considering non-tit-for-tat type strategies does not alter the previous results, while the introduction of non-linear payoffs sometimes does. In particular, under certain conditions, the fixation probability is maximized for a “paradoxical” strategy, which cooperates in the presence of fewer cooperating opponents than in other situations in which it defects.
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15
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Peña J, Nöldeke G. Group size effects in social evolution. J Theor Biol 2018; 457:211-220. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2018.08.004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 24] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/10/2018] [Revised: 07/31/2018] [Accepted: 08/03/2018] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
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16
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17
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Wu B, Arranz J, Du J, Zhou D, Traulsen A. Evolving synergetic interactions. J R Soc Interface 2017; 13:rsif.2016.0282. [PMID: 27466437 PMCID: PMC4971219 DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2016.0282] [Citation(s) in RCA: 27] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/09/2016] [Accepted: 06/30/2016] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Cooperators forgo their own interests to benefit others. This reduces their fitness and thus cooperators are not likely to spread based on natural selection. Nonetheless, cooperation is widespread on every level of biological organization ranging from bacterial communities to human society. Mathematical models can help to explain under which circumstances cooperation evolves. Evolutionary game theory is a powerful mathematical tool to depict the interactions between cooperators and defectors. Classical models typically involve either pairwise interactions between individuals or a linear superposition of these interactions. For interactions within groups, however, synergetic effects may arise: their outcome is not just the sum of its parts. This is because the payoffs via a single group interaction can be different from the sum of any collection of two-player interactions. Assuming that all interactions start from pairs, how can such synergetic multiplayer games emerge from simpler pairwise interactions? Here, we present a mathematical model that captures the transition from pairwise interactions to synergetic multiplayer ones. We assume that different social groups have different breaking rates. We show that non-uniform breaking rates do foster the emergence of synergy, even though individuals always interact in pairs. Our work sheds new light on the mechanisms underlying such synergetic interactions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Bin Wu
- Department of Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, August-Thienemann-Straße 2, 24306 Plön, Germany School of Sciences, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing 100876, People's Republic of China
| | - Jordi Arranz
- Department of Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, August-Thienemann-Straße 2, 24306 Plön, Germany
| | - Jinming Du
- Liaoning Key Laboratory of Manufacturing Systems and Logistics, Institute of Industrial Engineering and Logistics Optimization, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110819, People's Republic of China Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871, People's Republic of China
| | - Da Zhou
- School of Mathematical Sciences, Xiamen University, Xiamen 361005, People's Republic of China
| | - Arne Traulsen
- Department of Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, August-Thienemann-Straße 2, 24306 Plön, Germany
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18
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Abstract
Cooperation in collective action dilemmas usually breaks down in the absence of additional incentive mechanisms. This tragedy can be escaped if cooperators have the possibility to invest in reward funds that are shared exclusively among cooperators (prosocial rewarding). Yet, the presence of defectors who do not contribute to the public good but do reward themselves (antisocial rewarding) deters cooperation in the absence of additional countermeasures. A recent simulation study suggests that spatial structure is sufficient to prevent antisocial rewarding from deterring cooperation. Here we reinvestigate this issue assuming mixed strategies and weak selection on a game-theoretic model of social interactions, which we also validate using individual-based simulations. We show that increasing reward funds facilitates the maintenance of prosocial rewarding but prevents its invasion, and that spatial structure can sometimes select against the evolution of prosocial rewarding. Our results suggest that, even in spatially structured populations, additional mechanisms are required to prevent antisocial rewarding from deterring cooperation in public goods dilemmas.
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Affiliation(s)
- Miguel Dos Santos
- Department of Zoology, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom.
| | - Jorge Peña
- Department of Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Plön, Germany
- GEOMAR Helmholtz Centre for Ocean Research Kiel, Kiel, Germany
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Van Cleve J. Stags, Hawks, and Doves: Social Evolution Theory and Individual Variation in Cooperation. Integr Comp Biol 2017; 57:566-579. [DOI: 10.1093/icb/icx071] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/15/2022] Open
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20
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Cancer treatment scheduling and dynamic heterogeneity in social dilemmas of tumour acidity and vasculature. Br J Cancer 2017; 116:785-792. [PMID: 28183139 PMCID: PMC5355932 DOI: 10.1038/bjc.2017.5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 41] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/05/2016] [Revised: 11/06/2016] [Accepted: 12/20/2016] [Indexed: 12/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Background: Tumours are diverse ecosystems with persistent heterogeneity in various cancer hallmarks like self-sufficiency of growth factor production for angiogenesis and reprogramming of energy metabolism for aerobic glycolysis. This heterogeneity has consequences for diagnosis, treatment and disease progression. Methods: We introduce the double goods game to study the dynamics of these traits using evolutionary game theory. We model glycolytic acid production as a public good for all tumour cells and oxygen from vascularisation via vascular endothelial growth factor production as a club good benefiting non-glycolytic tumour cells. This results in three viable phenotypic strategies: glycolytic, angiogenic and aerobic non-angiogenic. Results: We classify the dynamics into three qualitatively distinct regimes: (1) fully glycolytic; (2) fully angiogenic; or (3) polyclonal in all three cell types. The third regime allows for dynamic heterogeneity even with linear goods, something that was not possible in prior public good models that considered glycolysis or growth factor production in isolation. Conclusions: The cyclic dynamics of the polyclonal regime stress the importance of timing for anti-glycolysis treatments like lonidamine. The existence of qualitatively different dynamic regimes highlights the order effects of treatments. In particular, we consider the potential of vascular normalisation as a neoadjuvant therapy before follow-up with interventions like buffer therapy.
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21
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Assortment and the evolution of cooperation in a Moran process with exponential fitness. J Theor Biol 2016; 409:38-46. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2016.08.026] [Citation(s) in RCA: 15] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/13/2016] [Revised: 07/01/2016] [Accepted: 08/16/2016] [Indexed: 11/20/2022]
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Abstract
Spatial structure greatly affects the evolution of cooperation. While in two-player games the condition for cooperation to evolve depends on a single structure coefficient, in multiplayer games the condition might depend on several structure coefficients, making it difficult to compare different population structures. We propose a solution to this issue by introducing two simple ways of ordering population structures: the containment order and the volume order. If population structure is greater than population structure in the containment or the volume order, then can be considered a stronger promoter of cooperation. We provide conditions for establishing the containment order, give general results on the volume order, and illustrate our theory by comparing different models of spatial games and associated update rules. Our results hold for a large class of population structures and can be easily applied to specific cases once the structure coefficients have been calculated or estimated.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jorge Peña
- Department of Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, August-Thienemann-Straße 2, Plön 24306, Germany
| | - Bin Wu
- Department of Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, August-Thienemann-Straße 2, Plön 24306, Germany
| | - Arne Traulsen
- Department of Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, August-Thienemann-Straße 2, Plön 24306, Germany
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23
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De Jaegher K. Harsh environments and the evolution of multi-player cooperation. Theor Popul Biol 2016; 113:1-12. [PMID: 27664440 DOI: 10.1016/j.tpb.2016.09.003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 13] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/02/2016] [Revised: 08/31/2016] [Accepted: 09/10/2016] [Indexed: 12/22/2022]
Abstract
The game-theoretic model in this paper provides micro-foundations for the effect a harsher environment on the probability of cooperation among multiple players. The harshness of the environment is alternatively measured by the degree of complementarity between the players' cooperative efforts in producing a public good, and by the number of attacks on an existing public good that the players can collectively defend, where it is shown that these two measures of the degree of adversity facing the players operate in a similar fashion. We show that the effect of the degree of adversity on the probability of cooperation is monotonous, and has an opposite sign for smaller and for larger cooperation costs. For intermediate cooperation costs, we show that the effect of a harsher environment on the probability of cooperation is hill-shaped.
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Affiliation(s)
- Kris De Jaegher
- Utrecht University School of Economics, Utrecht University, Kriekenpitplein 21-22, 3584 EC, Utrecht, The Netherlands.
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24
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Evolutionary Games of Multiplayer Cooperation on Graphs. PLoS Comput Biol 2016; 12:e1005059. [PMID: 27513946 PMCID: PMC4981334 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005059] [Citation(s) in RCA: 35] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/21/2016] [Accepted: 07/12/2016] [Indexed: 11/24/2022] Open
Abstract
There has been much interest in studying evolutionary games in structured populations, often modeled as graphs. However, most analytical results so far have only been obtained for two-player or linear games, while the study of more complex multiplayer games has been usually tackled by computer simulations. Here we investigate evolutionary multiplayer games on graphs updated with a Moran death-Birth process. For cycles, we obtain an exact analytical condition for cooperation to be favored by natural selection, given in terms of the payoffs of the game and a set of structure coefficients. For regular graphs of degree three and larger, we estimate this condition using a combination of pair approximation and diffusion approximation. For a large class of cooperation games, our approximations suggest that graph-structured populations are stronger promoters of cooperation than populations lacking spatial structure. Computer simulations validate our analytical approximations for random regular graphs and cycles, but show systematic differences for graphs with many loops such as lattices. In particular, our simulation results show that these kinds of graphs can even lead to more stringent conditions for the evolution of cooperation than well-mixed populations. Overall, we provide evidence suggesting that the complexity arising from many-player interactions and spatial structure can be captured by pair approximation in the case of random graphs, but that it need to be handled with care for graphs with high clustering. Cooperation can be defined as the act of providing fitness benefits to other individuals, often at a personal cost. When interactions occur mainly with neighbors, assortment of strategies can favor cooperation but local competition can undermine it. Previous research has shown that a single coefficient can capture this trade-off when cooperative interactions take place between two players. More complicated, but also more realistic, models of cooperative interactions involving multiple players instead require several such coefficients, making it difficult to assess the effects of population structure. Here, we obtain analytical approximations for the coefficients of multiplayer games in graph-structured populations. Computer simulations show that, for particular instances of multiplayer games, these approximate coefficients predict the condition for cooperation to be promoted in random graphs well, but fail to do so in graphs with more structure, such as lattices. Our work extends and generalizes established results on the evolution of cooperation on graphs, but also highlights the importance of explicitly taking into account higher-order statistical associations in order to assess the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in spatially structured populations.
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Eco-evolutionary dynamics of social dilemmas. Theor Popul Biol 2016; 111:28-42. [PMID: 27256794 DOI: 10.1016/j.tpb.2016.05.005] [Citation(s) in RCA: 44] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/02/2015] [Revised: 05/10/2016] [Accepted: 05/23/2016] [Indexed: 01/28/2023]
Abstract
Social dilemmas are an integral part of social interactions. Cooperative actions, ranging from secreting extra-cellular products in microbial populations to donating blood in humans, are costly to the actor and hence create an incentive to shirk and avoid the costs. Nevertheless, cooperation is ubiquitous in nature. Both costs and benefits often depend non-linearly on the number and types of individuals involved-as captured by idioms such as 'too many cooks spoil the broth' where additional contributions are discounted, or 'two heads are better than one' where cooperators synergistically enhance the group benefit. Interaction group sizes may depend on the size of the population and hence on ecological processes. This results in feedback mechanisms between ecological and evolutionary processes, which jointly affect and determine the evolutionary trajectory. Only recently combined eco-evolutionary processes became experimentally tractable in microbial social dilemmas. Here we analyse the evolutionary dynamics of non-linear social dilemmas in settings where the population fluctuates in size and the environment changes over time. In particular, cooperation is often supported and maintained at high densities through ecological fluctuations. Moreover, we find that the combination of the two processes routinely reveals highly complex dynamics, which suggests common occurrence in nature.
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26
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Mikkelsen KB, Bach LA. Threshold Games and Cooperation on Multiplayer Graphs. PLoS One 2016; 11:e0147207. [PMID: 26844547 PMCID: PMC4742282 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0147207] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/09/2015] [Accepted: 12/30/2015] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Objective The study investigates the effect on cooperation in multiplayer games, when the population from which all individuals are drawn is structured—i.e. when a given individual is only competing with a small subset of the entire population. Method To optimize the focus on multiplayer effects, a class of games were chosen for which the payoff depends nonlinearly on the number of cooperators—this ensures that the game cannot be represented as a sum of pair-wise interactions, and increases the likelihood of observing behaviour different from that seen in two-player games. The chosen class of games are named “threshold games”, and are defined by a threshold, M > 0, which describes the minimal number of cooperators in a given match required for all the participants to receive a benefit. The model was studied primarily through numerical simulations of large populations of individuals, each with interaction neighbourhoods described by various classes of networks. Results When comparing the level of cooperation in a structured population to the mean-field model, we find that most types of structure lead to a decrease in cooperation. This is both interesting and novel, simply due to the generality and breadth of relevance of the model—it is likely that any model with similar payoff structure exhibits related behaviour. More importantly, we find that the details of the behaviour depends to a large extent on the size of the immediate neighbourhoods of the individuals, as dictated by the network structure. In effect, the players behave as if they are part of a much smaller, fully mixed, population, which we suggest an expression for.
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Affiliation(s)
- Kaare B. Mikkelsen
- Interacting Minds Center, Aarhus University, DK-8000 Aarhus C, Denmark
- Department of Engineering, Aarhus University, DK-8000 Aarhus C, Denmark
- * E-mail:
| | - Lars A. Bach
- Department of Engineering, Aarhus University, DK-8000 Aarhus C, Denmark
- Interdisciplinary Center for Organizational Architecture (ICOA), Aarhus University, DK-8210 Aarhus V, Denmark
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27
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Garcia T, Doulcier G, De Monte S. The evolution of adhesiveness as a social adaptation. eLife 2015; 4:e08595. [PMID: 26613415 PMCID: PMC4775229 DOI: 10.7554/elife.08595] [Citation(s) in RCA: 32] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/07/2015] [Accepted: 11/26/2015] [Indexed: 12/31/2022] Open
Abstract
Cellular adhesion is a key ingredient to sustain collective functions of microbial aggregates. Here, we investigate the evolutionary origins of adhesion and the emergence of groups of genealogically unrelated cells with a game-theoretical model. The considered adhesiveness trait is costly, continuous and affects both group formation and group-derived benefits. The formalism of adaptive dynamics reveals two evolutionary stable strategies, at each extreme on the axis of adhesiveness. We show that cohesive groups can evolve by small mutational steps, provided the population is already endowed with a minimum adhesiveness level. Assortment between more adhesive types, and in particular differential propensities to leave a fraction of individuals ungrouped at the end of the aggregation process, can compensate for the cost of increased adhesiveness. We also discuss the change in the social nature of more adhesive mutations along evolutionary trajectories, and find that altruism arises before directly beneficial behavior, despite being the most challenging form of cooperation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Thomas Garcia
- Institut d'écologie et des sciences de l'environnement, Université Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris, France
| | - Guilhem Doulcier
- Institut de Biologie de l’École Normale Supérieure, École Normale Supérieure, PSL Research University, Paris, France
| | - Silvia De Monte
- Institut de Biologie de l’École Normale Supérieure, École Normale Supérieure, PSL Research University, Paris, France
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28
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Peña J, Nöldeke G. Variability in group size and the evolution of collective action. J Theor Biol 2015; 389:72-82. [PMID: 26551151 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.10.023] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/25/2015] [Revised: 10/07/2015] [Accepted: 10/10/2015] [Indexed: 11/27/2022]
Abstract
Models of the evolution of collective action typically assume that interactions occur in groups of identical size. In contrast, social interactions between animals occur in groups of widely dispersed size. This paper models collective action problems as two-strategy multiplayer games and studies the effect of variability in group size on the evolution of cooperative behavior under the replicator dynamics. The analysis identifies elementary conditions on the payoff structure of the game implying that the evolution of cooperative behavior is promoted or inhibited when the group size experienced by a focal player is more or less variable. Similar but more stringent conditions are applicable when the confounding effect of size-biased sampling, which causes the group-size distribution experienced by a focal player to differ from the statistical distribution of group sizes, is taken into account.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jorge Peña
- Department of Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, 24306 Plön, Germany.
| | - Georg Nöldeke
- Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Basel, 4002 Basel, Switzerland.
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29
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Peña J, Nöldeke G, Lehmann L. Evolutionary dynamics of collective action in spatially structured populations. J Theor Biol 2015; 382:122-36. [PMID: 26151588 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.06.039] [Citation(s) in RCA: 47] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/24/2015] [Revised: 06/22/2015] [Accepted: 06/24/2015] [Indexed: 01/09/2023]
Abstract
Many models proposed to study the evolution of collective action rely on a formalism that represents social interactions as n-player games between individuals adopting discrete actions such as cooperate and defect. Despite the importance of spatial structure in biological collective action, the analysis of n-player games games in spatially structured populations has so far proved elusive. We address this problem by considering mixed strategies and by integrating discrete-action n-player games into the direct fitness approach of social evolution theory. This allows to conveniently identify convergence stable strategies and to capture the effect of population structure by a single structure coefficient, namely, the pairwise (scaled) relatedness among interacting individuals. As an application, we use our mathematical framework to investigate collective action problems associated with the provision of three different kinds of collective goods, paradigmatic of a vast array of helping traits in nature: "public goods" (both providers and shirkers can use the good, e.g., alarm calls), "club goods" (only providers can use the good, e.g., participation in collective hunting), and "charity goods" (only shirkers can use the good, e.g., altruistic sacrifice). We show that relatedness promotes the evolution of collective action in different ways depending on the kind of collective good and its economies of scale. Our findings highlight the importance of explicitly accounting for relatedness, the kind of collective good, and the economies of scale in theoretical and empirical studies of the evolution of collective action.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jorge Peña
- Department of Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, August-Thienemann-Str. 2, 24306 Plön, Germany.
| | - Georg Nöldeke
- Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Basel, Peter Merian-Weg 6, 4002 Basel, Switzerland.
| | - Laurent Lehmann
- Department of Ecology and Evolution, University of Lausanne, Le Biophore, 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland.
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30
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Hilbe C, Wu B, Traulsen A, Nowak MA. Evolutionary performance of zero-determinant strategies in multiplayer games. J Theor Biol 2015; 374:115-24. [PMID: 25843220 PMCID: PMC4425415 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.03.032] [Citation(s) in RCA: 54] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/29/2014] [Revised: 03/12/2015] [Accepted: 03/24/2015] [Indexed: 12/02/2022]
Abstract
Repetition is one of the key mechanisms to maintain cooperation. In long-term relationships, in which individuals can react to their peers׳ past actions, evolution can promote cooperative strategies that would not be stable in one-shot encounters. The iterated prisoner׳s dilemma illustrates the power of repetition. Many of the key strategies for this game, such as ALLD, ALLC, Tit-for-Tat, or generous Tit-for-Tat, share a common property: players using these strategies enforce a linear relationship between their own payoff and their co-player׳s payoff. Such strategies have been termed zero-determinant (ZD). Recently, it was shown that ZD strategies also exist for multiplayer social dilemmas, and here we explore their evolutionary performance. For small group sizes, ZD strategies play a similar role as for the repeated prisoner׳s dilemma: extortionate ZD strategies are critical for the emergence of cooperation, whereas generous ZD strategies are important to maintain cooperation. In large groups, however, generous strategies tend to become unstable and selfish behaviors gain the upper hand. Our results suggest that repeated interactions alone are not sufficient to maintain large-scale cooperation. Instead, large groups require further mechanisms to sustain cooperation, such as the formation of alliances or institutions, or additional pairwise interactions between group members.
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Affiliation(s)
- Christian Hilbe
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge MA 02138, USA.
| | - Bin Wu
- Department of Evolutionary Theory, Max-Planck-Institute for Evolutionary Biology, August-Thienemann-Straße 2, 24306 Plön, Germany
| | - Arne Traulsen
- Department of Evolutionary Theory, Max-Planck-Institute for Evolutionary Biology, August-Thienemann-Straße 2, 24306 Plön, Germany
| | - Martin A Nowak
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge MA 02138, USA; Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge MA 02138, USA; Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge MA 02138, USA
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31
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Social evolution and genetic interactions in the short and long term. Theor Popul Biol 2015; 103:2-26. [PMID: 26003630 DOI: 10.1016/j.tpb.2015.05.002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 60] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/14/2014] [Revised: 03/31/2015] [Accepted: 05/04/2015] [Indexed: 11/20/2022]
Abstract
The evolution of social traits remains one of the most fascinating and feisty topics in evolutionary biology even after half a century of theoretical research. W.D. Hamilton shaped much of the field initially with his 1964 papers that laid out the foundation for understanding the effect of genetic relatedness on the evolution of social behavior. Early theoretical investigations revealed two critical assumptions required for Hamilton's rule to hold in dynamical models: weak selection and additive genetic interactions. However, only recently have analytical approaches from population genetics and evolutionary game theory developed sufficiently so that social evolution can be studied under the joint action of selection, mutation, and genetic drift. We review how these approaches suggest two timescales for evolution under weak mutation: (i) a short-term timescale where evolution occurs between a finite set of alleles, and (ii) a long-term timescale where a continuum of alleles are possible and populations evolve continuously from one monomorphic trait to another. We show how Hamilton's rule emerges from the short-term analysis under additivity and how non-additive genetic interactions can be accounted for more generally. This short-term approach reproduces, synthesizes, and generalizes many previous results including the one-third law from evolutionary game theory and risk dominance from economic game theory. Using the long-term approach, we illustrate how trait evolution can be described with a diffusion equation that is a stochastic analogue of the canonical equation of adaptive dynamics. Peaks in the stationary distribution of the diffusion capture classic notions of convergence stability from evolutionary game theory and generally depend on the additive genetic interactions inherent in Hamilton's rule. Surprisingly, the peaks of the long-term stationary distribution can predict the effects of simple kinds of non-additive interactions. Additionally, the peaks capture both weak and strong effects of social payoffs in a manner difficult to replicate with the short-term approach. Together, the results from the short and long-term approaches suggest both how Hamilton's insight may be robust in unexpected ways and how current analytical approaches can expand our understanding of social evolution far beyond Hamilton's original work.
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32
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Structure coefficients and strategy selection in multiplayer games. J Math Biol 2015; 72:203-38. [PMID: 25842359 DOI: 10.1007/s00285-015-0882-3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 18] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/08/2014] [Revised: 01/21/2015] [Indexed: 10/23/2022]
Abstract
Evolutionary processes based on two-player games such as the Prisoner's Dilemma or Snowdrift Game are abundant in evolutionary game theory. These processes, including those based on games with more than two strategies, have been studied extensively under the assumption that selection is weak. However, games involving more than two players have not received the same level of attention. To address this issue, and to relate two-player games to multiplayer games, we introduce a notion of reducibility for multiplayer games that captures what it means to break down a multiplayer game into a sequence of interactions with fewer players. We discuss the role of reducibility in structured populations, and we give examples of games that are irreducible in any population structure. Since the known conditions for strategy selection, otherwise known as [Formula: see text]-rules, have been established only for two-player games with multiple strategies and for multiplayer games with two strategies, we extend these rules to multiplayer games with many strategies to account for irreducible games that cannot be reduced to those simpler types of games. In particular, we show that the number of structure coefficients required for a symmetric game with [Formula: see text]-player interactions and [Formula: see text] strategies grows in [Formula: see text] like [Formula: see text]. Our results also cover a type of ecologically asymmetric game based on payoff values that are derived not only from the strategies of the players, but also from their spatial positions within the population.
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