Evolution of staying together in the context of diffusible public goods

Evolution of multicellular life cycles under costly fragmentation

A fascinating wealth of life cycles is observed in biology, from unicellularity to the concerted fragmentation of multicellular units. However, the understanding of factors driving their evolution is still limited. We show that costs of fragmentation have a major impact on the evolution of life cycles due to their influence on the growth rates of the associated populations. We model a group structured population of undifferentiated cells, where cell clusters reproduce by fragmentation. Fragmentation events are associated with a cost expressed by either a fragmentation delay, an additional risk, or a cell loss. The introduction of such fragmentation costs vastly increases the set of possible life cycles. Based on these findings, we suggest that the evolution of life cycles involving splitting into multiple offspring can be directly associated with the fragmentation cost. Moreover, the impact of this cost alone is strong enough to drive the emergence of multicellular units that eventually split into many single cells, even under scenarios that strongly disfavour collectives compared to solitary individuals.

Cooperation in Microbial Populations: Theory and Experimental Model Systems

Cooperative behavior, the costly provision of benefits to others, is common across all domains of life. This review article discusses cooperative behavior in the microbial world, mediated by the exchange of extracellular products called public goods. We focus on model species for which the production of a public good and the related growth disadvantage for the producing cells are well described. To unveil the biological and ecological factors promoting the emergence and stability of cooperative traits we take an interdisciplinary perspective and review insights gained from both mathematical models and well-controlled experimental model systems. Ecologically, we include crucial aspects of the microbial life cycle into our analysis and particularly consider population structures where ensembles of local communities (subpopulations) continuously emerge, grow, and disappear again. Biologically, we explicitly consider the synthesis and regulation of public good production. The discussion of the theoretical approaches includes general evolutionary concepts, population dynamics, and evolutionary game theory. As a specific but generic biological example, we consider populations of Pseudomonas putida and its regulation and use of pyoverdines, iron scavenging molecules, as public goods. The review closes with an overview on cooperation in spatially extended systems and also provides a critical assessment of the insights gained from the experimental and theoretical studies discussed. Current challenges and important new research opportunities are discussed, including the biochemical regulation of public goods, more realistic ecological scenarios resembling native environments, cell-to-cell signaling, and multispecies communities.

Individual- versus group-optimality in the production of secreted bacterial compounds

How unicellular organisms optimize the production of compounds is a fundamental biological question. While it is typically thought that production is optimized at the individual-cell level, secreted compounds could also allow for optimization at the group level, leading to a division of labor where a subset of cells produces and shares the compound with everyone. Using mathematical modeling, we show that the evolution of such division of labor depends on the cost function of compound production. Specifically, for any trait with saturating benefits, linear costs promote the evolution of uniform production levels across cells. Conversely, production costs that diminish with higher output levels favor the evolution of specialization-especially when compound shareability is high. When experimentally testing these predictions with pyoverdine, a secreted iron-scavenging compound produced by Pseudomonas aeruginosa, we found linear costs and, consistent with our model, detected uniform pyoverdine production levels across cells. We conclude that for shared compounds with saturating benefits, the evolution of division of labor is facilitated by a diminishing cost function. More generally, we note that shifts in the level of selection from individuals to groups do not solely require cooperation, but critically depend on mechanistic factors, including the distribution of compound synthesis costs.

Selection for synchronized cell division in simple multicellular organisms

The evolution of multicellularity was a major transition in the history of life on earth. Conditions under which multicellularity is favored have been studied theoretically and experimentally. But since the construction of a multicellular organism requires multiple rounds of cell division, a natural question is whether these cell divisions should be synchronous or not. We study a population model in which there compete simple multicellular organisms that grow by either synchronous or asynchronous cell divisions. We demonstrate that natural selection can act differently on synchronous and asynchronous cell division, and we offer intuition for why these phenotypes are generally not neutral variants of each other.

Games of multicellularity

Evolutionary game dynamics are often studied in the context of different population structures. Here we propose a new population structure that is inspired by simple multicellular life forms. In our model, cells reproduce but can stay together after reproduction. They reach complexes of a certain size, n, before producing single cells again. The cells within a complex derive payoff from an evolutionary game by interacting with each other. The reproductive rate of cells is proportional to their payoff. We consider all two-strategy games. We study deterministic evolutionary dynamics with mutations, and derive exact conditions for selection to favor one strategy over another. Our main result has the same symmetry as the well-known sigma condition, which has been proven for stochastic game dynamics and weak selection. For a maximum complex size of n=2 our result holds for any intensity of selection. For n≥3 it holds for weak selection. As specific examples we study the prisoner's dilemma and hawk-dove games. Our model advances theoretical work on multicellularity by allowing for frequency-dependent interactions within groups.

Cooperation, clumping and the evolution of multicellularity

The evolution of multicellular organisms represents one of the major evolutionary transitions in the history of life. A potential advantage of forming multicellular clumps is that it provides an efficiency benefit to pre-existing cooperation, such as the production of extracellular 'public goods'. However, this is complicated by the fact that cooperation could jointly evolve with clumping, and clumping could have multiple consequences for the evolution of cooperation. We model the evolution of clumping and a cooperative public good, showing that (i) when considered separately, both clumping and public goods production gradually increase with increasing genetic relatedness; (ii) in contrast, when the traits evolve jointly, a small increase in relatedness can lead to a major shift in evolutionary outcome—from a non-clumping state with low public goods production to a cooperative clumping state with high values of both traits; (iii) high relatedness makes it easier to get to the cooperative clumping state and (iv) clumping can be inhibited when it increases the number of cells that the benefits of cooperation must be shared with, but promoted when it increases relatedness between those cells. Overall, our results suggest that public goods sharing can facilitate the formation of well-integrated cooperative clumps as a first step in the evolution of multicellularity.

Stochastic evolution of staying together

Staying together means that replicating units do not separate after reproduction, but remain attached to each other or in close proximity. Staying together is a driving force for evolution of complexity, including the evolution of multi-cellularity and eusociality. We analyze the fixation probability of a mutant that has the ability to stay together. We assume that the size of the complex affects the reproductive rate of its units and the probability of staying together. We examine the combined effect of natural selection and random drift on the emergence of staying together in a finite sized population. The number of states in the underlying stochastic process is an exponential function of population size. We develop a framework for any intensity of selection and give closed form solutions for special cases. We derive general results for the limit of weak selection.