Practopoiesis: or how life fosters a mind

Where is the mind within the brain? Transient selection of subnetworks by metabotropic receptors and G protein-gated ion channels

Perhaps the most important question posed by brain research is: How the brain gives rise to the mind. To answer this question, we have primarily relied on the connectionist paradigm: The brain's entire knowledge and thinking skills are thought to be stored in the connections; and the mental operations are executed by network computations. I propose here an alternative paradigm: Our knowledge and skills are stored in metabotropic receptors (MRs) and the G protein-gated ion channels (GPGICs). Here, mental operations are assumed to be executed by the functions of MRs and GPGICs. As GPGICs have the capacity to close or open branches of dendritic trees and axon terminals, their states transiently re-route neural activity throughout the nervous system. First, MRs detect ligands that signal the need to activate GPGICs. Next, GPGICs transiently select a subnetwork within the brain. The process of selecting this new subnetwork is what constitutes a mental operation - be it in a form of directed attention, perception or making a decision. Synaptic connections and network computations play only a secondary role, supporting MRs and GPGICs. According to this new paradigm, the mind emerges within the brain as the function of MRs and GPGICs whose primary function is to continually select the pathways over which neural activity will be allowed to pass. It is argued that MRs and GPGICs solve the scaling problem of intelligence from which the connectionism paradigm suffers.

How the conception of control influences our understanding of actions

Wilful movement requires neural control. Commonly, neural computations are thought to generate motor commands that bring the musculoskeletal system - that is, the plant - from its current physical state into a desired physical state. The current state can be estimated from past motor commands and from sensory information. Modelling movement on the basis of this concept of plant control strives to explain behaviour by identifying the computational principles for control signals that can reproduce the observed features of movements. From an alternative perspective, movements emerge in a dynamically coupled agent-environment system from the pursuit of subjective perceptual goals. Modelling movement on the basis of this concept of perceptual control aims to identify the controlled percepts and their coupling rules that can give rise to the observed characteristics of behaviour. In this Perspective, we discuss a broad spectrum of approaches to modelling human motor control and their notions of control signals, internal models, handling of sensory feedback delays and learning. We focus on the influence that the plant control and the perceptual control perspective may have on decisions when modelling empirical data, which may in turn shape our understanding of actions.

A Pragmatist Approach to Complexity Theorizing in Project Studies: Orders and Levels

The limitations of complexity theorizing in project studies are traced back to simplistic and reductionist theorizing strategies. This article offers pragmatist recommendations to develop strong theorizing strategies organized in a triad: orders of theorizing (degree of recursiveness of the theorizing process), levels of theorizing (interactions between micro, meso, and macro loci of analysis), and the integration between orders and levels brought together in a recursive relationship of co-construction. We offer four main contributions to complexity theorizing in project studies: pragmatism is useful, deeper attention should be paid to theorizing across levels, third-order theorizing is needed, and complexifying terminology is required.

Repeated Contrast Adaptation Does Not Cause Habituation of the Adapter

Adaptation can optimize information processing by allowing the visual system to always adjust to the environment. However, only a few studies have investigated how the visual system makes adjustments to repeatedly occurring changes in the input, still less about the related neural mechanism. Our previous study found that contrast adaptation attenuated after multiple daily sessions of repeated adaptation, which was explained by the habituation of either the adapter's effective strength or the adaptation mechanisms. To examine the former hypothesis, in the present study we used the frequency tagging technique to measure the adapter-elicited steady-state visual evoked potential (SSVEP) amplitudes. Participants repeatedly adapted to the same contrast adapter in a top-up manner for six continuous days, which was called training of adaptation. The behavioral adaptation effect and SSVEP response to the trained adapter and an untrained control adapter were measured before and after training. The psychophysical results showed that the effect of adaptation in the trained condition significantly reduced after training, replicating our previous finding. Contradicting the prediction of the hypothesis that repeated adaptation attenuated the effective strength of the adapter, the SSVEP amplitude was unchanged after training, which was further confirmed by an equivalence test. Taken together, the results challenge the account of habituation of adapter in repeated adaptation, while leaving the account of habituation of adaptation mechanism to be tested.

Music-colour synaesthesia: Concept, context and qualia

This review provides a commentary on coloured-hearing arising on hearing music: music-colour synaesthesia. Although traditionally explained by the hyperconnectivity theory (Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001a) and the disinhibited feedback theory (Grossenbacher & Lovelace, 2001) as a purely perceptual phenomenon, the review of eight coloured-hearing neuroimaging studies shows that it may not be assumed that these explanations are directly translatable to music-colour synaesthesia. The concept of 'ideaesthesia' (Nikolić, 2009) and the role of conceptual and semantic inducers challenge the likelihood of a single mechanism underlying the cause of synaesthesia and argue for a move away from a purely sensory to sensory explanation. Finally, music-colour synaesthesia forms a challenge for established philosophical theories and the position of synaesthesia is considered within the larger context of musical qualia.

One-shot Synesthesia

Synesthesia is commonly thought to be a phenomenon of fixed associations between an outside inducer and a vivid concurrent experience. Hence, it has been proposed that synesthesia occurs due to additional connections in the brain with which synesthetes are born. Here we show that synesthesia can be a much richer and more flexible phenomenon with a capability to creatively construct novel synesthetic experiences as events unfold in people's lives. We describe here cases of synesthetes who occasionally generate novel synesthetic experience, called one-shot synesthesias. These synesthetic experiences seem to share all the properties with the classical synesthetic associations except that they occur extremely rarely, people recalling only a few events over the lifetime. It appears that these one-shots are not created at random but are instead responses to specific life events. We contrast the properties of those rare synesthetic events with other, more commonly known forms of synesthesia that also create novel synesthetic experiences, but at a high rate-sometimes creating novel experiences every few seconds. We argue that one-shot synesthesias indicate that synesthetic associations are by their nature not prewired at birth but are dynamically constructed through mental operations and according to the needs of a synesthetic mind. Our conclusions have implications for understanding the biological underpinnings of synesthesia and the role the phenomenon plays in the lives of people endowed with synesthetic capacities.

A Principle for Describing and Verifying Brain Mechanisms Using Ongoing Activity

Not even the most informed scientist can setup a theory that takes all brain signals into account. A neuron not only receives neuronal short range and long range input from all over the brain but a neuron also receives input from the extracellular space, astrocytes and vasculature. Given this complexity, how does one describe and verify a typical brain mechanism in vivo? Common to most described mechanisms is that one focuses on how one specific input signal gives rise to the activity in a population of neurons. This can be an input from a brain area, a population of neurons or a specific cell type. All remaining inputs originating from all over the brain are lumped together into one background input. The division into two inputs is attractive since it can be used to quantify the relative importance of either input. Here we have chosen to extract the specific and the background input by means of recording and inhibiting the specific input. We summarize what it takes to estimate the two inputs on a single trial level. The inhibition should not only be strong but also fast and the specific input measurement has to be tailor-made to the inhibition. In essence, we suggest ways to control electrophysiological experiments in vivo. By applying those controls it may become possible to describe and verify many brain mechanisms, and it may also allow the study of the integration of spontaneous and ongoing activity, which in turn governs cognition and behavior.

The Merit of Synesthesia for Consciousness Research

Synesthesia is a phenomenon in which additional perceptual experiences are elicited by sensory stimuli or cognitive concepts. Synesthetes possess a unique type of phenomenal experiences not directly triggered by sensory stimulation. Therefore, for better understanding of consciousness it is relevant to identify the mental and physiological processes that subserve synesthetic experience. In the present work we suggest several reasons why synesthesia has merit for research on consciousness. We first review the research on the dynamic and rapidly growing field of the studies of synesthesia. We particularly draw attention to the role of semantics in synesthesia, which is important for establishing synesthetic associations in the brain. We then propose that the interplay between semantics and sensory input in synesthesia can be helpful for the study of the neural correlates of consciousness, especially when making use of ambiguous stimuli for inducing synesthesia. Finally, synesthesia-related alterations of brain networks and functional connectivity can be of merit for the study of consciousness.

Semantic mechanisms may be responsible for developing synesthesia

Currently, little is known about how synesthesia develops and which aspects of synesthesia can be acquired through a learning process. We review the increasing evidence for the role of semantic representations in the induction of synesthesia, and argue for the thesis that synesthetic abilities are developed and modified by semantic mechanisms. That is, in certain people semantic mechanisms associate concepts with perception-like experiences-and this association occurs in an extraordinary way. This phenomenon can be referred to as "higher" synesthesia or ideasthesia. The present analysis suggests that synesthesia develops during childhood and is being enriched further throughout the synesthetes' lifetime; for example, the already existing concurrents may be adopted by novel inducers or new concurrents may be formed. For a deeper understanding of the origin and nature of synesthesia we propose to focus future research on two aspects: (i) the similarities between synesthesia and ordinary phenomenal experiences based on concepts; and (ii) the tight entanglement of perception, cognition and the conceptualization of the world. Importantly, an explanation of how biological systems get to generate experiences, synesthetic or not, may have to involve an explanation of how semantic networks are formed in general and what their role is in the ability to be aware of the surrounding world.