Modeling evolutionary games in populations with demographic structure

Age structure, replicator equation, and the prisoner's dilemma

We investigate the evolutionary dynamics of an age-structured population subject to weak frequency-dependent selection. It turns out that the weak selection is affected in a non-trivial way by the life-history trait. We disentangle the dynamics, based on the appearance of different time scales. These time scales, which seem to form a universal structure in the interplay of weak selection and life-history traits, allow us to reduce the infinite dimensional model to a one-dimensional modified replicator equation. The modified replicator equation is then used to investigate cooperation (the prisoner's dilemma) by means of adaptive dynamics. We identify conditions under which age structure is able to promote cooperation. At the end we discuss the relevance of our findings.

Hermaphroditic origins of anisogamy

Anisogamy-the size dimorphism of gametes-is the defining difference between the male and female sexual strategies. Game-theoretic thinking led to the first convincing explanation for the evolutionary origins of anisogamy in the 1970s. Since then, formal game-theoretic models have continued to refine our understanding of when and why anisogamy should evolve. Such models typically presume that the earliest anisogamous organisms had separate sexes. However, in most taxa, there is no empirical evidence to support this assumption. Here, we present a model of the coevolution of gamete size and sex allocation, which allows for anisogamy to emerge alongside either hermaphroditism or separate sexes. We show that hermaphroditic anisogamy can evolve directly from isogamous ancestors when the average size of spawning groups is small and fertilization is relatively efficient. Sex allocation under hermaphroditism becomes increasingly female-biased as group size decreases and the degree of anisogamy increases. When spawning groups are very small, our model also predicts the existence of complex isogamous organisms in which individuals allocate resources equally to two large gamete types. We discuss common, but potentially unwarranted, assumptions in the literature that could be relaxed in future models. This article is part of the theme issue 'Half a century of evolutionary games: a synthesis of theory, application and future directions'.

Life-History traits and the replicator equation

Due to the relevance for conservation biology, there is an increasing interest to extend evolutionary genomics models to plant, animal or microbial species. However, this requires to understand the effect of life-history traits absent in humans on genomic evolution. In this context, it is fundamentally of interest to generalize the replicator equation, which is at the heart of most population genomics models. However, as the inclusion of life-history traits generates models with a large state space, the analysis becomes involving. We focus, here, on quiescence and seed banks, two features common to many plant, invertebrate and microbial species. We develop a method to obtain a low-dimensional replicator equation in the context of evolutionary game theory, based on two assumptions: (1) the life-history traits are per se neutral, and (2) frequency-dependent selection is weak. We use the results to investigate the evolution and maintenance of cooperation based on the Prisoner's dilemma and the snowdrift game. We first consider the generalized replicator equation, and then refine the investigation using adaptive dynamics. It turns out that, depending on the structure and timing of the quiescence/dormancy life-history trait, cooperation in a homogeneous population can be stabilized. We finally discuss and highlight the relevance of these results for plant, invertebrate and microbial communities.

Towards a replicator dynamics model of age structured populations

We present a new modelling framework combining replicator dynamics, the standard model of frequency dependent selection, with an age-structured population model. The new framework allows for the modelling of populations consisting of competing strategies carried by individuals who change across their life cycle. Firstly the discretization of the McKendrick von Foerster model is derived. We show that the Euler–Lotka equation is satisfied when the new model reaches a steady state (i.e. stable frequencies between the age classes). This discretization consists of unit age classes where the timescale is chosen so that only a fraction of individuals play a single game round. This implies a linear dynamics and individuals not killed during the round are moved to the next age class; linearity means that the system is equivalent to a large Bernadelli–Lewis–Leslie matrix. Then we use the methodology of multipopulation games to derive two, mutually equivalent systems of equations. The first contains equations describing the evolution of the strategy frequencies in the whole population, completed by subsystems of equations describing the evolution of the age structure for each strategy. The second contains equations describing the changes of the general population’s age structure, completed with subsystems of equations describing the selection of the strategies within each age class. We then present the obtained system of replicator dynamics in the form of the mixed ODE-PDE system which is independent of the chosen timescale, and much simpler. The obtained results are illustrated by the example of the sex ratio model which shows that when different mortalities of the sexes are assumed, the sex ratio of 0.5 is obtained but that Fisher’s mechanism, driven by the reproductive value of the different sexes, is not in equilibrium.

Frequency-dependent growth in class-structured populations: continuous dynamics in the limit of weak selection

In this paper we consider class-structured populations in discrete time in the limit of weak selection and with the inverse of the intensity of selection as unit of time. The aim is to establish a continuous model that approximates the discrete model. More precisely, we study frequency-dependent growth in an infinite haploid population structured into a finite number of classes such that individuals in each class contribute to a given subset of classes from one time step to the next. These contributions take the form of generalized fecundity parameters with perturbations of order 1 / N that depends on the class frequencies of each type and the type frequencies. Moreover, they satisfy some mild conditions that ensure mixing in the long run. The dynamics in the limit as [Formula: see text] with N time steps as unit of time is considered first in the case of a single type, and second in the case of multiple types. The main result is that the type frequencies as [Formula: see text] obey the replicator equation with instantaneous growth rates for the different types that depend only on instantaneous equilibrium class frequencies and reproductive values. An application to evolutionary game theory complemented by simulation results is presented.

Stochastic noncooperative and cooperative evolutionary game strategies of a population of biological networks under natural selection

We review current static and dynamic evolutionary game strategies of biological networks and discuss the lack of random genetic variations and stochastic environmental disturbances in these models. To include these factors, a population of evolving biological networks is modeled as a nonlinear stochastic biological system with Poisson-driven genetic variations and random environmental fluctuations (stimuli). To gain insight into the evolutionary game theory of stochastic biological networks under natural selection, the phenotypic robustness and network evolvability of noncooperative and cooperative evolutionary game strategies are discussed from a stochastic Nash game perspective. The noncooperative strategy can be transformed into an equivalent multi-objective optimization problem and is shown to display significantly improved network robustness to tolerate genetic variations and buffer environmental disturbances, maintaining phenotypic traits for longer than the cooperative strategy. However, the noncooperative case requires greater effort and more compromises between partly conflicting players. Global linearization is used to simplify the problem of solving nonlinear stochastic evolutionary games. Finally, a simple stochastic evolutionary model of a metabolic pathway is simulated to illustrate the procedure of solving for two evolutionary game strategies and to confirm and compare their respective characteristics in the evolutionary process.

How Life History Can Sway the Fixation Probability of Mutants

In this work, we study the effects of demographic structure on evolutionary dynamics when selection acts on reproduction, survival, or both. In contrast to the previously discovered pattern that the fixation probability of a neutral mutant decreases while the population becomes younger, we show that a mutant with a constant selective advantage may have a maximum or a minimum of the fixation probability in populations with an intermediate fraction of young individuals. This highlights the importance of life history and demographic structure in studying evolutionary dynamics. We also illustrate the fundamental differences between selection on reproduction and selection on survival when age structure is present. In addition, we evaluate the relative importance of size and structure of the population in determining the fixation probability of the mutant. Our work lays the foundation for also studying density- and frequency-dependent effects in populations when demographic structures cannot be neglected.