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Pires DL, Broom M. The rules of multiplayer cooperation in networks of communities. PLoS Comput Biol 2024; 20:e1012388. [PMID: 39159235 PMCID: PMC11361752 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1012388] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/23/2024] [Revised: 08/29/2024] [Accepted: 08/05/2024] [Indexed: 08/21/2024] Open
Abstract
Community organisation permeates both social and biological complex systems. To study its interplay with behaviour emergence, we model mobile structured populations with multiplayer interactions. We derive general analytical methods for evolutionary dynamics under high home fidelity when populations self-organise into networks of asymptotically isolated communities. In this limit, community organisation dominates over the network structure and emerging behaviour is independent of network topology. We obtain the rules of multiplayer cooperation in networks of communities for different types of social dilemmas. The success of cooperation is a result of the benefits shared among communal cooperators outperforming the benefits reaped by defectors in mixed communities. Under weak selection, cooperation can evolve and be stable for any size (Q) and number (M) of communities if the reward-to-cost ratio (V/K) of public goods is higher than a critical value. Community organisation is a solid mechanism for sustaining the evolution of cooperation under public goods dilemmas, particularly when populations are organised into a higher number of smaller communities. Contrary to public goods dilemmas relating to production, the multiplayer Hawk-Dove (HD) dilemma is a commons dilemma focusing on the fair consumption of preexisting resources. This game yields mixed results but tends to favour cooperation under larger communities, highlighting that the two types of social dilemmas might lead to solid differences in the behaviour adopted under community structure.
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Affiliation(s)
- Diogo L. Pires
- Department of Mathematics, City, University of London, Northampton Square, London, United Kingdom
| | - Mark Broom
- Department of Mathematics, City, University of London, Northampton Square, London, United Kingdom
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Pires DL, Erovenko IV, Broom M. Network topology and movement cost, not updating mechanism, determine the evolution of cooperation in mobile structured populations. PLoS One 2023; 18:e0289366. [PMID: 37527254 PMCID: PMC10393168 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0289366] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/26/2023] [Accepted: 07/18/2023] [Indexed: 08/03/2023] Open
Abstract
Evolutionary models are used to study the self-organisation of collective action, often incorporating population structure due to its ubiquitous presence and long-known impact on emerging phenomena. We investigate the evolution of multiplayer cooperation in mobile structured populations, where individuals move strategically on networks and interact with those they meet in groups of variable size. We find that the evolution of multiplayer cooperation primarily depends on the network topology and movement cost while using different stochastic update rules seldom influences evolutionary outcomes. Cooperation robustly co-evolves with movement on complete networks and structure has a partially detrimental effect on it. These findings contrast an established principle from evolutionary graph theory that cooperation can only emerge under some update rules and if the average degree is lower than the reward-to-cost ratio and the network far from complete. We find that group-dependent movement erases the locality of interactions, suppresses the impact of evolutionary structural viscosity on the fitness of individuals, and leads to assortative behaviour that is much more powerful than viscosity in promoting cooperation. We analyse the differences remaining between update rules through a comparison of evolutionary outcomes and fixation probabilities.
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Affiliation(s)
- Diogo L Pires
- Department of Mathematics, University of London, London, United Kingdom
| | - Igor V Erovenko
- Department of Mathematics and Statistics, University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Greensboro, NC, United States of America
| | - Mark Broom
- Department of Mathematics, University of London, London, United Kingdom
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Pires DL, Broom M. More can be better: An analysis of single-mutant fixation probability functions under 2 × 2 games. Proc Math Phys Eng Sci 2022. [DOI: 10.1098/rspa.2022.0577] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Evolutionary game theory has proved to be a powerful tool to probe the self-organization of collective behaviour by considering frequency-dependent fitness in evolutionary processes. It has shown that the stability of a strategy depends not only on the payoffs received after each encounter but also on the population’s size. Here, we study
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games in well-mixed finite populations by analyzing the fixation probabilities of single mutants as functions of population size. We proved that nine of the 24 possible games always lead to monotonically decreasing functions, similarly to fixed fitness scenarios. However, fixation functions showed increasing regions under 12 distinct anti-coordination, coordination and dominance games. Perhaps counter-intuitively, this establishes that single-mutant strategies often benefit from being in larger populations. Fixation functions that increase from a global minimum to a positive asymptotic value are pervasive but may have been easily concealed by the weak selection limit. We obtained sufficient conditions to observe fixation increasing for small populations and three distinct ways this can occur. Finally, we describe fixation functions with the increasing regions bounded by two extremes under intermediate population sizes. We associate their occurrence with transitions from having one global extreme to other shapes.
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Affiliation(s)
- Diogo L. Pires
- Department of Mathematics, City, University of London, Northampton Square, London EC1V 0HB, UK
| | - Mark Broom
- Department of Mathematics, City, University of London, Northampton Square, London EC1V 0HB, UK
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Schimit PH, Pereira FH, Broom M. Good predictors for the fixation probability on complex networks of multi-player games using territorial interactions. ECOLOGICAL COMPLEXITY 2022. [DOI: 10.1016/j.ecocom.2022.101017] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/17/2022]
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Broom M, Křivan V. Two-strategy games with time constraints on regular graphs. J Theor Biol 2020; 506:110426. [PMID: 32777217 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2020.110426] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/10/2019] [Revised: 07/24/2020] [Accepted: 07/27/2020] [Indexed: 11/19/2022]
Abstract
Evolutionary game theory is a powerful method for modelling animal conflicts. The original evolutionary game models were used to explain specific biological features of interest, such as the existence of ritualised contests, and were necessarily simple models that ignored many properties of real populations, including the duration of events and spatial and related structural effects. Both of these areas have subsequently received much attention. Spatial and structural effects have been considered in evolutionary graph theory, and a significant body of literature has been built up to deal with situations where the population is not homogeneous. More recently a theory of time constraints has been developed to take account of the fact that different events can take different times, and that interaction times can explicitly depend upon selected strategies, which can, in turn, influence the distribution of different opponent types within the population. Here, for the first time, we build a model of time constraint games which explicitly considers a spatial population, by considering a population evolving on an underlying graph, using two graph dynamics, birth-death and death-birth. We consider one short time scale along which frequencies of pairs and singles change as individuals interact with their neighbours, and another, evolutionary time scale, along which frequencies of strategies change in the population. We show that for graphs with large degree, both dynamics reproduce recent results from well-mixed time constraint models, including two ESSs being common in Hawk-Dove and Prisoner's Dilemma games, but for low degree there can be marked differences. For birth-death processes the effect of the graph degree is small, whereas for death-birth dynamics there is a large effect. The general prediction for both Hawk-Dove and Prisoner's dilemma games is that as the graph degree decreases, i.e., as the number of neighbours decreases, mixed ESS do appear. In particular, for the Prisoner's dilemma game this means that cooperation is easier to establish in situations where individuals have low number of neighbours. We thus see that solutions depend non-trivially on the combination of graph degree, dynamics and game.
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Affiliation(s)
- Mark Broom
- Department of Mathematics, City, University of London, London, UK.
| | - Vlastimil Křivan
- Centre for Mathematical Biology, Department of Mathematics, Faculty of Science, University of South Bohemia, Branišovská 1760, 370 05 České Budějovice, Czech Republic; Czech Academy of Sciences, Biology Centre, Institute of Entomology, Branišovská 31, 370 05 České Budějovice, Czech Republic.
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Sérgio A, Schimit P. Interaction characteristics as evolutionary features for the spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma in a population modeled by continuous probabilistic cellular automata and evolutionary algorithm. ECOLOGICAL COMPLEXITY 2020. [DOI: 10.1016/j.ecocom.2020.100829] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
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Broom M, Erovenko IV, Rowell JT, Rychtář J. Models and measures of animal aggregation and dispersal. J Theor Biol 2020; 484:110002. [PMID: 31513801 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2019.110002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/12/2019] [Revised: 09/03/2019] [Accepted: 09/06/2019] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
Abstract
The dispersal of individuals within an animal population will depend upon local properties intrinsic to the environment that differentiate superior from inferior regions as well as properties of the population. Competing concerns can either draw conspecifics together in aggregation, such as collective defence against predators, or promote dispersal that minimizes local densities, for instance to reduce competition for food. In this paper we consider a range of models of non-independent movement. We include established models, such as the ideal free distribution, but also develop novel models, such as the wheel. We also develop several ways to combine different models to create a flexible model of addressing a variety of dispersal mechanisms. We further devise novel measures of movement coordination and show how to generate a population movement that achieves appropriate values of the measure specified. We find the value of these measures for each of the core models described, as well as discuss their use, and potential limitations, in discerning the underlying movement mechanisms. The movement framework that we develop is both of interest as a stand-alone process to explore movement, but also able to generate a variety of movement patterns that can be embedded into wider evolutionary models where movement is not the only consideration.
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Affiliation(s)
- Mark Broom
- Department of Mathematics, City, University of London, Northampton Square, London, EC1V 0HB, UK
| | - Igor V Erovenko
- Department of Mathematics and Statistics, The University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Greensboro, NC 27402, USA
| | - Jonathan T Rowell
- Department of Mathematics and Statistics, The University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Greensboro, NC 27402, USA
| | - Jan Rychtář
- Department of Mathematics and Applied Mathematics, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA 23284-2014, USA.
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Erovenko IV, Bauer J, Broom M, Pattni K, Rychtář J. The effect of network topology on optimal exploration strategies and the evolution of cooperation in a mobile population. Proc Math Phys Eng Sci 2019; 475:20190399. [PMID: 31736650 DOI: 10.1098/rspa.2019.0399] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/27/2019] [Accepted: 09/05/2019] [Indexed: 12/11/2022] Open
Abstract
We model a mobile population interacting over an underlying spatial structure using a Markov movement model. Interactions take the form of public goods games, and can feature an arbitrary group size. Individuals choose strategically to remain at their current location or to move to a neighbouring location, depending upon their exploration strategy and the current composition of their group. This builds upon previous work where the underlying structure was a complete graph (i.e. there was effectively no structure). Here, we consider alternative network structures and a wider variety of, mainly larger, populations. Previously, we had found when cooperation could evolve, depending upon the values of a range of population parameters. In our current work, we see that the complete graph considered before promotes stability, with populations of cooperators or defectors being relatively hard to replace. By contrast, the star graph promotes instability, and often neither type of population can resist replacement. We discuss potential reasons for this in terms of network topology.
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Affiliation(s)
- Igor V Erovenko
- Department of Mathematics and Statistics, University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Greensboro, NC 27402, USA
| | - Johann Bauer
- Department of Mathematics, City, University of London, Northampton Square, London EC1V 0HB, UK
| | - Mark Broom
- Department of Mathematics, City, University of London, Northampton Square, London EC1V 0HB, UK
| | - Karan Pattni
- Department of Mathematical Sciences, University of Liverpool, Liverpool L69 3BX, UK
| | - Jan Rychtář
- Department of Mathematics and Applied Mathematics, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA 23284-2014, USA
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Schimit PHT, Pattni K, Broom M. Dynamics of multiplayer games on complex networks using territorial interactions. Phys Rev E 2019; 99:032306. [PMID: 30999523 DOI: 10.1103/physreve.99.032306] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/03/2018] [Indexed: 06/09/2023]
Abstract
The modeling of evolution in structured populations has been significantly advanced by evolutionary graph theory, which incorporates pairwise relationships between individuals on a network. More recently, a new framework has been developed to allow for multiplayer interactions of variable size in more flexible and potentially changing population structures. While the theory within this framework has been developed and simple structures considered, there has been no systematic consideration of a large range of different population structures, which is the subject of this paper. We consider a large range of underlying graphical structures for the territorial raider model, the most commonly used model in the new structure, and consider a variety of important properties of our structures with the aim of finding factors that determine the fixation probability of mutants. We find that the graphical temperature and the average group size, as previously defined, are strong predictors of fixation probability, while all other properties considered are poor predictors, although the clustering coefficient is a useful secondary predictor when combined with either temperature or group size. The relationship between temperature or average group size and fixation probability is sometimes, however, nonmonotonic, with a directional reverse occurring around the temperature associated with what we term "completely mixed" populations in the case of the hawk-dove game, but not the public goods game.
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Affiliation(s)
- Pedro H T Schimit
- Informatics and Knowledge Management Graduate Program, Universidade Nove de Julho, Rua Vergueiro, 235/249, CEP 01504-000, São Paulo, São Paulo, Brazil
| | - Karan Pattni
- Department of Mathematical Sciences, University of Liverpool, Mathematical Sciences Building, Liverpool L69 7ZL, United Kingdom
| | - Mark Broom
- Department of Mathematics, City, University of London, Northampton Square, London EC1V 0HB, United Kingdom
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