The impact of truncation selection and diffusion on cooperation in spatial games

How should we distinguish between selectable and circumstantial traits?

There is surprisingly little philosophical work on conceptually spelling out the difference between the traits on which natural selection may be said to act (e.g. "having a high running speed") and mere circumstantial traits (e.g. "happening to be in the path of a forest fire"). I label this issue the "selectable traits problem" and, in this paper, I propose a solution for it. I first show that, contrary to our first intuition, simply equating selectable traits with heritable ones is not an adequate solution. I then go on to argue that two recent philosophical solutions to this problem-due to Peter Godfrey-Smith and Pierrick Bourrat-are unconvincing because they cannot accommodate frequency-dependent selection. The way out of this difficulty is, I argue, to accept that extrinsic properties dependent on relations between intrinsic properties of the population members should also count as selectable traits. I then show that my proposal is legitimized by more than the simple accommodation of frequency-dependent selection.

Evolution of contribution timing in public goods games

Life-history strategies are a crucial aspect of life, which are complicated in group-living species, where pay-offs additionally depend on others' behaviours. Previous theoretical models of public goods games have generally focused on the amounts individuals contribute to the public good. Yet a much less-studied strategic aspect of public goods games, the timing of contributions, can also have dramatic consequences for individual and collective performance. Here, we develop two stage game theoretical models to explore how the timing of contributions evolves. In the first stage, individuals contribute to a threshold public good based on a performance schedule. The second stage begins once the threshold is met, and the individuals then compete as a function of their performance. We show how contributing rapidly is not necessarily optimal, because delayers can act as 'cheats,' avoiding contributing while reaping the benefits of the public good. However, delaying too long can put the delayers at a disadvantage as they may be ill-equipped to compete. These effects lead to bistability in a single group, and spatial diversity among multiple interacting groups.