Energy-information coupling during integrative cognitive processes

Free energy and inference in living systems

Organisms are non-equilibrium, stationary systems self-organized via spontaneous symmetry breaking and undergoing metabolic cycles with broken detailed balance in the environment. The thermodynamic free-energy (FE) principle describes an organism's homeostasis as the regulation of biochemical work constrained by the physical FE cost. By contrast, recent research in neuroscience and theoretical biology explains a higher organism's homeostasis and allostasis as Bayesian inference facilitated by the informational FE. As an integrated approach to living systems, this study presents an FE minimization theory overarching the essential features of both the thermodynamic and neuroscientific FE principles. Our results reveal that the perception and action of animals result from active inference entailed by FE minimization in the brain, and the brain operates as a Schrödinger's machine conducting the neural mechanics of minimizing sensory uncertainty. A parsimonious model suggests that the Bayesian brain develops the optimal trajectories in neural manifolds and induces a dynamic bifurcation between neural attractors in the process of active inference.

Local similarity of activity patterns during auditory and visual processing

Neuroimaging studies have shown that brain activity is variable and changes according to stimuli and the environmental context, reflecting brain coding or information representations at different processing levels. However, little is known about activity organization that reflects coding strategies. Here, we explored and compared two different coding approaches, spatial via cross-correlation and intensity-based coding using mutual information. Using two fMRI datasets and different seeds, we searched for the spatial and intensity-based similarities with the seeds in brain activity. Our results showed that, apart from the seed regions, significant regions detected by intensity-based similarity analysis differ completely from those found using cross-correlation. These findings may indicate that information shared through spatial coding differs from that transmitted via non-spatial coding processes. Our results suggest that brain coding is organized in several different ways to optimize information processing.

Intensity patterns at the peaks of brain activity in fMRI and PET are highly correlated with neural models of spatial integration

Spatial integration during the brain's cognitive activity prompts changes in energy used by different neuroglial populations. Nevertheless, the organisation of such integration in 3D ‐brain activity remains undescribed from a quantitative standpoint. In response, we applied a cross‐correlation between brain activity and integrative models, which yielded a deeper understanding of information integration in functional brain mapping. We analysed four datasets obtained via fundamentally different neuroimaging techniques (functional magnetic resonance imaging [fMRI] and positron emission tomography [PET]) and found that models of spatial integration with an increasing input to each step of integration were significantly more correlated with brain activity than models with a constant input to each step of integration. In addition, marking the voxels with the maximal correlation, we found exceptionally high intersubject consistency with the initial brain activity at the peaks. Our method demonstrated for the first time that the network of peaks of brain activity is organised strictly according to the models of spatial integration independent of neuroimaging techniques. The highest correlation with models integrating an increasing at each step input suggests that brain activity reflects a network of integrative processes where the results of integration in some neuroglial populations serve as an input to other neuroglial populations.

How Energy Supports Our Brain to Yield Consciousness: Insights From Neuroimaging Based on the Neuroenergetics Hypothesis

Consciousness is considered a result of specific neuronal processes and mechanisms in the brain. Various suggested neuronal mechanisms, including the information integration theory (IIT), global neuronal workspace theory (GNWS), and neuronal construction of time and space as in the context of the temporospatial theory of consciousness (TTC), have been laid forth. However, despite their focus on different neuronal mechanisms, these theories neglect the energetic-metabolic basis of the neuronal mechanisms that are supposed to yield consciousness. Based on the findings of physiology-induced (sleep), pharmacology-induced (general anesthesia), and pathology-induced [vegetative state/unresponsive wakeful syndrome (VS/UWS)] loss of consciousness in both human subjects and animals, we, in this study, suggest that the energetic-metabolic processes focusing on ATP, glucose, and γ-aminobutyrate/glutamate are indispensable for functional connectivity (FC) of normal brain networks that renders consciousness possible. Therefore, we describe the energetic-metabolic predispositions of consciousness (EPC) that complement the current theories focused on the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC).

Bayesian mechanics of perceptual inference and motor control in the brain

The free energy principle (FEP) in the neurosciences stipulates that all viable agents induce and minimize informational free energy in the brain to fit their environmental niche. In this study, we continue our effort to make the FEP a more physically principled formalism by implementing free energy minimization based on the principle of least action. We build a Bayesian mechanics (BM) by casting the formulation reported in the earlier publication (Kim in Neural Comput 30:2616-2659, 2018, https://doi.org/10.1162/neco_a_01115 ) to considering active inference beyond passive perception. The BM is a neural implementation of variational Bayes under the FEP in continuous time. The resulting BM is provided as an effective Hamilton's equation of motion and subject to the control signal arising from the brain's prediction errors at the proprioceptive level. To demonstrate the utility of our approach, we adopt a simple agent-based model and present a concrete numerical illustration of the brain performing recognition dynamics by integrating BM in neural phase space. Furthermore, we recapitulate the major theoretical architectures in the FEP by comparing our approach with the common state-space formulations.