A mathematical analysis on public goods games in the continuous space

Evolutionary public goods game on the birandom geometric graph

To investigate the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games, this paper establishes a birandom geometric graph, in which two types of nodes, representing players and public goods respectively, are placed at random locations in the unit square. Each public good has a limit influence range and the individuals that fall into the same range engage in a public good game. In contrast to the classical network models consisting of only one type of nodes, the birandom geometric graph provides a natural way to describe the scenarios where individuals and public resources are independent of each other. Numerical simulations reveal that cooperation can be significantly promoted when the group size and the average number of groups that each player participates in are relatively small, which is at odds with the results on the square lattice, but is consistent with a body of empirical evidence reported by Ostrom and Olson et al. Analysis of the evolutionary process suggests that the facilitation of cooperation is due primarily to the formation of the cooperative clusters, which can effectively resist the invasion of the defectors.

Ecocultural range-expansion scenarios for the replacement or assimilation of Neanderthals by modern humans

Recent archaeological records no longer support a simple dichotomous characterization of the cultures/behaviors of Neanderthals and modern humans, but indicate much cultural/behavioral variability over time and space. Thus, in modeling the replacement or assimilation of Neanderthals by modern humans, it is of interest to consider cultural dynamics and their relation to demographic change. The ecocultural framework for the competition between hominid species allows their carrying capacities to depend on some measure of the levels of culture they possess. In the present study both population densities and the densities of skilled individuals in Neanderthals and modern humans are spatially distributed and subject to change by spatial diffusion, ecological competition, and cultural transmission within each species. We analyze the resulting range expansions in terms of the demographic, ecological and cultural parameters that determine how the carrying capacities relate to the local densities of skilled individuals in each species. Of special interest is the case of cognitive and intrinsic-demographic equivalence of the two species. The range expansion dynamics may consist of multiple wave fronts of different speeds, each of which originates from a traveling wave solution. Properties of these traveling wave solutions are mathematically derived. Depending on the parameters, these traveling waves can result in replacement of Neanderthals by modern humans, or assimilation of the former by the latter. In both the replacement and assimilation scenarios, the first wave of intrusive modern humans is characterized by a low population density and a low density of skilled individuals, with implications for archaeological visibility. The first invasion is due to weak interspecific competition. A second wave of invasion may be induced by cultural differences between moderns and Neanderthals. Spatially and temporally extended coexistence of the two species, which would have facilitated the transfer of genes from Neanderthal into modern humans and vice versa, is observed in the traveling waves, except when niche overlap between the two species is extremely high. Archaeological findings on the spatial and temporal distributions of the Initial Upper Palaeolithic and the Early Upper Palaeolithic and of the coexistence of Neanderthals and modern humans are discussed.

Noise driven evolutionary waves

Adaptation in spatially extended populations entails the propagation of evolutionary novelties across habitat ranges. Driven by natural selection, beneficial mutations sweep through the population in a "wave of advance". The standard model for these traveling waves, due to R. Fisher and A. Kolmogorov, plays an important role in many scientific areas besides evolution, such as ecology, epidemiology, chemical kinetics, and recently even in particle physics. Here, we extend the Fisher-Kolmogorov model to account for mutations that confer an increase in the density of the population, for instance as a result of an improved metabolic efficiency. We show that these mutations invade by the action of random genetic drift, even if the mutations are slightly deleterious. The ensuing class of noise-driven waves are characterized by a wave speed that decreases with increasing population sizes, contrary to conventional Fisher-Kolmogorov waves. When a trade-off exists between density and growth rate, an evolutionary optimal population density can be predicted. Our simulations and analytical results show that genetic drift in conjunction with spatial structure promotes the economical use of limited resources. The simplicity of our model, which lacks any complex interactions between individuals, suggests that noise-induced pattern formation may arise in many complex biological systems including evolution.

Pattern formation and chaos in spatial ecological public goodsgames

Cooperators and defectors can coexist in ecological public goods games. When the game is played in two-dimensional continuous space, a reaction diffusion model produces highly irregular dynamics, in which cooperators and defectors survive in ever-changing configurations (Wakano et al., 2009. Spatial dynamics of ecological public goods. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 106, 7910-7914). The dynamics is related to the formation of Turing patterns, but the origin of the irregular dynamics is not well understood. In this paper, we present a classification of the spatio-temporal dynamics based on the dispersion relation, which reveals that the spontaneous pattern formation can be attributed to the dynamical interplay between two linearly unstable modes: temporal instability arising from a Hopf-bifurcation and spatial instability arising from a Turing-bifurcation. Moreover, we provide a detailed analysis of the highly irregular dynamics through Fourier analysis, the break-down of symmetry, the maximum Lyapunov exponent, and the excitability of the reaction-term dynamics. All results clearly support that the observed irregular dynamics qualifies as spatio-temporal chaos. A particularly interesting type of chaotic dynamics, which we call intermittent bursts, clearly demonstrates the effects of the two unstable modes where (local) periods of stasis alternate with rapid changes that may induce local extinction.

Topology-independent impact of noise on cooperation in spatial public goods games

We study the evolution of cooperation in public goods games on different regular graphs as a function of the noise level underlying strategy adoptions. We focus on the effects that are brought about by different group sizes of public goods games in which individuals participate, revealing that larger groups of players may induce qualitatively different behavior when approaching the deterministic limit of strategy adoption. While by pairwise interactions an intermediate uncertainty by strategy adoptions may ensure optimal conditions for the survival of cooperators at a specific graph topology, larger groups warrant this only in the vicinity of the deterministic limit independently from the underlying graph. These discrepancies are attributed to the indirect linkage of otherwise not directly connected players, which is brought about by joint memberships within the larger groups. Thus, we show that increasing the group size may introduce an effective transition of the interaction topology, and that the latter shapes the noise dependence of the evolution of cooperation in case of pairwise interactions only.

Spatial dynamics of ecological public goods

The production, consumption, and exploitation of common resources ranging from extracellular products in microorganisms to global issues of climate change refer to public goods interactions. Individuals can cooperate and sustain common resources at some cost or defect and exploit the resources without contributing. This generates a conflict of interest, which characterizes social dilemmas: Individual selection favors defectors, but for the community, it is best if everybody cooperates. Traditional models of public goods do not take into account that benefits of the common resource enable cooperators to maintain higher population densities. This leads to a natural feedback between population dynamics and interaction group sizes as captured by "ecological public goods." Here, we show that the spatial evolutionary dynamics of ecological public goods in "selection-diffusion" systems promotes cooperation based on different types of pattern formation processes. In spatial settings, individuals can migrate (diffuse) to populate new territories. Slow diffusion of cooperators fosters aggregation in highly productive patches (activation), whereas fast diffusion enables defectors to readily locate and exploit these patches (inhibition). These antagonistic forces promote coexistence of cooperators and defectors in static or dynamic patterns, including spatial chaos of ever-changing configurations. The local environment of cooperators and defectors is shaped by the production or consumption of common resources. Hence, diffusion-induced self-organization into spatial patterns not only enhances cooperation but also provides simple mechanisms for the spontaneous generation of habitat diversity, which denotes a crucial determinant of the viability of ecological systems.

Evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games with common resource dynamics

Investment in a common resource shared by all players is difficult to evolve despite higher returns because a non-investor (free-rider) always receives more than an investor (altruist). This situation is referred to as the Tragedy of the Commons and is often observed in various biological systems including environmental problems of human society. Punishment and reputation are effective mechanisms but require cooperator's ability to identify free-riders. Volunteering can work in anonymous public goods games but this requires voluntary participation, which is not always the case. Here, we show that the evolution of altruism is possible in anonymous and obligate public goods games if we consider the spatiotemporal dynamics of the common resource that incorporate spatial diffusion and internal dynamics of the commons. The investors' strategy to counter free-riders is to increase population density and to outnumber them with the common resource level kept as low as that of the free-riders.