Is Homo sapiens polytypic? Human taxonomic diversity and its implications

The Fallacy of Equating the Hereditarian Hypothesis with Racism

There is a large amount of evidence that groups differ in average cognitive ability. The hereditarian hypothesis states that these differences are partly or substantially explained by genetics. Despite being a positive claim about the world, this hypothesis is frequently equated with racism, and scholars who defend it are frequently denounced as racists. Yet equating the hereditarian hypothesis with racism is a logical fallacy. The present article identifies ten common arguments for why the hereditarian hypothesis is racist and demonstrates that each one is fallacious. The article concludes that society will be better served if the hereditarian hypothesis is treated the same way as any other scientific claim—critically, but dispassionately.

Biogeographic Ancestry, Cognitive Ability and Socioeconomic Outcomes

The cause(s) of ubiquitous cognitive differences between American self-identified racial/ethnic groups (SIREs) is uncertain. Evolutionary-genetic models posit that ancestral genetic selection pressures are the ultimate source of these differences. Conversely, sociological models posit that these differences result from racial discrimination. To examine predictions based on these models, we conducted a global admixture analysis using data from the Pediatric Imaging, Neurocognition, and Genetics Study (PING; N = 1,369 American children). Specifically, we employed a standard methodology of genetic epidemiology to determine whether genetic ancestry significantly predicts cognitive ability, independent of SIRE. In regression models using four different codings for SIRE as a covariate, we found incremental relationships between genetic ancestry and both general cognitive ability and parental socioeconomic status (SES). The relationships between global ancestry and cognitive ability were partially attenuated when parental SES was added as a predictor and when cognitive ability was the outcome. Moreover, these associations generally held when subgroups were analyzed separately. Our results are congruent with evolutionary-genetic models of group differences and with certain environmental models that mimic the predictions of evolutionary-genetic ones. Implications for research on race/ethnic differences in the Americas are discussed, as are methods for further exploring the matter.

Biogeographic Ancestry, Cognitive Ability and Socioeconomic Outcomes

The cause(s) of ubiquitous cognitive differences between American self-identified racial/ethnic groups (SIREs) is uncertain. Evolutionary-genetic models posit that ancestral genetic selection pressures are the ultimate source of these differences. Conversely, sociological models posit that these differences result from racial discrimination. To examine predictions based on these models, we conducted a global admixture analysis using data from the Pediatric Imaging, Neurocognition, and Genetics Study (PING; N = 1,369 American children). Specifically, we employed a standard methodology of genetic epidemiology to determine whether genetic ancestry significantly predicts cognitive ability, independent of SIRE. In regression models using four different codings for SIRE as a covariate, we found incremental relationships between genetic ancestry and both general cognitive ability and parental socioeconomic status (SES). The relationships between global ancestry and cognitive ability were partially attenuated when parental SES was added as a predictor and when cognitive ability was the outcome. Moreover, these associations generally held when subgroups were analyzed separately. Our results are congruent with evolutionary-genetic models of group differences and with certain environmental models that mimic the predictions of evolutionary-genetic ones. Implications for research on race/ethnic differences in the Americas are discussed, as are methods for further exploring the matter.

Primate Taxonomy: Inflation or Real?

This article reviews changes in primate taxonomy, especially those pertaining to the meaning of the term species, since its inception two and a half centuries ago. Despite continuing discoveries and the involvement of competent practitioners, the adoption of the polytypic species concept, especially underpinned by the biological species concept, ensured that primate taxonomy was in a sorry state by the middle of the twentieth century. In the latter half of the twentieth century, a gradual rethinking of the nature of species took place, and many different species concepts were proposed. The phylogenetic species concept has been widely adopted over the past ∼20 years, sustained by a gradual realization that species are evolutionary lineages. This review provides examples of how the old way of thinking about species hampered our understanding of primate biodiversity and of how the phylogenetic species concept (or the diagnosability criterion under the general lineage concept) has clarified matters, opening them up for discussion. The adoption of this evolutionary view of species has implications for conservation, particularly because it increases recognition of biodiversity.