Affordances and neuroscience: Steps towards a successful marriage

Grasping affordance judgments depend on the object emotional value

Introduction

The concept of affordance refers to the opportunities for action provided by the environment, often conveyed through visual information. It has been applied to explain visuomotor processing and movement planning. As emotion modulates both visual perception and the motor system, it is reasonable to ask whether emotion can influence affordance judgments. If present, this relationship can have important ontological implications for affordances. Thus, we investigated whether the emotional value of manipulable objects affected the judgment of the appropriate grasping that could be used to interact with them (i.e., their affordance).

Methods

Volunteers were instructed to use a numerical scale to report their judgment on how an observed object should be grasped. We compared these judgments across emotional categories of objects (pleasant, unpleasant and neutral), while also considering the expected effect of object size.

Results

We found that unpleasant objects were rated as more appropriately graspable by a precision grip than pleasant and neutral objects. Simultaneously, smaller object size also favored this judgment. This effect was seen in all emotional categories examined in equal magnitude.

Discussion

Our findings suggest that the emotional value of objects modulates affordance judgments in a way that favors careful manipulation and minimal physical contact with aversive stimuli. Finally, we discuss how this affective aspect of our experience of objects overlaps with what affordances are conceptualized to be, calling for further reexamination of the relationship between affordances and emotions.

On natural attunement: Shared rhythms between the brain and the environment

Rhythms exist both in the embodied brain and the built environment. Becoming attuned to the rhythms of the environment, such as repetitive columns, can greatly affect perception. Here, we explore how the built environment affects human cognition and behavior through the concept of natural attunement, often resulting from the coordination of a person's sensory and motor systems with the rhythmic elements of the environment. We argue that the built environment should not be reduced to mere states, representations, and single variables but instead be considered a bundle of highly related continuous signals with which we can resonate. Resonance and entrainment are dynamic processes observed when intrinsic frequencies of the oscillatory brain are influenced by the oscillations of an external signal. This allows visual rhythmic stimulations of the environment to affect the brain and body through neural entrainment, cross-frequency coupling, and phase resetting. We review how real-world architectural settings can affect neural dynamics, cognitive processes, and behavior in people, suggesting the crucial role of everyday rhythms in the brain-body-environment relationship.

Tool use acquisition induces a multifunctional interference effect during object processing: evidence from the sensorimotor mu rhythm

A fundamental characteristic of human development is acquiring and accumulating tool use knowledge through observation and sensorimotor experience. Recent studies showed that, in children and adults, different action possibilities to grasp-to-move and grasp-to-use objects generate a conflict that extinguishes neural motor resonance phenomena during visual object processing. In this study, a training protocol coupled with EEG recordings was administered in virtual reality to healthy adults to evaluate whether a similar conflict occurs between novel tool use knowledge. Participants perceived and manipulated two novel 3D tools trained beforehand with either single or double-usage. A weaker reduction of mu-band (10-13 Hz) power, accompanied by a reduced inter-trial phase coherence, was recorded during the perception of the tool associated with the double-usage. These effects started within the first 200 ms of visual object processing and were predominantly recorded over the left motor system. Furthermore, interacting with the double usage tool delayed grasp-to-reach movements. The results highlight a multifunctional interference effect, such as tool use acquisition reduces the neural motor resonance phenomenon and inhibits the activation of the motor system during subsequent object recognition. These results imply that learned tool use information guides sensorimotor processes of objects.

Wild brains: The value of neuroethological approaches in preclinical behavioral neuroscience animal models

For three decades, IBNS has provided a forum for the dissemination of behavioral neuroscience research, broadly defined. Throughout this time, research presented at the annual meetings has reflected representative trends in the field with an emphasis on relevant preclinical animal models. From its inception, IBNS has contributed to my professional development and evolving research interests. Unsurprisingly, throughout the three decades of its existence, IBNS annual programs have reflected research trends that have been thoughtfully evaluated, challenged, and, in some cases, recalibrated. An emphasis in my lab, for example, has slowly navigated toward the inclusion of more diverse species (e.g., nonhuman primate models, wild rats, wild and captive raccoons) assessed in settings that reflect more ethological relevance than typically observed in traditional laboratory settings. Consequently, my research interests are pivoting from laboratory animal model exclusive (L.A.M.E.) endeavors to more natural, diverse, ethoexperimental approaches. As progress toward translational findings for psychiatric and neurological conditions is considered, it is recommended that researchers remain open to nontraditional methodological approaches that incorporate diverse animal models and assessments to inform laboratory-generated findings.

Being with other animals: Transitioning toward sustainable food futures

How do non-human animals (hereafter animals) fit into sustainable food futures? This question prompts ethical reflection. However, especially in times of transformative change, one should not overlook ontological assumptions before engaging in ethics. We follow up on the work of the late Australian philosopher Val Plumwood as she prominently made this move to the ontological level when considering the edibility of animals. As she invites one (1) to listen to animals as well as (2) to embody one's own edibility, salient ontological assumptions about how humans relate to other animals, and the rest of reality, rise to the surface. While Plumwood also developed a modest ethical framework to address animal edibility, her ontological approach is highlighted here, especially as it appears to point toward moral relativism. Plumwood's ontological approach is further developed, notably by unraveling the dualism between self and other. Doing so results in a more non-conceptual way of relating to other animals. As a genuinely interdependent way of engaging with reality, it appears most relevant to considering what role animals might have in sustainable food futures.

Context-sensitive computational mechanistic explanation in cognitive neuroscience

Mainstream cognitive neuroscience aims to build mechanistic explanations of behavior by mapping abilities described at the organismal level via the subpersonal level of computation onto specific brain networks. We provide an integrative review of these commitments and their mismatch with empirical research findings. Context-dependent neural tuning, neural reuse, degeneracy, plasticity, functional recovery, and the neural correlates of enculturated skills each show that there is a lack of stable mappings between organismal, computational, and neural levels of analysis. We furthermore highlight recent research suggesting that task context at the organismal level determines the dynamic parcellation of functional components at the neural level. Such instability prevents the establishment of specific computational descriptions of neural function, which remains a central goal of many brain mappers - including those who are sympathetic to the notion of many-to-many mappings between organismal and neural levels. This between-level instability presents a deep epistemological challenge and requires a reorientation of methodological and theoretical commitments within cognitive neuroscience. We demonstrate the need for change to brain mapping efforts in the face of instability if cognitive neuroscience is to maintain its central goal of constructing computational mechanistic explanations of behavior; we show that such explanations must be contextual at all levels.

Emotions Modulate Affordances-Related Motor Responses: A Priming Experiment

Traditionally, research on affordances and emotions follows two separate routes. For the first time, this article explicitly links the two phenomena by investigating whether, in a discrimination task (artifact vs. natural object), the motivational states induced by emotional images can modulate affordances-related motor response elicited by dangerous and neutral graspable objects. The results show faster RTs: (i) for both neutral and dangerous objects with neutral images; (ii) for dangerous objects with pleasant images; (iii) for neutral objects with unpleasant images. Overall, these data support a significant effect of emotions on affordances. The article also proposes a brain neural network underlying emotions and affordance interplay.

Influence of colour on object motor representation

Colour conveys specific information about the status/quality of an object; whereas its role in object recognition has been widely studied, little is known about its role in sensorimotor processes. We performed three experiments to assess whether colour influences the motor representation of graspable objects. In Experiment 1, we used a grasp compatibility task, in which participants categorized each object as natural or artifact, by performing reach-to-grasp movements. Response grasps could be compatible or incompatible with the ones normally used to manipulate the objects. Results showed faster reaction times for natural objects displayed in the correct colour compared with both opposite colour and correct colour artifact objects. In Experiment 2, to directly assess the effect of colour on object motor representation, we used an interference task in which an irrelevant object was shown while performing a pre-specified reach-to-grasp movement (i.e., verbal cues: small vs. large). Results highlighted a reversed compatibility effect when objects were shown in their correct colour, but only at the beginning of the movement (10 ms SOA). Finally, we run a third experiment using the same task as in Experiment 2. In this experiment, we compared the grasp compatibility effect driven by natural objects with the grasp compatibility effect driven by dangerous natural objects (e.g., cactus), which are objects that should not elicit a grasping program. The results of Experiment 3 confirm those of Experiment 2, highlighting also specific processes related to dangerous objects. Taken together, these results revealed that colour can be significant for the motor system, highlighting the close link between colour and shape, and also specific processes related to dangerous objects.

Tool use and function knowledge shape visual object processing

Perceiving the environment automatically informs how we can interact with it through affordance mechanisms. However, it remains unknown how our knowledge about the environment shapes how it is perceived. In this training study, we evaluated whether motor and function knowledge about novel objects affects visual object processing. Forty-three participants associated a usage or function to a novel object in interactive virtual reality while their EEG was recorded. Both usage and function influenced the mu-band (8-12 Hz) rhythms, suggesting that motor and function object information influence motor processing during object recognition. Learning the usage also prevented the reduction of the theta-band (4-8 Hz) rhythms recorded over the posterior cortical areas, suggesting a predominant top-down influence of tool use information on visuo-motor pathways. The modulation being specifically induced by learning an object usage, the results support further the embodied cognition approach rather than the reasoning-based approach of object processing.

Psychology in an Indeterminate World

By sharing their world, humans and other animals sustain each other. Their world gets determined over time as generations of animals act in it. Current approaches to psychological science, by contrast, start from the assumption that the world is already determined before an animal's activity. These approaches seem more concerned with uncertainty about the world than with the practical indeterminacies of the world humans and nonhuman animals experience. As human activity is making life increasingly hard for other animals, this preoccupation becomes difficult to accept. This article introduces an ecological approach to psychology to develop a view that centralizes the indeterminacies of a shared world. Specifically, it develops an open-ended notion of "affordances," the possibilities for action offered by the environment. Affordances are processes in which (a) the material world invites individual animals to participate, while (b) participation concurrently continues the material world in a particular way. From this point of view, species codetermine the world together. Several empirical and methodological implications of this view on affordances are explored. The article ends with an explanation of how an ecological perspective brings responsibility for the shared world to the heart of psychological science.

A distinction concerning vision-for-action and affordance perception

In this paper, I offer a discussion concerning the conceptual connection between the notion of vision-for-action and the one of affordance perception. I first analyze the notion of vision-for-action. I then analyze a notion usually coupled with it: the notion of affordance perception, the main insights behind which are guiding several current neuroscientific enterprises and the related philosophical speculations. Then, I argue that we should not couple these two notions with a light heart: though these two processes can be, from a theoretical point of view, related, we should be careful in inferring the actual and effective occurrence of the latter in the presence of the former. This will be done by carrying out a conceptual analysis of the experimental evidence coming from the 'Two Visual Systems Model', which is the main reference in the literature on affordance perception and vision-for-action. My point has strong philosophical implications for our view concerning the best interpretation of how vision-for-action really works, and the specific relation it actually entertains with affordance perception.

Asymmetric effects of graspable distractor disks on motor preparation of successive grasps: A behavioural and event-related potential (ERP) study

There is evidence that seeing a graspable object automatically elicits a preparatory motor process. However, it is unclear whether this implicit visuomotor process might influence the preparation of a successive grasp for a different object. We addressed the issue by implementing a combined behavioural and electrophysiological paradigm. Participants performed pantomimed grasps directed to small or large disks with either a two (pincer) or a five-finger (pentapod) grip, after the presentation of congruent (same size) or incongruent (different size) distractor disks. Preview reaction times (PRTs) and response-locked lateralized readiness potentials (R-LRPs) were recorded as online indices of motor preparation. Results revealed asymmetric effects of the distractors on PRTs and R-LRPs. For pincer grip disks, incongruent distractors were associated with longer PRTs and a delayed R-LRP peak. For pentapod grip disks, conversely, incongruent distractors were associated with shorter PRTs and a delayed R-LRP onset. Supporting an interpretation of these effects as tapping into motor preparation, we did not observe modulations of stimulus-locked LRP's (sensitive to sensory processing), or of the P300 component (related to reallocating attentional resources). These results challenge models (i.e., the "dorsal amnesia" hypothesis) which assume that visuomotor information presented before a grasp will not affect how we later perform that grasp.

Ecological Psychology and Enactivism: Perceptually-Guided Action vs. Sensation-Based Enaction

Ecological Psychology and Enactivism both challenge representationist cognitive science, but the two approaches have only begun to engage in dialogue. Further conceptual clarification is required in which differences are as important as common ground. This paper enters the dialogue by focusing on important differences. After a brief account of the parallel histories of Ecological Psychology and Enactivism, we cover incompatibility between them regarding their theories of sensation and perception. First, we show how and why in ecological theory perception is, crutially, not based on sensation. We elucidate this idea by examining the biological roots of work in the two fields, concentrating on Gibson and Varela and Maturana. We expound an ecological critique of any sensation based approach to perception by detailing two topics: classic retinal image theories and perception in single-celled organisms. The second main point emphasizes the importance of the idea of organism-environment mutuality and its difference from structural coupling of sensations and motor behavior. We point out how ecological-phenomenological methods of inquiry grow out of mutualism and compare Gibson's idea of visual kinesthesis to Merleau-Ponty's idea of the lived body. Third, we conclude that Ecological Psychology and varieties of Enactivism are laying down different paths to pursue related goals. Thus, convergence of Ecological Psychology and Enactivism is not possible given their conflicting assumptions, but cross-fertilization is possible and desirable.

On the Evolution of a Radical Concept: Affordances According to Gibson and Their Subsequent Use and Development

James J. Gibson, the founder of ecological psychology, introduced a radical empiricist approach to perception and action centered on direct perception in naturalistic environments that was counter to popular representational views of his time. This direct perception approach and the associated introduction of the affordance concept have been extremely influential in several fields of study. However, since its inception, the affordance concept has evolved in a manner such that it now deviates significantly from Gibson's original intention. This review follows use of the affordance concept by four sets of influential experimental psychologists: Gibson, Donald Norman, Mike Tucker and Rob Ellis, and Daniel Bub and Michael Masson. Particular attention is paid to the manner in which they applied the concept and the contributions provided by each set of researchers. The primary goal of this review is to determine what cognitive psychologists can take away from developments within the field and what considerations should be taken into account when using the term affordance. Having a more thorough understanding of the factors that led to the concept of affordance and its recent reformulations will better equip cognitive psychologists and, by extension, human factors researchers to further advance the study of perception-action relations.

Optimizing brain performance: Identifying mechanisms of adaptive neurobiological plasticity

Although neuroscience research has debunked the late 19^th century claims suggesting that large portions of the brain are typically unused, recent evidence indicates that an enhanced understanding of neural plasticity may lead to greater insights related to the functional capacity of brains. Continuous and real-time neural modifications in concert with dynamic environmental contexts provide opportunities for targeted interventions for maintaining healthy brain functions throughout the lifespan. Neural design, however, is far from simplistic, requiring close consideration of context-specific and other relevant variables from both species and individual perspectives to determine the functional gains from increased and decreased markers of neuroplasticity. Caution must be taken in the interpretation of any measurable change in neurobiological responses or behavioral outcomes, as definitions of optimal functions are extremely complex. Even so, current behavioral neuroscience approaches offer unique opportunities to evaluate adaptive functions of various neural responses in an attempt to enhance the functional capacity of neural systems.

Fear of Falling Contributing to Cautious Gait Pattern in Women Exposed to a Fictional Disturbing Factor: A Non-randomized Clinical Trial

Objective: This study aimed to investigate the gait pattern of elderly women with and without fall-history, with high and low fear of falling, when exposed to a disturbing factor. Materials and Methods: Forty-nine elderly women without cognitive impairment agreed to participate. Participants were divided into four groups, considering the history of falls and fear of falling. Three-dimensional gait analysis was performed to assess gait kinematics before and after exposure to the fictional disturbing factor (psychological and non-motor agent). Results: After being exposed to the perturbation, all showed shorter step length, stride length and slower walking speed. Those without fall-history and with high fear of falling showed greater changes and lower Gait Profile Score. Conclusion: The gait changes shown in the presence of a fear-of-falling causing agent led to a cautious gait pattern in an attempt to increase protection. However, those changes increased fall-risk, boosted by fear of falling. Clinical Trial Registration: www.residentialclinics.gov.br, identifier: RBR-35xhj5.