On the Working Memory of Humans and Great Apes: Strikingly Similar or Remarkably Different?

'Snakes and ladders' in paleoanthropology: From cognitive surprise to skillfulness a million years ago

A paradigmatic account may suffice to explain behavioral evolution in early Homo. We propose a parsimonious account that (1) could explain a particular, frequently-encountered, archeological outcome of behavior in early Homo - namely, the fashioning of a Paleolithic stone 'handaxe' - from a biological theoretic perspective informed by the free energy principle (FEP); and that (2) regards instances of the outcome as postdictive or retrodictive, circumstantial corroboration. Our proposal considers humankind evolving as a self-organizing biological ecosystem at a geological time-scale. We offer a narrative treatment of this self-organization in terms of the FEP. Specifically, we indicate how 'cognitive surprises' could underwrite an evolving propensity in early Homo to express sporadic unorthodox or anomalous behavior. This co-evolutionary propensity has left us a legacy of Paleolithic artifacts that is reminiscent of a 'snakes and ladders' board game of appearances, disappearances, and reappearances of particular archeological traces of Paleolithic behavior. When detected in the Early and Middle Pleistocene record, anthropologists and archeologists often imagine evidence of unusual or novel behavior in terms of early humankind ascending the rungs of a figurative phylogenetic 'ladder' - as if these corresponded to progressive evolution of cognitive abilities that enabled incremental achievements of increasingly innovative technical prowess, culminating in the cognitive ascendancy of Homo sapiens. The conjecture overlooks a plausible likelihood that behavior by an individual who was atypical among her conspecifics could have been disregarded in a community of Hominina (for definition see Appendix 1) that failed to recognize, imagine, or articulate potential advantages of adopting hitherto unorthodox behavior. Such failure, as well as diverse fortuitous demographic accidents, would cause exceptional personal behavior to be ignored and hence unremembered. It could disappear by a pitfall, down a 'snake', as it were, in the figurative evolutionary board game; thereby causing a discontinuity in the evolution of human behavior that presents like an evolutionary puzzle. The puzzle discomforts some paleoanthropologists trained in the natural and life sciences. They often dismiss it, explaining it away with such self-justifying conjectures as that, maybe, separate paleospecies of Homo differentially possessed different cognitive abilities, which, supposedly, could account for the presence or absence in the Pleistocene archeological record of traces of this or that behavioral outcome or skill. We argue that an alternative perspective - that inherits from the FEP and an individual's 'active inference' about its surroundings and of its own responses - affords a prosaic, deflationary, and parsimonious way to account for appearances, disappearances, and reappearances of particular behavioral outcomes and skills of early humankind.

Executive functions and brain morphology of male and female dominant and subordinate cichlid fish

BACKGROUND

Living in a social dominance hierarchy presents different benefits and challenges for dominant and subordinate males and females, which might in turn affect their cognitive needs. Despite the extensive research on social dominance in group-living species, there is still a knowledge gap regarding how social status impacts brain morphology and cognitive abilities.

METHODS

Here, we tested male and female dominants and subordinates of Neolamprologus pulcher, a social cichlid fish species with size-based hierarchy. We ran three executive cognitive function tests for cognitive flexibility (reversal learning test), self-control (detour test), and working memory (object permanence test), followed by brain and brain region size measurements.

RESULTS

Performance was not influenced by social status or sex. However, dominants exhibited a brain-body slope that was relatively steeper than that of subordinates. Furthermore, individual performance in reversal learning and detour tests correlated with brain morphology, with some trade-offs among major brain regions like telencephalon, cerebellum, and optic tectum.

CONCLUSION

As individuals' brain growth strategies varied depending on social status without affecting executive functions, the different associated challenges might yield a potential effect on social cognition instead. Overall, the findings highlight the importance of studying the individual and not just species to understand better how the individual's ecology might shape its brain and cognition.

Why did humans surpass all other primates? Are our brains so different? Part 2

The second part of this review is an attempt to explain why only Homo sapiens developed language. It should be remarked that this review is based on the opinion of a clinical neurologist and does not intend to go beyond an overview of this complex topic. The progressive development of language was probably due to the expansion of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and its networks. PFC is the largest area of the human cerebral cortex and is much more expanded in humans than in other primates. To achieve language, several other functions should have been attained, including abstraction, reasoning, expanded working memory, and executive functions. All these functions are strongly related to PFC and language had a profound retroactive impact on them all. Language and culture produce anatomic and physiological modifications in the brain. Learning to read is presented as an example of how culture modifies the brain.

On some statistical and cerebral aspects of the limits of working memory capacity in anthropoid primates, with particular reference to Pan and Homo, and their significance for human evolution

Some comparative ontogenetic data imply that effective working-memory capacity develops in ways that are independent of brain size in humans. These are interpreted better from neuroscientific considerations about the continuing development of neuronal architecture in adolescents and young adults, than from one about gross brain mass which already is reached in childhood. By contrast, working-memory capacity in Pan never develops beyond that of three- or four-year-old children. The phylogenetic divergence begs the question of whether it is any longer plausible to infer from the fossil record, that over the past two million years, an ostensibly gradual increase in endocranial volumes, assigned to the genus Homo, can be correlated in a scientifically-meaningful manner with the gradual evolution of our effective executive working memory. It is argued that whereas Pan's effective working-memory capacity is relatively similar to that of its storage working-memory, our working memory is relatively larger with deeper executive control.

Rhesus monkeys show greater habituation to repeated computer-generated images than do orangutans

Humans and several other species of animals have demonstrated the ability to use familiarity to recognize that they have seen images before. In prior experiments, orangutans failed to show use of familiarity in memory tasks, even when other solutions were not available. We tested for evidence of habituation, a decreased response to repeated stimuli, as a behavioral indicator that repeated images were familiar to subjects. Monkeys and orangutans selected the smallest target out of four while computerized images were presented as distractors. Latency to complete the target-finding task was compared between conditions in which the distractor image was a familiar, repeating image, a novel, never-before-seen image, or no distractor was present. Rhesus macaques showed significant habituation, and significantly more habituation than orangutans, in each of four experiments. Orangutans showed statistically reliable habituation in only one of the four experiments. These results are consistent with previous research in which orangutans failed to demonstrate familiarity. Because we expect that familiarity and habituation are evolutionarily ancient memory processes, we struggle to explain these surprising, but consistent findings. Future research is needed to determine why orangutans respond to computerized images in this peculiar way.

The prefrontal cortex: from monkey to man

The prefrontal cortex is so important to human beings that, if deprived of it, our behaviour is reduced to action-reactions and automatisms, with no ability to make deliberate decisions. Why does the prefrontal cortex hold such importance in humans? In answer, this review draws on the proximity between humans and other primates, which enables us, through comparative anatomical-functional analysis, to understand the cognitive functions we have in common and specify those that distinguish humans from their closest cousins. First, a focus on the lateral region of the prefrontal cortex illustrates the existence of a continuum between rhesus monkeys (the most studied primates in neuroscience) and humans for most of the major cognitive functions in which this region of the brain plays a central role. This continuum involves the presence of elementary mental operations in the rhesus monkey (e.g. working memory or response inhibition) that are constitutive of 'macro-functions' such as planning, problem-solving and even language production. Second, the human prefrontal cortex has developed dramatically compared to that of other primates. This increase seems to concern the most anterior part (the frontopolar cortex). In humans, the development of the most anterior prefrontal cortex is associated with three major and interrelated cognitive changes: (i) a greater working memory capacity, allowing for greater integration of past experiences and prospective futures; (ii) a greater capacity to link discontinuous or distant data, whether temporal or semantic; and (iii) a greater capacity for abstraction, allowing humans to classify knowledge in different ways, to engage in analogical reasoning or to acquire abstract values that give rise to our beliefs and morals. Together, these new skills enable us, among other things, to develop highly sophisticated social interactions based on language, enabling us to conceive beliefs and moral judgements and to conceptualize, create and extend our vision of our environment beyond what we can physically grasp. Finally, a model of the transition of prefrontal functions between humans and non-human primates concludes this review.

Corvids optimize working memory by categorizing continuous stimuli

Working memory (WM) is a crucial element of the higher cognition of primates and corvid songbirds. Despite its importance, WM has a severely limited capacity and is vulnerable to noise. In primates, attractor dynamics mitigate the effect of noise by discretizing continuous information. Yet, it remains unclear whether similar dynamics are seen in avian brains. Here, we show jackdaws (Corvus monedula) have similar behavioral biases as humans; memories are less precise and more biased as memory demands increase. Model-based analysis reveal discrete attractors are evenly spread across the stimulus space. Altogether, our comparative approach suggests attractor dynamics in primates and corvids mitigate the effect of noise by systematically drifting towards specific attractors. By demonstrating this effect in an evolutionary distant species, our results strengthen attractor dynamics as general, adaptive biological principle to efficiently use WM.

A test of memory for stimulus sequences in great apes

Identifying cognitive capacities underlying the human evolutionary transition is challenging, and many hypotheses exist for what makes humans capable of, for example, producing and understanding language, preparing meals, and having culture on a grand scale. Instead of describing processes whereby information is processed, recent studies have suggested that there are key differences between humans and other animals in how information is recognized and remembered. Such constraints may act as a bottleneck for subsequent information processing and behavior, proving important for understanding differences between humans and other animals. We briefly discuss different sequential aspects of cognition and behavior and the importance of distinguishing between simultaneous and sequential input, and conclude that explicit tests on non-human great apes have been lacking. Here, we test the memory for stimulus sequences-hypothesis by carrying out three tests on bonobos and one test on humans. Our results show that bonobos' general working memory decays rapidly and that they fail to learn the difference between the order of two stimuli even after more than 2,000 trials, corroborating earlier findings in other animals. However, as expected, humans solve the same sequence discrimination almost immediately. The explicit test on whether bonobos represent stimulus sequences as an unstructured collection of memory traces was not informative as no differences were found between responses to the different probe tests. However, overall, this first empirical study of sequence discrimination on non-human great apes supports the idea that non-human animals, including the closest relatives to humans, lack a memory for stimulus sequences. This may be an ability that sets humans apart from other animals and could be one reason behind the origin of human culture.

Experimental expansion of relative telencephalon size improves the main executive function abilities in guppy

Executive functions are a set of cognitive control processes required for optimizing goal-directed behavior. Despite more than two centuries of research on executive functions, mostly in humans and nonhuman primates, there is still a knowledge gap in what constitutes the mechanistic basis of evolutionary variation in executive function abilities. Here, we show experimentally that size changes in a forebrain structure (i.e. telencephalon) underlie individual variation in executive function capacities in a fish. For this, we used male guppies (Poecilia reticulata) issued from artificial selection lines with substantial differences in telencephalon size relative to the rest of the brain. We tested fish from the up- and down-selected lines not only in three tasks for the main core executive functions: cognitive flexibility, inhibitory control, and working memory, but also in a basic conditioning test that does not require executive functions. Individuals with relatively larger telencephalons outperformed individuals with smaller telencephalons in all three executive function assays but not in the conditioning assay. Based on our findings, we propose that the telencephalon is the executive brain in teleost fish. Together, it suggests that selective enlargement of key brain structures with distinct functions, like the fish telencephalon, is a potent evolutionary pathway toward evolutionary enhancement of advanced cognitive abilities in vertebrates.

Are there disciplinary boundaries in the comparative study of primate cognition?

A view continues to gain momentum that regards investigation of the cognition of great apes in captive settings as affording us a model for human cognitive evolution. Researchers from disciplines such as comparative psychology, anthropology, and even archaeology, seem eager to put their theories to the test by using great apes as their chosen experimental model. Questions addressed currently by comparative psychologists have long been the object of attention by neurophysiologists, psychobiologists and neuroscientists, who, however, often use rodents and monkeys as the species of choice. Whereas comparative psychology has been influenced greatly by ethology, much neuroscience has developed against a background of physiology and medicine. This separation of the intellectual contexts wherein they have arisen and flourished has impeded the development of fluid interaction between comparative psychologists and researchers in the other disciplines. We feel that it would be beneficial for comparative psychologists and neuroscientists to combine research endeavours far more often, in order to address common questions of interest related to cognition. We regard interdisciplinary cross-pollination to be particularly desirable, even if many comparative psychologists lack deep expertise about the workings of the brain, and even if many neuroscientists lack expert knowledge about the behaviour of different species. Furthermore, we believe that anthropology, archaeology, human evolutionary studies, and related disciplines, may well provide us with significant contextual knowledge about the physical and temporal background to the evolution in humans of specific cognitive skills. To that end, we urge researchers to dismantle methodological, conceptual and historical disciplinary boundaries, in order to strengthen cross-disciplinary cooperation in order to broaden and deepen our insights into the cognition of nonhuman and human primates.

To copy or not to copy? That is the question! From chimpanzees to the foundation of human technological culture

A prerequisite for copying innovative behaviour faithfully is the capacity of observers' brains, regarded as 'hierarchically mechanistic minds', to overcome cognitive 'surprisal' (see 2.), by maximising the evidence for their internal models, through active inference. Unlike modern humans, chimpanzees and other great apes show considerable limitations in their ability, or 'Zone of Bounded Surprisal', to overcome cognitive surprisal induced by innovative or unorthodox behaviour that rarely, therefore, is copied precisely or accurately. Most can copy adequately what is within their phenotypically habitual behavioural repertoire, in which technology plays scant part. Widespread intra- and intergenerational social transmission of complex technological innovations is not a hall-mark of great-ape taxa. 3 Ma, precursors of the genus Homo made stone artefacts, and stone-flaking likely was habitual before 2 Ma. After that time, early Homo erectus has left traces of technological innovations, though faithful copying of these and their intra- and intergenerational social transmission were rare before 1 Ma. This likely owed to a cerebral infrastructure of interconnected neuronal systems more limited than ours. Brains were smaller in size than ours, and cerebral neuronal systems ceased to develop when early Homo erectus attained full adult maturity by the mid-teen years, whereas its development continues until our mid-twenties nowadays. Pleistocene Homo underwent remarkable evolutionary adaptation of neurobiological propensities, and cerebral aspects are discussed that, it is proposed here, plausibly, were fundamental for faithful copying, which underpinned social transmission of technologies, cumulative learning, and culture. Here, observers' responses to an innovation are more important for ensuring its transmission than is an innovator's production of it, because, by themselves, the minimal cognitive prerequisites that are needed for encoding and assimilating innovations are insufficient for practical outcomes to accumulate and spread intra- and intergenerationally.

Early knapping techniques do not necessitate cultural transmission

Early stone tool production, or knapping, techniques are claimed to be the earliest evidence for cultural transmission in the human lineage. Previous experimental studies have trained human participants to knap in conditions involving opportunities for cultural transmission. Subsequent knapping was then interpreted as evidence for a necessity of the provided cultural transmission opportunities for these techniques. However, a valid necessity claim requires showing that individual learning alone cannot lead to early knapping techniques. Here, we tested human participants (N = 28) in cultural isolation for the individual learning of early knapping techniques by providing them with relevant raw materials and a puzzle task as motivation. Twenty-five participants were technique naïve according to posttest questionnaires, yet they individually learned early knapping techniques, therewith producing and using core and flake tools. Early knapping techniques thus do not necessitate cultural transmission of know-how and could likewise have been individually derived among premodern hominins.

Young children spontaneously invent three different types of associative tool use behaviour

Associative Tool Use (ATU) describes the use of two or more tools in combination, with the literature further differentiating between Tool set use, Tool composite use, Sequential tool use and Secondary tool use. Research investigating the cognitive processes underlying ATU has shown that some primate and bird species spontaneously invent Tool set and Sequential tool use. Yet studies with humans are sparse. Whether children are also able to spontaneously invent ATU behaviours and at what age this ability emerges is poorly understood. We addressed this gap in the literature with two experiments involving preschoolers (E1, N = 66, 3 years 6 months to 4 years 9 months; E2, N = 119, 3 years 0 months to 6 years 10 months) who were administered novel tasks measuring Tool set, Metatool and Sequential tool use. Participants needed to solve the tasks individually, without the opportunity for social learning (except for enhancement effects). Children from 3 years of age spontaneously invented all of the types of investigated ATU behaviours. Success rates were low, suggesting that individual invention of ATU in novel tasks is still challenging for preschoolers. We discuss how future studies can use and expand our tasks to deepen our understanding of tool use and problem-solving in humans and non-human animals.